Argentina, Economic Science and this year's "Nobel"

Trump wanted the Peace one, Milei the one in Economics

A few random thoughts about some recent news. Today, Javier Milei met with Donald Trump at the White House. Trump reportedly warned that the United States “will not be kind” to Argentina if Milei does not win the upcoming elections. That statement seems to suggest that the much-discussed “rescue” of the Argentine peso may be tied to domestic electoral results — something that Treasury Secretary Bessent had already hinted at when he announced the possibility of a US Treasury rescue package for Argentina.

No surprise there. But the situation brings back memories of earlier crises — particularly the 2001–2002 collapse, when Argentina defaulted after a long neoliberal experiment of liberalization, deregulation and privatization under the Menem administration. The current crisis, which began with the 2018 IMF program, is in many ways a continuation of that same process.

Back in 2002, the crisis caught one economist in particular by surprise: Rudi Dornbusch. Writing in the Financial Times, Dornbusch argued that Argentina could not be trusted to govern itself and proposed that its fiscal and monetary policy should be overseen by a foreign board of central bankers — a shockingly neocolonial suggestion, even for that time ["I'm shocked, shocked I tell you"]. I wrote a short letter to the Financial Times in response, which you can find here, mocking this absurd idea.

Two decades later, we are still dealing with the same problems. The “cleanup” of the 2002 mess took place under the so-called populist governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, through two major debt renegotiations in 2005 and 2010. During that period, Argentina’s debt-to-export ratio — a measure of repayment capacity — improved significantly [see my piece on Challenge on that and the Vulture Fund negotiations that Macri ended up finishing in a favorable way to the Vultures; you know on what side he is]. Yet the Macri administration (2015–2019) more than doubled the foreign debt once again, setting the stage for the current crisis [on the doubling of debt see this piece with Matias De Lucchi; whole issue, scroll down].

In short, the same set of economic elites have crashed the economy multiple times. Domingo Cavallo, Menem’s finance minister and architect of the 1990s convertibility plan, reappeared at the end of the De la Rúa government in 2001. Federico Sturzenegger, who was at the central bank during Macri’s failed experiment in 2018, is now serving as Milei’s Minister of Deregulation. This revolving door of orthodox technocrats has brought Argentina back to the IMF, and now possibly to a US Treasury rescue, for the third time in a generation.

What’s frustrating is how the narrative never changes. The mainstream explanation — repeated recently by a well-known economist from the Di Tella University — is that Argentina’s problems are caused by irresponsible “populists.” In his version, written in academic jargon about sunspots and expectations, the blame somehow always falls on Peronists, whether they are in power or not. If the economy collapses, it’s because investors fear a Peronist comeback; if it booms, it’s despite them. Don't worry, it won't.

This kind of argument says a lot about the state of the economics profession, perhaps more than about Argentina’s actual economy. Instead of looking at straightforward indicators — who increased the foreign debt, how exports performed, whether external repayment capacity was sustained — many economists hide behind highly subjective assumptions disconnected from reality.

This is part of a broader problem in Latin American economics: what my colleague Franklin Serrano calls “brain damage” — not “brain drain.” The issue isn’t that talented economists leave the country, but that many return from US PhD programs armed with orthodox models that have repeatedly failed our economies. They bring back the intellectual framework that justifies the very policies that keep generating crises.

This brings me to another bit of recent news: the so-called Nobel Prize in Economics (technically, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel). This year’s award went to Philippe Aghion Peter Howitt, and Joel Mokyr for their contributions to what’s broadly called “Schumpeterian growth theory” — work that connects innovation and technological change to economic growth. Surprising and soul crushing news to Milei, who wanted the prize for stabilizing the economy (a miracle according to Niall Ferguson).

Aghion and Howitt's models attempt to explain long-term growth by endogenizing productivity — the famous Solow residual. They borrow Schumpeter’s language of innovation and creative destruction, though often in a far more formal framework. In that sense, the connection to Schumpeter is more symbolic than substantive. Still, compared to some recent laureates, this year’s selection is a relatively defensible choice. Their models are certainly more in line with Schumpeter that some of the heterodox neo-Schumpeterian models.

Joel Mokyr, a historian, has written extensively on the cultural roots of the Industrial Revolution. His work offers a deeply Eurocentric — also, and more importantly, culturalist and supply-side — interpretation of why growth took off in Europe. While I disagree with much of that perspective, it’s undeniable that the Industrial Revolution did begin in Europe, and any serious account must explain that historical specificity. The problem is less Eurocentrism per se than the exclusive focus on supply factors, ignoring the demand and institutional dimensions that Keynesian and structuralist economists once emphasized. In that sense, I welcome the recognition of a historian among the laureates. But I also lament the profession’s retreat from the richer, more historically grounded analyses of scholars like David Landes, whose The Unbound Prometheus offered a more balanced view of the Industrial Revolution — one attentive to the demand aspects of economic growth.

Perhaps the real lesson — both from Argentina’s crises and from this year’s “Nobel” — is that economics still struggles to learn from its own history.

Argeo Quiñones and Ian Seda on the crisis in Puerto Rico

Argeo Quiñones-Pérez and Ian Seda-Irizarry discuss the crisis in this piece. They correctly point out the neocolonialist solution being imposed by the US administration. I find the imposition of a Fiscal Control Board (FCB) particularly problematic. Back when Argentina defaulted in 2002, Rudi Dornbusch had suggested something similar. At that time I sent the letter below to the Financial Times that had published his proposal.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:
Mystery of about-turn on Argentina 

Financial Times, Mar 12, 2002
From Matias Vernengo. 

Sir, Back in February 1997, Professor Rudiger Dornbusch said: "Argentina is on the go - (it) is the only country in the world today that enjoys both price stability and vigorous growth." The reasons were associated, according to Prof Dornbusch, with hard money and pro-market reforms. Argentina's policies then were an example to Brazil, Mexico and other developing countries. Now, Prof Dornbusch together with Prof Ricardo Caballero tells us that this exemplary economy was not so ("Argentina cannot be trusted", March 8). Prof Dornbusch should clarify what transformed this successful liberalisation experience into a catastrophe, or explain why he changed his mind. Also, it must be noted that suggesting a foreign board of central bankers to control monetary policy, and another foreign board to verify fiscal performance, is tantamount to suggesting colonisation of Argentina by foreign agents. The question then is whether Argentina should be returned to Spain. Or does Prof Dornbusch have another suggestion? 

Matias Vernengo,
Assistant Professor,
Kalamazoo College,
Kalamazoo, MI 49006, US

Note that the problems, both of Puerto Rico and Argentina, are related to debt in foreign currency, and, hence, to balance of payments issues, rather than fiscal per se. In addition, note that Argentina was quasi-dollarized by Convertibility, while Puerto Rico is effectively dollarized. Btw, the new government in Argentina wants to be re-colonized by Spain (the finance minister apologized to Spanish investors recently; see here).

The hope of some on the left, in Puerto Rico, was that, with a Bernie victory in the primaries there, the movement for decolonization could gain some force. Alas, Hillary won the primary.

A more detailed discussion of the crisis by the same authors is available here in their paper "Wealth Extraction, Governmental Servitude, and Social Disintegration in Colonial Puerto Rico."

Some thoughts on currency crises and overshooting

So I've been teaching an international finance class, after a long while I might add. The discussion of currency crises models I think is interesting, since it is very revealing of the mainstream assumptions about the long run. Typical discussion would imply that in the long run the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hold. PPP means simply that the exchange rate adjusts for differences between the domestic and foreign price levels. Hence, we have that S =P/P*, where the star indicates foreign variable. If in addition we believe with the QTM that the central bank (CB) controls prices by controlling the money supply, then the CB can control the exchange rate indirectly.

In the figure below the 45o line shows the equilibrium levels of the exchange rate (S) as the price level, which is related to the money supply. Now suppose that the central bank fixes the exchange rate at S1 (the graph is based on Dornbusch representation in his classic paper; for now disregard the QQ curve). If the money supply is below the level that corresponds to P1, then the fixed exchange rate is too depreciated for the current stock of money, stimulating exports, discouraging imports, and leading to Current Account (CA) surpluses. In this case, the central bank would accumulate international reserves. The accumulation of reserves leads to increasing money supply and the economy moves to a new equilibrium.

If the central bank follows the rules of the game and it is credible (and the assumptions are also valid, meaning the economy has a tendency to full employment and increase in money supply only affect prices) then the money supply increases/decreases with the CA surpluses/deficits and the system converges to a stable equilibrium. However, if the commitment to the fixed-peg is not credible, and the rules of the game are not followed, then problems might arise. Imagine a situation in which the monetary authority continues to print money, to finance fiscal deficits for example, and the fixed exchange rate would now be below its equilibrium value (below the 45o line). Beyond the equilibrium point the central bank would start losing reserves. At some point, say when the money supply reaches the money supply level compatible with P2, the stock of reserves would be depleted. At this point, the central bank cannot defend the exchange rate anymore and the exchange rate jumps to S2. The Krugman model basically assumed exactly this, with the difference that if agents have rational expectations (perfect foresight in this case), then they would have an advantage to try to speculate against the currency before reserves are exhausted.*

In the model above the currency crisis occurs because the CB does not follow a monetary policy consistent with the fundamentals, that is, prints too much money to finance the government. Although, not immediatly obvious the model above is a simplified version of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model, in the long run, when prices rather than income is the adjusting variable.In this case, the MF model can be represented with the exchange rate and prices, rather than output, as the adjusting variables. The QQ curve is a downward sloping curve, since higher prices increase money demand (or reduce the real money supply), leading to a higher rate of interest and a more appreciated exchange rate (lower S). Note the QQ curve is just the old LM for an open economy.

Also, because the QTM and PPP hold it must be true that increases in money supply lead to higher prices which lead to a proportional change in the nominal exchange rate, for a given foreign price and foreign money supply. In other words, the 45o degree line which corresponds to the proportional changes in domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate must still hold. We can derive the IS curve too, which would be upward sloping, but it is unnecessary, since if PPP holds then the economy must be in the long run on the 45o degree line.**

Dornbusch's trick, which was considered the first New Keynesian model (featuring both rational expectations and price rigidities), is that the nominal exchange rates adjusts faster than prices, then an increase in money supply would shift the QQ (LM) curve upwards. An increase in money supply reduces the domestic interest rate, leading to a depreciation of the currency. The economy moves from point A to point B. Then as depreciation increases net exports, and a lower rate of interest leads to more investment, there will be excess demand in the goods market, and for an economy that is at full employment, prices would go up. As prices go up, then the economy moves down the new QQ’ curve from point B to C, since with higher prices money demand increases and the rate of interest must increase (less than the initial decrease) causing some appreciation (less than the initial depreciation). At the new equilibrium the exchange rate is more depreciated than at the original equilibrium, but because of the short run rigidity of prices, the exchange rate overshoots its equilibrium value in the short-run. The point was that even if markets were efficient, in the sense that with price flexibility they tend to full employment and to the equilibrium exchange rate (PPP), the use of the exchange rate to deal with shocks might lead to excessive volatility.

There are many problems with the long run MF model (meaning the one solved in the S-P space). The obvious one is the notion that price flexibility leads to full employment, something that Keynes long ago suggested was NOT the case. Although Keynes was aware of the possibility of the system returning to full employment with price flexibility, he suggested that if lower prices had a negative impact on firms that are indebted, then investment would fall. In his own words: "indeed if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency, — with severely adverse effects on investment." In other words, with price flexibility the IS shifts back, and there is no tendency to full employment. That means that one should stick with the solution of the model in S-Y space, if one wants to introduce the open economy (one such model, without full employment and many other mainstream characteristics is available here).

Alternative (classical-Keynesian, post-Keynesian or whatever you prefer to call them) models would not only emphasize the role of quantity adjustments, but also the the sustainability of the current account (CA), rather than fiscal deficits in the explanation of currency crises. While conventional currency crises models of all generations (including the more heterogeneous 3rd generation models) suggest that at the heart of currency crisis there is a fiscal crisis, post-Keynesians emphasize terms of trade shocks and hikes to foreign rates of interest, highlighting the role of the balance of payments constraint in currency crises. Note that the economy in this view is not at full employment, and, hence the effect of fiscal expansions is not on prices, but on the level of activity. Higher level of income leads to increasing imports and a deteriorating CA. It’s the deteriorating CA and not the fiscal deficits that matter and the CA position might worsen even if the fiscal accounts are balanced. Further, after a currency crisis the central bank hikes the rate of interest, increasing the costs of debt-servicing, and, hence, government spending, at the same time that the recession reduces the revenue, leading to a weakening of the fiscal accounts. In this case, it is the external currency crisis that causes the domestic fiscal crisis. Causality is reversed. My two cents.

* Later models, like Obstfeld's, shown that if the costs of defending the parity are high, for example because in order to preclude the loss of reserves associated with a currency attack, the central bank hikes the rate of interest and pushes the economy into a recession, then there is a chance that self-fulfilling speculation might lead to a crisis.

** The IS curve would be positively sloped and steeper than a 45o line, since depreciation creates excess demand in the goods market. To restore equilibrium, domestic prices would have to increase, though proportionately less, since an increase in domestic prices affects aggregate demand, both via the relative price effect and via higher interest rates.

PS: I had posted before on my course here, were there is a link to Serrano and Summa's critique of the MF model.

Sensible theory and economic predictions

Yes, that's Wynne's bust.
 

Economists are well known for having predicted nine of the last five recessions.  Or so goes the joke.  The fact that economists cannot predict and that forecasters are always wrong is not new, and I would suggest less important than often understood.  The problem is not so much that economists cannot predict particular events, but that the dominant theory is an ineffective tool for understanding real economies. And that is true for both the New Classical/Real business Cycle types that believe that markets are efficient immediately, or the imperfectionist New Keynesian, that think that they are too, but only in the long run (this view should lead you to believe that the main solution is to reduce imperfections). As a result, the mainstream always provides unreasonable predictions.

But let me give an example of what I mean. Rudiger Dornbusch was a well respected mainstream economist.  He said back in 1999 that the euro would:

"reinforce financial deregulation (national and cross border) in Europe to create a broad and deep capital market. Europe comes from a dinky and segmented national, bank-based financial structure. It is on the way to a US-style capital market where households hold funds and companies issue paper and stocks, intermediation margins are small and governance significant. European companies will benefit from the transformation, the most significant supply side influence we will see. … the Euro is a thoroughly modern institution, well-adapted to a highly integrated and trigger-happy international capital market."

Not only deregulation was something good for Europe, but also giving up the currency would allow for lower interest rates and higher growth.  For him:

"Having a national money is expensive … It offers little flexibility and year after year an interest cost is paid for what is the illusion of independence. … Monetary sovereignty nowadays means only the right to bad money.  How can the periphery get out of the self-inflicted historical curse of a central bank and a national money. Do what Argentina did ... Give up the national money and create a hard link to a world class currency."

It goes without saying that this does not sound like good advice these days.  And before you say that hindsight is always 20-20, I want to remind you that yes some people that were in favor of the European project actually saw the limitations of the euro.  The economists that did not believe in the efficiency of markets (at least not for allocating resources, including labor) argued that giving up a tool (like the exchange rate) would imply the need for other tools.  Here is Wynne Godley in 1992, about the project of a common currency for Europe:

"It needs to be emphasised at the start that the establishment of a single currency in the EC would indeed bring to an end the sovereignty of its component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues. … the power to issue its own money, to make drafts on its own central bank, is the main thing which defines national independence. If a country gives up or loses this power, it acquires the status of a local authority or colony. Local authorities and regions obviously cannot devalue. But they also lose the power to finance deficits through money creation while other methods of raising finance are subject to central regulation. Nor can they change interest rates. As local authorities possess none of the instruments of macro-economic policy, their political choice is confined to relatively minor matters of emphasis – a bit more education here, a bit less infrastructure there."

And colonies are exactly what the countries of the European periphery have become.  And the options have been a lot less education, retirement, employment and infrastructure.  Further, Godley was concerned that the European project, that he supported, was incorrectly based on the notion:

"that economies are self-righting organisms which never under any circumstances need management at all ... It is a crude and extreme version of the view which for some time now has constituted Europe’s conventional wisdom … that governments are unable, and therefore should not try, to achieve any of the traditional goals of economic policy, such as growth and full employment."

Hence, sensible theory did allow, not to get the timing of the euro crisis (or wouldn't allow now to know exactly when Greece is going to default), but to get reasonable understanding of how economies work, and to provide fitting advice.  Of course almost nobody got the message.