Milei's Psycho Shock Therapy

My short piece for Dollars & Sense on Milei's economic program is out now, here. An early version is available here. Btw, this is the 50th anniversary issue. By coincidence, 20 years ago, a piece of mine on Brazil (and the Lula government back then) was also published on Dissent on their 50th anniversary issue.

The Milei piece was written in June and revised around September. Now it seems more clear that they might receive some fresh money from the IMF, which will allow them to continue to pushing the adjustment well into next year, and, perhaps beyond. Note that this is exactly what the same team during the Macri administration. Try to cut spending in domestic currency (now more drastically) and, hence, debt in pesos, and increasing indebtedness in dollars. The money will probably come in, and as the interest rate differential remains negative, it will probably not lead to the accumulation of reserves. To be seen.

USA For Sale!

In this animated video (above) created by Mark Fiore for the Center for Media and Democracy’s “Outsourcing America Exposed” project, Outsourcing Eddie shows us the many ways in which America is for sale.

Reasonable liberals and conservatives, unreasonable economics

The ambiguously liberal/conservative duo, Joe Scarborough and Jeff Sachs, self-denominated reasonable (what Krugman refers to as 'serious' people), suggest that we need austerity in their WAPO op-ed. Forget for a second the inconsistencies of Scarborough, the conservative in the duo. What I find incredible is that Sachs continues to push the fiction that he is a liberal in the American sense of the word, meaning progressive or lefty, rather than a right wing neoliberal.

Let's not forget that Jeff Sachs is Dr. Shock Therapy,* a doctrine that suggested that budget deficits should be cut to control inflation, and that deregulated markets would promote growth and development, and that he applied in Bolivia, Poland and Russia, among other countries. The collapse and failure in these countries foreshadowed the failures of the so-called Washington Consensus. Forget also the institutional problems Sachs had regarding his advice in Russia [note that he did not have the same legal problems that led his collegue "Andrei Shleifer, whose misbehavior cost Harvard something like $25 million in damages, plus another $10 million or $15 million in legal fees," according to David Warsh].

The really incredible thing is that they try to argue, on the basis, of their reasonable principles, that we need austerity. They put Dick Cheney's and the right wing supply-siders that sometimes say that deficits do not matter, in their view because the supply side effects of higher productivity (entrepreneurship) brought by lower taxes would produce growth and higher revenue, together with Krugman and other Keynesians that suggest with full support of the evidence that spending does have positive effects on the level of activity. Note that in the second case Keynesians, and even further Functional Finance people (following Abba Lerner) would not suggest that deficits do not matter. What they suggest is that the way you spend and tax matters. So deficits could be bad or good, depending on what causes them. Higher deficits caused by tax cuts for the wealthy and to support wars of choice abroad, are not the same that deficits to reconstruct infrastructure and promote full employment.

But the incredible thing is that they (Scarborough and Sachs) try to claim that Keynes would have been against fiscal expansion now. Yes, Keynes was indeed for some fiscal restraint, but that was during the war, when deficits were above 20%, and not in the middle of the recovery.

For more on Sachs long and strange career read the following article by Doug Henwood at the Left Business Observer.

* He actually gave the Tanner Lecture at the University of Utah on Poland's shock therapy. I was not there in 1994, I should add. By the way, at that time he actually still thought that shock therapy was a success story. Oh well.

The Soviet economy: lessons for developing countries

I highly recommend the following paper by Mazat and Serrano on the Soviet Economy, from 1950 to 1991, which shows the relevance of the surplus approach tradition to deal with real economic problems. The paper suggests that the limitations of the Soviet system, that eventually led to its collapse were associated to the exhaustion of the regime of extensive accumulation of capital in the late 1960s early 1970s.

Growth was very rapid at the beginning. The graph (from Kotz and Weir's Russia’s Path from Gorbachev to Putin, 2007) shows the rates of growth of the Soviet Union and the US from 1928 to 1975, and a few sub-periods. With the exception of World-War II the Soviet Union was catching up with the US.

Following Kalecki, they show that there was no problem of effective demand, and that USSR was characterized by resource mobilization towards rapid industrialization. Further, "the extensive Soviet growth model relied on the increase of the surplus thanks to the mobilization of additional resources." As noted by Kotz and Weir (2007, p. 36): "the rapid employment shift from agriculture to industry contributed to GNP growth, since output per worker is much higher in industry than in agriculture." Cheap labor and available resources implied that growth involved incorporating workers into the growing industrial sector, and that implied huge investments in infrastructure and heavy industries.

However, by the 1970s the extensive model of growth had reached its limits. The graph shows the slowdown of Soviet growth.

Note that while it is true that the slowdown in the Soviet economy was parallel with the post-Bretton Woods slowdown in the West, it was more marked. This was, as noted by Mazat and Serrano, the result of the vanishing labor surplus, and the exhaustion of cheap sources of new natural resources. It is worth noticing that:

"The sudden worsening of Soviet economic performance in the 1970s was not limited to economic growth. There is also evidence that the rate of technological innovation slowed down around the 1970s ... Most noticeably, the Soviet Union largely failed to absorb the revolution in communication and information processing brought by electronics and computers, which was rapidly altering Western capitalist economies from the 1970s" (Kotz and Weir, 2007, p. 45).

This inability to keep pace with technological innovation in the West, associated with increasing imports of grain, linked to the severe difficulties of increasing agricultural productivity, and the higher demands for consumer goods that come with higher income per capita, implied increasing external problems for the Soviet economy. In their words:

"The Soviet population also wanted more consumption goods and consumer durables of better quality. But the cold war continued to require massive expenditure of resources in the military sector. At this stage several attempts to reorder priorities and reform the planning system to enable to increase the quantity and the quality of consumer goods, but they all failed. As local production was unable to fulfill entirely this demand, imports of these categories of product were necessary, especially from the West."

Note that these problems are typical of developing countries in the so-called hard phase of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). The increase in agricultural, capital and consumer goods imports, was financed with oil and gas exports (in the 1970s positively impacted by the oil shocks, but negatively in the 1980s, with the collapse of terms of trade), which also made the Soviet Union look more like a typical middle income developing country.

In sum, "from the 1970s, the structural external vulnerability became a permanent feature of the USSR, and the very low price of oil from the mid 1980s had an important impact on the final collapse of the Soviet system in the following decade." In other words, an external crisis, not very different than the one that caused the Latin American debt crisis and that led to the imposition of the Washington Consensus was behind the Soviet collapase and the imposition of the disastrous shock therapy. The difficulties of moving from the extensive model of growth to the intensive growth model, discussed in this paper, are very similar to the difficulties faced by industrializing nations in the periphery and are a cautionary tale for all developing countries.