The United States’ Unchallenged Hegemony in the World-System

 

By David Fields

A prevalent assumption concerning the United States’ global position posits precipitous hegemonic decline. Conventional wisdom, predominant since the 1970s, suggests that the U.S. has been on the verge of losing its preeminent status, as evidenced by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the subsequent emergence of the Eurozone, BRICS, and the spectacular rise of China. Proponents of this view tend to interpret U.S. current account deficits as an unsustainable imbalance, predicting a hard landing scenario resulting from resoundingly widespread divestment from dollar-denominated assets. Similarly, academic and political anxieties regarding a more disorderly international system, often linked to a perceived weakening of U.S. influence, are further amplified by recent fascist political rhetoric of “America First”.

To construct an effective critique of U.S. imperialism, it is pertinent to ascertain that the United States is not experiencing a significant hegemonic decline; its structural power within the capitalist world-system persists without substantial challenge.

Read rest here. 

Affordable Housing Problems and Solutions: The Utah Case

David Fields (Guest blogger)

Rising housing costs and stagnating real wages are the primary causes of worsening housing affordability in Utah. The dismal wage growth is the result of a larger nationwide upward redistribution of wealth and income, which can be attributed to the following: a failure to adhere to full employment objectives; fiscal austerity; and various labor market policies and business practices allowing the higher social strata of a professional class to capture ever larger shares of economic growth. This is the result of institutional transformations that have exposed workers to the vulnerability of higher turnover, resulting in higher averages of unemployment, particularly worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic induced recession. For instance, from 2009 to 2016 real income only grew at 0.31% per year while rent crept upward at a rate of 1.03% per year in 2017 constant dollars. Slow and unequal wage growth stems from a growing wedge between overall productivity and the pay (wages and benefits) received by a typical worker.

Of particular note is the extent to which housing security has become directly dependent on price fluctuations driven by investment property, which excludes lower-income households from the housing market. A plausible explanation for why rents and home prices have increased is due to developers more interested in building or rehabilitating for upper-income households or high or ultra-high net worth individuals, for purposes of land-value maximization. While these newly built and rehabilitated structures increase the number of housing units relative to demand, which increase vacancy rates, they are essentially vehicles for wealth storage. As such, simply increasing the housing stock may have a much smaller effect on affordability than what could be anticipated.

Housing prices have skyrocketed over the past two decades, significantly contributing to chronic economic insecurity in relation to real wage stagnation.

What works? Empirically verified: rent control, mortgage assistance for homeowners, and transfer payments to vulnerable populations, along with allowing wages to rise with cost of living, which translates to policies that guarantee living wages, e.g. living wage ordinances and generous unemployment insurance disbursements. In addition, strict regulations as to what type of housing is built and where it can be built are requisite. Innovations in construction techniques and design would not only lower the costs of development, but also guarantee that dwellings are safe and adequate. If the private market is unable to achieve such sustainability, then more public oversight and control is necessary.

Housing market pressures drive up rents and home prices, making housing unaffordable and pushing long-time residents out of their communities, or into homelessness. Sometimes, these pressures result from targeted investments aimed at improving the quality of distressed neighborhoods. They can also result from gentrification, rapid growth in local jobs and population, or rising income inequality, all of which are not mutually exclusive. A countercyclical policy reaction to said pressures (solution 1) plays an essential role in moderating these market dynamics. Protecting against the displacement of long-time residents is vital; this also includes promoting spatial variation of affordable, i.e. mixed income, to prevent spatial inequality concerning the geographical segregation between “wealthy neighborhoods” “poorer neighborhoods.”

A stable and affordable home not only supports a household’s economic security and well-being, it can also help build wealth. Yet, many US households, particularly households of color, face steep barriers to buying a home or sustaining homeownership. Not only do people of color have lower homeownership rates than white people, they are less likely to sustain their homeownership. Black homeownership rates dropped significantly after the Great Recession to levels similar to those before the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act in 1968. Strict regulations against redlining, for example, can potentially expand stable housing and wealth-building opportunities to the nation’s increasingly diverse population.

In short the solution requires:

1. Ensuring Socially Equitable Affordable Housing Stays at Low Cost 
2. Protecting against Displacement
3. Ensuring and Expanding Access to Secure Homeownership

US Interstate Transfers and the Euro Crisis

by Nathaniel Cline and David Fields

It is recognized among heterodox economists that the fiscal crisis some Eurozone countries faced (and are facing) is the result not of internal fiscal excess but of fundamental imbalances made worse by the adoption of a common currency. Indeed, as Wynne Godley pointed out (in several pieces) long ago, European structural payment imbalances will not be automatically corrected by market forces. In this case a common currency without centralized fiscal powers will potentially exacerbate the balance of payments problems of member countries. Some countries will be permanently outsold, and under the current arrangements, are forced to make large income adjustments to resolve their balance of payments.

As a result, many (even in the mainstream) have suggested that a common fiscal union would resolve the problems these countries face. Comparisons have been made to the US whose member states enjoy a common currency with a substantial federal fiscal system that redistributes funds among the states. Residents of states pay taxes to the federal government and states receive government expenditures (through federal programs, grants, salaries, and other means). However the payments states receive are decided upon different ground than the taxes they pay. Thus a state like Mississippi pays very little in taxes, but receives a substantial amount of government spending. In contrast, states like Minnesota pay in to the system much more than they receive.

In normal times this prevents large balance of payments crises from emerging between states. Mississippi is thus permitted a higher average growth rate than would otherwise be implied by their balance of payments.

It is misleading however to assume from these large transfers that simple fiscal transfers between states would resolve Europe's fiscal problems. In a recent presentation to the Eastern Economic Association, Dave Fields and I argued that in fact, the US did not respond to the crisis by transferring large amounts of money between states as it does in normal times.

The key point was that US federal government went into deficit to transfer money to states as a whole. The relevant transfer in the crisis was then not among states, but between states and the federal government. What is needed then is a Euro deficit which would finance all member states, and not necessarily transfers between say Germany and Greece in the middle of a crisis.

The degree of interstate transfers in the US is shown below. Note that between 2004 and 2007 it appears that the federal government is actually a net drag on the states. This is likely not quite correct because the expenditures in the chart do not count expenditures which cannot easily be allocated among states (like for instance federal interest payments).

The Degree of Interstate Transfers 2004-1013

Source: Expenditures provided by the Pew Fiscal Federalism Initiative, tax data from the IRS, author's calculations

The issue can be seen clearly too if the transfers are broken down by state as is done in the chart below. One can see that by 2009, only a few states remained net contributors to the system while the others all became net recipients (including by the way both California and Texas). 

Fiscal Transfers Between the States 2008-2009

Source: Expenditures provided by the Pew Fiscal Federalism Initiative, tax data from the IRS, author's calculations

New Book: The 2015 Hampton Reader, Selected Essays and Analyses from the Hampton Institute

A collection of essays and analyses from the The Hampton Institute - A Working Class Think Tank. Includes, articles by David Fields, and Hampton's most popular essays from 2013-14 in addition to exclusive content that can only be read here. From a follow-up to Sean Posey's timely analysis of Youngstown, Ohio as a microcosm of the post-industrial American "rustbelt" to Andrew Gavin Marshall's in-depth research on "the intellectuals and institutions of American imperialism," the 2015 Hampton Reader is sure to generate ideas, spark debate, and cultivate dialogue.

See here.

Book Review of Foster & McChesney's "The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China"

The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China. John Bellamy Foster & Robert W. McChesney Hardcover: 224 pages. Publisher: Monthly Review Press (September 1, 2012). Language: English. ISBN-13: 978-1583673133

By David Fields

Over-accumulation stemming from the so-called golden age of global capitalism has ensued an era of underconsumption as exemplified by low profit rates and chronic excess capacity. As such, what has taken place is an historical transformation towards the process of financialization. With an inability to absorb effectively economic surpluses, concerning the promotion of rising wages along with productivity, NFCs, or non-financial corporations, are coerced to paying a larger share of their internal funds, specifically via debt leveraging (including consumers), to financial institutions. These financial institutions, which are increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people, have become some of the most powerful actors. Increasing concentration of control within the financial sector lends credence to Marx's (1894: 544-45) argument that what Foster & McChesney call the age of monopoly finance capital is one in which

[t]he credit system, which as its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralization, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.

Read rest here.

Bill Lucarelli on The Euro: A currency in search of a state

 

New paper concerning Euro by Bill Lucarelli

From the abstract:

To understand the structural dynamics of the current eurozone crisis, it is necessary to examine the longstanding internal contradictions that the system has inherited from its inception under the Maastricht Treaty and the neoliberal strategy which has governed its evolution from the first experiments in economic and monetary union in the 1970s. A brief narrative of the evolution of the European Monetary Union yields some insights into its peculiar institutional design. More specifically, the article examines the dangerously self-reinforcing logic between speculative bond markets and cascading, deflationary policies of austerity imposed on those countries encountering severe debt crises. This examination reveals the fragile foundations upon which the eurozone was constructed [...] The stark contrast between US monetary and exchange rate policies and the straightjacket imposed in the eurozone by the ECB during the financial crisis that began in 2008 could not be more revealing. As David Fields and Matias Vernengo (2012) [see here] contend,

By buying great quantities of Treasuries, the Fed not only keeps stable bond prices and low interest rates, but also provides assurances that Treasury bonds remain a secure asset. That allows the US Treasury to maintain high fiscal deficits on a sustainable basis. That is the exact opposite of what the ECB has done for the countries in the periphery of Europe. Countries in the currency union lose control of monetary policy and cannot depreciate the exchange rate. But a common currency setting also brings to an end the possibility for a single nation to run fiscal deficits since the sources of funding are either removed or subjected to supra-national control.

Read rest here (subscription required).

Lars P. Syll On What’s wrong with IS-LM?

By Lars. P. Syll

Yesterday, David Fields of Naked Keynesianism wondered what was my position on the fact that many heterodox economists would consider the IS-LM framework “to still be relevant if given enough flexibility without neoclassical synthesized elements.”

I will sure come back on this when time admits a more thorough analysis, but let me start by giving at least a tentative answer — focusing on where I think IS-LM doesn’t adequately reflect the width and depth of Keynes’s insights on the workings of modern market economies.

Read the rest here.

Print version of the paper on the dollar is now out

The full paper is here (previous post here). The abstract says:

This paper suggests that the dollar is not threatened as the hegemonic international currency, and that most analysts are incapable of understanding the resilience of the dollar, not only because they ignore the theories of monetary hegemonic stability or what, more recently, has been termed the geography of money, but also as a result of an incomplete understanding of what a monetary hegemon does. The paper argues that the dominant view on the international position of the dollar has been based on a Metallist view of money. In the alternative Cartalist view of money, the hegemon is not required to maintain credible macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscally contractionary policies to maintain the value of the currency), but to provide an asset free of the risk of default. Further, it is argued that the current crisis in Europe shows why the euro is not a real contender for hegemony in the near future.

My affiliations are now dated, but that's not a problem. 

The two meanings of dollarization

This is part of an entry written for the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization. From the intro:

The expression of ‘dollarization’ has at least two different meanings. In the narrow sense, it refers to massive currency substitution, in which a country, most likely a developing one, supplements its domestic unit account of fiduciary reserve assets with a foreign currency, more often than not the United States dollar or, in some cases, the euro. Note that currency substitution could be complete and might even imply the elimination of a domestic token. Full dollarization in that sense has taken place in small countries, mostly in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific which are heavily dependent on the United States. Dollarization, in this sense, is the exemplification of a country foregoing its national ‘monetary sovereignty’ (Mundell 1961, p. 661).

In the broader sense, dollarization refers to US hegemony in the world economy as a result of the US dollar being the numeraire currency in international markets. This christens the United States as the premier international monetary authority that regulates and dictates the flows of international financial commitments for global economic activity. Of particular importance in this context is the fact that the key international commodities, including oil, are priced in US dollars in international markets. The former conception of dollarization can be described as dollarization strictu sensu, while the latter as latu sensu dollarization, i.e. not the specific use of the dollar by a country, but by the whole world economy—an international system in which the dollar is de facto a global fiat money (Vernengo, 2006).

Read the rest here.

Hegemonic currencies during the crisis

The paper "Hegemonic currencies during the crisis: The dollar versus the euro in a Cartalist perspective," discussed here before, has been published in the Review of International Political Economy (subscription required). A previous version here. The paper suggests that the dollar is not threatened as the hegemonic international currency, and that most analysts are incapable of understanding the resilience of the dollar, not only because they ignore the theories of monetary hegemonic stability or what, more recently, has been termed the geography of money, but also as a result of an incomplete understanding of what a monetary hegemon does. The paper argues that the dominant view on the international position of the dollar has been based on a Metallist view of money. In the alternative Cartalist (or Chartalist) view of money, the hegemon is not required to maintain credible macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscally contractionary policies to maintain the value of the currency), but to provide an asset free of the risk of default. Further, it is argued that the current crisis in Europe shows why the euro is not a real contender for hegemony in the near future.