Gustavo Petro’s “economy for life” captures something essential about the planetary crisis. Turning it into a program requires confronting the structures that stand in the way.
Read the whole article, where I challenge some of the myths about the New Global Order, here.
A new paper (in Portuguese) by Carlos Medeiros and Esther Majerowicz analyzes the economic relationship between China and Brazil using the center–periphery framework developed by Raúl Prebisch. It argues that, in the 21st century, this relationship reflects a dual process: China’s rise as a new global economic “center” and Brazil’s passive adaptation as a peripheral economy, reinforcing asymmetric development patterns.
A key claim is that China has become central not just because of its size, but because it is now a major source of industrial production and technological innovation, influencing global demand, trade patterns, and commodity prices. Its growth has reshaped the world economy, especially by increasing demand for raw materials and lowering prices of manufactured goods. For Brazil, this has led to a reprimarization of exports. The country increasingly exports commodities (soy, iron ore, oil) to China while importing manufactured goods. This pattern strengthens traditional center–periphery dynamics, despite being framed politically as South–South cooperation. This suggests similar problems as identified by myself and Esteban Pérez in a paper discussing the development strategies in Latin America. The main difference is that in the last decade and a half, the central position of China is more clear, even if the typical notion that American hegemony is over has been exaggerated in American liberal circles.
The authors identify two possible development paths. The dominant one is a business as usual strategy, aligned with Chinese demand and Brazilian agribusiness and mining interests, which deepens dependency. The alternative is a developmental strategy based on diversification, industrial upgrading, and technological cooperation, but this path seems currently unlikely. They also emphasize that Chinese investment in Brazil is concentrated in extractive industries and infrastructure, reinforcing the existing specialization pattern, although there are some emerging opportunities in sectors like renewable energy and digital technologies.
Finally, the paper argues that shifting toward a more balanced relationship would require active state planning, political will, and supportive social coalitions in Brazil. Without these, the current asymmetrical structure is likely to persist or deepen.
Reading Keynes in Buenos Aires
This week I participated (virtually) in a conference in Colombia organized by the finance ministry, alongside a remarkable group of participants, including Rafael Correa, Isabella Weber, and Daniela Gabor. The focus of the discussion was the ongoing dispute between the government of Gustavo Petro and the Colombian central bank over the persistence of relatively high interest rates, and the broader question of central bank independence.
None of this, of course, is new. Variants of this conflict have played out repeatedly, including in the United States, where Donald Trump has openly criticized the Federal Reserve for maintaining interest rates he considers too high, and has clashed with Jerome Powell, as I have discussed here. But the Latin American context adds an important layer that is often missing from these debates.
The first point worth stressing is historical. The notion of an independent central bank is a relatively recent invention. Central banks have existed for centuries, but their functions have evolved significantly. Early central banks, even before institutions like the Bank of England (see here and here), were deeply intertwined with the fiscal needs of the state. They acted as fiscal agents, helping to finance public debt, often at levels that would alarm today’s orthodox commentators. In Britain, public debt during the Industrial Revolution exceeded 100 percent of GDP, with significant portions effectively absorbed by the central bank.
In this context, I suggested an analogy with Ha-Joon Chang’s argument about kicking away the ladder. Chang shows that today’s advanced economies relied heavily on protectionism and industrial policy during their own development, only to later promote free trade as the universal path, effectively denying developing countries the same tools. Something similar can be said about central banking. Historically, advanced economies used their central banks as instruments of development and as fiscal agents of the state, helping to finance large public debts and support economic transformation. Once they achieved development, they moved toward promoting central bank independence as a general principle, thereby limiting the ability of developing countries to use similar financial tools. In that sense, one could say that they also kicked away the financial ladder.
The idea that central banks should operate according to fixed rules, insulated from political pressures, is more closely associated with the gold standard era and the late nineteenth century. Even then, this rule-based framework reflected specific historical conditions rather than a timeless principle. And, as is well known, it broke down in the interwar period, when governments, faced with high unemployment, and the crisis of British hegemony, abandoned orthodoxy in favor of more active coordination between central banks and treasuries.
The US experience is illustrative. Under Marriner Eccles during the New Deal and World War II, the Federal Reserve worked closely with the Treasury, including maintaining low interest rates on government debt. It was only with the Treasury–Fed Accord of 1951 that the modern notion of central bank independence took shape. Even then, the separation was never as clean as the textbooks suggest.
This is because, at a more fundamental level, the central bank and the Treasury cannot be meaningfully separated. The central bank still acts as the fiscal agent of the state. Government spending creates money, whether through keystrokes in digital accounts, as emphasized recently by Modern Money Theory authors, or more traditional mechanisms. The idea that governments can run out of money (domestic issued money) in a technical sense is a useful fiction, one that obscures the real constraints, which are not financial but material. As John Maynard Keynes famously suggested, if it can be done, financing can be arranged.
This brings us to the present conjuncture. The recent inflationary episode in the United States was not primarily the result of excessive demand, but of supply-side disruptions, pandemic-related bottlenecks and energy price shocks (I wrote many posts on that; see this one). As these factors subsided, inflation fell. The Federal Reserve’s aggressive interest rate hikes were, at best, incidental to this process, and at worst risked pushing the economy into recession. What prevented that outcome was not monetary policy, but fiscal expansion, particularly the initial stimulus enacted by the Biden administration, the one that Larry Summers referred to as the worst economic mistake of the last 40 years (it's worth remembering).
If this is the case at the center, the implications for the periphery are even more significant. In Latin central bank independence is even more recent than in the US. It results from institutional arrangements that have evolved particularly in the wake of the debt crises of the 1980s and the
imposition of the Washington Consensus, but that have been fully
accepted by left of center governments in the region (note that most central banks in the region were created to deal with development issues in the aftermath of the 1930s crisis; this is represented by Prebisch, reading Keynes in Buenos Aires, in the figure above*).
The debate in Colombia mirrors similar tensions in Brazil, where Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has criticized high interest rates maintained by the central bank under the previous chairman, appointed by Jair Bolsonaro, Roberto Campos Neto. Interest rates, which remain high with the current president of the Brazilian Central Bank, Gabriel Galípolo, have not precluded growth, which depended on fiscal expansion and higher wages. True, Brazil has returned to growth, but it has done so more slowly than it could have, but not as a result of the interest rate policy. Instead, the slower pace of growth results from the self-imposed fiscal limits (see this by Haluska, Serrano and Summa).
Here is where the Colombia and Latin America, more generally, diverge from the US case. In the periphery, central banks do not operate in a vacuum. Their policies are constrained by the global financial environment, particularly by the stance of US monetary policy. Higher interest rates in the United States put pressure on developing countries to maintain relatively high rates of their own, in order to stabilize nominal exchange rates and avoid capital outflows and depreciation. Currency depreciation is not only inflationary but also contractionary, making macroeconomic management far more difficult.**
This is why the question of central bank independence, while important, is ultimately secondary to the issue of fiscal rules. Even countries without severe external constraints, such as Colombia or Brazil, face self-imposed limits on their ability to use fiscal policy to expand demand and promote growth. These constraints are not natural. The challenge, then, is not simply to debate whether central banks should be independent or not and from whom (certainly from financial markets). It is to rethink the broader framework within which monetary and fiscal policy operate, particularly in the periphery.
The discussion in Colombia, therefore, is not just about the appropriate level of interest rates or the degree of central bank independence. It is about the broader question of how much room governments have to use fiscal policy as a tool for development.
* Yes, the figure is AI; and the 9 of July monument, the obelisk, which was completed in 1936, was designed by Raúl's brother, Alberto Prebisch.
** Hélène Rey refers to this as the dilemma (instead of trilemma), since countries, with fixed or flexible (and, I guess, anything in between) exchange rate regimes, loose monetary policy autonomy with greater capital mobility.
Submissions should be made using the usual channels of the journal, and they will be managed jointly by editors and guest editors. All accepted articles will be published in the special issue.
Deadline for submissions: November 30, 2023. For further information, please contact the Guest Editors: Matias Vernengo (Bucknell University, U.S.A.; mv012@bucknell.edu) and Roberto Lampa (University of Macerata, Italy; r.lampa@unimc.it)
Prebisch believed that understanding the evolution of capitalist economies over time and in different contexts required a general cycle approach, encompassing all the different areas of economic activity, which he labelled “economic dynamics.” This theory, developed between 1945 and 1949, stemmed from a critique of both neoclassical and Keynesian theories, which Prebisch viewed as static representations of capitalism. It was applied first to a closed economy and then to a centre-periphery context. The theory combined the notion that profit is the driving force of economic activity, with a process of forced savings and the idea that the time lag between income circulation (and the resulting demand) and the completion of the production process are the main source of cyclical fluctuations. Prebisch’s dynamics theory, which he never completed, influenced his “development manifesto” (Prebisch, 1950).Read full paper here.
Read rest here.Emerging-market and developing countries resented U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke during his spell in office. In 2012, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff scolded Bernanke and the Fed's loose monetary policy for creating a "tsunami" of financial flows to emerging markets that was appreciating currencies, causing asset bubbles, and exporting financial instability to the developing world. It may just turn out that they dislike Janet Yellen even more.Although it was Bernanke who started tapering the Fed's loose policy, Yellen will be the one to end quantitative easing and, eventually, raise short-term interest rates. And those could be an even bigger problem for emerging markets than the initial tsunami.Yellen's recent confirmation that quantitative easing (QE) will cease in October 2014 is the latest and firmest signal that U.S. monetary policy is reversing direction. The Fed began the year talking about the "tapering" of loose monetary policy, relaxing QE's bond-buying program and potentially raising interest rates. Now a concrete end to QE is on the horizon. The big question that emerging markets are now asking is how quickly and how suddenly interest rates will go up. Following the latest numbers that the United States' GDP grew by 4 percent during the second quarter, some monetary policy hawks are calling for interest-rate hikes soon to cool the economy. That's exactly what emerging markets are worried about....
Prebisch believed that understanding the evolution of capitalist economies over time and in different contexts required a general cycle approach, which he labeled ‘dynamic economics’, encompassing all the different areas of economic activity. His dynamic economics stemmed from a critique of both neoclassical and Keynesian theories, which Prebisch viewed as static representations of capitalism. His dynamics was first applied to a closed economy and then to a center-periphery context. These combined the notion that profit is the driving motive of economic activity with a process of forced savings and the idea that the time lag between income circulation and the derived demand, and the time taken in the productive process was the main source of cyclical fluctuations. Prebisch’s dynamic theory, which he never completed, influenced his Development Manifesto (1949).Full paper available here. From the conclusion:
The long process of development of Prebisch’s economic ideas, which did not stop with his famous Development Manifesto in 1949, from the 1920s culminated in the late 1940 with his dynamic theory. The essence of Prebisch’s dynamic analysis, in which cycle and growth went hand in hand, was the introduction of time lags in a process of continuous disequilibrium. In his model fluctuations result from the difference in the time-period for incomes to circulate within the productive process with the time period required for final production to be brought and sold on the market. In this respect, he was part of a broad tradition of authors trying to formalize macro-dynamics in the wake of the Keynesian Revolution. He maintained elements that were Keynesian in spirit with others that were decidedly neoclassical, while at the same time introducing elements of the old classical school, as it should be expected in a period of transition in the economic profession, and also in an author that was brought up intellectually in a rather eclectic environment.
More importantly, Prebisch stands alone among his contemporaries in trying to explain the cyclical growth of the global economy as the result of the interaction of center and periphery, in which the international division of labor matters. Not only Prebisch introduces the specificity of the problems of managing the peripheral economy, but also he is unique among the economists dealing with cyclical growth to discuss the importance of the change in the global center in the inter-war period from the United Kingdom to the United States.
His conception of the institutional and historical specificity of economic dynamics would eventually develop into what Structuralists at ECLAC would refer to as the Historical-Structural method of analysis, which analyzed the process of structural transformation of underdeveloped economies in historical perspective. In this sense, his understanding of capitalist dynamics, right before he wrote the Development Manifesto and became the Secretary General of ECLAC, was based on a theory that purported to be general and encompassing well beyond the problems of peripheral countries with declining terms of trade, which became the trade mark of his contributions to economic analysis.
"There is a very real risk of new economic crises erupting and, in today’s highly integrated world economy; their impact will not be limited to specific sectors or to well-defined regions. The G-20 initially recognised this fact, but recent actions have not been consistent. In particular, the fiscal restraint in the countries with current account surpluses and very low long-run interest rates in Europe, point precisely in the wrong direction. A fragile global economy has a significant interest in the implementation of expansionary, rather than contractionary fiscal policies in key economies. Only the former can open a path towards lower fiscal deficits and falling public debt ratios. A “lost decade” for the world economy would risk the development gains achieved during the recent years, and throw into question the ability of democratic governments to tackle the most urgent challenges of our age."Fiscal austerity in the center, not bubbles in the periphery, are the real risk for the global economy.
