Trumponomics vs. Bidenomics: The good, the bad and the stupid

The debate between Biden and Trump is on everybody's mind. And for good reason, the future of the global economy, and the well being of the planet are always at stake in American elections. I, of course, will restrict my brief comments here to the economy, and what the alternatives might entail. But the analysis of the impacts of both programs, if one can talk of programs per se, is very poor, to say the least.

Broadly speaking there has been increasing agreement on a tougher policy with respect to China, what Jake Sullivan referred to as a New Washington Consensus. Many see this as a revival of industrial policy. This is of course suggests some continuity with the Trump policies, even though I would suggest that only with Biden there was a clear plan to re-shore manufacturing jobs, particularly with chips and electric vehicles. Trump basically just hiked tariffs. Both protectionism and the continuity make some liberals (I would say neoliberal progressives, to use Nancy Fraser's term, nervous. For example, Edward Luce's anxiety is that Biden agrees too much with Trump. He says: "both Biden and Trump are vowing to travel in the same direction. But Trump would do so in leaps and bounds."

Note that in all fairness, the US never really stopped doing industrial policy. As noted by Fred Block, even with the problems of the Military-Industrial-Sillicon-Valley Complex, a hidden developmental state. The main new element in the "New" Washington Consensus is really that the US will be less willing to promote economic development by invitation in the case of China. As the IMF policies seem to indicate, for the rest of the world, the old consensus is in place. In that respect, the anxieties of liberals on this are exaggerated.

But that's not all. According to Luce, based on a report* from Moody's, "Trump’s policies would trigger a recession by mid-2025. Unemployment and inflation would jump. The bottom half of US income distribution would suffer the most." He concludes that: "The economic consequences of Trump would be a disaster." This was reinforced letter by 16 Nobel economists warns that: "Many Americans are concerned about inflation, which has come down remarkably fast. There is rightly a worry that Donald Trump will reignite this inflation, with his fiscally irresponsible budgets." This is flatly incorrect. Tax cuts (or their extension) and tariffs wouldn't cause inflation and a recession. Worst case scenario there would be a one time increase in prices, but again the bargaining power of the working class is at low point. So no danger of inflation there. And neither would affect the ability the government to spend. On that Republicans are normally less fiscally conservative when in power than Dems (see old roundtable on that here). And it actually it is a critique that misses the point of why Bidenomics is much better than Trumponomics.

Inflation was not caused by Biden's fiscal packages, as I have insisted several times here (see this paper). And Trump's tax cuts would also not be a problem from that perspective. The point is that Trump would be, in his domestic agenda, more of the trickle down agenda or Republicans going back to Ronald Reagan. Cutting taxes for the wealthy and making it harder for minorities and the poor (often minorities) to access welfare programs. It would be distributively problematic. Inflation is not the risk. The problem with Trump's policies is that they hurt the very working class (many in unions, and certainly white folk) that might vote for him. It would be stupid for unions and other progressives to support Trump.

The good thing about Biden is that he, in part because he had more union connections, and in part because he has moved towards the left (certainly Bernie played a role here), was bold in his fiscal policy, and that might have been instrumental in avoiding a recession (that the Fed was almost engineering). Contrary to Obama, with his mild post-bubble program, and Hillary, Biden has moved to a more traditional Dem (New Deal would be a stretch perhaps) logic of tax and spend.

Eight years ago Hillary had a completely different economic agenda, and that actually explained, to some extent, why Trump ended up winning. I noted that it was likely in this post from before that election, right after a debate, in which I said: "This [election] is going to be way closer than it should be." I also noted that the problem with Hillary was that: "The fact that she has not fully renounced Clintonomics, i.e. financial deregulation, austerity (End of Welfare as we know it) and free trade, is a problem for the progressive base of the party. She walked back some of these, mostly after pressure from the Bernie campaign, but is unclear that these changes would stick."

That these divisions are still relevant within the Democratic Party is clear in the primary in New York that pitied Bowman and Latimer, the former with support from Bernie and the latter from Hillary. Bernie said that "the race 'one of the most important in the modern history of America' and a contest between 'the billionaire class' and ordinary citizens," according to the Financial Times. So if one wants to criticize Trumponomics, the issue is that his agenda is the pro-billionaire one (Wall Street and Silicon Valley agree and have closed the funding gap). Biden is the leftest president since Lyndon Johnson (he is clearly to his right, and LBJ was no commie). He also is not the best possible candidate. He has one unbeatable quality though: he is NOT Trump.

* Mark Zandi is the main author of the report, and he can be seen as another neoliberal progressive, aligned with the pro-business part of the Dems.

Lara-Resende and MMT in the Tropics

So André Lara-Resende, who I discussed here before, is again writing on the crisis of macroeconomics (in Portuguese and you might need to have a subscription), and now instead of embracing the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), has supposedly embraced Modern Money Theory (MMT). Many US MMTers cheered this as a demonstration of the reach of MMT in other countries. I would be less cheerful.

Lara-Resende, let me explain to non-Brazilian readers, was a student of Lance Taylor at MIT, and then a professor at the Catholic University in Rio, being a key author of inertial inflation, an heterodox view of inflation, that was central for the failed Cruzado Stabilization Plan back in 1986. He then participated in the successful stabilization of the economy with the Real Plan, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the finance minister in 1994, and during the latter's presidency a short lived president of the development bank (BNDES, in the Portuguese acronym) -- and not the central bank as many in the US have suggested (that was Persio Arida, his frequent co-author on inflationary inertia). Btw, he fell as the head of the bank because he was recorded in conversations with the president (Cardoso) on issues related to the privatization process of the telecommunications sector, in which they seemed to favor a particular group. The development bank during this period was essentially used to promote privatization as a part of the so-called Washington Consensus policies. Also, by the 1990s all the economists from the Catholic University had adhered to the Washington Consensus, and moved away from heterodoxy in the same way Cardoso distanced himself from Dependency theory, and still remain essentially aligned with neoliberal policies to these days. Lara-Resende included, as we will see.

Note that he does say that the four pillars of the new macro are that money and taxes are connected, that the government has no financial constraint, but only a real (capacity) constraint, that money is endogenous (the central bank sets the interest rate), and that the Domar rule holds and stability of debt-to-GDP ratios require the interest rate to be lower than the rate of growth. He also says inflation is all about expectations, and the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) does not hold, something he had already said in his previous op-ed. Many (too many) interpreted this as being Chartalist Money, Functional Finance and Endogenous Money and as such as a version of MMT. Including some analysts in Brazil, with whom I fully agree on their critiques of Lara-Resende's policy conclusions, like the sharp critique by Guilherme Haluska here (also in Portuguese). Note, however, in my previous post on him, that he thought that the FTPL was an heterodox view of the macroeconomy, and he is explicit in his new op-ed that his ideas follow from his last book, in which he defends the FTPL.

In his book what he refers to "heterodox" is the experience with alternative monetary policies after the 2008 crisis, meaning Quantitative Easing, simply because it does not follow the QTM. In his words, from the 2017 book: “The result of the heterodox policies of the central banks in advanced economies, after the financial crisis of 2008, raised serious doubts about some fundamental points of the foundations of macroeconomic theory" or in the original if you don't trust me as a translator (I don't): "O resultado da experiência heterodoxa dos Bancos Centrais dos países avançados, depois da crise financeira de 2008, levantou sérias dúvidas sobre alguns pontos fundamentais da teoria macroeconômica." He does say that one of the pillars of the new macro paradigm is in his 2017 book, but my guess is the ideas are essentially the same. He used the language of MMT, and cited Knapp and Lerner to promote the same neoliberal policies of the 1990s, and the same ideas he defended a couple of years ago using FTPL.

So it is clear that the pillars are essentially of some weird New Classical story of the FTPL, in which fiscal dominance is central to the argument, and there is endogenous money, because of the neo-Wicksellian twist in modern macro. Yes, the QTM does not hold, but it is the expectations about future inflation that matter, and those are tied, in Lara-Resende's views, to fiscal policy (or at least were two years ago). The argument is the fiscal dominance one, that monetary policy has to deal with the unsustainable debt, so inflation is a fiscal phenomenon, and fiscal adjustment is needed. He was and is for austerity! He does use an MMT rhetoric and cites Abba Lerner for sure (more on that below), and that's a testament of the current relevance of MMT and its role in shaping the Bernie and Ocasio-Cortez's progressive views (something positive as I noted in my last post).

His argument is that Brazil is on the wrong side of the Domar stability condition, and, hence, the debt-to-GDP ratio is increasing (in domestic currency), and that something has to be done about it. Not sure why. Note that I always say that in domestic currency there is no default, and one of my complaints about MMT is that they do not pay attention to debt in foreign currency (at some point Warren Mosler was against capital controls and for flexible exchange rates, since the former were not necessary and the latter would solve external problems). But Brazil is not borrowing in foreign currency, and is sitting on top of a mountain of foreign reserves (something like US$ 380 billion, last time I checked, someone correct me if I'm wrong). Then he argues that inflation is all caused by excess demand in the developmentalist period, the period from the 50s to the 80s. However it is unclear why that is still a problem, or why there was excess demand, if it wasn't as a result of fiscal policy.

Fiscal reform, and, in particular, the pension reform are needed not to raise revenue (here is an MMT theme), in his view. He suggests that the reasons are that the pension system is unfair, and that in Lerner's fashion [sic] tax cuts are needed to promote the reduction of bureaucracy and allow for the expansion of more effective private investment.* These should be complemented with trade liberalization, a lower interest rate with a digital currency (bitcoin?) and fiscal adjustment, because the State is "bloated, inefficient and patrimonialist" (in the original: "Estado inchado, ineficiente e patrimonialista").

With friends like these, who needs enemies?

* It's true that Brazil has relatively high levels of taxes, in comparison to developing countries, but the problem is not that they are high, per se, but instead that they are regressive.

A brief comment on the Argentinian Crisis

This was faster than even I expected (for my views on what Macri meant as soon as he was elected see this and for a more recent assessment go to this post). Let me first say that I don't think is quite like the 2001/02 crisis. It is unlikely that there will be a default anytime soon. The level of reserves is at about US$ 56 billion, and the IMF is happy to finance the very Neoliberal government of Macri (because the IMF has changed a lot, remember?).

The economy with Macri has not performed very well, as expected. Inflation has remained high, since the depreciation of the peso has persisted, and that was no accident. It allowed to erode real wages, which I noted from the beginning was part of their goals. Also, the rate of growth has been lackluster, and if the IMF is to be believed real GDP growth in his first two years was on average at around 0.5 percent. Again, I don't think that has been a central concern (even if they suggest the opposite). Note that again a relatively low rate of growth (as per Okun's Law) leads to slow job growth (formal unemployment is above Cristina Kirchner), and less wages pressures. In Argentina, economic policy is truly geared towards containing wage resistance, when you get a Neoliberal administration.

Macri's policies are essentially the same as the Neoliberal policies of Menem (and his finance minister Domingo Cavallo, who is back, and defending Macri), minus the fixed exchange rate system. The notion was that a flexible exchange rate with inflation targeting would basically provide the same price stability as Convertibility in the 1990s, without the balance of payments problems that led to the 2001-02 debacle. Btw, this idea that one could use either a very rigid or a very flexible exchange rate regime (but nothing in between, and certainly not capital controls) was really the exchange rate policy of the Washington Consensus and was made famous by Stan Fischer as the Bipolar Consensus.*

So Macri liberalized the foreign exchange market, further liberalized imports, in crucial sectors where there was a significant repressed consumption by the middle and upper classes, like electronics, and that led to a significant increase in imports, not matched by increases in exports (even with the depreciation of the peso; as it turns the depreciation of the currency is inflationary, and by reducing real wages, contractionary, but it does not increase exports by a lot, which depend on foreigners incomes for the most part; who could have foreseen such an effect!), and they resort to foreign borrowing to close the gap. Again using IMF numbers, that are estimated for 2017 (and I should note and not very reliable since inflation data is also not very good. A bit enervating given how much the opposition to the Kirchners complained about the quality of inflation data, and the notion that would not happen with them) we get the following picture for the current account (CA).

Clearly the external situation has worsened significantly. Don't get me wrong, I don't think the recent run on the peso has been caused directly by the CA position. This is more like the long term problem. If you liberalize imports, and the patterns of consumption are such that imports explode, but your pattern of specialization is the production of commodities, and you solve this by borrowing in foreign currency, it cannot end up very well. And it won't. Btw, yes I did say back in 2016 that foreign debt driven growth was dangerous and eventually unsustainable at the time that Moody's was upgrading Argentina. So what caused the recent run on the peso, you ask. Not sure, to be frank.

The Fed in the US has been signaling higher rates (and they went up a bit), and that causes trouble for sure. And the Macri team, which has some from the Menem/de la Rúa Neoliberal Era (like Sturzenegger at the Central Bank), is not very competent (not sure why FT thinks they are pragmatic and in between the Neoliberals of Menem and the 'heterodox' of the Kirchners), and kept interest rate really low (for distributive reasons alluded above) allowing for depreciation. At any rate, the turbulence might be temporary, but the issue is not, and Argentina is headed for more problems.

* On this John Williamson, and his views on competitive exchange rates, did not reflect well what the consensus in Washington (meaning the IMF, World Bank and the US Treasury) really thought.

PS: If you read Spanish, you must check this short piece by Fabián Amico and Mariano de Miguel (h/t Edurado Crespo). Best I've read so far.

PS2: Forgot this one by Claudio Scaletta in Página/12, also worth reading, as everything Claudio writes.

The vulture passes

Yep, not the condor. So it's my short note in Página/12 (in Spanish), the Argentine newspaper, on the future of the external debt negotiations. Note that the short summary on top suggests, since this is a debate, that the return of a neoliberal project would lead to increasing external debt. And that might be true, yet, as I note in my piece it is not true that external debt is always bad, since one can use it for diversifying exports (and reducing structural heterogeneity), reducing imports (the old import substituting industrialization strategy) and making the balance of payments more sustainable in the long run.

I might add then that the use of foreign debt, with caution, is not necessarily neoliberal. At any rate, neoliberal is a complicated term, often used to refer to things one does not like. Unlike neoclassical economics (or marginalism more properly) it does not have a precise meaning. I would imagine that in this context is used to refer to pro-business, pro-liberalization, laissez-faire policies that characterized the Washington Consensus and the 1990s in Argentina. And yes that would be a terrible model to go back to.

Kevin P. Gallagher on BRICS Consensus

By Kevin P. Gallagher

Conveniently scheduled at the end of the World Cup, leaders of the BRICS countries travel to Brazil in mid-July for a meeting that presents them with a truly historic opportunity. While in Brazil, the BRICS hope to establish a new development bank and reserve currency pool arrangement. This action could strike a true trifecta — recharge global economic governance and the prospects for development as well as pressure the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — to get back on the right track. The two Bretton Woods institutions, both headquartered in Washington, with good reason originally put financial stability, employment and development as their core missions. That focus, however, became derailed in the last quarter of the 20th century. During the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF pushed the “Washington Consensus,” which offered countries financing but conditioned it on a doctrine of deregulation.

Read rest here.

Jorge Castañeda and the wrong lessons from Liberalization Reforms

Jorge Castañeda, ex-advisor to the left of center candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and ex-foreign affairs secretary in the right wing administration of Vicente Fox has written here about the need for further reforms in Mexico. He sings the praises of NAFTA.

"NAFTA brought with it a spectacular increase in Mexican exports, as well as a dramatic shift in their composition. But it proved to be a great disappointment in terms of foreign investment inflows and economic growth, which has averaged 2.6% per year over the last two decades – slower than Peru, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay. As a result, Mexico’s income gap with the US and Canada has barely narrowed."

The change in exports was basically associated to an acceleration of the 'maquilization' process, manufacturing exports with low local value added content. No comments on the massive immigration* and the fact that neither growth nor income distribution have improved after NAFTA (both claims often made about what to expect from it from the free trade crowd).

So what should Peña Nieto do? According to Castañeda:

"Energy reform opens up electricity generation and oil exploration, extraction, and refining to private foreign or domestic investment through licenses, concessions, production sharing, or profit sharing. The oil workers’ union has been banished from the board of directors of Pemex, the national oil company, and new contracts for shale oil and gas, together with deep-water prospecting and drilling, will be signed with a government agency, not with Pemex. 

Once the myriad legal and political obstacles are cleared, Mexico will be able to increase oil and gas production, drive down the price of electricity, and stimulate growth in an otherwise lethargic economy."

In other words, deregulation, weakening of unions to attract foreign capital (more secure environment for capital, since Mexico is such a paradise for workers), and that would lead to growth. No changes from the old Washington Consensus mantra.

You would expect that the failures of "Free Trade", liberalization and deregulation were incorporated, as much as the lessons from financial deregulation in the US after the 2008 crisis, but the resilience of Neoliberal ideas, in the face of adverse evidence, is impressive indeed.

* On lack of convergence with the US and immigration Blecker and Esquivel say: "the data show that there has been no economic convergence whatsoever between Mexico and the United States since NAFTA’s enactment. As a result, the historical Mexico-US economic gap in percentage terms has not been reduced after 15 years of free trade, and the incentives to migrate are probably even greater than before." Read their assessment of NAFTA here.

Michael Pettis on Chinese Liberalization Reforms and Economic Growth

Two posts worth reading by Michael Pettis (here and here; might need subscription). He suggests in the first one that reports that consumption in China is much higher than previously thought are exaggerated (Ken Peng suggested here that consumption levels are 10% higher than what is often assumed, i.e. closer to 45% rather than 35% of GDP). He argues that if China is to continue to grow, even at a slightly reduce pace, then it:

"must find a way to grow without even faster growth in credit, and the best way to do so... is to boost consumption growth by sharply increasing the household income share of GDP and to shift investment from the state sector to far more efficient smaller businesses."

No problem with the first part. Not sure about the second, i.e. the notion that small private businesses are more productive than large public firms. In fact, public investment has been central for Chinese growth all along, and if anything it is the decline in public spending that has hurt the recovery in developed countries.

A note of clarification on why he argues that credit expansion is dangerous in China. He says in his most recent post that:

"A recent China Beige Book survey suggests that a large and rising share of new loans is being extended simply to roll over old loans that cannot be repaid out of operating earnings. China needs credit growth, in other words, just to avoid recognising bad loans, and any attempt to constrain money growth is likely to cause a surge in financial distress."

Fair enough, but as noted before here, these bad loans are in Chinese currency and do NOT represent a real threat to economic growth, since the central bank can always act as a lender of last resort in domestic currency. The solution he proposes makes even less sense, namely: interest rate liberalization, which was in the list of measures proposed by the infamous Washington Consensus (point 4 in Williamson's original decalogue).

The idea is that market determined interest rates would be higher and preclude excessive debt accumulation, I imagine. Also, higher interest rates would reduce investment, particularly in housing, again in my interpretation of what Pettis suggests. Yet, the experience in countries that actually liberalized interest rates, and the whole financial system, was not to reduce debt and tame excessive speculation.

The demand for credit depends on real economic activity and if consumption and investment (in particular public investment that is autonomous) continues to expand it will increase even with higher rates of interest. The effect of interest rate/financial liberalization is to increase the share of the pie that goes to creditors and capital in general, which according to Pettis' correct logic would reduce the redistribution towards wages and slowdown growth.

Mind you, although Pettis seems to think about credit creation in mainstream terms, with credit driving economic activity, he can be read as suggesting that growth is demand-led, which is pretty radical.

Say's Law Keynesians

In the 1990s Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the one time sociologist and dependency theory author, turned politician and president of Brazil said that people should forget about what he had written in the past (on dependency theory). Something similar could be said about the economists at Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro, who were the main economic advisors to Cardoso during his presidency.* They seem to have forgotten what they wrote in the past.

An interesting case of the switcheroo from heterodox to mainstream is Edward Amadeo (Labor Minister during the Cardoso administration, even though he had connections to the Worker's Party up to the early 1990s), author of a very good book on Keynes (Keynes' Principle of Effective Demand), based on his dissertation at Harvard supervised by Murray Milgate and co-supervised by Lance Taylor (who was at MIT at that time), with a preface by Vicky Chick. The book is still the best interpretation of Keynes' General Theory, and its relation with the Treatise on Money.

Among other things Amadeo shows that the conventional view which assumes that Keynes moved from an interpretation of the system with flexible prices and fixed quantities in the Treatise to one of fixed prices and flexible quantities in The General Theory (GT), as interpreted by Leijonhufvud for example (see his classic On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes), is incompatible with a careful reading of chapter 19 of the GT (Amadeo, 1989, p. 4).

Further, Amadeo correctly points out that the transition from the Treatise to the GT involves a change from a dynamic theory of the trade cycle in historical time to an equilibrium theory of the level of output, one in which the flexibility of prices does not guarantee full employment. And obviously the level of activity is determined by demand. Amadeo also wrote a few papers on what we would now call the Kaleckian models of growth (see here; subscription required).

That is why is interesting to read a recent paper by Amadeo (in Portuguese here; originally published in O Globo). He says that Cardoso's agenda, which would have been carried by Serra (defeated presidential candidate in 2002), would have:

"redoubled the emphasis on education, promoted savings, done the labor reform, flattened the tax structure, promoted global integration, invested in infrastructure and modernized the public administration."

Note that the emphasis is on supply-side policies (with the exception of investment in infrastructure, which was actually accelerated during the Lula administration so-called PAC). And yes he suggests that savings would have lead presumably to investment and growth in a typical Solow model result, meaning Say's Law.

One could go on and discuss the other incompatibilities with almost all his previous work (not sure if he wrote something theoretical in a neoclassical perspective), for example the defense of labor reform (meaning lower wages) to promote growth and employment (the opposite of what the GT says). Or the silliness of suggesting at this point that more liberalization (global integration) along the lines of the Washington Consensus would really work. Or the fact, that he seems to believe that fiscal adjustment is necessary now in Brazil and that this would be compatible with higher growth (contractionary expansions).

But the remarkable thing is at the end of the day the complete 180 degree change in theoretical perspective, with no justification of what made him change his mind. I assume that in his case we can paraphrase Keynes and suggest that when proven correct, he changes his mind.

* Other economists close to Cardoso, like Serra from the more radical Unicamp, also moved to the right, favoring privatization and fiscal adjustment, but arguably abandoned academic economics long ago, being like Cardoso politicians. Finally, some economists from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas from São Paulo, like Bresser Pereira, remained more heterodox, and defend now something called New Developmenatlism. I'll leave comments on that for another post.

It's NOT just the external conditions

Frankly, it's a bit boring. But every time you show the actual data on Argentina's growth someone says it's just good luck. The terms of trade boom. Data below compares terms of trade in Argentina and Brazil in the same period, 2003-12 (Kirchner-Kirchner and Lula-Dilma).

Not very different, and if something terms of trade improved a little bit more in Brazil (33% against 22% approximately, for the whole period). Note that metallic commodities (Brazil is a big exporter of iron ore) increased more than agricultural goods (both Brazil and Argentina are big exporters of soybean and derived products, for example). So did Brazil grew more than Argentina, which is what you would expect if external conditions determined growth? See graph below.

As it turns out Argentina grew 5.8% against 3.6% in Brazil. Further Brazil has a larger current account deficit. Fiscal and monetary policy were more expansionary in Argentina, and the nominal and real exchange rates more devalued. Let alone that the average real wage grew more in Argentina. So no it was NOT all external conditions.

Can we please, pretty please, with sugar on top, stop just venting prejudices and get the data before we talk. You are entitled to be against the policies of the government, you might even be for the policies of the Washington Consensus (people have defended crazier ideas). But, as Daniel Patrick Moynihan used to say, you are not entitled to your own facts.

Growth in Argentina, again

So again, because some didn't get the memo. How 'bad' has been Argentina's performance since the crisis in 2002? Well if you use the numbers put out by Orlando Ferreres, not the government official data, with inflation at around 25% or so, what you get is the graph below.

Note that the average rate of growth in 2003-2012 is about 5.8% better than at any time in the post-war period (in fact, in recorded history). In the neoliberal era the rate of growth was 0.2% between 1976 and 1989, and 1.9 between 1990 and 2002, while in the State-led growth period it was a healthy 3.8%. 'Nough said. These are not opinions. Simply the facts. And no there is NO problem with these measures. These are the data use by the critics of the government.

This is not say that everything is fine in Argentina. But certainly the country does not need a return to the failed policies of the Washington Consensus.

More on the Indian Economy

In Mumbai for a conference sponsored by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). On my way, I read an op-ed by Arvind Panagariya in the Times of India, in which he defends that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) should embrace the reform agenda, followed by Congress and by the same BJP when in power. His views [remember that Panagariya is a fairly conventional free trade mainstream economist] are fairly conventional, but interestingly he suggests that "the Indian public today fully appreciates the benefits of reforms."

The notion that the majority of the Indian people are for the Washington Consensus reforms is surprising to say the least. The basis for his proposition is very flimsy indeed. He suggests the following:

"The opposition parties had claimed that the latest package of reforms would damage millions of shopkeepers (FDI in retail), transport workers (diesel price hike) and urban households (subsidised LPG cylinders). Yet, none could translate that supposed harm into sustained anti-reform demonstrations in the public space."

In other words, the evidence for the support for the reforms is the lack of protests on the streets against the reforms. It is far from clear, however, that the absence of protests are a sign of support. Note that for good or bad the Indian economy, even with a slowdown, continues to grow fast, so it would be surprising to find a lot of protesters in the streets.

And yes India has been growing relatively fast since the 1980s, that is a whole decade before liberalization started in 1991. Also, note that one of the key areas in which India has not followed the liberalization and deregulation policies of the neoliberal agenda is in the financial sector, preserving capital controls (even if there have been pressures and a certain amount of liberalization it is way less than what happened in Latin American economies, for example).

The current debate in India has been very heated, following the revelations that Wal-Mart has paid bribes (as much as it happened in Mexico). At any rate, the process of liberalization proceeds with parties being for once in power, but against when in the opposition. This system has been perfect in order to guarantee that no matter who wins the elections, yes this is the largest democracy in world, the process of economic liberalization is not affected.

PS: On a slightly different matter, the RBI study has an interesting study that shows a 10% increase in minimum support price (MSP) of wheat raises wholesale inflation by 1%. That is, price controls, in this case on food supplies, is an important element of anti-inflationary policy in India.

Kevin Gallagher on capital controls

Another interesting talk at the Central Bank of Argentina, this one by Kevin Gallagher from the University of Boston based to a great extent on his recent work with José Antonio Ocampo and Stephany Griffith-Jones on the regulation of capital flows (see here).

He has three main points to make. First, there is increasing and overwhelming evidence that there is no connection between capital account liberalization and economic growth. He cited the recent work by Arvind Subramanian, Olivier Jeanne and John Williamson (the latter of Washington Consensus fame) at the Peterson Institute, called "Who Needs to Open the Capital Account?," who argue (2012, p. 5) that "the international community should not seek to promote totally free trade in assets -- even over the long run-- because ... free capital mobility seems to have little benefit in terms of long run growth."

Second, it seems that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has come to partially recognize the appropriateness of capital account regulations and has gone so far as to recommend (and officially endorse) a set of guidelines regarding the appropriate use of Capital Account Regulations (CARs), the new term for capital controls within the IMF. He warned, correctly I think, that changes within the IMF can be seen as a reform that tries to restrict the use of capital account regulations to emergencies, and situations approved by the IMF within article 4 consultations, when article 6 guarantees that countries can use them freely.

Finally, and more importantly, Kevin warned that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have regularly included very restrictive language on capital account regulations, and have a tendency to restrict the policy space in developing countries, exactly when a consensus that this restrictions do not provide any benefit in terms of growth.

Is Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) still possible?

For a very long time Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was seen as a four-letter word. The notion was that ISI had led to extensive inefficiencies and that the debt crisis of the 1980s was its last breath. The old ideas about comparative advantage were back with a vengeance, and the prescription was for trade liberalization, encapsulated in the Washington Consensus. Export orientation was promoted, since it was widely believed that an emphasis on exports would force integration into world markets, more efficient allocation of resources, and that external markets would impose discipline by eliminating uncompetitive firms.

The problem with the conventional wisdom is that the ISI period corresponds to a high growth phase for most developing countries, one in which they caught up with the developed world despite the fast growth in the latter, which would not have been possible if ISI-driven growth did produce tremendous inefficiencies on an economy wide scale.

Read the rest here

FDI and Economic Development

In the 1960s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) were seen, at least by progressives, as an obstruction in the process of economic development.  The ultimate critique was that not much of the technological development introduced by foreign firms diffused to other parts of the economy, and that profit remittances would become a burden on the balance of payments accounts.  Hence, TNCs were seen as signs of the exploitation of the South by the North.  It did not help that companies, like International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) in Chile during the Allende government, were plotting to bring down democratically elected governments.  Everything about foreign capital was bad.

By the 1990s, after a lost decade and the victory of the Washington Consensus Decalogue, foreign capital and TNCs were seen as central for economic development.  FDI created jobs, increased productivity, and macroeconomic problems associated to the balance of payments accounts were seen as secondary, since export performance, within the context of an export-led development strategy, would reduce the possibilities of crises.  Everything about foreign capital was good.

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