Óscar Ugarteche (1949-2026)

 

At the Institute of Economics in México in 2018

I was traveling attending a conference in Rio, and didn't have time to write a post on the passing of my good friend Óscar Ugarteche. IDEAS published an obit here. I met Óscar at UNAM many years ago (way before that photo, btw). Later, when I worked at the Central Bank of Argentina, I invited him to speak there. His work was an important influence on my own understanding of sovereign debt and the international financial architecture.

Óscar's central insight was that sovereign-debt crises should not be understood simply as the result of irresponsible borrowing or excessive government spending. They form part of recurrent international credit cycles. Periods of abundant liquidity and low interest rates encourage lenders to expand credit aggressively. When interest rates rise, commodity prices fall, or capital flows reverse, countries that appeared solvent suddenly face an external constraint and may be forced into default. The debt cycle is therefore produced by creditors and the international monetary system as well as by debtors.

Debt restructuring is necessary when the original payment schedule has become economically impossible, but the existing system is fragmented and biased. Bondholders, commercial banks, official creditors, multilateral institutions, and suppliers are treated through different forums, while multilateral institutions generally refuse to restructure their own claims. Collective-action clauses can limit holdouts within a particular bond issue, but they cannot coordinate all classes of creditors. Óscar therefore favored a comprehensive, multilateral sovereign-debt restructuring and arbitration mechanism capable of imposing comparable treatment and preventing vulture funds or individual creditors from benefiting from concessions made by everyone else.

 

His view of the IMF was correspondingly critical. He wrote a brief history of the IMF that is worth reading, but I think is only in Spanish. After the end of Bretton Woods, the Fund ceased to be principally an institution of international monetary stabilization and became, in his phrase, a kind of "policeman for the banks." It supplied finance and imposed adjustment so that private creditors could be repaid. Responsibility was placed almost entirely on debtor governments, while neither creditors nor the international financial conditions that produced the lending boom were held accountable. Conditionality imposed the costs on wages, public services, growth, and state capacity, while the United States remained largely exempt from the disciplines imposed on the Global South. His preferred alternative was to reduce the IMF's power, transfer stabilization functions to regional monetary funds, and create an independent international debt-arbitration framework.

 

He wrote the entry on "Sovereign Default" for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. An interesting point that he discusses is the forgotten history of the Confederate external debt. While cases of defaulters that do not pay their debts are almost nonexistent, contrary to common belief about deadbeat countries, Óscar discussed in his entry the only  historical exception, which involved the unresolved debts of several former Confederate and Southern states, with Mississippi providing Óscar's principal example of outright and permanent debt repudiation.

 

In Óscar's account, the decisive role of the US government during the 1930s was to construct the legal and diplomatic conditions under which confederate debt could remain unpaid and eventually disappear. The federal government denied any responsibility for contracts entered into by individual states and claimed that it lacked the constitutional power to compel Mississippi and the other states to pay. The Eleventh Amendment also protected states from suits brought by foreign citizens. At the international level, the southern bloc in the Senate had repeatedly inserted reservations into arbitration treaties precisely because arbitration might reopen the repudiated Southern debts. Ugarteche says that in 1930 the United States prevented the creation of an international arbitration tribunal in Geneva for fear that the bonds would be brought before it. This left British bondholders without either access to the debtor states through diplomacy or a neutral international court.

 

Óscar's hypothesis is that after World War II, the United States effectively forgave Britain’s inter-Allied war debt, and British bondholders may in return have abandoned their claims against the American states. In other words, the power of the US made the enforcement of debt contracts impossible and then helped shape the postwar settlement in which the claims disappeared.

Oscar Ugarteche on German Debt Reduction

"The largest debt problems in terms of GDP faced in financial history have belonged either to the United States or to European Governments. Large debt problems in developing and emerging nations have usually stemmed out of a drop in GDP size due to a fall in export earnings and a rise in interest rates. The reason is that creditors stop lending at a certain point and start restructuring existing debt which leads to debt growth but it is not really new lending. In major nations, lending goes on as the strategic reason for borrowing has normally been justified: a war. As a result, the leading debt reduction and innovative management schemes are related to these. Contrary to the impression generated by extensive works on the Latin American and African debt, it is the under researched European and US historical debt that must be looked into in order to understand some historical solution patterns to debt problems. Current European very high debt levels (over 90% of GDP) are due partially to accumulated current account deficits of over 3% of GDP for over a decade plus the cost of bank rescues in 2009-2010 plus some countercyclical policy costs. Greece has additional debt due to major infrastructure works. It entered the Euro with a high debt level (around 100% of GDP) but the total GDP amount shrunk 33.3% from 55,318 million euros to 36,866 million euros in constant terms between 2007 and 2013 as a result of austerity policies. If GDP had remained stagnant, the index would be 131% and not 174.9% and rising."

Read rest here.

BRICS Bank mini-symposium at the IDEAS Network

The International Development Economics Associates (IDEAS) Network has published a series of short papers on the BRICS Bank, from the more negative views of Prabhat Patnaik, that suggests that the South continues to pursue neoliberal policies and the bank will not be of much help in this context, to the more optimistic of my good friend Oscar Ugarteche (second part here), who thinks that the declaration of the last BRICS Summit had a distinctive anti-neoliberal flavor, and that the bank might be one of the pillars of an alternative to the neoliberal order, in which the dollar has a less prominent role. Jayati Ghosh's views are also less pessimistic than Patnaik (for my preliminary thoughts go here).