Capital controls in the US?

In a recent Financial Times op-ed, Michael Pettis argued that the US should impose capital controls. In his view, the traditional view according to which capital inflows necessarily lower domestic interest rates and spur productive investment is based on a misunderstanding of how capital flows affect modern economies. This might have been true for rapidly growing developing economies with high investment needs and limited domestic savings, where foreign capital truly relieved a saving constraint. However, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, modern financial systems can expand credit largely unconstrained. In this environment, capital inflows into advanced economies like the US, do not primarily finance new, productive investments.

In the modern context, capital inflows often lead to an increase in household or fiscal debt. Policymakers use this credit growth to sustain domestic demand and prevent recessions that would otherwise be caused by the leakage of demand abroad due to trade deficits. This is a "beggar thy neighbour" dynamic -- a term coined by Joan Robinson, and the reason she appears in the FT piece, even though she was referring to competitive depreciation and trade restrictions, not capital flows -- where trade deficits are caused by shifts in spending to foreign goods, forcing domestic businesses to reduce output. Further, this reliance on rising household or fiscal debt to absorb foreign capital inflows and the resulting trade deficits is unsustainable in the long run. It leads to rising debt levels and distorted economic structures. He concludes that restricting capital inflows would directly address the problem of aligning a country's external position with its domestic needs.

There are many problems with these views. On a theoretical level, he does suggest, as Vicky Chick in a paper that Lance Taylor liked and used in his courses, in the earlier period savings was necessary for investment. Essentially Say's Law. That is certainly not the case. Even in the 19th century, with less developed financial markets, banks had the ability to create credit, and savings (a flow) did not finance investment. Also, interest rates do not depend on the capital flows and the available funds, and are essentially an exogenous variable controlled to a great extent by the monetary authority (that was true in the past too).

More importantly, it is unclear that the external situation of the US, indebted in its own currency is unsustainable. What is the problem that this would be solving? There is no fiscal problem either, irrespective of the downgrade of US debt by Moody's recently (Standard & Poor's and Fitch had done it years ago). In fact, capital controls would affect the international role of the dollar and would be a major misstep, since it would directly affect the ability of foreigners to use dollars, and restrict its use in international financial markets. Not that this would have any chance of happening with Bessent, a Wall Street operator, as Treasury Secretary.

Private debt (not public) is considerably more dangerous than public debt, since when the government gets indebted, if it uses the money to promote growth, it directly affects its ability to pay back the debt, since its revenue is tied to the level of economic activity. That is why public debt tends to fall not by cutting spending and promoting adjustment and reducing the amount of debt, but by promoting growth and reducing the relevance of debt with respect to ability to repay. So, Pettis is not incorrect in noting that the US has depended more on private debt, which is riskier. But capital controls would do little to limit this dynamic. Policies that expand the remuneration (wages) of the people at the bottom (i.e. better income distribution) and that are more lenient with private debtors would have better results.

Regulation of financial markets too should play a role. In particular, the predatory lending practices that are still rampant in the US more than a decade and half after the 2008-9 financial crisis. But in all fairness, if there is something the US can do to grow faster and avoid financial problems, it would simply be more spending (perhaps a mix of infrastructure and social transfers) and lower interest rates. One can hope.

Servaas Storm on Lance Taylor

Lance Taylor in Beijing (with me, center), 2001

Full paper for download here. From Duncan Foley's recollection cited in the paper.

Lance had what one might call a casual approach to every-day dress, though he appeared for public talks well turned out even with rather jaunty accessories. It was not unusual, however,for him to appear in his office in the working clothes of a Maine farmer. On some of these occasions, particularly when travel delays or cancellations disrupted work plans, I would try to persuade Lance that graduate students were at least as interesting as goats in the hopes of getting him to spend more time in New York, but I made no headway on this issue.

I don't know if I was as interesting as a goat, but I do recall a dinner after some late talk at CEPA, in which Duncan and Lance discussed about goats and whether they did have souls. Worth reading if you are interested in alternative macro views, and the legacy of someone diametrically opposed to Robert Lucas Jr, who also passed away recently (on my views on Lucas go here).

Lance Taylor (1940-2022) and his legacy

With Lance in Beijing (2001)

I took Lance’s macro class in the Fall of 1995 at the New School for Social Research (NSSR), and then was his Teaching Assistant for two years. The book we formally used was Income Distribution, Inflation and Growth: Lectures on Structuralist Macroeconomic Theory, in which the terms (not the concepts) for wage-led and profit-led economies were first used (at least that's what I think; profit-led does not appear in the index, I must note). But classes were based on his notes, on what became his next book Reconstructing Macroeconomics (he thanked me for all the input in my copy; I had to learn how to read his handwriting, which was not easy). In many ways, my thinking was influenced more by the Sraffian professors at the NSSR, both John Eatwell (I was also his TA in the micro class) and Ed Nell (who really was the first to discuss functional finance in my classes), in part because the blend of Cambridge left-of-center Keynesianism and Latin American Structuralism, that Lance exposed, was more familiar to me coming from Brazil.

My plan was to work on inflation theory (and I did write a conflict model, that can be seen as being in Lance’s tradition later on; in my view his best book is the one that is less formal, and is on inflation, his Marshall Lecture at Cambridge, Varieties of Stabilization Experience; at the time I first read it I didn't know that the title was a quote from Henry James; the other candidate is his book with Eatwell Global Finance at Risk. Both are more books than manuals). But I started working with Wynne Godley on his stock-flow model for the joint Center for Economic and Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Levy Economic Institute project. A year into the project I told Lance that it would make sense if I worked on something related to the project, namely the sustainability of the US external account. Lance was very nice about it, and not only went along, but also provided funding, since I received CEPA’s dissertation grant.

I ended up writing something that was very close to Massimo Pivetti’s monetary theory of distribution. The theory at least. Lance provided comments and feedback, and, at some point, told me that I was obsessed with this monetary distribution thing (I was, indeed). But he also provided support, and his criticism was always constructive. Lance was the best supervisor one could have. He guided the work with frequent conversations, read and criticized what I gave him to read, and, after it passed certain standards, approved it, even if it wasn't exactly a Lance Taylor dissertation. He never tried to mold my thinking, or force me to work on own his terms. Sadly, that isn’t the norm in academia. I think he had been lucky with his supervisor too. He once spoke fondly of Hollis Chenery (his supervisor; not his mentor, which I think was Rosenstein-Rodan; I might be wrong), because he protected the radicals, which were under pressure in the late 1960s at Harvard. His intellectual generosity, among several other qualities, is something that will be deeply missed.

Lance was open to alternative methods, and approaches, what he called closures (certainly more than I am), and his comparative method was influenced by other disciplines, the qualitative "thick descriptions" a la Clifford Geertz that he liked. I actually ended up reading a bit of Geertz because of my conversations with Lance, particularly when I was the assistant director at CEPA (he was the director) and he organized a book on several comparative studies of liberalization in peripheral countries (the one on Brazil, which was supposed to appear in a previous volume, and should have been written by Edward Amadeo, was eventually written by me; photo above is from one of the conferences that led to that book). Geertz saw anthropology, as he famously put it, "not [as] an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." The thick description was essentially the interpretive work of the ethnographer. Lance took that view, in some sense, of economics, blending the description of the historical and institutional features of peripheral countries, with relatively simple models in what Paul Krugman (a co-author; Paul's first paper was the one on contractionary depreciations with Lance) called the MIT or Solow type models (my only other model in that sense, is the currency crisis one that puts Krugman's one upside down).

 

I tend to think that this methodological stance is Lance most enduring legacy, and the one that had the most influence on my own work. Most discussions of his work emphasize the gap models (which I think are problematic, the savings and fiscal gaps in particular), or the stagnationist model of growth, which builds on Bob Rowthorn's seminal Neo-Kaleckian growth model (and also on Amitava Dutt's model, which I think was part of his dissertation work under Lance). Some might even think that it was the reversal of his views on the role of exchange rates in development, his paper with Roberto Frenkel on stable and depreciated exchange rates as engines of growth (which can be seen in line with Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Jaime Ros views, and as being at the center of New Developmentalism). Others might think it's his work on Social Accounting Matrices that prefigured, and went hand in hand with his appreciation for Wynne Godley's stock-flow consistent models (on Wynne's methodological stance, see this old post).

In a way, all these models, and others (I could have added the Minsky crisis one, that is often neglected), to some extent show the use of models for Lance. He was somewhat eclectic, and use them to illustrate some of the issues with developing countries. But for him that had to be complemented by the interpretive thick descriptions. In my view, the models per se were less relevant for Lance, who was an unorthodox lefty that remained so, as someone remembered recently, even as the whole world moved to the right in the 1980s, and 1990s (he told me that a director of research at the World Bank, that had become a neoliberal, told him in his last visit to that institution, if he wasn't ashamed for still defending those structuralist views). And he did leave MIT for the NSSR, which was a strong signal of his political views. The simple model allowed him to tell the stories.

I have a tendency to prefer greater consistency in the models, and I'm less keen on accepting some possibilities of neoclassical/monetarists closures for the real world. But his methodology, which in some sense contrasts with the large stock-flow models that my other mentor (Wynne) liked, is certainly something I think it is a more fruitful way of thinking about macroeconomic problems. But again the specific models per se are less relevant, and the thick description that they illustrate with simplicity matter more.

The New School for Social Research at 100: A view from the Econ. Dept.

From a late 1990s catalogue; Lance Taylor (center), and also in no particular order

and from what I can remember (Ellen Houston, Adalmir Marquetti, myself (with goaty

on the left side), Margaret Duncan, Josh Bivens and Carlos Bastos (Orozco Room)

The New School for Social Research was founded 100 years ago by a group of academics dissatisfied with the direction of American high education. Economics was central to the early history of the New School, and my brief, very incomplete, and certainly idiosyncratic historical account emphasizes the Economics Department of what used to be called the Graduate Faculty.

Thorstein Veblen, one of the founders, had written his famous Higher Learning in America, which in a sense is the original critique of the corporate university. The idea was to put learning at the center, and avoid the conventional trappings of universities, with no degrees provided to students. The foundations of the critical perspectives provided at the New School came from institutionalists (like Veblen), pragmatists, represented by another prominent founder, namely John Dewey, and revisionism in history, with Charles Beard as its main voice at the new institution. Many came from Columbia University and were dissatisfied with both institutions of higher education and the direction the country had taken, in particular with World War I. These were mostly anti-war, progressive social scientists.

Perhaps the key person at the inception of the New School was Alvin Johnson, a somewhat difficult to classify economist (Gonçalo Fonseca at the HET website suggests that he might be seen as Austrian), that has been almost completely forgotten. Johnson was the editor of the massive Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, later substituted by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (last edition under Sandy Darity, and I have two entries on Export Promotion and James Mill), which put him in contact with several economists around the world, many in Germany.

A group of scholars that he met as the editor of the encyclopedia was the basis for the so-called University in Exile, which eventually was the basis for the Graduate Faculty, the division that now still is called the New School for Social Research (while the whole is just The New School, if I do understand the naming changes at my alma mater). The most important and cohesive group of economists that arrived at the New School in 1933, and the following years, escaping persecution in Nazi Germany, were the ones related to the Kiel School, including Gerhard Colm (on Colm I co-authored this paper with Luca Fiorito), Adolph Lowe, Jacob Marschak, and Hans Neisser. In that group, Lowe, the mentor to Robert Heilbroner, was to be the more consequential for the New School.

The New School was not orthodox in its economic teaching, but the 1930s were a period of flux in the profession at any rate. The Keynesian Revolution was in course, and Keynes was acquainted with Johnson and the New School, as it can be seen in the letter he gave to H. G. Bab (see below; click to amplify). In that sense, while it is true that the place was somewhat unorthodox, given its origins and the historical period in question, that should not be exaggerated. Note that Marschak went on to be the head of the Cowles Commission, and a leading mainstream economist. While at the New School he supervised Franco Modigliani's doctoral thesis, which was the basis for his famous neoclassical synthesis paper of an ISLM model with rigid wages and for his Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.

The New School, more enjoyable and compatible people than at Columbia, for sure (click to enlarge)

I say this because there is a tendency to think of the New School as being always heterodox, and taking that term to have more or less a contemporary meaning (for what I mean about that go here; for a great and more in depth discussion see this post by Ingrid Kvangraven and Carolina Alves). Many others taught at the New School in this period, perhaps, worth mentioning is the case of Abba Lerner, the main author of the functional finance school (something that is at the core of Modern Money Theory, but is more restrictive and specific than MMT).

The Kiel School was what one could term eclectic. They certainly had roots on elements of the German Historical School, and readings of marginalist and non-marginalist authors, including Marxists. Gonçalo puts Tugan-Baranovsky as one of the influences on the Kiel School. Tugan, a "semi-critic of Marx" according to Schumpeter, argued that a disproportion between the investment and consumption goods sectors would lead to recurrent industrial crises, and that notion of structural imbalances was central for Kiel authors. Leontief was also connected to the Kiel School.

While many in the Kiel School were open to and used marginalist concepts, as in the case of institutionalists, not all were neoclassical, and Lowe's views arguably were the most clearly connected to the works of the old classical political economists. Ed Nell, in the appendix to Lowe's book The Path of Economic Growth compares it with Leontief, Von Neumann, and Sraffa, as being classically inspired. One can think of Ed's Transformational Growth research program as building on that tradition.

But it would be a stretch to suggest that Bob Heilbroner, Lowe's main disciple at the New School, and the next key person in the history of the Economics Department at the Graduate Faculty, was a follower of classical political economy. A cursory reading of his classic, The Worldly Philosophers, shows that his reading of Smith is perfectly compatible modern mainstream readings, which imply that Smith was a precursor of supply and demand theories. The chapter on Smith discusses the law of markets, but the labor theory of value only makes an appearance in the chapter on Marx, and to suggest that it was a deviation from Smith and Ricardo. The degree to which Heilbroner conflates classical and marginalist or neoclassical theory is clear in that he argues that the Walrasian circular-flow in Schumpeter's theory resembles Ricardo's stationary state. And in the discussion of Schumpeter's notion of profit he suggests, regarding the labor theory of value, that "everyone knew to be wrong and therefore did not have to be reckoned with."*

Further, his views on economic growth, as evidenced in his book on the economics history of the Unites States, were essentially that growth was supply-side constrained and dependent on technological innovation, in ways that seem to be closer to his Harvard undergraduate teacher, Joseph Schumpeter, than classical political economy authors (Smith had, arguably, a demand driven view of growth, at least for some, while Ricardo most certainly didn't, and Marx is open to many different views; I'll keep that to another post). I emphasize this to show that even if he was unorthodox in many ways Bob was not necessarily what we would term heterodox in the modern sense of the word (even if taken loosely as not being neoclassical).** In my view, no clear heterodox bias existed up to the 1960s, in a department that had basically been under the shadow of three economists, Johnson, Lowe and Heilbroner. Note that this somewhat eclectic persistence of different approaches was more or less common in many departments at that time.

But the Johnson-Lowe-Heilbroner nexus provided the basis for the changes that shaped the department with the arrival of Ed Nell in the late 1960s. Ed had worked with Hicks at Oxford, and he was from early on critical of methodological individualism, something that is clear from his critique of the concept of the rational economic man. More importantly he was concerned with growth, and that led to a discussion of the theories of value and distribution (perhaps influenced by Hicks' Capital and Growth, which remains an important book), and was influenced by Sraffa's revival of classical political economy. It was after Ed arrived that a series of new hires, among them Stephen Hymer, Anwar Shaikh, and David Gordon, changed the department. Note that the late 1960s and early 1970s too is the period in which the economics profession segregates the heterodox groups, makes it harder for radicals to get tenure in conventional and prestigious departments (e.g. Sam Bowles at Harvard), and publishing requires the foundation of new journals (e.g Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, and the Cambridge Journal of Economics).

In my view, it is no coincidence that this is also when the change in the notion of equilibrium, as discussed by Garegnani, takes place (some discussion of that here). The point is that the capital debates had shown the limits of marginalist (neoclassical) economics, and the profession embraced what I have referred to as vulgar economics after that. The hiring of heterodox economists, critical of the mainstream in this period, and the sociology of academia, locked in heterodox hegemony at the Econ. Dept. of the Graduate Faculty.

Many other heterodox economists taught at the New School's Econ. Dept. from that point onwards. I might note Paul Sweezy, which if I'm not wrong was instrumental in making Bob Pollin choose the New School for his PhD, was among the teachers in the 1970s. And also many Sraffians like Piero Garegnani, John Eatwell, taught on a recurring basis, while many were visitors for shorter periods. Again, somewhat idiosyncratically, in my view it is the arrival of Lance Taylor in 1993 and a few years later of Duncan Foley that consolidated the persistence of the heterodoxy, and the type of heterodox department (with a mix of structural Keynesianism and Marxism), that the New School has today.

Perhaps, it is important to emphasize how limited this story is. There is a missing story about the role of David Gordon, who was also a key player in the department for many decades, and of Anwar Shaikh, that I always saw as somewhat of an influential outsider (maybe I'm wrong), even by the New School standards. And also the many other wonderful and creative heterodox economists that passed through the New School over the years. There is a question about the gender imbalances at the New School, and within heterodoxy itself, that I do not address. I'll explicitly avoid saying any additional names, since in this way I cannot be accused of forgetting someone (I'm leaving out a ton, including the many alumni that went on to remarkable careers). Hopefully this provides a window on how the New School became heterodox and why it remains so.

* It should be noted that Bob's book was published in 1953, a few years before the labor theory of value was rehabilitated by Sraffa's Production of Commodities.

** On a personal note, I remember talking to Bob on an interval of a conference organized by Ed Nell on functional finance, in 1997, I think, in which he argued that the Maastricht limits (3 per cent for deficits, and 60 per cent for debt) were reasonable measures to constrain the size of government. He was a liberal in an older sense of the word, perhaps.

Demand Drives Growth all the Way

New paper by Lance Taylor, Duncan Foley and Armon Rezai. From the abstract:

"A demand-driven alternative to the conventional Solow-Swan growth model is analyzed. Its medium run is built around Marx-Goodwin cycles of demand and distribution. Long-run income and wealth distributions follow rules of accumulation stated by Pasinetti in combination with a technical progress function for labor productivity growth incorporating a Kaldor effect and induced innovation. An explicit steady state solution is presented along with analysis of dynamics. When wage income of capitalist households is introduced, the Samuelson-Modigliani steady state “dual” to Pasinetti’s cannot be stable. Numerical simulation loosely based on US data suggests that the long-run growth rate is around two percent per year and that the capitalist share of wealth may rise from about forty to seventy percent due to positive medium-term feedback of higher wealth inequality into its own growth."

Read full paper here.

Trump-Style Policies Will Deepen the “American Carnage”

By Lance Taylor

President Trump, in his inaugural address and elsewhere, rightly says that over the decades since 1980 American household distributions of income and wealth became strikingly unequal. But if recent budget and legislative proposals from Trump and the House of Representatives come into effect, today’s distributional mess would become visibly worse.

First, I will sketch how the mess happened, then I will propose some ideas about how it might be cleaned up. I will show that even with lucky institutional changes and good policy, it would take several more decades to undo the “American carnage” that the president described.

Read full text here.

The “Natural” Interest Rate and Secular Stagnation: Loanable Funds Macro Models Don't Fit Today’s Institutions or Data

By Lance Taylor

Can America recover ideal rates of growth through interest-rate policies? This important analysis suggests that most economists misunderstand the issue. Updating Keynes, the analysis suggests that fiscal stimulus, labor union bargaining power, and more progressive income taxes are needed to support growth. (The article includes some algebra, which some readers may choose to skip.)

The main points of this paper are that loanable-funds macroeconomic models with their “natural” interest rate do not fit with modern institutions and data. Before getting into the numbers, it makes sense to describe the models and how to think about macroeconomics in the first place.

Today’s “New Keynesian” orthodoxy says that short- to medium-run performance is determined by interest-sensitive “loanable funds.” Unimpeded interest-rate adjustment should support robust macroeconomic equilibrium. Examples of this thinking include the (visibly nonexisting) “zero lower bound” on rates, which allegedly holds down saving and contributes to secular stagnation, the global “savings glut” keeping market rates near zero, and the “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” (DSGE) models beloved by freshwater economists and central banks in which investment is determined by saving as a function of financial return.

Loanable-funds doctrine dates back to the early nineteenth century and was forcefully restated by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell around the turn of the twentieth (with implications for inflation not pursued here). It was repudiated in 1936 by John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory. Before that he was merely a leading post-Wicksellian rather than the greatest economist of his and later times.

Macroeconomic models are built around assumptions about behavior imposed upon accounting relationships such as value of output (or demand) equals cost of output (which generates income), and value of assets in a balance sheet equals value of liabilities plus net worth. Keynes said that changes in income dominate in making sure that the first accounting balance is satisfied. He switched Wicksell’s assumptions about macro causality—or, in the jargon, the “closure” of the model—to fit his understanding of the system. New Keynesian economists reswitch the closure back to Wicksell.

Institutions have evolved since Wicksell and Keynes were writing—the welfare state materialized and international trade expanded. Both thought, correctly for their times, that most saving comes from households and that most investment is done by business. Unlike Keynes, Wicksell argued that “the” interest rate as opposed to the level of output adjusts to ensure macro balance. If potential investment falls short of saving, then, maybe with some help from inflation and the central bank, the rate will decrease. Households will save less (and possibly also run up debt to buy into a financial bubble as prior to 2007), and firms seek to invest more. The supply of loanable funds will go down and demand up, until the two flows equalize with the interest rate at its “natural” level.

In New Keynesian thinking, demand for investment can be so weak and the desire to save so strong that the natural rate lies below zero. The “distortion” imposed by the zero lower bound short-circuits the adjustment process, leading to calls for central banks to raise their inflation targets to reduce the “real” interest rate (nominal rate minus inflation). More straightforward interventions—such as restoring American labor’s bargaining power so that rising wages can push up prices from the side of costs, expansionary fiscal policy, or redistributing from the top 1 percent to households in the bottom half of the income size distribution whose saving rates are negative—are apparently impossible for “political” reasons.

Read the rest here.

The “Natural” Interest Rate and Secular Stagnation

New paper by Lance Taylor in Challenge Magazine. From the blurb:

Can America recover ideal rates of growth through interest-rate policies? This important analysis suggests that most economists misunderstand the issue. Updating Keynes, the analysis suggests that fiscal stimulus, labor union bargaining power, and more progressive income taxes are needed to support growth. (The article includes some algebra, which some readers may choose to skip.)

Read full paper here.

Lance Taylor on Loanable Funds and the Natural Rate

New paper on INET. Here is from Lance's conclusion:

... writing in the General Theory after leaving his Wicksellian phase, Keynes said that “... I had not then understood that, in certain conditions, the system could be in equilibrium with less than full employment….I am now no longer of the opinion that the concept of a ‘natural’ rate of interest, which previously seemed to me a most promising idea, has anything very useful or significant to contribute to our analysis (pp. 242-43).” Today’s New “Keynesians” have tremendous intellectual firepower. The puzzle is why they revert to Wicksell on loanable funds and the natural rate while ignoring Keynes’s innovations. Maybe, as he said in the preface to the General Theory, “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones… (p. viii).”

His point is that while there are good reasons to believe in the forces of stagnation, the reasons are not the Wicksellian ones given in New Keynesian models. Worth reading.

Wealth Concentration, Income Distribution, and Alternatives for the USA

New paper by Lance Taylor, Özlem Ömer and Armon Rezai. From the abstract:

US household wealth concentration is not likely to decline in response to fiscal interventions alone. Creation of an independent public wealth fund could lead to greater equality. Similarly, once-off tax/transfer packages or wage increases will not reduce income inequality significantly; on-going wage increases in excess of productivity growth would be needed. These results come from the accounting in a simulation model based on national income and financial data. The theory behind the model borrows from ideas that originated in Cambridge UK (especially from Luigi Pasinetti and Richard Goodwin).

Download paper here.

Thirlwall à la Godley

Short note on Thirlwall's Law by Lance Taylor available here. As he notes on Thirlwall's Law:  "Insofar as they [the conditions to generate it] are 'extreme,' the plausibility of (3) [Thirlwall's Law] is open to doubt," which is one of the points I raised in my recent debate with Jaime Ros. Causality here remains from exports to growth, which was reversed in Clavijo and Ros, but there is a healthy skepticism about the generality of the law.

Arguably Godley had a version of Thirlwall's Law in his model too. As noted by Zezza: "the ideas underlying the ‘New Cambridge Hypothesis,’ which assumed... that the private sector would adjust rather quickly to a shock, to restore its desired income/assets ratio." In this sense, in the long run in a steady state Godley assumed that the net acquisition of financial assets would be zero. This would be a stock version of the flow equilibrium between investment and savings, the private balance.

Krugman is not a real Keynesian

From The Boston Globe:

Keynes’s insights have enormous practical importance, according to Lance Taylor and Duncan Foley of the New School. Temperamentally opposite — Foley a brilliant theorist, Taylor a pragmatist influential in developing nations — they jointly received the Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute on Monday. But isn’t Keynes now mainstream? No, say Foley and Taylor. The mainstream still sees economies as inherently moving to an optimal equilibrium, as Wicksell did. It still says demand causes short-run fluctuations, but only supply factors, such as the capital stock and technology, can affect long-run growth.

Read rest here. Not a surprise for the readers of this blog.

Taylor and Foley recipients of Leontief Prize live

2015 Leontief Prize went to Duncan Foley and Lance Taylor for their work on "Macroeconomics in the Age of Climate Change." Watch their talk live starting at 5:30 Eastern Time today here.

PS: If you missed it, they will post later video footage. Meanwhile here are the interviews with last years winners Angus Deaton and James K. Galbraith.

Duncan Foley and Lance Taylor win Leontief Prize

GDAE will award its 2015 Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought to Duncan Foley and Lance Taylor. This year's award, titled "Macroeconomics in the Age of Climate Change," recognizes the contributions that these researchers have made to our understanding of the relationships between environmental quality and the macroeconomy.

“Our Institute’s work has been much influenced, and has greatly benefited, by the ways in which Dr. Foley and Dr. Taylor have crossed the boundaries between economics and other disciplines to produce the kind of rigorous analytical work that the Leontief Prize was created to recognize,” said GDAE Co-Director Neva Goodwin. “Dr. Taylor’s research has integrated relevant social relations into macroeconomic models, and is of critical importance for understanding present and future environmental realities and challenges. Dr. Foley’s unique approach to combining research on political economy with advances in statistics and a broad grasp of the relevant data has produced a deeper appreciation of the policy consequences of economists’ choices in theories and models.”

The ceremony and lectures by the awardees will take place in the spring of 2015 at Tufts University; further details will be forthcoming.

For more go here.

Structuralist (Keynesian) Response to Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century

A series of papers that provide more than a review a collective response to Piketty's book can be found here. It was part of a mini-symposium organized by Lance Taylor, co-sponsored by the New School and INET.

A Taxonomy of Piketty's reviews

Brad DeLong wrote a lengthy review of Piketty's Capital, paraphrasing in the title the famous ISLM (ISLL in Hick's original terminology) paper by John Hicks, which deserves a review by itself. In particular the discussion of Piketty's analytical model, which is, as noted before, incredibly problematic. It is worth noticing that Brad argues somehow that there two kind of reviews, namely: those that are useful and worth reading, in which he includes Tyler Cowen's review (which I've only indirectly alluded to here and here), and the ones that are wrong and are 'distracted by irrelevances,' which include Galbraith and Palley's reviews.*

Brad's idea is not bad, I mean of a taxonomy of the reviews of Piketty, but his take is neither useful to understand the differences, nor constructive for dialogue. So here is my very brief taxonomy.

There are only a few that I included, not because these are the more important necessarily, but because they seem to be representative. I made two analytical distinctions. Mainstream and Heterodox, which is based on the theoretical background, and whether the authors accept the Neoclassical paradigm or not (Murphy and Austrians do, in a confused way). Also, reviews are classified as favorable or critical of the policy prescriptions in Piketty's book. Basically, one distinction is theoretical and the other is policy oriented.

Note that the interesting thing that emerges is that there are NO, at least to my knowledge, Critical Heterodox views, that is, heterodox authors that are against higher taxes and wealth taxes.

The basis for the mainstream critiques (Cowen and Murphy) is that taxes create distortions and lead to lower growth making things worse. After all greed is good, or something like that. This comes from the more radical fringe of the pro-markets are efficient wing of the profession. The conventional defense of Piketty is basically based on New Keynesian (or old in the case of Solow) views, and it suggests that market imperfections are sufficiently large that there is space for redistribution, and tax policy is the main way to go to redress the increase in inequality of the last 30 years.

Finally the Heterodox views (Galbraith, Palley and Lance Taylor), and here I included a non-economist, David Harvey that follows a distinctly Marxist view,** which all suggest that Piketty raises and important point, which has been discussed by heterodox economists forever, that the empirical analysis is also an addition to our understanding of inequality, but that there are theoretical flaws, which both mainstream groups (Piketty would be closer to a New Keynesian, and he is a Socialist, or at least supported Holland in the last election) share, and that this limits, but does NOT disqualify the argument for redistribution.

This illustrates also a point made in this blog for a while. On the one hand, heterodox groups are politically closer to some New Keynesian authors, which, however, remain firmly based on the orthodox notion that markets unimpeded by imperfections produce optimal outcomes. Once, the New Keynesians get rid of some of the limitations of their theoretical framework, the essential being the natural rate (of interest or unemployment), their political argument would be more coherent and stronger.

* The ones that are wrong or distract point to the logical flaws in Piketty's theoretical model, by the way.

** I didn't include Cassidy's good review, simply because as a journalist the mainstream/heterodox distinction doesn't quite apply, but his views are fundamentally favorable. By the way, the Financial Times, also would not fit that dichotomy, but it certainly fits more clearly the political one, and has come clearly against Piketty for his empirical mistakes (here). For a response see Branko Milanovic here (h/t Daniele Tavani).

Lance Taylor on Piketty's Capital

(Jeff Susman, MV, and Lance Taylor, Beijing, 2001)

A short paper by Lance available here. From the conclusion:

Current flows of taxes on the upper percentiles of the income distribution and transfers to the bottom in the USA are on the order of ten percent of GDP. Meanwhile the income share of the top percentile rose by more than ten percent between 1980 and 2010 (Taylor, et. al., 2014), to a large extent due to a rising profit share. The tax/transfer program would have to be doubled in size (emphasizing estate taxes inparticular) to offset the “autonomous” increase in the profit share. On the policy front such an effort may not be likely. 

With regard to political economy, the increase in the profit share (and therefore the profit rate) was not so autonomous after all. It was the outcome of a sociopolitical process which could be reversed. ... public intervention would go a long way toward maintaining aggregate demand and reducing capitalist control. Otherwise, wage repression leads to secular stagnation by enriching the rentier.

Along the same lines of Galbraith and Palley Lance suggests that more than taxes would be necessary to reverse the conservative agenda of financial deregulation, union bashing and pro-market reforms that have dominated economic policy for the last 30 years or so.

Was the devaluation in Argentina good and inevitable: A reply to Rapetti

Back in the mid-1990s I was a student of John Eatwell (his last TA in the microeconomics course at the New School, I think, before he went back to Cambridge), and one thing that has stuck with me over the years is that he argued no economic debate was ever solved by empirical evidence. Hyperbole aside, and I should say it is not a great exaggeration, logic has also not been particularly good a clarifying debates in economics (just think of the Capital Debates).

So last week I wrote this post on why the Argentine devaluation is not a traditional Balance of Payments crisis. As I noted it was a policy decision in the works for a long while. At any rate, neither the real exchange rate, nor the current account are in a position that per se is unsustainable. That is still true, however, Martín Rapetti from the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad claims I am confused in my criticism of his work, as much as that of Frenkel and Bresser-Pereira, the so-called New Developmentalists, which believe that devaluation is good for growth.

He suggests now that he does not claim that devaluation is good for long run growth (my quote from Bresser in the previous post was very clear suggesting that is in fact what New Developmentalists think). In his words:

"Formulations like mine seem to be the source of another confusion in Matias’ analysis. He argues that people like Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Roberto Frenkel and me were advocating for a devaluation because we support the idea that maintaining a competitive real exchange rate (CRER) is good for growth."

He argues now that the reason for wanting a devaluation was:

"based on the inconsistencies of macroeconomic policy and not on my frustration about the abandonment of the competitive RER strategy that Argentina carried out between 2002 and circa 2008."

Althought Martín does not quite spell out what the contradictions are (and they are not the current account or the real exchange rate apparently, since he says: "He [that would be me, Matías] is right: the current account deficit was only 0.5% of GDP in 2013 (although it would higher without the import controls) and the RER is certainly not as overvalued as in Brazil (which, by the way, is very overvalued [that has no run on the currency, I might add])." The imbalances are one might assume inflation, and the cause of inflation as Frenkel and others have suggested is the excess demand (read fiscal deficits). So he wanted, and by the way I've heard this from almost anybody connected to CEDES, more fiscal adjustment. In fact, in the CEDES story, the government started to move away from good macro policy when Roberto Lavagna, which included several CEDES insiders, left the government at the end of 2005.

On this new position, let me refer again to my previous post (from March 2012) in which I quoted a paper Frenkel presented at a conference organized by Bresser, in which he said:

“the monetary and fiscal policies required to accompany the adoption of a SSCRER target must also have special features: the permanent expansionary stimulus that is part and parcel of the SSCRER heightens the importance of the restraining role to be played by fiscal and monetary policies.”

Let me emphasize this, the notion was that a stable and competitive real exchange rate is so powerful (permanent expansionary stimulus he says, sic) as an instrument for growth that you need fiscal and monetary contraction. Note that devaluation and macroeconomic contraction are the traditional tools of the IMF for countries with balance of payments problems. Part of what I suggested in my previous post is that heterodox authors tended to be more circumspect about the incredible advantages of depreciation. Martín's nuance about disequilibria (fiscal expansion) and not the effects of devaluation on growth are really not clear. If I was confused, he must explain how. Did Frenkel and him changed their position? If so I'm glad, but certainly I'm NOT the one confused here.

His other critique is decidedly bizarre. He argues

"Matías seems to miss the important point that as long as expected depreciation at the exchange rate that the Central Bank is defending is higher than the yield of domestic assets, there would be an excess demand for foreign currency that would eventually lead to the depletion of FX reserves and the collapse of the domestic currency."

First of all, in the post Martín criticizes I say the following:

"Note that if the government on top of the current measures adds fiscal contraction (monetary tightening is a given, since higher rates of interest will be needed to avoid more capital flight; and the effects of monetary contraction can be compensated by subsidized public credit) as the New Developmentalists wanted (since for them inflation was caused by excess demand) then the slowdown will be significant and even a recession could take place."

In other words, yes the government must increase the rate on interest to avoid the expectations of a devaluation. My point indeed was that back in 2012 they should have done that, when the blue was closer to 5, and it was easier to do and avoid a depreciation (which Martín wanted and I didn't) and that he used to think it was good, but now that happened he has second thoughts (you'll see why in a second).

Second, exactly because the problem is the low rates of interest when compared with holding dollars, you see that this is not a problem associated to the exchange rate being overvalued or the current account being unsustainable in the short run. It is something that could have been solved long ago with a higher rate of interest. Mind you, Martín is simply wrong when he says that since 2010 the Central Bank of Argentina was using the nominal exchange rate as an anchor for prices (he is really confused on this one; just check the rate of depreciation), and I should know since I was at the bank at some point during this period (actually Brazil did that, and that explains lower inflation in Brazil).

But here comes the cherry on top of the ice-cream. Why would depreciation still be good for Martín? Because the long-term exchange rate elasticity of exports is actually high. The short-term isn't and that's why in the short run the depreciation will be contractionary and he has some doubts about it. But in the long run things are hunky dory. So here is NOT about imbalances, but depreciation is good for growth because it increases competitiveness and exports (wink, wink, devaluation is not good, but yes it is; and I'm confused!). In his words:

"The problem is that Matías confuses an important distinction between short-run and long-run effects of the real exchange rate on economic performance. In Krugman-Taylor, a real devaluation (a change in the RER) has a negative effect on output and employment in the short run; in Frenkel-Taylor, a competitive RER level has a positive effect on long-run growth."

I guess I missed that class by Lance, and that's the source of my confusion. I should note that I had a few exchanges with Martín on Twitter (see below in Spanish) on which he also suggested that in the long run was good for growth.

@mgrapetti @SSAlfredo y Martin si cambiar los precios relativos resuelve el problema externo, cual es la elasticidad? Pq no das el numero
— Matías Vernengo (@NakedKeynes) June 16, 2013

Here is the problem, Martín (neither him, nor Frenkel or anybody else as far as I know) has shown this great long-term elasticities that show that depreciation in the long-run (the Frenkel-Taylor, not Krugman-Taylor story) is good for growth. The evidence I cited here (from this paper by Fiorito and Silvio and Nahuel Guaita) actually shows that there is no indication of a positive elasticity in any run. If Martín shows that there is some evidence on positive and significant long-term real exchange elasticities for exports (I'm really interested in what methodology he suggests for finding this result, and separate the short and long run elasticities), like Keynes I will change my mind, and try to prove Eatwell wrong on the role of empirical evidence in economic debates. But if you (Martín) cannot come up with evidence to support your nice theoretical model (the Frenkel-Taylor that rules in the long run, are we clear?!), what should we call you? Confused does not seem the correct definition for someone that keeps defending an idea for which there is no evidence (don't worry, I'm not in the game of name calling).

Finally, I should add here, that while I do think that the government has committed mistakes, and allowing the blue (the black market) exchange rate to depreciate and not hike interest rates earlier  is one of those (I would add the need for a more aggressive Import Substitution policy to reduce the external constraint, something I defended as early as March 2012; see here), I still think that this government should be supported and is much better than the alternative (Martín is certainly not in favor of the government).

INET PhD student workshop in Foz do Iguaçu - Brazil

Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil
December 8-10, 2013

The Institute for New Economic Thinking will offer a PhD student workshop in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil. The event will take place on December 8-10, 2013, right before the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting, the largest annual convening of the Brazilian economics academy. The workshop is being organized in cooperation with ANPEC, the Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics, and will consist of lectures by selected senior scholars as well as paper presentations by young scholars.

Lectures

The Institute will offer the mini course Growth in Developing Countries, taught by Nelson Barbosa from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, and Lance Taylor from the New School for Social Research. The course will analyze the growth experience of developing countries from a structuralist perspective. A detailed course description will be posted here soon.

More info here (h/t Laura Carvalho).

Where is the elasticity? (or more on devaluation and growth)

Since 2007 mainstream economists, and often some heterodox (or more precisely eclectic) authors, have suggested that the Argentine economy is on the verge of collapse (see for example my good friend Bresser-Pereira here or this). A typical argument made by both orthodox economists (some of which favored the Convertibility Plan of the 1990s) and the more unconventional is that real exchange rate (RER) appreciation is at the heart of the Argentine problems and the more recent lack of growth.

I have discussed this before here with respect to the so-called Sustainable and Stable Competitive Real Exchange Rate literature (see here). The argument for a SSCRER was put forward by Frenkel and Taylor in a well-known paper, but the notion has many defenders (see the good paper by Blecker and Razmi from Setterfield's essential book on growth), including more conventional authors like Rodrik. At the risk of being repetitive let me point out the pros and cons of the arguments for devaluation.

Depreciation protects local industry and leads to a boost to domestic production, and also, by leading to an increase in exports, reduces the external constraint of the economy. That would be the substitution effect associated to the change in the relative prices. Yet depreciation also (everything else constant) reduces wages, increases the profits of exporters, and leads (yes, the economy is wage-led) to a reduction in spending and lower levels of activity. In this case, a depreciation does help reduce your external constraint, but by leading to a contraction. The second effect, associated to an income effect, was well-known by heterodox authors, having been developed by Albert Hirschman and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (for the Argentine case) and then formalized by Krugman and Taylor (see here; subscription required).

At the end of the day it is an empirical question. All the evidence seems to suggest, at least for the Argentine case (here paper by Fiorito and others in Spanish; but it seems to be more general, see here) that income effects tend to be larger than substitution effects, and hence one might be concerned about possible contractionary effects of a depreciation.

In the case of Argentina, it is clear that the expansion of the volume of exports goes hand in hand with the expansion of the world GDP (Figure below).

The relation between the real exchange rate and exports is less clear. As it is shown below after the large real depreciation in 2002, growth in the volume of exports goes hand in hand with significant appreciation.

No doubt defenders of depreciation will argue that the big depreciation in 2002 was essential for export growth afterwards (see Rapetti here who argues that "competitive RER was a key factor behind Argentina’s recovery and growth"). But if you put the depreciation in the wider macroeconomic context of 2002, and compare with the current one, you are bound to have second thoughts.

The depreciated nominal exchange rate in a context of high unemployment (around 22%) did not lead to inflationary pressures, since wage demands were subdued (and hence the nominal depreciation translated into a large real one). Second, spare capacity meant that the protection afforded by the real depreciation led to a huge expansion of domestic production, spurred by the expansion of domestic demand (higher real wages and expansion of fiscal spending, particularly in social programs). Exports actually don't seem to move much with the depreciation. There is no econometric evidence for large elasticity of exports with respect to the exchange rate, in the short or long-run (if someone has it please, please, pretty please with a cherry on top share it; it's been frustrating to have an argument with people that argue a point for which there is no known evidence).

Note that all the above mentioned conditions are not in place now. Unemployment is considerably lower (around 7% or so), and the expansion of real wages and government spending have slowed down (so much so, that in the last year the economy has stalled). So maybe we need less Frenkel and Taylor and more Krugman and Taylor to understand what is going on in Argentina right now.