How the IMF and US helped loot and entrap Argentina with debt

 

Friends with benefits 

By Thomas Palley

Argentina is back in the news with renewed financial turmoil spurred by President Milei’s poor political standing. That poor standing is the product of anger with Argentina’s dire economic performance and massive corruption within Milei’s administration, and it augurs poorly for his party’s performance in the forthcoming October 2025 election.

In response, the IMF and US have jumped into action to save Milei’s government. The IMF had already provided a $20 billion bailout in April 2025. Now, the US government has provided another $20 billion (in the form of a central bank currency swap line). Furthermore, the US has expressed willingness to provide additional stand-by credit and even purchase Argentine government debt.

The media has focused on Argentina’s long troubled financial history, the difficult inflation situation President Milei inherited, and President Trump’s political affinity with Milei. However, that fails to explain why the IMF and US have provided such huge assistance to Argentina, given its lack of credit worthiness.

The support for Milei should be understood as a continuation of past lending to Presidents Macri (2015-2019), and Menem (1989-1999). The purpose is to entrench Neoliberalism in Argentina and entrap it with dollar debt. It is supported by local elites because they are the beneficiaries of Neoliberalism, and they also get to loot the Argentine state via the process of debt entrapment.

Read rest here. 

Rethinking the determination and long-run evolution of income distribution

New paper by Thomas Palley. From the abstract:

This paper presents a theory and model of long-run cycles in income inequality. The model explains the historical pattern of income distribution identified by Kuznets (1955) and Piketty (2014). It breaks with conventional marginal product theory which claims functional income distribution is determined by the technological conditions of production. Instead, it emphasizes the role of socio-political forces that shape and drive fluctuations in the level of popular political organizations, which then impact distribution. That impact includes assessment and attribution of productivity contributions. The model provides a framework for interpreting the historical evolution of income distribution and inequality, and for reflecting on current conditions and possible future developments. The core message is twofold. First, socio-political developments matter for income distribution. Second, if those developments are cyclical, income distribution will also exhibit cyclicality.

Read paper here.

The Ukraine war and Europe’s deepening march of folly

By Thomas Palley

In her book The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, the historian Barbara Tuchman explores the perplexing question of why countries sometimes pursue policies that are fundamentally contrary to their own interests. That question has acquired renewed relevance as Europe has now enlisted in a deepening march of folly over Ukraine.

Failure to reject the march of folly will have grave consequences for Europe, but doing so is a huge political challenge. It requires explaining how Europe has been harmed by its Ukraine policy; how Europe stands to be further harmed by doubling-down on that policy; how the march of folly has been sold politically; and why the political establishment persists therewith.

Read rest here.

Paul Davidson (1930-2024) and Post Keynesian Economics

Paper on Paul with Tom Palley and Jamie Galbraith published by ROKE. From the abstract:

"Paul Davidson was a critical figure in the preservation of John Maynard Keynes’s ideas, sticking with them when they were out of fashion. He was also key to the survival of the Post Keynesian school. Davidson endorsed Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of interest, and he emphasized fundamental uncertainty as a central feature of economic reality, essential to making sense of a monetary economy. His greatest legacy is the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, the intellectual home for a generation of Post Keynesian economists. Without his efforts, the heterodox economics community would be significantly smaller than it is now."

Full paper available here.

Paul Davidson (1930-2024)

 

Paul (I'm next to him) and the Brazilians at the UMKC, PK Conference in 2002

Paul has passed away a few days ago. He wasn't in good shape for a while, and this was expected. He lived a long and productive life. I wasn't personally close to him, even though I met him several times from the mid-1990s onward. He went to two conferences I co-organized at the Federal University in Rio, always with Louise, which was a central figure of Post Keynesian (PK) life, and basically run the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (JPKE) for him.

He was more effective as an institutional organizer, and as an observer of economic reality (and his main book was called Money and the Real World) than in his theoretical endeavors. His views on Keynes stayed close to the flawed discussion of the Principle of Effective Demand in chapter 3 of the General Theory, and an insistence on the importance of uncertainty and non-ergodicity in Keynes' work, that proved to be somewhat of a dead alley for PKs. He also emphasized the ideas of Tony Thirlwall, and his export-led model of growth, as a central PK contribution to economic theory. Finally, he tended to accept the views of Robert Skidelsky on Keynes' intellectual development, who, as I noted here, accepted a conventional on interpretation of Keynes' ideas, relying on imperfections to explain unemployment, even if he provided a much needed accurate biography of Keynes (in contrast to Harrod).

JPKE, that he created with Sidney Weintraub, and help from John Kenneth Galbraith among others, was central for a generation of PKs. He was part of the Trieste Summer Conferences that, in the early 1980s, that included many heterodox groups, and was the closest to Marc Lavoie's broad tent in real life, but failed to provide a unified view, and an alternative to mainstream marginalist theory. Many thought that the PK project was sectarian, and could not incorporate other views. I tend to think that the failure resulted from the fragmentation of the mainstream, that was reflected in the fragmentation of the heterodoxy, and were part of the era. Certainly not Paul's fault, who, at least in my experience, was very open and willing to debate, even if he did stick to his views. At least, not his personal fault.

When LP (Rochon) invited me to start a new journal, more or less at the time Paul was substituted as the editor of the JPKE by Jan Kregel and Randy Wray, on PK monetary economics, I suggested we needed a journal that would bring other Keynesians into the conversation. Hence, the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE).* Paul wrote to me once he knew about the new name of the journal. I knew from him that they had thought of naming their journal the Journal of Keynesian Economics, but the acronym would have been JOKE, so they opted for Post Keynesian, and the name stuck to the school of thought. He wasn't happy. But he understood that our project was very different.

Ours was not a journal to propagate the ideas of the heterodox followers of Keynes, and to emphasize the notion that effective demand mattered, at times that Keynesians were under attack with the neoliberal turn, and the rise of Monetarism and New Classical economics (Paul was in the book of debaters with Milton Friedman, that included also Jim Tobin, and a few other more conventional Keynesians). Ours was an attempt to recreate a Keynesian big tent (not an heterodox one) to reinforce the commonalities with all Keynesians (in spite of the many differences).

Paul was combative, forceful in his discussions, particularly about Keynes' legacy, and a key figure in the preservation of Keynesian ideas, when those were considerably less popular, and the profession moved incorrectly away from the Keynesian Consensus. Later many would gladly talk about the return of the master. Paul never abandoned him, and he was right. A great loss for the profession.

* On that see Tom Palley here and my discussion of Bob Solow's role here.

Keynes’ denial of conflict: a reply to Professor Heise’s critique

Tom Palley reply to response about his paper on Keynes lack of understanding of class conflict. In many ways, this is how Tom discusses Keynes lack of understanding of old classical political economy. Tom is correct in pointing out that:

"Kalecki (1933 [1971]) began the process of incorporating conflict into the Keynesian paradigm, but there is much more to be done regarding recognizing conflicts’ implications for economic theory and recognizing the multiple fora in which it appears."

Of course, Kalecki was building on Marx and classical political economy. Read the full reply here.

Dollar Hegemony and Argentina

First part of a two part interview with Anita Fuentes at Security in Context. The discussion on Argentina and Milei is in the next part. I'll post it as soon as it is up.

The theory of monetary disorder

 

 “When I discovered that the economic order produced social disorder, they took away my scholarship.”

New working paper by Tom Palley. From the abstract:

This paper introduces the notion of monetary disorder. The underlying theory rests on a twin circuits view of the macro economy. The idea of monetary disorder has relevance for understanding the experience and consequences of the recent decade-long period of monetized large budget deficits and ultra-easy monetary policy. Current policy rests on Keynesian logic whereby a large fall in aggregate demand warrants robust offsetting monetary and fiscal policy actions. That logic neglects potential monetary disorder being bred within the financial circuit in the form of inflated asset prices and leveraged balance sheets. That disorder is likely to develop long before inflation accelerates so that inflation targeting fails to protect against it. Political factors increase the policy danger as the benefits of disorder are front-loaded and the costs backloaded. The paper concludes with a policy discussion regarding how to prevent Keynesian goods market counter-cyclical stabilization policy from causing monetary disorder.

Download it here.

Dollar Hegemony, coming soon

The dollar's hegemony rests on the economic, military, and international political power of the USA. There have been two eras of dollar hegemony which were characterized by different models. Dollar hegemony 1.0 corresponded to the Bretton Woods era (1946-1971). Dollar hegemony 2.0 corresponds to the Neoliberal era (1980-today). The deep foundation of both models is USA power, but the two models have different economic operating systems. The articles in this book explore this and consider two further questions: what is the future of dollar hegemony? And: is there a better way of organizing the world monetary order? There has been considerable speculation of a drift to currency multipolarity but, so far, there is little evidence of that. The Chinese renminbi might join or displace the dollar as the world's hegemonic currency, but that will require China making significant changes to its financial markets and monetary policy. Dollar hegemony imposes significant costs on developing and emerging market economies, but the international political economy of systemic reform is fraught, making reform unlikely.

The menace of the myth of General Pinochet’s Chilean economic miracle

By Thomas Palley

September 11, 2023, marks the fiftieth anniversary of General Pinochet’s military coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende. While it is now widely recognized that Pinochet authorized large-scale human rights abuses, there is an accompanying narrative that he also unleashed an economic miracle via embrace of Milton Friedman’s “Chicago Boys” vision of a market economy.

The “Pinochet economic miracle” narrative is profoundly misleading. Worse yet, it is a political menace for two reasons. First, it risks tacitly promoting the notion that dictatorship may be legitimate to the extent it offers a road to prosperity. Second, the Pinochet regime embraced Neoliberalism which promotes anti-democratic tendencies by fracturing society. The claim of a Pinochet economic miracle lends support to Neoliberalism, thereby encouraging acceptance of Neoliberalism despite its anti-democratic proclivities.

For those reasons, debate over Pinochet’s economic policy remains of vital importance. The fiftieth anniversary of Pinochet’s coup is an opportunity to challenge the pernicious miracle myth which is increasingly part of the conventional wisdom.

Read rest here.

Hysteresis in economics

 

Hysteresis, not hysteria

New paper by Thomas Palley. From the abstract:

This paper argues for broadening the application of hysteresis to institutions, policy lock-in, psychology, identity, and economic ideas. Hysteresis is an element of historical processes, and the real world is historical. That explains why hysteresis is pervasive and important. Hysteresis should be a fundamental building block of political economy. Expanding its application in economics is both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is that it provides a means for incorporating political, sociological, and
psychological forces which economics tends to neglect. That will enrich economics and can also provide a mutually enriching bridge to other social sciences. The challenge is introducing such concerns raises questions about the character of economics’ knowledge claims, which is likely to trigger resistance from economists.

The Forgotten Case Against Milton Friedman: Jacobin's Interview with Tom Palley

 

In 1967, Milton Friedman launched a counterrevolution in economics that overturned the Keynesian theory of inflation. Three years later, economist James Tobin issued a powerful theoretical rebuttal — but in the economics mainstream, it’s been all but forgotten.

Read full interview here.

The problem with Keynes' General Theory: by Tom Palley

New working paper by Tom Palley. From the abstract:

Keynes' General Theory was a massive step forward relative to classical economics, but it was also a step backward in its denial of the conflictual nature of capitalism. There is need to understand Keynes' technical contributions regarding the workings of monetary economies, but also need to understand the flaws within his thinking and the consequences thereof. Keynes made a fundamental contribution elucidating the mechanism of effective demand, and he also has claim to be the preeminent monetary theorist. However, owing to his denial of conflict, he had a flawed view of capitalism which is why establishment Keynesianism struggles to explain contemporary stagnation. That flawed view also undermines the case for Social Democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, his view of capitalism is supportive of Neoliberalism and Keynes can be viewed as a compassionate (Third Way) Neoliberal.

In some ways this is the argument in Geoff Mann's In the Long Run We Are All Dead. I think one way of thinking about it is that Keynes' effective demand as a critique of marginalist (neoclassical) economics needs to be completed by old classical (political economy) ideas, which put the class conflict at the center of analysis. That of course is necessary for a policy break with neoliberalism.

On central bank independence and the public good

The debate between Tom Palley and Steve Kamin on central bank independence and the several rescues of banks after financial crises, including the more recent rescue of the Silicon Valley Bank.

Tom suggests that central banks are dominated by financial interests, and that this has been a problem. At the same time he avoids the libertarian notion of free banking, and suggests that a central bank at the service of public interest would require alternative views, I would directly say related to working class interests.

Tom Palley on the Causes and Consequences of the War in Ukraine

 By Thomas Palley

(1) The origins of the Ukraine conflict lie in the ambitions of US Neocons. Those ambitions threatened Russian national security by fuelling eastward expansion of NATO and anti-Russian regime change in the Republics of the former Soviet Union.

(2) The Ukraine conflict is now a proxy war. The US is using Ukraine to attack and weaken Russia.

(3) Russia will eventually prevail. We may already be approaching “game over” because Ukraine’s forces have been eviscerated. Ukraine is now press-ganging military conscripts in Kiev and Lviv.

(4) Once Russia imposes its will, the US will be forced to step back but it will have achieved its strategic goal of weakening Russia and separating Western Europe (especially Germany) from Russia.

(5) Ukraine will be effectively destroyed. It will be half-occupied by Russia; hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians will have died; millions will have fled; and the Ukrainian Nazis will be in charge of what is left.

(6) We have all been played by the Biden administration and the US Neocons.

The biggest losers are the ordinary people of Ukraine. They were cheated by the US Neocons of the possibility of a peaceful accord with Russia.

But we have all lost, especially Western Europe. Higher inflation and energy prices today; lost future economic opportunities; a worsened outlook for climate change; a dangerously deteriorated global security outlook that includes risk of nuclear war; and renewed militarism that will disfigure our societies for decades to come.

(7) Western Europe’s political elites are deeply culpable for their venal capitulation to US Neocon pressures.

(8) The US is guilty of provoking the war. But it will never be charged because this is a proxy war and it tacitly controls the International Court in The Hague.

Published originally here.

Ukraine: what will be done and what should be done?

 By Thomas Palley

While rightly condemning Russia for its invasion, the mainstream media continues to selectively report the history behind these events. In my view, its omissions are intentional and contribute to the tragedy. They inflame public understanding, render a diplomatic resolution more difficult, and lock us into a worse trajectory.

Let me make further clear my argument: (1) President Putin is head of the Russian state which is under slow-motion implacable attack by US-led NATO. (2) After failing to secure a satisfactory diplomatic resolution, he has taken action to head off that attack.

If you accept those two propositions, the Ukraine story is massively more complicated than simply claiming Putin is an aggressor and we (the US) are good. There will be no lasting peace until that complexity is fully engaged.

Read rest here.

American Exceptionalism and the Liberal Menace: the US and Ukraine

By Tom Palley

American exceptionalism is the most dangerous doctrine in the world, and it has been on full display in the current Ukraine crisis. Worse yet, the loudest advocates have been America’s elite liberal class.

The doctrine of exceptionalism holds that the US is inherently different from and superior to other nations. That superiority means the US is subject to a different standard. Its actions are claimed to be benevolent and above international law, and the US is entitled to intervene at will around the world, including building a global network of military bases and garrisons that it would never permit another power to have.

Read rest here.

The economics of New Developmentalism

New versus Classical Developmentalism

New paper by Tom Palley, titled “The Economics of New Developmentalism: A Critical Assessment” which has been published in Investigacion Economica. Palley argues that "the issues raised will be a key element in the 2022 Brazilian presidential election that will likely pit Ciro Gomes versus Lula in the first round. Gomes aligns with New Developmentalism. Lula inclines to Classical Developmentalism. Of course, economic analysis is just part of the development problematic. It must be reconciled and integrated with the political reality of Latin America’s unethical economic elite, its corrupted political class, and the omnipresent threat of US intervention against change that challenges the economic status quo."

'Rethinking capacity utilization choice: the role of surrogate inventory and entry deterrence'

 By Thomas Palley

This paper presents a macroeconomics-friendly Post Keynesian model of the firm describing both an inventory theoretic approach and an entry deterrence approach to choice of excess capacity. The model explains why firms may rationally choose to have excess capacity. It also shows the two approaches are complementary and reinforcing of each other. Analytically, the paper makes three principal contributions. First, it provides a simple framework for understanding the microeconomics of capacity utilization choice. Second, it reframes the Post Keynesian discussion of capacity utilization by making excess capacity choice the key to understanding normal capacity utilization. Third, it implicitly challenges Neo-Kaleckian wage-led growth theory as the model shows choice of the optimal excess capacity rate is independent of the level of demand.

Read rest here.

Diego Maradona (1960-2020): Some Bittersweet Reflections

By Thomas Palley (guest blogger)

Maradona was more than just an extraordinary footballer. He was also a complicated social icon. That further distinguishes him from other footballers, though Pele also has some of that… and it is great to see young footballers like Marcus Rashford taking up that mantle.

He was both rewarded by and terribly exploited by the system. The system treated him like a “race horse”. They wanted him to play at all cost and pumped him with drugs. They did not care about the physical and psychological costs to him. That contributed to his addiction. Maybe he would have gotten there on his own owing to personality reasons, but the addictive pain-killers they fed him sure gave him a healthy shove in that direction.

He came from great poverty, from a shanty town. He never hid that and insisted on keeping the connection. I’m told he had tattoos of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. He also had a relationship with the Pope (Francisco, not Benedict II or John Paul II). That politics speaks well of him, even if it was not carried through with the consistency of an intellectual or political activist.

As for the “Hand of God” goal, it obviously sits badly with England supporters. But in a way it fits with Maradona’s personality and social icon standing – a sort of roguish Robin Hood’s goal. I’ve come to accept it and even enjoy it.

Did you know that in Argentina, before inflation made them irrelevant, they used to call the 10 (diez) peso note a “Diego”? That is how much people loved him.

Published originally here.