More on MMT in the Tropics: or Can exchange rate instability, and zero interest rates, guarantee prosperity in the periphery?

 

Lance Taylor, Wynne Godley and myself in March 1999

Back in the 1990s (from late 1996 to early 1999 to be precise), I worked for Wynne Godley at the Levy Institute. Minsky, that I saw in Brazil once, had just passed away. Randy Wray was at the Levy at an office not far from Wynne's, where we worked on his model. I was, also, in Ed Nell's study group (Matt Forstater was a frequent visitor), that met regularly and discussed functional finance. In fact, one of the few topics that I was first exposed at the New School, rather than at my alma mater in Brazil.

Ed organized a conference on functional finance in 1997 (if memory doesn't fail me), then published as a book (see here), which in many ways was the beginning of what later would be called Modern Money Theory (note that at the core was Abba Lerner's functional finance). At dinner (at the Orozco Room) I sat at a table with Musgrave, Duesenberry, and, for a brief moment, Eisner, that had to leave early.* I think that was the first time I met Mosler.** Randy's MMT book came next year, in 1998 (I should note that I paid less attention to that book than his previous one, based on his PhD dissertation under Minsky, since I was at the time writing my own dissertation under Wynne and Lance Taylor, both pictured above on the day of my defense).

I start this, just to explain what should be obvious, that functional finance, endogenous money, and a preoccupation with full employment not only are part of my concerns, but that I learned, at least in part, some of these ideas more or less at the same time that they were being discussed and the MMT school was being formed. Mind you the notion of effective demand, and the perils of the external constraint, were things I already knew, but some of the issues with value theory and its importance for policy I also learned with Ed, and John Eatwell, at the New School. Further, on a personal note, I should clarify that while I worked for Wynne, who at the time was concerned with the growing external imbalances of the US, and the consequences for the international position of the dollar, I tended, on this topic to be closer to Randy's views, since it was clear for any one that came from the Federal University in Rio, and who had been influenced by Maria da Conceição Tavares, that the dollar was under no danger, and the US by definition didn't have an external constraint.

All of this to say, again, that in general, I do agree with the notion that autonomous spending determines income, and taxes being charged out of income, are the result of spending, and, as a result, the limit to fiscal policy is essentially political in nature. That is something that MMT has been instrumental in popularizing in the United States, and whenever I can, I do help on that (see my podcast with Stephanie Kelton, who was at Levy when I worked there, and started her PhD at the New School slightly after I did). She was here at Bucknell to discuss the documentary Finding the Money.

 

Stephanie at the Campus Theatre, Bucknell last March

This introduction, longish and winding, is to explain why it is somewhat weird to discuss this paper by Arturo Huerta, who I have met in Mexico, but do not know very well. This is difficult because it is a misrepresentation of the differences I do have with MMT. His paper is supposedly a rebuttal to some arguments that we have made with Esteban Pérez on Modern Money Theory (MMT). The paper is a mix of name calling (essentially that we are conventional or orthodox, read, neoclassical, and that we are neoliberals or aligned with them) and a series of arguments in defense of flexible exchange rate regimes as a solution for unemployment problems in peripheral countries. The title, "Exchange-Rate Stability Causes Deterioration of the Productive Sphere and Destabilizes Developing Economies," seems to go even further and advocate for exchange rate instability. For Minsky financial stability was destabilizing, for some MMT authors exchange rate stability causes underdevelopment and is also destabilizing.

In fact, this seems to be more a response to the critique, mine more than Esteban's, to Warren Mosler's proposal for Argentina (see below),* which would definitively cause more exchange rate instability,  inflation and a huge recession, than to our original discussion of MMT in developing countries. In fact, Huerta does not cite that paper, but our response to a poorly developed and somewhat misleading paper by Agustin Mario, that I discussed here, who said without any evidence that we defended supply side views of economic growth.

Mosler's plan consists of free float (which he says retains foreign reserves), a zero (yep, that is zero) interest rate irrespective of the rate of interest in the United States, and a Job Guarantee (JG) program. The rest is less relevant, at least for our purposes. I also assume some expansionary fiscal policy on top would be necessary for the JG.

 

Mosler's policy proposal for Argentina

Huerta's main point is that a flexible exchange rates would free the country to spend in domestic currency, very much like Mosler suggests, without loss of reserves, which developing should not be concerned with in the first place. He essentially argues along Wray's lines according to which: "a government does not need to fear that it will run out of foreign currency reserves (or gold reserves) for the simple reason that it does not convert its domestic currency to foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate" (from Wray's Modern money theory: a primer on macroeconomics for sovereign monetary: p. 161. It is still exactly like that in the 2024 edition).

The notion is that: "a floating currency provides more policy space – the ability to use domestic fiscal and monetary policy to achieve policy goals. By contrast, a fixed exchange rate reduces policy space" (Ibid.). Of course, a fixed exchange rate is not necessarily the same that a stable one, and the notion that allowing big devaluations is counter-productive. MMTeers may say, as I'm sure they will, we do not defend big devaluations. Maybe not explicitly, but if you keep low (zero interest rates), and do not intervene in the exchange rate market, that is, unavoidably, the consequence. Doing that will not retain reserves, and central banks should be concerned about reserves. Btw, Milei was able to reduce inflation drastically because he did intervene both in the official and the parallel exchange rate markets (and the loan from the IMF is essentially about recomposing reserves; more on that in another post).

Then comes the question of why you should be concerned with reserves, and here Huerta's position is somewhat puzzling, particularly for someone coming from a developing country. I quote here, he says: "Vernengo and Pérez (2021) do not consider that purchases of imported goods are paid for in the importing nation’s currency, accepted by the exporters so that they can make investments, acquire financial assets, and make purchases in that nation." He suggests that they would accept pesos. In this view, a country that is an oil importer, that cannot function without energy, can import oil in domestic currency. Good luck with that!

But even if we leave the realm of Latin American magical realism, an the notion that developing countries can import in its own currency the basic capital and intermediary goods that they need to maintain normal levels of activity, his view is full of problems. He accepts very conventional views about the exchange rate (while claiming that I do have orthodox views, which I never did, on fiscal austerity; on that, note that The Guardian quotes me twice, here and here, as being against austerity when many heterodox economists, some even arguably MMTeers, I might add, have been for austerity in Argentina, saying that the mistake of the Kirchners was their fiscal excesses).

His main argument is that a "flexible exchange rates are important ... for increasing the competitiveness of national productivity and reducing pressures upon the external sector." He repeats it,  saying that: "A flexible exchange rate improves competitiveness and promotes economic growth, thereby reducing the current account deficit." In other words, the flexible exchange rate does solve the external problem (Randy is always more careful about that, and I have not seen that argument in his work).

He says that: "the reason for MMT’s advocacy of flexible exchange rates is so that the exchange rates may adjust to differences between domestic prices and those of the principal trading partners. By allowing those adjustments, a nation can avoid the relative-price distortions that would affect national production." *** He notes, as I suggested above, that they are not for depreciation per se (yeah, but with a zero interest rate...), but that: "the predominant exchange rate stability (achieved by maintaining high interest rates, in order to promote capital inflow) has led to exchange rate appreciation, which is detrimental to the competitiveness of national production." In this, as we noted in our original paper with Esteban, they are very similar to Bresser-Pereira's New Developmentalism. In the concern with a competitive exchange rate, but with a tolerance, if not a promotion of exchange rate instability, which is inevitable with very low interest rates.

There are many other issues, which again reveal actual use of marginalist thinking, for example, he says: "In saying that low interest rates generate inflation, these authors presuppose that low rates increase demand, and that the economy is in full employment. However, Vernengo and Pérez do not consider the fact that low interest rates favor the growth of investment, production, and productivity." First of all, that misrepresents our views. Low interest rates, leading to a negative interest rate differential (when the local rate is lower than the US rate adjusted for risk) leads to depreciation, and higher costs of imported goods, and inflation even if the economy is below full employment (I published the model in a book edited by, wait for it ... Forstater and Wray). Inflation comes from distributive conflict, and a depreciation, by affecting the costs of production and reducing real wages, stokes inflation. Second of all, his point is that lower interest rates lead to higher investment, which is a marginalist view that associates the intensity of the use of capital with its remuneration, a problem Huerta and many Post Keynesians share with Keynes.**** I follow Sraffians and prefer to abandon marginalist principles.

Huerta puts emphasis on the role of investment as central for growth, and in the need of very low interest rates for that, irrespective of their effect on exchange rate instability. He actually says several times that exchange rate stability is a problem, and argues that: "economies that give priority to exchange-rate stability cannot employ flexible monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate growth." On this, my views are closer to Ricardo Summa, that notes that investment is not so unstable, and follows the accelerator, and that autonomous demand (the non capacity generating part of it) is central for explaining growth.

So one needs a managed exchange rate, to avoid the inflationary pressures, and one needs to be concerned with reserves to be able to avoid the perils of not being able to import essential goods, that would cause bottlenecks an impede growth. But Huerta knows that, as a friend noticed (see below).

As he says in his tweets, what would Mexico do if it runs out of dollars to buy corn? Why not use pesos instead then? I mean, I get that Vernengo did not consider that, but he is an orthodox economist, isn't he?

In other words, sometimes, and certainly not always, developing countries cannot pursue expansionist fiscal policies because they do NOT HAVE DOLLARS (there is a reason every country, even China, accumulated humongous reserves of dollars after 2008-9). In order to be able to do it, sometimes, higher rates are needed in the periphery (not so much in the US). Then expansionary fiscal policy can be pursued even with higher interest rates, and the economy would be able to grow (as would investment that would respond, not to the higher interest, but to higher levels of demand). Exchange rate competitiveness is not central for growth, and Latin America did its State-led, import substitution industrialization (that Huerta cites all the time) during Bretton Woods with a stable nominal exchange rate (Mexico had a fixed rate from 1954 to 1976; they call it stabilizing development). It was a period of high growth, and relatively stable and appreciated exchange rate.

* I did co-edit a book, that had what I think was the last paper written by Eisner and can be seen as a follow up to that conference (ours what out of a few sessions we co-organized at the Easterns in DC in 2004, on functional finance issues.

** Mosler was in Argentina and presented this in several venues, including, at the University of Moreno, where someone questioned the idea that flexible rates with zero interested was feasible, and correctly noted that it would be inflationary and contractionary. He proceeded to ask if the person worked with me, as the story was related to me. As if my position on this is somewhat unique and someone that suggests that it doesn't make sense is my disciple.

*** Note that for Huerta exchange rates change relative prices and allow to fix distortions, in typical marginalist fashion. The emphasis is not on the effects on distribution and through that on quantities, as in structuralist views.

**** This blog is known for emphasizing the Sraffian critique of the marginalist theory of investment (very old post on that).

The New School for Social Research at 100: A view from the Econ. Dept.

From a late 1990s catalogue; Lance Taylor (center), and also in no particular order

and from what I can remember (Ellen Houston, Adalmir Marquetti, myself (with goaty

on the left side), Margaret Duncan, Josh Bivens and Carlos Bastos (Orozco Room)

The New School for Social Research was founded 100 years ago by a group of academics dissatisfied with the direction of American high education. Economics was central to the early history of the New School, and my brief, very incomplete, and certainly idiosyncratic historical account emphasizes the Economics Department of what used to be called the Graduate Faculty.

Thorstein Veblen, one of the founders, had written his famous Higher Learning in America, which in a sense is the original critique of the corporate university. The idea was to put learning at the center, and avoid the conventional trappings of universities, with no degrees provided to students. The foundations of the critical perspectives provided at the New School came from institutionalists (like Veblen), pragmatists, represented by another prominent founder, namely John Dewey, and revisionism in history, with Charles Beard as its main voice at the new institution. Many came from Columbia University and were dissatisfied with both institutions of higher education and the direction the country had taken, in particular with World War I. These were mostly anti-war, progressive social scientists.

Perhaps the key person at the inception of the New School was Alvin Johnson, a somewhat difficult to classify economist (Gonçalo Fonseca at the HET website suggests that he might be seen as Austrian), that has been almost completely forgotten. Johnson was the editor of the massive Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, later substituted by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (last edition under Sandy Darity, and I have two entries on Export Promotion and James Mill), which put him in contact with several economists around the world, many in Germany.

A group of scholars that he met as the editor of the encyclopedia was the basis for the so-called University in Exile, which eventually was the basis for the Graduate Faculty, the division that now still is called the New School for Social Research (while the whole is just The New School, if I do understand the naming changes at my alma mater). The most important and cohesive group of economists that arrived at the New School in 1933, and the following years, escaping persecution in Nazi Germany, were the ones related to the Kiel School, including Gerhard Colm (on Colm I co-authored this paper with Luca Fiorito), Adolph Lowe, Jacob Marschak, and Hans Neisser. In that group, Lowe, the mentor to Robert Heilbroner, was to be the more consequential for the New School.

The New School was not orthodox in its economic teaching, but the 1930s were a period of flux in the profession at any rate. The Keynesian Revolution was in course, and Keynes was acquainted with Johnson and the New School, as it can be seen in the letter he gave to H. G. Bab (see below; click to amplify). In that sense, while it is true that the place was somewhat unorthodox, given its origins and the historical period in question, that should not be exaggerated. Note that Marschak went on to be the head of the Cowles Commission, and a leading mainstream economist. While at the New School he supervised Franco Modigliani's doctoral thesis, which was the basis for his famous neoclassical synthesis paper of an ISLM model with rigid wages and for his Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.

The New School, more enjoyable and compatible people than at Columbia, for sure (click to enlarge)

I say this because there is a tendency to think of the New School as being always heterodox, and taking that term to have more or less a contemporary meaning (for what I mean about that go here; for a great and more in depth discussion see this post by Ingrid Kvangraven and Carolina Alves). Many others taught at the New School in this period, perhaps, worth mentioning is the case of Abba Lerner, the main author of the functional finance school (something that is at the core of Modern Money Theory, but is more restrictive and specific than MMT).

The Kiel School was what one could term eclectic. They certainly had roots on elements of the German Historical School, and readings of marginalist and non-marginalist authors, including Marxists. Gonçalo puts Tugan-Baranovsky as one of the influences on the Kiel School. Tugan, a "semi-critic of Marx" according to Schumpeter, argued that a disproportion between the investment and consumption goods sectors would lead to recurrent industrial crises, and that notion of structural imbalances was central for Kiel authors. Leontief was also connected to the Kiel School.

While many in the Kiel School were open to and used marginalist concepts, as in the case of institutionalists, not all were neoclassical, and Lowe's views arguably were the most clearly connected to the works of the old classical political economists. Ed Nell, in the appendix to Lowe's book The Path of Economic Growth compares it with Leontief, Von Neumann, and Sraffa, as being classically inspired. One can think of Ed's Transformational Growth research program as building on that tradition.

But it would be a stretch to suggest that Bob Heilbroner, Lowe's main disciple at the New School, and the next key person in the history of the Economics Department at the Graduate Faculty, was a follower of classical political economy. A cursory reading of his classic, The Worldly Philosophers, shows that his reading of Smith is perfectly compatible modern mainstream readings, which imply that Smith was a precursor of supply and demand theories. The chapter on Smith discusses the law of markets, but the labor theory of value only makes an appearance in the chapter on Marx, and to suggest that it was a deviation from Smith and Ricardo. The degree to which Heilbroner conflates classical and marginalist or neoclassical theory is clear in that he argues that the Walrasian circular-flow in Schumpeter's theory resembles Ricardo's stationary state. And in the discussion of Schumpeter's notion of profit he suggests, regarding the labor theory of value, that "everyone knew to be wrong and therefore did not have to be reckoned with."*

Further, his views on economic growth, as evidenced in his book on the economics history of the Unites States, were essentially that growth was supply-side constrained and dependent on technological innovation, in ways that seem to be closer to his Harvard undergraduate teacher, Joseph Schumpeter, than classical political economy authors (Smith had arguably a demand driven view of growth, while Ricardo most certainly didn't, and Marx is open to many different views; I'll keep that to another post). I emphasize this to show that even if he was unorthodox in many ways Bob was not necessarily what we would term heterodox in the modern sense of the word (even if taken loosely as not being neoclassical).** In my view, no clear heterodox bias existed up to the 1960s, in a department that had basically been under the shadow of three economists, Johnson, Lowe and Heilbroner. Note that this somewhat eclectic persistence of different approaches was more or less common in many departments at that time.

But the Johnson-Lowe-Heilbroner nexus provided the basis for the changes that shaped the department with the arrival of Ed Nell in the late 1960s. Ed had worked with Hicks at Oxford, and he was from early on critical of methodological individualism, something that is clear from his critique of the concept of the rational economic man. More importantly he was concerned with growth, and that led to a discussion of the theories of value and distribution (perhaps influenced by Hicks' Capital and Growth, which remains an important book), and was influenced by Sraffa's revival of classical political economy. It was after Ed arrived that a series of new hires, among them Stephen Hymer, Anwar Shaikh, and David Gordon, changed the department. Note that the late 1960s and early 1970s too is the period in which the economics profession segregates the heterodox groups, makes it harder for radicals to get tenure in conventional and prestigious departments (e.g. Sam Bowles at Harvard), and publishing requires the foundation of new journals (e.g Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, and the Cambridge Journal of Economics).

In my view, it is no coincidence that this is also when the change in the notion of equilibrium, as discussed by Garegnani, takes place (some discussion of that here). The point is that the capital debates had shown the limits of marginalist (neoclassical) economics, and the profession embraced what I have referred to as vulgar economics after that. The hiring of heterodox economists, critical of the mainstream in this period, and the sociology of academia, locked in heterodox hegemony at the Econ. Dept. of the Graduate Faculty.

Many other heterodox economists taught at the New School's Econ. Dept. from that point onwards. I might note Paul Sweezy, which if I'm not wrong was instrumental in making Bob Pollin choose the New School for his PhD, was among the teachers in the 1970s. And also many Sraffians like Piero Garegnani, John Eatwell, taught on a recurring basis, while many were visitors for shorter periods. Again, somewhat idiosyncratically, in my view it is the arrival of Lance Taylor in 1993 and a few years later of Duncan Foley that consolidated the persistence of the heterodoxy, and the type of heterodox department (with a mix of structural Keynesianism and Marxism), that the New School has today.

Perhaps, it is important to emphasize how limited this story is. There is a missing story about the role of David Gordon, who was also a key player in the department for many decades, and of Anwar Shaikh, that I always saw as somewhat of an influential outsider (maybe I'm wrong), even by the New School standards. And also the many other wonderful and creative heterodox economists that passed through the New School over the years. There is a question about the gender imbalances at the New School, and within heterodoxy itself, that I do not address. I'll explicitly avoid saying any additional names, since in this way I cannot be accused of forgetting someone (I'm leaving out a ton, including the many alumni that went on to remarkable careers). Hopefully this provides a window on how the New School became heterodox and why it remains so.

* It should be noted that Bob's book was published in 1953, a few years before the labor theory of value was rehabilitated by Sraffa's Production of Commodities.

** On a personal note, I remember talking to Bob on an interval of a conference organized by Ed Nell on functional finance, in 1997, I think, in which he argued that the Maastricht limits (3 per cent for deficits, and 60 per cent for debt) were reasonable measures to constrain the size of government. He was a liberal in an older sense of the word, perhaps.

Seymour Harris on Post War Public Debt

Seymour E. Harris, 1897-1975

Seymour Edwin Harris was one of the pioneers of Keynesian economics in the US. He worked in the Office of Price Administration during the War, which was headed at some point by John Kenneth Galbraith, and was the chair of Harvard's Economics department. Galbraith suggests that: "President John F. Kennedy, shortly before he was killed, told of his intention of making Harris his next appointment to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System." That was not meant to be.

His views on public debt show how widespread the ideas that would be labeled Functional Finance by Abba Lerner were among Keynesians in the 1940s. Most of the quotes below come from a paper on "Postwar Public Debt." The paper is in the book Postwar Economic Problems that he edited and is available here.

Note that there was no doubt that more debt was necessary to fund public investment in the post-war period. He says:

"We must not, therefore, be deterred from public invest­ment by these alarmists, if the postwar situation calls for public investment. Above all, we should assess the rising public debt in terms of the economy which must support it. There is no danger in a rising public debt which provides the income to finance it, or which grows in a developing economy."

An important point, often missed in current discussions of public debt, is that debts can be rolled over, and repayment is unnecessary. In fact, repayment might be a terrible idea and lead to deflationary forces and economic contraction.

"In answer to the contention that a permanent debt is a breach of faith, it is suggested that the obligation of the government is merely to provide the cash value of the bond on the date of maturity: the cash required may be obtained through sales of new bonds. Repayment of debt, moreover, may have deflationary effects; and the more impressed one is by the theory that our economy tends to stagnate, the more objectionable is the repayment of debt."

Further, accumulation of debt is not a problem. In an even more stark way than what Lerner would suggest later, Harris says that there might not be a clear limit to the amount of debt.

"Accumulation of debt will not bring ultimate collapse if the economy continues to grow. Tax capacity increases with the rise of income; and so long as the rise of debt charges is kept well within the limits set by a rising trend of income and capacity to pay taxes, no fears need be felt concerning a rising public debt.
...
In one sense, there is no limit to the growth of public debt, for, as debt charges rise, the taxation of holders of this debt may rise at an equal rate."

Finally, accumulation of debt does not bring the end of capitalism (one might argue the other way round, without debt, no capitalism) and the risk of inflation is minimal. 

"It may be a shock to many to learn that a public debt of $4,000 billion may be carried by the economy without a collapse of the capitalist system, a repudiation of the debt, or a great inflation. Yet the arithmetic of the problem suggests this conclusion."

He later qualifies suggesting that some inflation would take place if the economy approaches full employment. Note that at this point, in 1943, the fears were that after the war the situation of the 1930s, with economies struggling with unemployment would become the norm again. The famous paper by Samuelson suggesting exactly that is in this volume too.

In essence all of his predictions were correct. Expansion of debt did not lead to the collapse of capitalism in the US, or to high inflation (which occurred in the 1970s, but for other reasons, when debt was much lower in terms of GDP than in the 1940s). In fact, the capacity to repay grew so much, that as a share of GDP debt payments dwindled.  A good lesson, other than how to use Excel, for Reinhart and Rogoff.

PS: Hat tip to Nahuel Guaita.

Big government, functional finance and debt sustainability

Teaching the fiscal policy classes of my intermediate macro course. One of the few things that is still not well understood and discussed in manuals is functional finance. Froyen's manual, which is otherwise an old textbook similar to Dornbusch and Fischer or Gordon or any 1970s manual (meaning with short run ISLM and Phillips curve first, and then growth), includes in the policy discussion Partisan Theory and Public Choice, but not Functional Finance or any heterodox approach.

Partisan Theory, developed by Douglas Hibbs, builds on an old idea by Kalecki that political and ideological elements would affect the business cycle. Left of center governments would lead to higher government spending and lower unemployment, and conservative governments would be concerned with inflation, and tend to promote fiscal adjustment. Public choice, more dramatically, suggested that politicians would be guided by selfish desire for re-election, which would lead to a permanent bias for deficits, and accumulation of debt. Big government, and Keynesian ideas, that had unleashed the monster, or so thought James Buchanan, one of the leaders of the Public Choice School, had to be constrained by balanced budget amendments.

When one looks at the data for the United States it is fairly clear that over the last forty something years it has been Republicans that have expanded deficits.

Deficit (% GDP)

In the graph you can see that with Carter (1977-1980), Clinton (1993-2000) and Obama (2009 to 2012 in the graph) the deficit as a share of GDP has fallen, while it did increase with all Republicans [note that with Reagan they increase, and then fall after taxes were raised]. Also, if you have any doubts, Republicans are the party of big government when it comes to spending.

Government Spending (% GDP)

The graph above shows that also spending actually falls with the three Democrats, and increases with the four Republicans (Ford, Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II). This switch on Democratic and Republican views on fiscal issues was discussed here. Obviously there are important differences between the old Democrats, from the New Deal and Kennedy/Johnson era, that wanted big government for social purposes, and the kind of big government promoted by the GOP.

Also, the political economy of why the GOP is for big government, has less to do with Partisan Theory or Public Choice, and more with the starve-the-beast theory, according to which if you cut taxes, then government will eventually be forced to cut spending.

Functional finance, an idea introduced by Abba Lerner, that could be seen as the extension of Keynesian ideas to fiscal policy (Keynes actually had little to say in the General Theory, were he refers vaguely to the socialization of investment rather than fiscal deficits), suggests that deficits should be judged on the basis of their function in the economy. Deficits that promote growth, and take place in an environment of low rates of interest, not only would be sustainable, but would be necessary to promote full employment.

By the way, by historical standards the US net debt (held by the public, i.e. not in the hands of the Fed or the Social Security Trust Fund) is not high at around 70% of GDP, below the peak at the end of the Great Depression and World-War II.

Net Public Debt (% GDP)

The debt-to-GDP ratio did increase after the 1980s, basically as a result of higher deficits on average (both the starve the beast, and more recently the massive recession), but also because until the collapse of the housing bubble rates of interest were on average higher than rates of growth of the economy. The debt-to-GDP ratio did fall in the late 1990s, as a result of the Clinton surpluses.

Mind you, two important points must be noted. First, historically the period in which rates of interest were consistently below growth rates was during the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism, roughly the post-war period up to the 1970s. In other words, in normal times the economy is in the wrong side of Domar's sustainability condition [that the rate of growth of the ability to repay, economic growth, should be higher than the growth of debt, that is, the rate of interest]. That didn't preclude governments to run deficits and accumulate debt. Note that governments have one advantage over private agents, when it comes to spending, namely: government spending is sufficiently large that by increasing general income it leads to higher tax revenue and an increase of its own income.

The second point, for those concerned with the size of the debt, is that the recession, and the collapse of the bubble have created the political conditions for a low rate of interest, which would be very hard to reverse in the medium term. That is, the Fed is unlikely to hike rates while unemployment remains high. Which basically provides space for fiscal deficits and debt on a relatively cheap basis. Of course chances of that happening are a completely different question.

Robert Skidelsky on Hayek, Keynes and Common Sense

Robert Skidelsky at a Liberty Fund event, not too long ago. Note that in the opening remarks he says: "I'm going to talk about the conditions of liberty, which seems a good topic of conversation for a Liberty Fund event. Owing to the hazards of the weather, I find myself the sole representative of common sense this afternoon." Not sure what the weather conditions had to do with it, but I must agree, given the venue.

The whole thing here. My only major disagreement is that I really do not think that Hayek is the great rival of Keynes, or even one of the major economists of the 20th century, given his contributions. On the neoclassical front, Hicks, Modigliani, by bringing neoclassical results in the long run, but opening space for Keynesian policies in the short run, associated to rigidities an imperfections, and even Friedman, with the return of the concept of the natural rate, were more relevant than Hayek.

Who was Keynes great rival? While he was alive his debates were with his Cambridge peers, Pigou and Robertson, more than with Robbins, Hayek and the LSE economists. In fact, a good chunk of the younger LSE economists became, in different degrees, Keynesian (e.g. Hicks, Kaldor, Lerner, and even Shackle). But if I had to say, his great rival was himself, which would probably fit his very elevated sense of self-worth. In particular, his inability of getting rid of marginalist (neoclassical) elements of his theory is what ultimately opened the door for the Neoclassical Synthesis.

When were we Keynesians?

From a policy point of view, in the United States, the two common periods associated with the ascendancy of Keynesianism are right after the so-called Roosevelt recession in 1937-38, when Currie and Eccles and other fiscal expansionists got the upper hand in the dispute with Morgenthau and the deficit hawks, and the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut in 1964, when the New Economics became dominant in the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), during Walter Heller's chairmanship, when James Tobin (among others) was a staff member.

And it is correct that in both periods expansionary fiscal policies, which are broadly Keynesian, were actually pursued. But it would be a mistake to think that Keynesian ideas actually won the day, and became common sense among policy makers and the political elites in the US. In fact, while Keynesian ideas and Keynesian economists became dominant for short periods, for the most part political elites remained firmly conventional and remained wedded to sound finance ideas. Without World War II and then the Cold War, which allowed for some type of Military Keynesianism, Keynesian ideas would not have had a chance.

In theory too, while Keynesian ideas associated to the possibility of unemployment in the short run became dominant, the reason was not Keynes' own explanation that this would be the normal, long term situation, associated even to a situation with wage and price flexibility. Unemployment was seen as an imperfection, something that required in the short run a brief stimulus, but that did not have significant long term effect. Hence, by the 1950s if small deficits in recessions or war periods would be acceptable for politicians, they were certainly not seen as desirable as a longer term instrument for economic development.

Domar, Lerner and other Functional Finance authors, that took Keynes' fiscal ideas to their logical conclusion never became dominant. In a sense, we can say that we were never truly Keynesian. Only by the 1970s a sort of perverse Keynesianism would eventually prevail within one of the wings of the Republican Party. Supply-siders would argue that lower taxes, not as a result of its multiplier effects, but as a result of the incentives to invest, would lead to higher growth, hence deficits were not a problem. This was embraced by some more mainstream Republicans also, as a way of promoting the 'Starve the Beast' strategy, i.e. cut taxes in a boom, and force welfare cuts in a crisis (any similarity with current events is totally not a coincidence).

On the other hand, most Democrats, which were never particularly Keynesian, moved away even from a short term defense of anti-cyclical fiscal policy. For that reason we should not be surprised that austerity, and sound finance ideas have gained so much traction in recent debates about the Great Recession, and why we should continue to have a very slow recovery.

PS: The significant victory of Keynesians was less about the consensus on anti-cyclical fiscal policy than the implementation of programs that established automatic stabilizers, like unemployment insurance.

PS2: Krugman today says that the austerian's position has imploded with the Rogoff-Reinhart debacle. Also, he shows that most Americans actually are not concerned about deficits, but the wealthy are. I guess politicians respond to the wealthy then. Like in gun control, what the majority wants does not necessarily translate into policy.

Reasonable liberals and conservatives, unreasonable economics

The ambiguously liberal/conservative duo, Joe Scarborough and Jeff Sachs, self-denominated reasonable (what Krugman refers to as 'serious' people), suggest that we need austerity in their WAPO op-ed. Forget for a second the inconsistencies of Scarborough, the conservative in the duo. What I find incredible is that Sachs continues to push the fiction that he is a liberal in the American sense of the word, meaning progressive or lefty, rather than a right wing neoliberal.

Let's not forget that Jeff Sachs is Dr. Shock Therapy,* a doctrine that suggested that budget deficits should be cut to control inflation, and that deregulated markets would promote growth and development, and that he applied in Bolivia, Poland and Russia, among other countries. The collapse and failure in these countries foreshadowed the failures of the so-called Washington Consensus. Forget also the institutional problems Sachs had regarding his advice in Russia [note that he did not have the same legal problems that led his collegue "Andrei Shleifer, whose misbehavior cost Harvard something like $25 million in damages, plus another $10 million or $15 million in legal fees," according to David Warsh].

The really incredible thing is that they try to argue, on the basis, of their reasonable principles, that we need austerity. They put Dick Cheney's and the right wing supply-siders that sometimes say that deficits do not matter, in their view because the supply side effects of higher productivity (entrepreneurship) brought by lower taxes would produce growth and higher revenue, together with Krugman and other Keynesians that suggest with full support of the evidence that spending does have positive effects on the level of activity. Note that in the second case Keynesians, and even further Functional Finance people (following Abba Lerner) would not suggest that deficits do not matter. What they suggest is that the way you spend and tax matters. So deficits could be bad or good, depending on what causes them. Higher deficits caused by tax cuts for the wealthy and to support wars of choice abroad, are not the same that deficits to reconstruct infrastructure and promote full employment.

But the incredible thing is that they (Scarborough and Sachs) try to claim that Keynes would have been against fiscal expansion now. Yes, Keynes was indeed for some fiscal restraint, but that was during the war, when deficits were above 20%, and not in the middle of the recovery.

For more on Sachs long and strange career read the following article by Doug Henwood at the Left Business Observer.

* He actually gave the Tanner Lecture at the University of Utah on Poland's shock therapy. I was not there in 1994, I should add. By the way, at that time he actually still thought that shock therapy was a success story. Oh well.

The Economist is Cartalist

Well not really, but they do cite the Cartalist approach of Charles Goodhart and wonder about it and the meaning for US dollar hegemony. They contrast Cartalism (or Chartalism) with the marginalist approach of Menger, but do not cite Georg Knapp or Abba Lerner or Keynes (of the Treatise on Money) as precursors of Goodhart, or any MMT author for that matter, following the tradition that the acceptable critiques of the mainstream have to come from within. Interestingly the specific take of the piece, the relation of Cartalism and dollar hegemony, has been the theme of our posts (here, here and here), and at least one paper. What are these guys reading?

PS: The classic book by Knapp on Chartalism is available here.

Debt dynamics for dummies

Krugman again does a great job showing that the risks of explosive debt are way overblown.  As he says:

"So even with substantial deficits, the pace of long-term budget worsening is very slow."

It is not difficult to understand debt dynamics.  The ratio of debt to income (GDP) is a measure of the capacity to repay debt.  If the economy grows faster than debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls.  GDP grows with demand expansion, and debt grows at the pace of the interest on the debt.  In other words, if the economy grows faster than the rate of interest, then the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall even if the government runs deficits.

The graph below shows the growth rate and the real rate of interest on government bonds for the US since 1990.  As it can be seen, since 2003, with the exception of the Great Recession, the rate of interest has been below the rate of growth.

The debt-to-GDP ratio has only increased (see graph below), because the crisis has caused significant deficits to accumulate.  Note that in the 1990s, a combination of lower interest rates, higher growth and fiscal surpluses had stabilized debt, which starting growing in the Reagan years.

Finally, note the growing deficits in the figure below have reversed with a very mild recovery in 2010. Interest will remain low. What is needed is a stronger recovery to get growth going and that would increase revenue (allow for reduced spending on several things like unemployment insurance) and eventually lead to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.

The way out of the fiscal problems is growing!  Even dummies should get this right.

Monetization of debt: what does it do? Krugman and Rognlie on MMT

Again in a previous post I suggested I would deal with the issue, which seems to be apropos, since there has been a certain discussion in the blogosphere about the so-called Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) approach (see here, here and here). First, I should clarify that the discussion to which I refer tends to conflate two different issues. One is the question that I will deal here, what are the constraints faced by the government in managing its budget, and the approach associated with MMT in this case is basically what used to be called functional finance, a tradition that harks back to Abba Lerner and Evsey Domar, and to which Keynes eventually agreed.

The other issue is related to the causality between money and economic activity, and is part of what in more modern times has been called endogenous money. The debates on this issue are older than the Bullionist/Anti-bullionist and Currency/Banking schools, and in modern times the endogenous money (anti-bullionist-banking) view was developed by Nicholas Kaldor and Basil Moore among other names. The reason the two issues tend to be conflated is that printing money is one way to finance government spending, and there is a traditional connection between sound finance and monetarist (exogenous money) views.

First, it is clear that if debt is denominated in domestic currency default per se is NOT possible, simply because the government can always monetize the debt. So the question is not whether the government has a budget constraint (what’s the meaning of a constraint if you can print money anyway), as Matt Rognlie says (he gets worked up by this, and affirms that: “MMT is wrong on money … The government does have a budget constraint”). Unless he denies monetization of debt is always possible (there might be political problems, but it is technically possible) in domestic currency, he needs to explain what is the constraint. Otherwise the question is really related to the consequences of monetization. By the way, that is the same confusion made by Krugman. He says:

“As I understand the MMT position, it is that the only thing we need to consider is whether the deficit creates excess demand to such an extent to be inflationary. The perceived future solvency of the government is not an issue.”

Again, what could be the solvency issue if the debt is denominated in a currency that the government controls? He may have issues with the consequences of printing money, but not with the fact that money can be printed. So solvency is NOT, and cannot be an issue. What are the consequences of monetizing debt then?

Long ago the authors of the Banking school (e.g. Thomas Tooke) noted that if more money is pumped into the system agents would spend the money or pay their debts (the second case is known as the reflux mechanism). If they pay previous debt, the money has no effect on the level of activity. On the other hand, if they spend and firms have extra capacity output must increase. Note that firms normally have extra capacity, and can produce more at the same price, contrary to the textbook (U-shaped) cost curves.

But what if the economy is at full capacity? Then it is clear that excess demand may have an impact on prices (or, if instead of monetization, the government prints more debt agents may demand higher rate of interest to hold it). The question then is whether the economy is at full employment and what determines full capacity, not whether monetization is always inflationary (which clearly would only be the case if the economy was always at full capacity; unless Krugman and Rognlie agree with Lucas, this could not be the case for them).

However, note that it has been accepted that the supply constraint is variable (the mainstream refers to it as the Time Varying Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment or TV-NAIRU). The important question regarding monetization is what determines this supply constraint that imposes an inflation barrier to demand expansion, what Friedman referred to as the natural rate of unemployment (note that natural was meant to suggest that policy cannot affect it).

Here it is also important to note that one component of demand, investment, does have an impact on the supply side. In other words, investment has a dual effect, it is a component of demand (more sales of equipment) and it creates more supply capacity in the future (when the equipment is installed). So, as the economy grows, firms try to adjust their capacity to demand, so as to keep up with the economy, and avoid loosing market share to competition. This suggests that one of the reasons for the variation of the supply constraint is the expansion of demand itself.

It should be noted that this does not mean that the supply constraint is never reached, but it is clearly a rare phenomenon. The graph below shows unemployment in the United States from 1929 to 2011. Only in four occasions did the annual average unemployment fall below 4%, in the mid-1940s, the early 1950s, the late 1960s and the late 1990s (all during Democratic administrations, by the way, with the exception of 1953).

Inflation did accelerate in the first three, when the economy, because of war efforts (WW-II, Korea and Vietnam), was most likely close to full employment (I’m more skeptical about the 1960s, since inflation really picks up in the 1970s, and oil shocks where more important than full employment), but not in the last. Even in those cases, only in the first public debt was actually growing, and the size of the deficits (more than 20%) was incredibly large.  Interest rates did not increase significantly in any of these episodes either (this seems to be Rognlie bone with MMT).

This is the evidence that is used to suggest that governments have a constraint and beyond that inflation ensues? And that is taken as serious thinking on money and deficits! I would agree with Robert Vienneau that this is “unjustifiably arrogant” dismissal of MMT, to say the least.  Part of what I have referred to as the incredible persistency of monetarist views (even among more progressive economists).

It's not the size, but how you use it: A note on the debt-ceiling limit

According to the New York Times we barely averted the government shutdown to move on to the war over the debt-ceiling limit. Tim Geithner has argued that the government will hit, no later than May 16, the federal debt-ceiling limit of US$ 14,2 trillion. In fact, contrary to what one might expect the debt-ceiling limit is often increased. The question, of course, is whether the increase in debt vis-à-vis the capacity to repay, normally measuring debt as a share of GDP, is of such magnitude that the economy is doomed.

When we hit the limit, federal public debt will be slightly below the 100% mark. Historically, is not the highest debt-to-GDP level in the US, neither unprecedented by historical standards. The graph below shows British debt-to-GDP from 1692 to 2011.

The peak in British debt, at the end of the Napoleonic wars, was about 260%, and it had grown consistently during the 18th century. David Hume argued in 1752 that: “either the Nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the Nation.” He was obviously wrong (that’s probably why his theories are still taught by economists!). Not only public debt, which is what he meant by public credit, did not bankrupt the UK, but also it allowed for an Industrial Revolution and the victory in the hegemonic wars against France. A pile of debt laid the foundations for the Victorian economy boom and world dominance.

Note that during the 18th century the UK had higher taxes to pay for the higher debt levels than France, but interest rates were considerably lower, which implied that the burden of debt (interest payments out of total spending) was not much bigger than in France. James MacDonald has a very good book on the British debt history.

This suggests that more important than the growing debt-to-GDP ratio in the US is how it is used, and how it is funded. The function of the deficits and debt is more important than the size, as Abba Lerner argued. Hence, if we spend money to create jobs (e.g. remaking the infrastructure) and tax the rich rather then cut spending on programs for the poor, increasing the debt-ceiling limit should be a no-brainer.