Podcast on Adam Smith with Heinz Kurz

Here the podcast with Carlos Pinkusfeld Bastos, from the Federal University of Rio, and the Centro Celso Furtado, and Professor Heinz Kurz, on Adam Smith, and the new Neo-Mercantilist trends.

The Washington Post, Argentina’s “Renaissance” and the Milei Mirage

A recent Washington Post editorial, “Argentina’s renaissance continues,” offers a nearly perfect example of the Milei success story now circulating in the financial press. According to this view, inflation has fallen mostly as the result of the fiscal adjustment, exports are rising, as a result of market confidence, and Moody’s, Fitch and S&P have upgraded Argentina’s debt. The latter in and of itself shows that markets approve, and what else would you need, really? From this, the editorial concludes that Milei’s free-market reforms are working, that life is improving for Argentines, and that the country offers a model for other stagnant economies.

The problem is not that these developments are invented, but that the editorial provides the wrong explanation for them. Inflation fell primarily because the government slowed the rate of currency depreciation after Milei’s initial maxi-devaluation had pushed monthly inflation to roughly 25 percent and caused a collapse in real wages. Fiscal austerity contributed by producing a deep recession, weakening employment and reducing wage demands, but balancing the budget was not the central anti-inflationary mechanism. Exchange-rate stabilization reduced inflation, and austerity produced the contraction.

The same confusion appears in the discussion of the fiscal surplus. Argentina’s fundamental constraint is not the government’s ability to balance a budget denominated in pesos, but its capacity to obtain the foreign currency needed to pay external debts and finance essential imports. Milei inherited a heavily indebted economy with few reserves and has remained dependent on support from the IMF, China (the swap in 2024) and the United States (last year). A fiscal surplus may reassure creditors, but it does not create dollars, expand productive capacity or resolve the external constraint. Indeed, cuts in public investment may weaken precisely the productive capabilities Argentina needs in the longer run.

Nor did Milei create the export recovery, which is entirely related to foreign markets. Agricultural exports benefited from the end of the drought, while increased energy production reflects investments in Vaca Muerta and related infrastructure made before he came to office. Recession also reduced imports, mechanically improving the trade balance. The Post therefore credits free-market reform with the effects of favorable weather, previous investment, state-supported energy development and depressed domestic demand.

Credit-rating upgrades indicate that bondholders now believe they face a lower perceived risk of default.  That might or not be true (hint, probably not, and markets often make mistakes). They do not demonstrate that Argentine workers are better off or that a sustainable development model has emerged. The real questions concern wages, employment, poverty, public services, investment and the capacity to earn foreign exchange without repeated dependence on external borrowing. Milei may have achieved a politically important stabilization, but it remains fragile and externally dependent. What the Post calls a renaissance looks much more like another familiar Argentine cycle of austerity, financial enthusiasm and growing foreign obligations.

Óscar Ugarteche (1949-2026)

 

At the Institute of Economics in México in 2018

I was traveling attending a conference in Rio, and didn't have time to write a post on the passing of my good friend Óscar Ugarteche. IDEAS published an obit here. I met Óscar at UNAM many years ago (way before that photo, btw). Later, when I worked at the Central Bank of Argentina, I invited him to speak there. His work was an important influence on my own understanding of sovereign debt and the international financial architecture.

Óscar's central insight was that sovereign-debt crises should not be understood simply as the result of irresponsible borrowing or excessive government spending. They form part of recurrent international credit cycles. Periods of abundant liquidity and low interest rates encourage lenders to expand credit aggressively. When interest rates rise, commodity prices fall, or capital flows reverse, countries that appeared solvent suddenly face an external constraint and may be forced into default. The debt cycle is therefore produced by creditors and the international monetary system as well as by debtors.

Debt restructuring is necessary when the original payment schedule has become economically impossible, but the existing system is fragmented and biased. Bondholders, commercial banks, official creditors, multilateral institutions, and suppliers are treated through different forums, while multilateral institutions generally refuse to restructure their own claims. Collective-action clauses can limit holdouts within a particular bond issue, but they cannot coordinate all classes of creditors. Óscar therefore favored a comprehensive, multilateral sovereign-debt restructuring and arbitration mechanism capable of imposing comparable treatment and preventing vulture funds or individual creditors from benefiting from concessions made by everyone else.

 

His view of the IMF was correspondingly critical. He wrote a brief history of the IMF that is worth reading, but I think is only in Spanish. After the end of Bretton Woods, the Fund ceased to be principally an institution of international monetary stabilization and became, in his phrase, a kind of "policeman for the banks." It supplied finance and imposed adjustment so that private creditors could be repaid. Responsibility was placed almost entirely on debtor governments, while neither creditors nor the international financial conditions that produced the lending boom were held accountable. Conditionality imposed the costs on wages, public services, growth, and state capacity, while the United States remained largely exempt from the disciplines imposed on the Global South. His preferred alternative was to reduce the IMF's power, transfer stabilization functions to regional monetary funds, and create an independent international debt-arbitration framework.

 

He wrote the entry on "Sovereign Default" for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. An interesting point that he discusses is the forgotten history of the Confederate external debt. While cases of defaulters that do not pay their debts are almost nonexistent, contrary to common belief about deadbeat countries, Óscar discussed in his entry the only  historical exception, which involved the unresolved debts of several former Confederate and Southern states, with Mississippi providing Óscar's principal example of outright and permanent debt repudiation.

 

In Óscar's account, the decisive role of the US government during the 1930s was to construct the legal and diplomatic conditions under which confederate debt could remain unpaid and eventually disappear. The federal government denied any responsibility for contracts entered into by individual states and claimed that it lacked the constitutional power to compel Mississippi and the other states to pay. The Eleventh Amendment also protected states from suits brought by foreign citizens. At the international level, the southern bloc in the Senate had repeatedly inserted reservations into arbitration treaties precisely because arbitration might reopen the repudiated Southern debts. Ugarteche says that in 1930 the United States prevented the creation of an international arbitration tribunal in Geneva for fear that the bonds would be brought before it. This left British bondholders without either access to the debtor states through diplomacy or a neutral international court.

 

Óscar's hypothesis is that after World War II, the United States effectively forgave Britain’s inter-Allied war debt, and British bondholders may in return have abandoned their claims against the American states. In other words, the power of the US made the enforcement of debt contracts impossible and then helped shape the postwar settlement in which the claims disappeared.

Robert Blecker (1956-2026)

Robert with Jane, that also passed away recently

I've just heard the news that Robert Blecker passed away. I've known him since the 1990s, when I was a graduate student at the New School. His books on the US economy for EPI were particularly important for the work I did with Wynne Godley on the external accounts of the Levy macro model.

He will be remembered for his several contributions to Post Keynesian open macroeconomics. His contributions include extending Kaleckian theories to open economies, in particular the distributive implications of wage-led and profit-led regimes, advancing debates over balance-of-payments-constrained growth and Thirlwall's Law, and extensive work on exchange rates, Mexico, NAFTA and international trade policy.

ROKE devoted its the 2nd issue, this year to his work. You can read about his work in this article by Ricardo Summa, Gustavo Bhering and Nathalie Marins in the introduction to the symposium.

Decolonizing Keynesian Macroeconomics by Jayati Ghosh

 

The 9th Godley-Tobin Memorial Lecture was delivered by Professor Jayati Ghosh, from UMass, Amherst, one of the leading development economists. Jayati argues that Keynesian economics must be further “decolonized” by recognizing how financial globalization and currency hierarchies constrain developing countries. Even fiscally disciplined poorer countries face higher borrowing costs, capital volatility, and reduced policy autonomy, so effective Keynesian policy requires tighter regulation of finance and reform of the international monetary system.

Smith, Hamilton, and the Revenge of the Mercantilists

Heinz Kurz recently gave a very stimulating lecture, "The Wealth of Nations (WN) at 250: The Revenge of the Mercantilists" at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and I was the commentator. His central point was that Adam Smith has been badly served by both his admirers and his critics. Smith was not the apostle of selfishness, laissez-faire, and the minimal state imagined by later free-market ideologues. Political economy was, for him, a branch of the science of the statesman, concerned with the institutions and policies required to promote prosperity, liberty, and justice.

Kurz rightly emphasized Smith’s distrust of merchants and manufacturers. Smith understood that business interests do not automatically coincide with the public interest. Merchants frequently seek monopoly, protection, and political privilege. The “mercantile system” was objectionable not simply because it involved state intervention, but because the state had been captured by particular interests. This reminded me of what Bob Heilbroner used to say, the enemy in the WN is not the state, but monopolies.

Kurz also criticized the revival of economic nationalism associated with Donald Trump. Trump’s policies reproduce some of the errors criticized by Smith, especially the obsession with bilateral trade balances and the confusion of particular corporate interests with the national interest. But Trumpism is not really a restoration of historical mercantilism. Mercantilism was part of a broader process of state formation, institutional development, naval power, public finance, and industrial transformation. Trump has tariffs, but no coherent development strategy.

This is where I would place the emphasis somewhat differently. The historical success of the Italian City States, Netherlands, Britain, and later the United States rested not simply on trade protection and some degree of what today is called industrial policy. It depended on the construction of a fiscal and monetary architecture based on the so-called Military-Fiscal State. Taxation, public debt, public banks, central banking, infrastructure, where central elements of the Military-Fiscal, and Fiscal-Naval, state. These institutions made sustained developmental policy possible. Trump revives the rhetoric of mercantilism while neglecting the other elements that successful countries actually used. I discussed why Trump's protectionism would not birng back manufacturing jobs here.

Kurz’s discussion also raises an old notion about Smith’s “Physiocratic prejudice.” Following a line of interpretation originating with Piero Sraffa, Kurz argues that Smith continued to give agriculture and “corn” a privileged position within his analytical system, even though Smith explicitly rejected the Physiocratic doctrine that agriculture alone was productive. On an analytical level, there is no doubt that Professor Kurz is correct and that the foundation of the Smithian growth model is Physiocratic. 

Kurz's argument is subtler than simply saying Smith believed only agriculture was productive. Instead, Kurz reconstructs Smith's analytical system in Sraffian terms and argues that Smith distinguishes "necessaries" (corn) from luxuries. Corn is treated as the only genuine basic commodity, because every production process ultimately requires workers' subsistence. Manufacturing therefore cannot become the independent engine of cumulative growth. Consequently Smith retains what Sraffa calls a "Physiocratic prejudice." Notice that Kurz's criticism concerns the architecture of Smith's growth theory, not Smith's explicit statements about productive labor.

Tony Aspromourgos provides a counterpoint, with a more direct textual reading of Smith. Textually, Smith clearly regarded manufacturing, transportation, and commerce as contributors to the social surplus. Aspromourgos stresses that Smith rejected the Physiocratic view outright: "The capital error of this system ... seems to lie in its representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, as altogether barren and unproductive." He notes that Smith systematically repudiates the Physiocratic limitation of productive labor to agriculture in Book IV of WN. This reflects the difference between a historical-institutional reading of Smith's aims and the theoretical basis of his model.

Ronald Meek, in a classic paper, suggests another way of looking at the issue. Smith was not primarily constructing a timeless model of production in the manner of Ricardo or Sraffa. His central concern was historical development, in particular the movement from hunting to pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society, and the corresponding transformation of property, law, government, and social classes. Agriculture may therefore be historically central without being the only analytically productive sector.

This has implications for the interpretation of Alexander Hamilton, and Hamiltonian protectionism, often defended as the first in a long line of American protectionists, an American School, as Michael Hudson has called it.* Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures should not be read as a theoretical rejection of Smith. Hamilton relied on distinctly Smithian mechanisms, the division of labor, the extent of markets, the vent for surplus that created demand for agricultural output. His disagreement concerned the policies appropriate to a new, agrarian republic rather than the underlying theory.

Hamilton did not believe that the policy appropriate to an already industrial and financially developed Britain could simply be transferred to the United States. Public credit, a national bank, taxation, and the encouragement of manufacturing were historically specific applications of political economy to American conditions. In that sense, Hamilton was not a mercantilist in Smith’s pejorative meaning. He was a Smithian developmental statesman.

Paradoxically, Jefferson’s agrarian ideal was closer to the Physiocratic privileging of agriculture, while Hamilton’s emphasis on manufacturing, urbanization, finance, and the division of labor was closer to the dynamic elements of Smith’s commercial society. Kurz’s lecture therefore provides an excellent starting point for recovering a Smith who was neither a free-market ideologue nor an opponent of developmental statecraft.

* On the American School or Political Economy Tradition see my substack post here. 

Right-Wing Populism Did Not Kill Neoliberalism

My new piece is out in Jacobin. I argue that neoliberalism is not dead simply because governments now use tariffs, sanctions, subsidies, or industrial policy more openly. The core of neoliberalism was never only about free trade, but the insulation of markets and capital from democratic control. Right-wing populism has changed the rhetoric, but it has largely preserved the underlying neoliberal order. Contemporary right-wing populism should not be mistaken for a clean break with neoliberalism.

Donald Trump's tariffs, sanctions, and attacks on globalization are often presented as a rejection of the old free-market consensus. But the underlying arguments remain deeply neoliberal. The entrepreneur is still the hero (Tech and crypto-bros). Government is legitimate when it protects national business, punishes foreign competitors, or clears obstacles to private accumulation. Tariffs are sold less as a challenge to markets than as a way of restoring a supposedly fair market order against cheating foreigners, bureaucrats, and global elites.

The same point applies more broadly to the new industrial policy, which was never completely abandoned in the United States or Western Europe, one might add. States may subsidize national champions, direct investment, or protect selected sectors. Yet they can still treat profitability, competitiveness, shareholder value, and private returns as the ultimate criteria of success. Protectionism is not, by itself, an alternative to neoliberalism. Nor is a larger state. States have always intervened in markets. The question is whether intervention changes the social hierarchy of power or merely uses public resources to secure a more competitive capitalism.

Read it here.

On the Fiscal-Military State

The fiscal-military state was not simply a state that spent more on war. It was a new institutional form in which taxation, public debt, public banking, naval procurement, bureaucracy, and war-making capacity were joined together. I discuss it in a longer post on substack. I argue that the British case shows how this system became a foundation of capitalist development. Also, ancient Athens shows that public finance and naval power could be constitutive of state formation much earlier, but it lacked the permanent funded debt, central banking, and capitalist financial system that made Britain distinctive.

Jane D’Arista, 1932–2026

 

From the right, at the top and only the back of the head, José Antonio Ocampo, then Robert Blecker, and then Jane. I'm next to her to the left. In 2000, I think

I was saddened to learn of the passing of Jane D’Arista, economist, poet, and one of the most insightful analysts of money, finance, and financial regulation of her generation. Jane died on July 4 at the age of 94.  I had been in contact with her last year about her lovely memoir. Her long career included work as a staff economist for the US House Banking and Commerce Committees, as a principal analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, and later as a teacher and researcher at Boston University, PERI, the University of Utah, and The New School. She authored important work on the evolution of U.S. finance, monetary policy, regulation, and financial crises, including The Evolution of U.S. Finance and All Fall Down.

Her memoir tells the remarkable story of how she became an economic analyst almost by accident. Hired initially to organize the papers of Congressman Wright Patman, she entered the world of banking policy through archives, hearings, investigations, and congressional staff work. From Patman’s populist battles against concentrated financial power, to her work on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, foreign bank regulation, offshore banking, and the CBO, Jane learned economics from the inside of institutions. That practical knowledge gave her work unusual depth. She understood finance not as an abstract market mechanism, but as a political and institutional structure shaped by law, power, public purpose, and regulation. She famously anticipated the concept of shadow banking in the early 1990s, referring to it as the parallel banking system.

 

Jane between me and Robert Blecker at an event at American University honoring her late husband in 2018

I was fortunate to meet Jane while working for Lance Taylor at The New School. She was incredibly generous with younger economists and a profound source of wisdom. During my time at the University of Utah, she taught briefly, and she later visited the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, my alma mater, for a conference I co-organized. I am deeply saddened by her passing, but grateful to have had the opportunity to know her.

Jane belonged to a tradition of economists who took institutions seriously, understood the dangers of unregulated finance, and believed that public policy could and should discipline financial power. She will be missed, but her work remains essential reading.

Prices, Quantities, and the Problem of Inflation

A recent exchange on X (Tweeter) pointed to a paper that proposes to separate demand from supply-driven inflation by looking at the relation between prices and quantities. According to the paper, if both rise, inflation is treated as demand-driven (as shown below). If prices rise while quantities fall, it is treated as supply-driven (no figure, but easy to visualize, a shock to Ys, the aggregate supply). The problem is that this does not identify the cause of inflation.

Prices can rise because of higher costs (e.g. energy, imported inputs, etc.) while quantities increase for independent reasons (e.g. increase in government transfers to the unemployed). The economy may be recovering, public spending may be growing, credit may be expanding, or firms may be drawing on unused capacity. In that case, prices and quantities rise together, but it does not follow that demand caused the price increase (old post on why prices and quantities can and should be treated as analytically separate here).

The real issue is capacity. Higher demand becomes inflationary when it encounters binding limits on production. But full capacity is not fixed or directly observable. It depends on the technology, on the availability of labor and inventories, on access to imported inputs, and sector-specific bottlenecks. There are many measures of capacity utilization, non perfect, obviously. Most of my discussion of why the inflationary acceleration of the pandemic was not demand driven is based on looking at different measures of that.

A growing economy can therefore have rising prices and rising output for many different reasons. Cost pressures may push prices up while demand supports expanding production. The sign of price and quantity changes cannot tell us which force caused inflation. The procedure classifies observed co-movements. It does not establish the structural source of inflation. To do that, one must examine costs, mark-ups, distributional conflict, supply disruptions, and the actual conditions of production, not simply whether prices and quantities move in the same direction.