André Lara-Resende's recent proposal (in Portuguese but you can use AI translation) to reduce Brazilian interest rates has generated considerable debate. He is certainly right that Brazil's high interest rates are the main cause of the rise of debt-to-GDP ratios. Brazil is on the wrong side of the Domar condition with GDP growth below interest rates (g < r), so debt should grow faster than output. He is also correct that the conventional argument according to which excessive government spending is responsible for the fiscal deficit is fundamentally misguided. Most of the nominal deficit results from interest payments, not primary expenditures. These are facts. On that we can all agree (hopefully).
The problem is that Lara-Resende, through a rather convoluted theoretical argument based on John Cochrane's Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) and neo-Fisherian ideas, ends up accepting the conventional premise that Brazil faces an unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratio that must be reduced (my previous discussion of his theoretical views here and here). He proposes a peculiar way to lower the Selic (base rate) to approximately 7.5% within a year, to establish a rule limiting future interest rates, and use international reserves to contain the depreciation that might result.
A recent note by Franklin Serrano and Luiz Eduaro Melin, (see here; in Portuguese too), provides an devastating critique. Their central point is that Lara-Resende treats the exchange rate effects of lowering interest rates as a one time adjustment that can be managed with reserves. But with an open capital account, a sufficiently large reduction in the interest differential can generate persistent capital outflows. Depreciation creates expectations of further depreciation, encouraging additional outflows. The Central Bank would then be forced to sell increasing amounts of dollars to defend the currency, potentially exhausting its reserves (similar issue of my discussion with Huerta here).
Worse, Lara-Resende's proposal would prevent the Central Bank from using interest rates to counter these pressures, except under exceptional circumstances authorized by a new fiscal and monetary council. As Serrano and Melin note, this would tie the hands of the central bank, and might create the conditions for a crisis, where none exists.
This is particularly problematic because Brazil does not currently face an external constraint. I've made this point repeatedly on this blog, including during the crisis of 2015 (at least no one can say I'm inconsistent). Brazil has more than $360 billion in international reserves, and its relatively high interest rates have helped prevent destabilizing capital flight, preserve the reserves and control inflationary pressures, by avoiding runway depreciation (in contrast to neighboring Argentina, at least until recently; Argentina has depended on IMF and US Treasury loans, not reserves, BTW). This does not mean interest rates must remain at their current extraordinarily high levels. It means that the external consequences of lowering them cannot simply be ignored.
The difference with the Argentinean situation is crucial to understand the problems with Lara-Resende's proposal. I've often argued that Brazil does not grow faster because policymakers do not want to pursue the necessary expansionary policies, whereas Argentina can't grow without confronting its external constraint. Argentina lacks sufficient reserves and has recurrent difficulties obtaining foreign currency, and has done so by increasing indebtedness in foreign currency. Brazil has neither problem at present. Lara-Resende's proposal could create an external constraint where none currently exists. That would be quite an achievement!
Serrano and Melin also question the theoretical foundations of the supposed limit to domestic public debt and the wisdom of transferring important fiscal and monetary decisions to a council with unclear democratic accountability. In this they follow functional finance principles that are well established. Brazil cannot be forced into default on public debt denominated in its own currency because of an inability to obtain reais. There are real constraints on economic policy, including productive capacity, inflation and the balance of payments. But there is no meaningful fiscal solvency constraint requiring the government to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. As Serrano and Melin emphasize, even the neoclassical literature does not establish the debt ceiling presumed by the confidence argument underlying Lara-Resende's proposal.
The obvious alternative is to expand public investment, increase real wages and social transfers, and promote faster economic growth. Public investment would sustain demand and expand productive capacity. Faster growth would also increase tax revenues and might even reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. But that would be a consequence of successful economic policy, not its objective.
There is a historical warning here. Dilma Rousseff's New Economic Matrix attempted to stimulate growth through lower interest rates, currency depreciation and incentives to private investment, rather than a vigorous expansion of public investment. That did not work (see here). After her narrow reelection in 2014, she made matters worse by appointing Joaquim Levy to reassure financial markets and adopting austerity. The result was a deep recession and a political crisis. Lula's fourth term should avoid both mistakes. Financial markets and much of the financial press are already demanding another round of fiscal adjustment. Lara-Resende correctly rejects that prescription, but his alternative risks introducing exchange rate instability in pursuit of an unnecessary fiscal objective.







