What is heterodox economics?

New working paper published by the Centro di Ricerche e Documentazione Piero Sraffa. From the abstract:

 This paper critically analyzes Geoffrey Hodgson’s definition of heterodox economics as the refutation of the orthodox view that emphasizes utility maximization as its main theoretical core, and his view that it is the fragmentation of heterodox economics that explains its subsidiary role within the profession. Hodgson’s views led to a series of responses, that criticize his definition, but also present significant problems of their own. The limitations of Hodgson and his critics’ views are contrasted with an alternative definition that emphasizes the importance of conflictive distribution and the principle of effective demand in the long run. The idea of a broad tent, from a sociological point of view, does not preclude the need for a clear analytical definition of heterodoxy. The broad tent should be seen as part of a strategy of survival.

Link here.

Paul Davidson (1930-2024)

 

Paul (I'm next to him) and the Brazilians at the UMKC, PK Conference in 2002

Paul has passed away a few days ago. He wasn't in good shape for a while, and this was expected. He lived a long and productive life. I wasn't personally close to him, even though I met him several times from the mid-1990s onward. He went to two conferences I co-organized at the Federal University in Rio, always with Louise, which was a central figure of Post Keynesian (PK) life, and basically run the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (JPKE) for him.

He was more effective as an institutional organizer, and as an observer of economic reality (and his main book was called Money and the Real World) than in his theoretical endeavors. His views on Keynes stayed close to the flawed discussion of the Principle of Effective Demand in chapter 3 of the General Theory, and an insistence on the importance of uncertainty and non-ergodicity in Keynes' work, that proved to be somewhat of a dead alley for PKs. He also emphasized the ideas of Tony Thirlwall, and his export-led model of growth, as a central PK contribution to economic theory. Finally, he tended to accept the views of Robert Skidelsky on Keynes' intellectual development, who, as I noted here, accepted a conventional on interpretation of Keynes' ideas, relying on imperfections to explain unemployment, even if he provided a much needed accurate biography of Keynes (in contrast to Harrod).

JPKE, that he created with Sidney Weintraub, and help from John Kenneth Galbraith among others, was central for a generation of PKs. He was part of the Trieste Summer Conferences that, in the early 1980s, that included many heterodox groups, and was the closest to Marc Lavoie's broad tent in real life, but failed to provide a unified view, and an alternative to mainstream marginalist theory. Many thought that the PK project was sectarian, and could not incorporate other views. I tend to think that the failure resulted from the fragmentation of the mainstream, that was reflected in the fragmentation of the heterodoxy, and were part of the era. Certainly not Paul's fault, who, at least in my experience, was very open and willing to debate, even if he did stick to his views. At least, not his personal fault.

When LP (Rochon) invited me to start a new journal, more or less at the time Paul was substituted as the editor of the JPKE by Jan Kregel and Randy Wray, on PK monetary economics, I suggested we needed a journal that would bring other Keynesians into the conversation. Hence, the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE).* Paul wrote to me once he knew about the new name of the journal. I knew from him that they had thought of naming their journal the Journal of Keynesian Economics, but the acronym would have been JOKE, so they opted for Post Keynesian, and the name stuck to the school of thought. He wasn't happy. But he understood that our project was very different.

Ours was not a journal to propagate the ideas of the heterodox followers of Keynes, and to emphasize the notion that effective demand mattered, at times that Keynesians were under attack with the neoliberal turn, and the rise of Monetarism and New Classical economics (Paul was in the book of debaters with Milton Friedman, that included also Jim Tobin, and a few other more conventional Keynesians). Ours was an attempt to recreate a Keynesian big tent (not an heterodox one) to reinforce the commonalities with all Keynesians (in spite of the many differences).

Paul was combative, forceful in his discussions, particularly about Keynes' legacy, and a key figure in the preservation of Keynesian ideas, when those were considerably less popular, and the profession moved incorrectly away from the Keynesian Consensus. Later many would gladly talk about the return of the master. Paul never abandoned him, and he was right. A great loss for the profession.

* On that see Tom Palley here and my discussion of Bob Solow's role here.

More on oligopolistic inflation (Greedflation)

Marc Lavoie has written this post on the current inflation debates, which received some attention. We had a conversation (I don't say debate because we mostly agreed, and the video is here, last September). I also recommend Julia Braga and Franklin Serrano's paper on Marc's chapter on inflation, which is relevant for the current debates. The debate rages, within heterodoxy, as if a lot of the ideas are new, but quite frankly they are a recap of discussions of the past, particularly for those that dealt with the extensive debates about inflation and hyperinflation in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.

That demand-pull inflation was not the cause of inflation, I think is accepted among heterodox authors, and increasingly so within the mainstream or at least the media, that mostly covers the mainstream. After an initial idyll with Larry Summers and the notion that excessively large fiscal packages during the pandemic had caused inflation, now his view that a prolonged period of relatively high (or at least higher) unemployment was necessary for stabilization has fallen out of favor. Disinflation has taken place with relatively low levels of unemployment (which, it's worth remembering measure very poorly the conditions in the labor market in our neoliberal era, and where there is more slack than noted due to significant numbers of discouraged workers). The coverage has changed from thinking Summers was right to dismissing his views. He was wrong both times.

I'm more concerned with the dominant view among progressives that inflation was caused by higher profit margins, associated to the excessive power of corporations. Something that has been called greedflation, by many commentators (see Robert Reich's recent column here), and that back when, in a distant past in another galaxy, we called oligopolistic inflation. So this is mostly a debate between neoliberal and progressive Dems (Republicans have been less relevant; for their view go to this conference/book including John B. Taylor, John Cochrane and others at the Hoover Institution; not very different than Summers, who was at the conference, at least conceptually, even if more hawkish, if that is possible).*

In particular, I think the main remaining issue is the question of the role of mark ups, or profit margins in the inflationary process. As I noted before, the idea of oligopolistic inflation is in some sense a reaction to the notion that wage resistance and wage-price spirals would imply that workers are responsible for inflation (in this reading as much as demand-pull inflation would require unemployment for stabilization, conflict inflation would imply the need for wage stagnation). Some heterodox economists have even suggested that wage-price spirals are sort of a myth.

Note that when workers manage to increase wages, then price making firms will try to recompose their margins and increase prices. And if workers are not satisfied, as prices go up again and real wages fall, then you get a spiral. Hence, the wage-price spiral is a reflection of distributive conflict, and that workers and capitalists are not satisfied with their relative shares. In that sense, inflation is neither wage-led nor profit-led, like accumulation can be. It is the result of incompatible income claims by both classes.

There is a simple model in this old paper for the Handbook edited by Phil Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, in which I discussed the three causes of inflation for heterodox authors, supply shocks, inertia and conflict.

* The inflation paranoia is somewhat surprising, with Taylor saying that: "The answer to the key question, 'Are We Entering a New Era of High Inflation?' is clearly 'yes,' unless monetary policy makers change policy." Note that this is not new. The late Allan Meltzer warned against the dangers of excessive monetary expansion after the 2008-9 crisis, saying back then: "the enormous increase in bank reserves —caused by the Fed’s purchases of bonds and mortgages — will surely bring on severe inflation if allowed to remain." So, you would have to really believe in the lags in monetary policy (more than a decade) for his prediction to make any sense.

Lavoie on Inflation Theory: Conflicting claims versus the NAIRU

New Paper by Julia Braga and Franklin Serrano. From the abstract:

The conflicting claims approach to the theory of inflation so thoroughly surveyed and well presented in Chapter 8 of Lavoie’s (2022) book is deservedly becoming increasingly consensual among heterodox (and even some notable mainstream) macroeconomists. However, the relevance of a concept (and the very existence of) a NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) derived consistently from the very premises of the conflicting claims approach is still very controversial. In this review article, we will be to argue that a NAIRU is not really useful for the conflicting claims approach. First, it can only properly be derived under quite restrictive assumptions; second, if a NAIRU actually existed, it would render demand management policies undesirable and very destabilizing anyway. With that in mind, the key aspects explored here are: 1) the different roles of hysteresis in the output and labour markets; 2) the assumptions concerning real profit markups of firms; and 3) the extent to which money wage increases actually incorporate past (or expected) inflation. We also add some remarks regarding the role of changes in international commodity prices and nominal exchange rates that further illustrate the necessary relation between conflicting claims inflation and the theory of distribution and relative prices.

Read the rest here.

Thinking about Inflation: A conversation with Marc Lavoie

The conversation on inflation with Marc Lavoie at the Fields Institute in Toronto. I think that there was an agreement, between us, and most people in the room that the oligopolistic view of inflation does not hold water. I tried to discuss the Argentinean case on the basis of a piece that I co-wrote with Fabián Amico and Franklin Serrano, published in the local version of Le Monde Diplomatique online. A longer version, also in Spanish, here. An English version is in the works, btw.

Review of Keynesian Economics is out!

We are delighted to announce the publication of Volume 10, Issue 1 of the Review of Keynesian Economics. We invite you to visit the website where you can read all the article abstracts and download two free articles.

The issue focuses on monetary macroeconomics. The lead article is Professor Marc Lavoie’s 2021 Godley-Tobin Memorial Lecture titled Godley versus Tobin on monetary matters. That is followed by an article by Federal Reserve economist Jeremy Rudd titled Why do we think that inflation expectations matter for inflation? (And should we?). Additionally, there is an article on the role of risk and uncertainty in Keynes’ and Kalecki’s interest rate theory; an article providing a modern theory of animal spirits founded on contemporary psychological theory; an article on pre-Keynesian application of Keynesian policies in the Great Depression; and an article augmenting the standard undergraduate upper-level macroeconomics model with hysteresis via the central bank’s estimate of the natural rate of interest.

Garegnani: Ten Years After

This event organized by the Italian Post Keynesian Network. I wrote about Garegnani's contributions when he passed away here in the blog. We will discuss some of the issues he raised, but also the new directions of Sraffian economics.

 

Godley versus Tobin on Monetary Matters by Marc Lavoie

 

The 4th Godley-Tobin Lecture given by Marc Lavoie, a co-author of Wynne Godley, and one of the leading Post Keynesian authors.

Fourth Godley-Tobin Lecture: Marc Lavoie on Godley vs Tobin on Monetary Theory

Part of the Eastern Economic Association Meeting, and sponsored by the Review of Keynesian Economics.

The New IMF and the Covid Crisis

 

Video of the roundtable sponsored by the Review of Keynesian Economics on the changes (or lack of) at the IMF with Ilene Grabel, Marc Lavoie, Esteban Pérez Caldentey and Florencia Sember.

Why do we need a theory of value?

The theory of value and distribution is at the heart of economics. To be clear, when I say that it is at the center, it means that discussions of almost any topic in economics, in one way or another, depend on a certain theoretical position about the theory of value and distribution. However, most economists have no clue about it, about the centrality of value. Not only they don't understand the original and now infamous labor theory of value (LTV), that dominated between Petty and Ricardo (and Adam Smith too, even though that tends to surprise and puzzle most economists),* but also they misunderstand the dominant marginalist paradigm. Some economists actually think that you don't need a theory of value at all, and some don't even understand that they use a conventional (some vulgar form of supply and demand) theory of value. Hence, the reason of this post is to try to help clarify some very basic issues related to the necessity of a theory of value for proper theorizing in economics.

In a sense, this topic was discussed here before, in my post on Sraffa, Marx and the LTV. But it is worth revisiting, and thinking in broader terms, beyond the LTV, to understand why a theory of relative prices is needed in general, to understand almost everything in economics.

Let me start with the authors of the surplus approach. In fact, a bit earlier with the economists that would eventually be known as Mercantilists (if you can talk about a school). If we are allowed to generalize and simplify, the latter believed that the wealth of nations depended essentially on maintaining trade surpluses, and accumulating precious metals. Profits were essentially the result of buying cheap and selling dear, or profits upon alienation, which indicates that, for Mercantilists, profits were generated in the exchange process.

Classical political economy authors, starting with William Petty, emphasize the determination of profits in the process of production, as a residual of output, once the conditions for the reproduction of the productive system were satisfied. So profits are not the result of selling high and buying low, something that could result from the mere fluctuation of market prices, but from the ability to produce beyond what was needed for the simple material reproduction of society. Note that to obtain profits, part of the residual, the surplus over and beyond reproduction requirements, one needs to know the prices of the means of production. That is, one needs to be able to account for the normal prices of the goods that went into the production of all commodities. And these prices would include a normal profit. Again, not the extra gain that might occur from a high market price. So the normal rate of profit is needed to determine prices, and prices are needed to determine the normal rate of profit. This was well understood by both Ricardo and Marx.

Value (the relative prices of commodities) and distribution (the normal rate of profit) are intertwined. Smith knew that the simple LTV (amounts of labor incorporated) was not correct other than in very rudimentary economic systems, with essentially no produced means of production. His solution was to adopt the idea of labor commanded (more on that on my post on Sraffa, and the one on the standard commodity). Ricardo solved this problem, in his corn essay, by assuming that the surplus and the means of production advanced to produce output where all in physical quantities of corn, hence profits could be determined independently from relative prices, as a physical quantity. And Marx adopted the simple labor theory of value in volume one of Capital. Both believed, for slightly different reasons, that their main arguments would hold even if the LTV was not precisely correct.

I am not concerned with the problems with the LVT in Ricardo and Marx (worth noticing that the mathematical solution was not known in their time, and was essentially developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) or Sraffa's solution. It is worth insisting that the LTV does have an analytical solution that is unique, and stable (see my post on the standard commodity for the former, which suggests a Smithian, i.e. labor commanded, version of the LTV is perfectly fine).** That's good, btw. It suggests that the classical political economy notion that there are prices that guarantee the reproduction, and, beyond the the expansion (or accumulation), of the economic system do exist.

Here I want to emphasize the importance of the LTV for the analysis of other aspects of the economy. Ricardo saw the problems of the Smithian adding up theory. That's the notion that prices were composed by the sum of natural wages, profits and rent and that prices would go up if one of its components went up.  In order to determine the rate of profit properly, Ricardo noted the explanation of value was essential. The rate of profit was central because in his view the processes of accumulation depended on the rate of profit. Hence, proper discussion of accumulation and growth depends on a proper theory of value and distribution. Btw, all classical authors assumed that real wages were exogenously determined by institutional and historical circumstances (so there was a role for history and institutions in their theory; also, for accumulation that was seen as too complex to be theorized in the same level of abstraction that value). But even if one is less keen than Ricardo on the role of profits in accumulation, it is undeniable that distribution affects accumulation, and, hence, a proper theory of value and distribution is needed.

Note also, that other things that depend on relative prices are crucially affected by the theory of value and distribution. Classical authors assumed that the process of competition, by which they meant only free entry and not the size or the number of firms in an industry, would lead to a uniform rate of profit. In that sense, the forces of competition were central in forging the structure of production, and, hence, the determination of technological change or to understand the patterns of trade specialization, which cannot be understood without the determination of relative prices. In fact, perhaps the most famous and the most controversial issues coming out of Ricardian economics dealt with international trade and the effects of technical change (the so-called machinery question), and are directly connected to the theory of value.

Even the most crucial macroeconomic problem, the question of output determination (and employment, for a given technique) is affected by the theory of value. Note that classical political economists assumed output as given for the determination of the surplus. And Ricardo accepted Say's Law as a way of determining output and employment (not Marx, btw, so it's NOT a requirement of the surplus approach). But as much as for accumulation understanding of distribution is central for the determination of the level of output, as it is explicit in the Kaleckian effective demand model. the classical long term prices are compatible with levels of output that do not guarantee full employment. And the parametric role of distribution in affecting the size of the multiplier is crucial for output and employment determination. So unemployment is possible in the long run, as a regularity of market economies.

In other words, for a coherent theory of output, accumulation, international trade, technological change and more (taxation, etc.) you need a theory of value and distribution. That is also the case in the mainstream. Marginalism developed in the last quarter of the 19th century, both as a result of the lack of analytical solution in that period for the problems of the LTV and as a reaction to radical revival of the theory (Marxism). The important distinction is that while classical political economy authors dealt only with objective factors, and considered demand as given when determined value and distribution, marginalism incorporated subjective preferences as central for the explanation of long term normal prices, and prices and quantities were determined simultaneously.

Beyond the problems with the marginalist solution for the existence of long term prices (see this on the capital debates) and their switch to the intertemporal approach, which basically only deals with short term prices, their theory is also central for almost everything in economics. In a sense, given that in marginalist analysis distribution is determined by supply and demand, and by the relative scarcity of factors of production, the theory of value and distribution is even more central for other parts of their theory than in the surplus approach. Here the theory of distribution does not affect indirectly the level of output and the process of accumulation. Here the level of employment and, for a given technology, output determination is the same as the theory of distribution. Real wages and the level of employment are determined in the labor market simultaneously. Everything derives from that.

Before getting to the reason why the theory of value and distribution, central for everything, is often ignored, let me note briefly the possibility of a third alternative to value and distribution, beyond the surplus approach and marginalism. That would be the markup theories of pricing. Note that theories of markup pricing essentially describe how firms determine prices. Most of these theories were developed as a result of the imperfect competition literature sparked by Sraffa's famous (1926) critique of Marshallian price theory (see an old post on that here).

First, as it would be known for the readers of this blog (at least the ones that have been reading for a long while), markup pricing is actually dealing with a different set of issues, and Franklin Serrano suggested here that they are different than the classical political economy normal long term prices (the Marxist prices of production or Sraffa's prices), and that Fred Lee and Marc Lavoie were right about that. He argued that some Sraffians (I won't name names), and I would add probably Fred too, thought that Sraffian prices were compatible with the full cost pricing tradition, and I could have included myself in this group.*** Note that what I mean by that is simply that the behavior of firms must be compatible in the real world with the logic of gravitation in classical analysis. In other words, if prices of production imply a normal profit over the full cost for a given technique, then firms somehow must be trying to do that.

But it is clear that the full cost pricing of a particular firm might not be the long run equilibrium price around which market prices gravitate, with free mobility, that is, with competition in the classical sense. In a way, the same circularity suggested above reapers, costs depend on prices (and that involves the profit related to the markup), and prices depend on costs. The firm's individual prices might not be the prices that are required for the reproduction of the economy as a whole. In that sense, markup theories must be grounded on some surplus approach understanding of value and distribution, and they are essentially theories about market prices, meaning short run behavior. In that sense, they run into the same problem than the intertemporal marginalist models, the Arrow-Debreu type, that became more popular after the capital debates, and that led to what Garegnani famously referred to as the change in the notion of equilibrium (that is the abandonment by the mainstream of the notion of long run equilibrium). Some heterodox groups see this as a positive development, but again it implies that they cannot say anything clear about distribution and relative prices, and that has implications for almost any other theory.

I might add here, which is more concerning for some heterodox groups, is that many of these theories are also compatible with marginalist interpretations of the theory of value and distribution. Many imperfect competition theories just suggest simple inverse relations between markups and the price elasticity of demand. This again fall into the type of situation I discussed recently regarding Karl Polanyi, of well-meaning critics of the marginalist mainstream, using marginalist or neoclassical concepts w/o knowing they are doing it (if it's conscious acceptance of the mainstream model, then it's something different).

One last thing in this regard, while markup theories must be grounded on some theory of value and distribution, and my take is that the surplus approach is where it would make sense, the opposite is not true. There is no need for a theory of the firm, of individual behavior, to understand long term prices. Classical political economists certainly discussed behavior, but that essentially entailed some notion related to class, to general social norms, not about what is going on in someone's brain. Even Smith that was certainly concerned with the issue of the role of self-interest in determining the equilibrium outcomes in the market, cannot be assumed to be a precursor of the rational maximizing agents of the mainstream, or of methodological individualism. The same could be said of utilitarian views and Ricardo, who was, to some degree, close to many utilitarians including Bentham. Here too, many heterodox economists think that an alternative theory of behavior is central for economics, and that is why many see behavioral economics as somewhat heterodox.

Finally, getting, even if briefly, to the point of why most economists remain oblivious to the relevance of value and distribution. I would suggest that this is a recent phenomenon. It is the result of what I have discussed here before, the return of vulgar economics (for example, here or here), and that the mainstream has abandoned the long run, and provides only a theory of short run prices. But at the same time the mainstream must revert to the old model in order to promote economic policy. Note that only in that model you can guarantee that markets provide efficient allocation of resources (w/o imperfections), and the price system signals the direction of adjustment. It is often missed by the heterodox groups that resist old classical political economy (often for incorrectly assuming that it is a precursor of marginalism) that their theory of value and their long term prices provide something completely different, an understanding of the conditions for the reproduction of society. That notion, btw, is alive and well in other social sciences (see here or here). Not in economics.

* It survived in the fringes and it was rediscovered by Marx and then much later Sraffa, who actually provided a coherent solution to some of its logical limitations. But after Ricardo, the LTV was never dominant again.

** On the gravitation of market prices towards normal prices see the work by Bellino and Serrano here.

*** My fondness for the subject in part derived from having worked for Wynne Godley at the Levy for two years, who was a disciple of P. S. W. Andrews one of the key authors of the Oxford Economists' Research Group (OERG) behind full cost pricing theories.

The IMF and fiscal policy

This is a topic I discussed several times here (for example, here, here, here, here or here). Now there is a paper by Marc Lavoie (with co-author) in Intervention, on the same topic. The paper notes that: "There is a paper by Vernengo/Ford (2014) that covers some of the same ground. Their conclusion is that the 2008 crisis prompted only some cautious change in the views being entertained at the IMF" (my paper with Kirsten is here). Just to clarify, that's not exactly our point. The point we make is that while the research department has changed some of their views, without discarding the crucial concept of the natural rate of unemployment in their analytical framework, the policies pursued by the IMF changed very little indeed. So that there is a kind of double discourse. I referred to something like that within the mainstream of the profession as organized hypocrisy. Double discourse in theory, with no significant change in the theories that underlie the policy, and almost no change in policy.* At any rate, as anything that Marc writes this paper is worth your time and attention.

* In our intro we say: "It is concluded that even a most optimistic reading of IMF reports and country arrangements disappoints. The power structure ultimately remains the same: the Fund continues to be the mechanism through which creditor countries enforce contractionary policy on indebted countries." So, in our view, nothing really changed. more window dressing than anything else going on.

Kaldorian and Sraffian supermultipliers: a clarification

This is a post for those interested in demand-led theories of growth. Not long ago I wrote a post on misconceptions about Sraffian economics. Marc Lavoie sent me a nice email about it, and a recent paper he published in Metroeconomica (subscription required), which comments on a paper I wrote with Esteban Pérez (working paper available here). In his discussion of supermultiplier models, which put the multiplier and the accelerator together to explain -- not fluctuations of the level of output around its normal position -- but the determination of trend or normal output. Lavoie says:

"Other post-Keynesians, also assume that non-capacity creating autonomous expenditures are the driving force, rather than investment. Serrano himself refers to Kaldor (1983, p. 9) to provide support for this reversal of causality. Fazzari et al. (2013) assume that there is some unidentified demand component that grows autonomously, in order to tame Harrodian instability; Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch. 11) and, as already pointed out Allain (2015), rely on autonomous government expenditures. Indeed, there is a large Kaldorian literature that relies on exogenous growth components other than business investment, most particularly the whole literature on Thirlwall 's law with its exogenous exports (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994), as well as Godley and Cripps (1983), with both government expenditure and export sales."

And in a footonte to that passage he says:

"Thus, adding to the confusion over terminology, Pérez-Caldentey and Vernengo (2013) refer to the Kaldorian tradition when discussing models based on induced investment and non-capacity creating exogenous growth components such as Serrano's Sraffian supermultiplier analysis."

So let me clarify our use of Kaldorian, and also why I believe that it is a mistake to refer to the Sraffian supermultiplier as neo-Kaleckian, even though it does have evidently Kaleckian elements. As I understand the distinction that came to dominate demand-led models of growth, there are basically two* main traditions, one that is referred to as neo-Kaleckian, and one that is referred to as Kaldorian.

The first tradition developed from Bob Rowthorn's expansion of Joan Robinson's 1960s model. And because Joan Robinson was influenced by Kalecki, and  Rowthorn, a Marxist author, was seen as Kaleckian, the name stuck. The original model, one must note was wage-led. And causality basically determined whether the authors was Keynesian or Marxist, with Ed Nell famously referring to one author that suggested that causality went from income distribution to growth as Jean Baptiste Marglin. At any rate, Marxist and Keynesian closures, to use the term popularized in this context by Lance Taylor, were special cases of the neo-Kaleckian model. Later developments introduced changes in the independent investment function which allowed for a profit-led closure.

As I noted before, the term Kaleckian is a bit of a misnomer. The current version of the model allows for a profit-led closure, which is not clearly in Kalecki, and, besides its derived from Joan Robinson's model. The Kaleckian feature is that often it is assumed that workers do not save, and capitalists do not consume, for simplification, a classical political economy type of assumption really.**

The genesis of supermultiplier models is more convoluted. On the one hand, the combination of multiplier and accelerator was used to discuss economic cycles, not growth, including by Hicks, who first discussed the idea of the supermultiplier. By the late 1960s, Kaldor moved away from the differential savings or neo-Keynesian growth models (sometimes referred to as Kaldor-Pasinetti or Cambridge growth model), and adopted the supermultiplier model, formalized by Thirlwall in the 1970s. The model assumed as a simplification that exports were the only autonomous component of demand. In accordance with the accelerator, investment was seen as derived demand. That is the main difference with the so-called Neo-Kaleckian models, namely: there is no independent investment function.***

The idea of the supermultiplier was later, in the 1980s and 1990s, developed by Bortis and Serrano,**** both authors sharing a Sraffian perspective. In these versions, autonomous spending was not restricted to exports, and government spending was also relevant. The term Sraffian or classical-Keynesian has been used to describe these models. In essence, they are Kaldorian models, since investment is derived demand, as much as in Thirlwall's model. In this sense, even though the Kaldorian models a la Thirlwall are a special case of the Sraffian supermultiplier, as discussed here in my debate with Jaime Ros (in Spanish), and by definition more general than the export-led growth model, they came later, and can be seen as a development within this tradition.

So certainly the intention is not to create confusion. In my view, models with an independent investment function are broadly speaking neo-Kaleckian, while models in which investment is derived demand are Kaldorian. And there are differences between models within those broadly defined traditions.

* All taxonomies are somewhat arbitrary and one might see some sub-divisions from the two main branches discussed here as standing in the same footing, for example, some might argue for an explicitly Marxist tradition.

** Goodwin predator-prey models, which have become quite fashionable, can be seen as a variation of these neo-Kaleckian models.

*** I think these Cambridge models have been completely abandoned since the 1960s, and that is the reason why I don't have three types of models in my taxonomy. They are a historical curiosity, associated to a response to the Harrod instability problem, at a time when full employment seemed like a stylized fact in advanced capitalist economies. For a clear explanation of the implications of the different model closures see the paper by Franklin Serrano and Fabio Freitas here.

**** The Sraffian versions of the supermultiplier model also assume differential savings by workers and capitalists, as many other classical political economy inspired models, and in that sense have Kaleckain features. But they are not neo-Kaleckian, since there is no independent investment function.

Misconceptions about Heterodox Economics in general and Sraffian in particular

I had discussed before the meaning of heterodox economics. I suggested a definition based on positive contributions (rather than as a critique of the mainstream) and based on concepts rather than schools of thought. In my view the two principles that were central for defining heterodoxy were the Principle of Effective Demand (PED), based on Keynes and Kalecki's ideas, and the idea that distribution is the result of class conflict, which in my view is best expressed in Sraffa's recovery of the surplus approach. And I suggested that several authors within various schools of thought (Post Keynesians, Marxists, Institutionalists, Sraffians, Feminists, Ecological economists, Structuralists, and even some Evolutionary or Schumpeterian economists) could probably accept both propositions (not Austrians, which are a fringe version of Marginalism, and as a result not an heterodox school per se). In that sense, there could be a view of heterodoxy as not necessarily fragmented set of Schools of Thought.

However, it is a different proposition to suggest that something like a consensus between heterodox schools is really emerging. That I actually doubt. John King suggests that this would be Fred Lee's position in his new book Advanced Introduction to Post Keynesian Economics (there is no direct quote, but I always interpreted Fred as suggesting that a more cohesive heterodox approach was possible rather than it was actually taking place in reality, but I might be wrong).

In fact, it is my view that, in general, not only heterodox groups, which by definition tend to be small and often concerned with specific topics, but the mainstream is quite fragmented. On macro issues, even with the New Neoclassical Synthesis, there is a lot of disagreement between New Keynesians and RBC types, particularly on policy issues. So it should not be surprising that heterodox groups are quite fragmented too. Sometimes the fragmentation within the mainstream gives the false impression that some groups are breaking away, or on the edge (see my view on that here). And it is not just fragmentation, but also confusion. Even in the mainstream there is lack of understanding about the meaning of the mainstream (see here for example).

So it should not be surprising that, given the fragmentation of the heterodoxy, several misconceptions arise. Sraffians are particularly vulnerable to this since Sraffa wrote so little, and even though his Production of Commodities is not a difficult book to read, it is one that has been often misunderstood. Marc Lavoie has responded, from a Post Keynesian and friendly standpoint, to some of these misconceptions (the fact that some people consider Austrians heterodox, but are not certain about Sraffians speaks volumes about confusion among heterodox groups too).

Yet, I was a bit surprised by some of the misconceptions in John King's book. He says that: "There is no role in Sraffian models for fundamental uncertainty, money or the principle of effective demand." In the quote he suggests that this is the position of Hart and Kriesler (2014), but if he disagrees he does not say anything. So it is safe to assume that he concurs. He complements this by arguing that: "since the relationship between the wage rate and the rate of profit in Sraffian models is monotonically declining, it is difficult (if not impossible) for the their models to incorporate a 'wage-led' growth regime." Hm, were to start.

So Garegnani pointed out long ago (in the 1960s, but the English publication was in the late 1970s; links to the English versions of both the 1960s and 1970s papers here) that not only Sraffians believe in effective demand, but that a coherent presentation of the Principle of Effective Demand requires the abandonment of marginalism (particularly the marginal efficiency of capital argument). Not only that, Garegnani is very clear in his 1960s papers that (from link above):

"As regards consumption, increases in real wages lead to a rise in consumption and hence, provided the economy has accumulation capacity that is not fully utilized, to an expansion of the productive system and to an increase in employment. Given the level of productivity in the economy, the increase in real wages will in fact cause a redistribution of income in favour of a class that consumes a major portion of its income, and with that an increase in the first component of final demand... 

a steady and continuous rise in real wages along with the consequent steady and continuous increase in consumption can serve to instil in entrepreneurs a confidence in the continuous expansion of the market for their products, inducing them to undertake investments and increases in employment and output that will in turn help to raise final demand."

So yeah the economy is wage-led. Actually, in Garegnani's debates with Marxists, with Joan Robinson and other authors on the causes of long run growth, he could be seen exactly as taking the position that profit-led regimes are not possible, in the sense that he understood that firms would not invest because of a higher rate of profit. Firms are interested in adjusting capacity to demand, and to maintain a normal level of capacity utilization. Also, one should note that Garegnani wrote his paper in the 1960s under the direct influence of Sraffa, who might also have understood the idea of the accelerator. That is why Franklin Serrano is correct in suggesting the supermultiplier is Sraffian. Not only Sraffians have effective demand, they do in the long run (not in the short run as a result of imperfections).

Two things are important in this context. First, in Sraffa's price equations, which uses the method of given quantities developed by classical political economy authors, imply that there is class conflict, and an inverse relation between the real wage and the rate of profit. However, in a theory of the determination of output in the long run, output by definition is not given and the effects of income distribution on output might be ambiguous, even if the demand regime is wage-led (for example, higher wages might lead to loss of external competitiveness, and lower exports than more than compensate the increase in consumption associated to higher wages). Second, as I noted on my previous post on Garegnani's 1960s paper, the Sraffian project was the revival of the classical theory of distribution, concomitantly with the extension of the Keynesian Principle of Effective Demand to the long run.

On the absence of money in the Sraffian system also a lot of ink has been wasted. In his Production of Commodities Sraffa famously suggests that it is the rate of interest, as determined by the monetary authority, which is the exogenous variable. So prices and real wages are determined for given technical conditions of production and the long term interest rate as set by the monetary authority. Pivetti referred to this as the monetary theory of distribution. So monetary policy has important distributive implications, and this view is perfectly compatible with Keynes' views on a normal, conventional and not psychological, rate of interest. It is also compatible with endogenous money views, that hark back to Tooke and other Banking School authors. There is money, and not in the sort of Monetarist way in which the central bank controls its quantity.

Finally, on uncertainty. True for Sraffians uncertainty is not central for unemployment (one in three), yet that does not mean is completely irrelevant or that it does not play any role. Here it is important to note that any good discussion of uncertainty suggests that the one that is central is the uncertainty about future demand. See for example Davidson in this example. So the problem is lack of demand. Autonomous demand that is. And that works, as it should, with the supermultiplier.

Unlimited Targets? Some pointers

By Sergio Cesaratto (Guest Blogger)

In this short note I will not add anything of substantial to the debate with Marc Lavoie on the nature of the Eurozone (EZ) crisis in view of Target 2 (T2). Readers have numerous papers to look at (including Lavoie 2015a/b, Cesaratto 2013, 2015a/b) and posts (Vernengo 2015, Ramanan, 2015). However, although most of relevance has already been said, there is perhaps still some space for few qualifications.

1. Subject of the dispute is on whether the EZ crisis can be considered a balance of payment (BoP) crisis in view of the existence of T2 and of the Eurosystem semi-authomatic refinancing mechanism, or if it should be considered a crisis derived from flawed institutional mechanisms that led, in particular, to a belated intervention by the ECB to sustain peripheral sovereign debts.

Marc believes that given the existence of T2 and refinancing mechanisms, a BoP crisis cannot occur in a monetary union:

“The point that I have tried to make on a number of occasions at conferences is that outflows are not limited by the amount of foreign reserves in the Eurozone context, in contrast to a country on a fixed or managed exchange rate regime. If a Eurozone country is running a current account deficit that banks from other Eurozone members decline to finance, or if it is subjected to capital outflows, then all that happens is that the national central bank of that country will be accumulating TARGET2 debit balances at the ECB. There is no legal limit to these debit balances. The national central bank with the debit balances, which pay interest at the target interest rate, has as a counterpart in its assets the advances that it must make to its national commercial banks at that same target interest rate. And the commercial banks can obtain central bank advances as long as they show proper collateral. Why would the size of current account deficits or TARGET2 debit balances worry speculators?” (Lavoie 2015: 158)

Marc correctly points out the difference in our views:

“Cesaratto (2015°: 151) and I agree when he concludes that “there are no definite limits to T2 imbalances”; he seems to disagree when he adds that “a political limit has been set by the imposition of harsh austerity measures on peripheral countries in order to obtain positive CA balances”. (ibid)

So the difference is that I see policy limits (perhaps political was not the right word) to T2 imbalances in the sense that policy makers cannot see them growing indefinitely, reflecting growing flow and stock foreign indebtedness and, correspondingly, mounting indebtedness of peripheral private and sovereign debts.

2. To give an example, would a central government with a sovereign central bank (CB) let one region (say Calabria) to expand its expenditure issuing regional bonds by letting its CB to guarantee an unlimited issuance? Notably this behaviour would let this region to accumulate an unlimited balance of payment deficit and foreign debt with the rest of the country and the rest of the world. At the minimum the other regions would like to imitate this (electorally) convenient behaviour. The reader can derive by herself the economic consequences of this behaviour.

If this does not complicate the life of readers, a reference to a view that cannot be suspected of fiscal timidity, that is to MMT, is useful here. Wray and Nersisyan (2010: 16) argue that although there are not “financial constraints [to sovereign debt and deficit] inherent in the fiat system”, nonetheless some arbitrary fiscal constraint, e.g. a balanced budget of the cycle, is necessary to avoid that the government “might spend ‘out of control,’ taking too large a percent of the nation’s resources”.

Would any national government let its CB to back a single region to behave this way? And should we expect the EU sustaining a single member, let alone a group of members, to behave this way? Or could we expect the U.S. printing dollars to check the Argentinian foreign debt crisis in 2001?

On a similar vein Ramanan (2015, italics added) pointed out:

“Let’s consider what happens if there is no federal government and if the ECB is the main supranational authority (ignoring other supranational institutions which have limited powers). Suppose the ECB were to guarantee the debt of governments of all Euro Area nations. There’s nothing to prevent, say, the government of Finland to increase the compensation of its employees every year by a huge percentage and thereby affecting Finnish corporations’ compensation of its employees. This will result in a reduction of competitiveness of Finnish producers and Finnish resident economic units will rely more on goods and services produced abroad. This will raise Finland’s net indebtedness to the rest of the Euro Area and the world. If someone believes that this debt is not a problem, how about the inflationary impact of this rise in demand on the rest of the Euro Area?... 

To summarize, the Euro Area problem wouldn’t have been a balance-of-payments problem had the official sector promised to act as a lender of the last resort to national Euro Area governments without any condition. As long as there are conditions, it is a balance-of-payments problem. One cannot pretend that the European Central Bank has or can be given such powers to lend without any condition. And hence the Euro Area crisis is a balance-of-payments problem.”

3. In this sense I do not agree with the ecumenical view taken by Matias Vernengo (2015) according to which:

“Cesaratto and Lavoie hypotheses are one and the same. The balance of payments and the monetary sovereignty views of the European crisis are two sides of the same coin. The fact that overdraft facilities involved in the TARGET2 system could be used to create credit to finance euro imbalances, or that the ECB could buy government bonds in the secondary market does not preclude the fact that the actual crisis is, in the absence of these policies, the result of the inability to manage a CA deficit.”

It can be noted that Matias eventually endorses the argument (that I refrain to attribute to Lavoie but that, perhaps, he might approve) that the absence of an unlimited credit by the ECB is the ultimate cause of the BoP crisis. My view is that it is unthinkable to believe in an open ended support by the ECB (or by the EU governance) of unlimited Target 2 imbalances. And this is, in my view, the ultimate cause of the imposition of austerity policies on the periphery. The ECB “whatever it takes” (threatened) intervention, finalised to alleviate the austerity costs by reassuring financial markets, was indeed subordinate to the adoption of austerity measures - so that no German court could protest, inspired by Werner Sinn, that the ECB was sustaining unlimited peripheral foreign debts.

In Lavoie’s and Paul De Grauwe (e.g. 2013)’s views austerity was functional to reassure the financial markets about the fiscal sustainability of peripheral debts given the absence of the ECB as lender of last resort (see Cesaratto 2015b for a review). Note that this view is exposed to a fiscal interpretation of the crisis (one that Lavoie and De Grauwe firmly oppose). And, indeed, the reader may wander what is the cause of the crisis, given that Lavoie and De Grauwe tend to neglect Robert Frankel’s and others’ story about the similarities of the EZ crisis with the typical financial crisis of emerging economies (see Cesaratto 2015b for a review)

The next are minor points.

4. Marc is correct when he argues that Roberto Frenkel does not reject the “unlimited Target 2 unbalances view”:

“Let me make a final point. Cesaratto (…) enlists Roberto Frenkel (2012) among the
economists who support his ‘balance-of-payments’ interpretation of the crisis. I got quite
a different impression when I read his paper. While Frenkel (2012: 13) agrees with Cesaratto that the adoption of the common currency was a mistake and that the crisis has its origin in ‘the conjunction of fixed exchange rates, full capital mobility and weak financial regulation,’Frenkel nevertheless believes that the size of TARGET2 balances is irrelevant and argues that the sovereign risk premiums observed with GIIPS countries were tied to the absence of a credible lender of last resort”

And indeed in my most recent paper (Cesaratto 2015b) I had already pointed out:

“A more nuanced position is taken by Frenkel (2014, pp. 13-14). On the one hand he regards the eurocrisis as a balance of payment crisis; on the other, he denies that there can be an “exchange rate risk” (the typical manifestation of a balance of payment crisis) in the euro zone presumably because of the combination of Target 2 and the ECB refinancing operations. The increasing sovereign default risk is then attributed to the absence of a lender of last resort. Notably, with OMT the ECB began to act as a lender of last resort but precisely to defuse what Draghi (2012) called in his most famous speech ‘convertibility risk’, that is the risk of a euro break-up.”

5. Finally, although this is less important, I’d like to point out, in Cesaratto (2015a) I was not so pretentious to claim that Lavoie (2015) was entirely devoted to discuss Cesaratto (2013). Unfortunately this is the impression that the reader may get from Lavoie’s incipit of his Reply. When I began my (2015) paper writing:

“In a general appreciation of my work on TARGET2 (T2) (Cesaratto 2013), Marc Lavoie (2015a) criticized my interpretation of the Eurozone (EZ) troubles as a balance of payments crisis”,

by ”general appreciation” I meant “positive reception” (see e.g. the Microsoft Window Word dictionary), but perhaps the way I expressed myself was ambiguous.

References

Cesaratto, S. 2013. “The Implications of TARGET2 in the European Balance of payments Crisis and Beyond.” European Journal of Economics and Economic Policy: Intervention 10, no. 3: 359–382. link

Cesaratto, S. 2015a. “Balance of Payments or Monetary Sovereignty?. In Search of the EMU’s Original Sin–Comments on Marc Lavoie’s The Eurozone: Similarities to and Differences from Keynes’s Plan.” International Journal of Political Economy 44, no. 2: 142–156. link

Cesaratto, S. 2015b. Alternative Interpretations of a Stateless Currency crisis, Asimmetrie, WP no.8. link

De Grauwe, P. (2013) Design Failures in the Euro zone - can they be fixed? London School of Economics, LEQS Paper No. 57/2013. Link

Frenkel, R. 2012. “What Have the Crises in Emerging Markets and the Euro Zone in Common and what Differentiates Them?”, link

Frenkel, R. (2014) What have the crises in emerging markets and the Euro Zone in common and what differentiates them? in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Daniel Heymann (eds), Life After Debt - The Origins and Resolutions of Debt Crisis, Palgrave Macmillan (quotations from the WP version link)

Lavoie, M. 2015a. “The Eurozone: Similarities to and Differences from Keynes’s Plan.” International Journal of Political Economy 44, no. 1 (Spring): 3–17. link

Lavoie, M. 2015b. “The Eurozone Crisis: A Balance-of-Payments Problem or a Crisis Due to a Flawed Monetary Design?” International Journal of Political Economy 44, no. 2: 157-160. (abstract)

Nersisyan, Y. and Wray, L.R. (2010) Does Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt Growth? A Critique of This Time Is Different, by Reinhart and Rogoff, Levy Institute, WP No. 603

Ramanan (2015) Sergio Cesaratto’s Debate With Marc Lavoie on Whether the Euro Area Crisis Is a Balance-Of-Payments Crisis – II, The Case For Concerted Action

Vernengo, M. (2015) Greece on the verge, Nakedkeynesianism, June 30

Greece on the verge

Jean François Ponsot, Jonathan Marie and @NakedKeynes

I'm in France for a talk at the Université de Paris XIII, invited by Jonathan Marie and Dany Lang. The Greek crisis looms large in everybody's minds. I gave a talk based on two papers, one published here, and the other (specifically on the Spanish crisis) just finished, which will soon come as a working paper. But I discussed to a great extent the debate between Sergio Cesaratto and Marc Lavoie on the nature of the European crisis, that is, whether it is a balance of payments crisis or a monetary sovereignty one.

Cesaratto argues that a balance-of-payment crisis is possible in a currency union, and that the financial crisis of the Eurozone is indeed such a balance-of-payment crisis. Arguably Pérez and Vernengo (2012; the one linked above) suggest the same, even though the paper was written to argue that the crisis was not fiscal, as per the mainstream hypothesis, and the actual policies pursued by the Troika, which require fiscal adjustment as a solution (presumably because the problem was fiscal).

In the balance of payments or Cesaratto hypothesis, the problem would be that there are no federal transfer payments from the surplus to the deficit countries to help compensate the negative impact of CA deficits on GDP and budget balances. Or to make it more correct, it would be that there are no fiscal transfers from a federal government to the federated units, as has been shown is the case by Nate Cline and David Fields here for the US case.

Yet, as noted by Lavoie, the Eurozone crisis seems to have been mainly caused instead by a banking problem, which transformed itself into a public debt problem. In other words, the currency issue, and the functioning of the monetary union seem to be at the core of the crisis, not a balance of payments one. The monetary union clearly eliminates exchange rate risk, but not country risk, which might explain the interest rate differentials between euro countries. So some countries remain more vulnerable than others.

Marc suggests that the interbank payments system, the so-called TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System), used by the European Central Bank (ECB) can be seen as being at the heart of the problem. In his example, if a Spanish firm imports cars from a German firm, the ECB credits the German firm in a German bank and debits the Spanish one in his correspondent bank. There is no limit to the debit position that the Banco de España, the Spanish central bank, can incur at the ECB. The overdraft capacity of the ECB is unlimited.* So in this view the solution would be for the ECB to use its overdraft capacity to create the conditions for the euro periphery to continue to function without austerity.

Alternatively, this could be solved if the ECB bought bonds from the member countries. However, the rules of the euro imply that the ECB cannot purchase sovereign debt, and, hence, the mechanism by which a risk free asset is normally created is precluded to function. The creation of the risk free asset is the essential function of the central bank in relation to financial stability. According to Lavoie the Eurozone setup should have incorporated a central bank that holds and purchases large amounts of securities issued by the participating national governments. Something that was done in the US by the Fed after the crisis.

My argument, discussed briefly here before, is that the Cesaratto and Lavoie hypotheses are one and the same. The balance of payments and the monetary sovereignty views of the European crisis are two sides of the same coin. The fact that overdraft facilities involved in the TARGET2 system could be used to create credit to finance euro imbalances, or that the ECB could buy government bonds in the secondary market does not preclude the fact that the actual crisis is, in the absence of these policies, the result of the inability to manage a CA deficit. In his example, the origin of the debit position of the Banco de España is an import of German cars, which presumably corresponds to a current account deficit position.

In this sense, the European crisis is caused by the failures of the euro design, but it is also one that forces countries with banks that over-borrow, or that have firms that over-import, to adjust by reducing its imports through austerity, and, hence, increasing its ability to repay. Note that leaving the euro (in particular for Greece, i.e. Grexit), which would imply some degree of depreciation of the newly created currency, might not be sufficient (or even necessary) to solve the crisis. I discussed this here before. Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, has also been skeptical about depreciation and Greexit.

* Marc compares TARGET2 to Keynes bancor, and suggests that Keynes might be, more than Mundell, the father of the euro. Two things come to mind. I think in principle, the adjustment rules based on austerity, are closer to Mundell than Keynes (poor Keynes, this institutional mess should not be pinned on him). Second, Keynes' plan also implies that there is a need for surplus countries to finance deficit ones. What really matters in this is who creates the overdraft, who has the power to create money, so to speak. Normally that has nothing to do with having surpluses. National governments are not in surplus against its subunits. Globally the US is a deficit country, and is still the one issuing the global currency.

More on currency crises and the euro crisis

I wrote a while ago about currency crises (see here). There I suggested that classical-Keynesian or post-Keynesian views on currency crises invert the causality between fiscal and balance of payments problems in a currency crisis. Currency crises are not caused by excessive fiscal spending financed by monetary emissions, which would lead to inflation, and eventually after a run on the currency and depletion of reserves to a devaluation, but on current account problems.

There two key problems with the conventional view. On the one hand, the very monetarist notion that increases in money supply have direct impact on prices, and no effect on quantities. That would be an extreme natural rate hypothesis. But also that these models presume that fiscal deficits and debt denominated in domestic currency are the problem in currency crises, when the relevant debt is the foreign one, related to the current account deficit, and denominated in foreign currency. In other words, whereas default in the former is not possible, in the latter it clearly is. The mismatch between government receipts in domestic currency and foreign debt obligations in foreign currency is the key problem in currency crises.

Fiscal deficits might play a role in a currency crisis, but it is ultimately an indirect one. If the fiscal deficit, by leading to an increase in the level of activity (not prices) leads to a current account deficit, then it does exacerbate the external constraint of the economy, and might contribute to the eventual depreciation. Note that this suggests that the variations of the level of income are more relevant for the adjustment of the balance of payments, than changes in the exchange rate, something noted for the case of peripheral economies, in particular Argentina during the Gold Standard, by A. G. Ford (for a discussion of that go here).

In a classical-Keynesian view the fiscal crisis might be a result of the currency crisis, and not vice versa (as I discussed for Brazil here). If the crisis leads to a recession, then fiscal revenues collapse, and spending increases, particularly unemployment insurance expenditures, welfare spending, and transfers, exacerbating the fiscal problems. Further, the central bank might hike the domestic interest rate, to preclude capital flight and further devaluation and that would have an additional effect on interest payments on domestic debt, also worsening the fiscal stance.

This currency crisis story might have some relation to the current debate between Marc Lavoie and Sergio Cesaratto on whether the European crisis should be seen as a a monetary sovereignty problem (Marc) or balance of payments crisis (Sergio). Both would agree that the crisis is not the result of fiscal problems, as described above. Even in Greece, that had higher fiscal deficits than others, the relevance of those deficits, and the enforcing of brutal austerity afterwards, has been associated to the current account. Note that in common currency areas, like the United States, federal fiscal transfers (and not just inter-state transfers) would allow for imbalances to continue without leading to contraction of output to reduce the regional balance of payments constraints, as noted by Nate Cline and David Fields here.

Alternatively, in the absence of fiscal transfers from a federal European government, if the European Central Bank (ECB) had the ability to buy euro denominated bonds of peripheral countries and keep their borrowing costs low, fiscal policy could be used by member countries, without risk of default. That's what Marc Lavoie has argued, that at the heart of the problem there is a monetary sovereignty problem. Basically the ECB could transform what is effectively a foreign currency problem, since peripheral countries have a constraint in euros, into an essentially domestic problem with no risk of default. On the other hand, it is also true that the manifestation of the euro crisis is in the form of a regular balance of payments problem, as noted by Sergio Cesaratto. In a sense, both are correct. The imbalances in the current account, which Sergio puts at the center, become relevant because in the absence of fiscal transfers, and of a monetary authority providing a zero risk asset for governments to borrow in times of crisis, as emphasized by Marc, the adjustment is done by variations of the level of income.

The difference might lie not so much in the diagnostic, which is basically the same (they also agree on Keynesian fashion that the current account adjustment is done by variations in quantities not prices), but on the policy alternatives. Sergio's emphasis seems to suggest that exit is the best alternative. Marc's views would indicate that reforming the institutions would be better (mind you, they might think differently, I'm suggesting what the different emphasis might imply). It is unclear to me that depreciation and exit from the euro would solve the problems of peripheral countries (on the role of depreciation on solving the external problem in Greece, that is, Greexit, go here). On the other hand, the reform of the European institutional framework has proceeded at pace that seems too slow for the magnitude of the problems faced in the peripheral countries. There is no good alternative.

PS: The Troika's solution is austerity, since the the crisis is seen as a fiscal problem, as in conventional currency crises models. And the ECB should in that framework remain concerned only with inflation.

Rochon on Lavoie

The Progressive Economics Forum holds its annual meetings at the Canadian Economics Association (CEA) conference. This year we are at Ryerson University, Toronto, Thursday, May 28 to Sunday, May 31, 2015.

Introducing Marc Lavoie 
May 29, 2015

By Louis-Philippe Rochon

I am very honoured to be introducing this year’s guest speaker.

When I was asked to introduce him, I found myself in a bit of a conundrum.

After all, how can I possibly do this in just 5 minutes?  I mean it is impossible to do justice to his work over the last 35 years in such a short time.  His CV by the way is 40 pages long. So one would need quite possibly a good hour to cover all the important features of our guest’s distinguished career.

Marc Lavoie obtained his doctorate from Sorbonne Paris 1 in 1979 and arrived at the University of Ottawa the same year.  It was only a few years later, in 1983, I believe, that I had him as a professor.  I took Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics  (with a hyphen!) largely because nothing else fit my schedule.  I must admit I was a bit reluctant to take the course as other students were telling me to stay away. But, I did anyways and the rest, as the old saying goes, is history.

Marc has a long – very long – list of publications.  To wit, he has published, at last count, over 120 peer-reviewed journal articles and 71 book articles; he has written 10 books, and edited another six.

Among the books he has written, we have an excellent first-year textbook, co-written with his colleague of 35 years, Mario Seccareccia, who was also my professor.

There is also a book that has contributed to the emergence of an entire new approach, the so-called stock-flow consistent approach, which has seduced a great many young, and not so young, scholars.  Today, there are a great many articles and conferences dedicated to that approach.

The book, Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, was co-written with Wynne Godley, and, like many of his other books, has had a tremendous impact on post-Keynesian economics.  It is safe to say that Marc has single-handedly given great empirical “legitimacy” to heterodox economics.

Another book is his Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics. First written in French for the famous Repères series, I had the privilege of translating it in English (something by the way I will never do again, and I think Marc will agree on that!), and it has also been translated into Spanish, Japanese, Mandarin, with Italian and Korean translations in the works. I hear a Klingon version is next!

His most recent book, a greatly expanded version of his quintessential 1992 tome, is by any definition an essential book for anyone wanting to learn about post-Keynesian and heterodox economics. Indeed, Post-Keynesian Economics: New Foundations, in my opinion, towers high above all other books on the topic, and offers readers great insights into the essential features, both micro and macro, of post-Keynesian economics. In my opinion, this book is already a classic. I am certain, in several decades from now, it will be regarded as one of the greatest written on Post-Keynesian economics.

Among his edited volumes, I want to point to three in particular.  His most recent with Fred Lee (2013) In Defense of Post-Keynesian Economics and Heterodox Economics: Response to their Critics, is an excellent collection of articles addressing directly the many critics of heterodox economics.

Another book, entitled Money and Macroeconomic Issues: Alfred Eichner and Post-Keynesian Economics (2010), reflects on the great work of Alfred Eichner, an economist who has greatly influenced Marc’s thinking.  It is a book, which was co-edited by Mario Seccareccia and myself.

Finally, another great book, co-edited with Mario Seccareccia, on Central Banking in the Modern World: Alternative Perspectives (2004) has many excellent articles on credit, money and central banking.

Now, while many here know his writings in economic theory, monetary theory and policy, fiscal policy, endogenous money, growth theory, price theory, Marc also has a whole other life in sports economics. This is perhaps a reflection of his avid interest in sports, having been named not once, but twice, Carleton University’s Male Athlete of the Year (1973-74, 1974-75).  He is greatly passionate about fencing, for which he not only won the Canadian national senior championship in sabre seven times, but also represented Canada in the 1975, 1979 and 1983 Pan-American Games (where he finished 4th in the individual event in sabre in 1979). He also participated in the Commonwealth championships in 1974 (4th), 1978 (2nd) and 1982, and competed at the 1976 and the 1984 Summer Olympics.

He is currently Managing co-editor of the European Journal of Economics and Economic Theory: Intervention, and is on the editorial board or Executive Board of 13 journals, including my own journal, the Review of Keynesian Economics. He has lectured around the world, in far too many places to list.

There is no doubt that Marc’s contribution to economics and to post-Keynesian economics in particular has influenced a generation of scholars. Many regard him, and rightly so, as one the greatest scholars in the heterodox tradition. I concur.

As an example, I am currently editing a set of 3 anthologies in post-Keynesian economics for Edward Elgar.  So last month, out of curiosity, I posted a few messages on FB, asking the over 200 post-Keynesian and heterodox economists I know there from around the world, which was their most influential article on monetary theory.  Of those who replied to me by email, close to 80% stated that’s Marc’s 1996 article in the Scottish Journal of Political Economy was probably the most important post-Keynesian article on endogenous money, with another 15% mentioned his 1996 article in Money in Motion.

In closing, I need to mention one last important contribution.

Above, I often interchanged the word post-Keynesian for heterodox.  This was deliberate. It reflects Marc’s deep passion for a unified heterodox approach.  Where many of our colleagues, including myself, see differences and quarrels, Marc sees similarities and bridges among the various heterodox traditions; where some argued for the exclusion of some approach from the post-Keynesian family, Marc insisted on casting a large post-classical tent, and pointed to what united us rather than divided us.  This has been a consistent theme throughout his career and his writings.

I am running out of time.  Well, like I said, it is difficult to do justice to his long career in such a short time, and this was the root of the conundrum I faced. But well, upon deeper reflection, I guess there really is no conundrum.

I don’t need longer than 5 minutes, I am happy with less. Since in the end, we all agree, our distinguished guest needs no introduction.

Ladies and gentlemen, Marc Lavoie

For more information on the PEF at the CEA, see here.

A debate on Endogenous Money and Effective Demand: Keen, Fiebiger, Lavoie and Palley

The last issue of the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE) has a debate between Steve Keen with Brett Fiebiger, Marc Lavoie and Tom Palley. Two papers are available for download (Keen and Lavoie's). Tom's paper is available as a working paper here.

The basis for Steve's defense of endogenous money is based on the works of Schumpeter, as developed by the latter's student Hyman Minsky. In his words:

"The proposition that effective demand exceeds income is not a new one: it can be found in both Schumpeter and Minsky (and arguably in Keynes's writings after The General Theory, though not in as definitive a form – see Keynes 1937*, p. 247). A difference between income and expenditure, with the gap filled by the endogenous creation of money, was a foundation of Schumpeter's vision of the entrepreneurial role in capitalism. Minsky's attempt to reconcile endogenous money and sectoral balances is the closest antecedent to the argument I make, but I will start in chronological order with Schumpeter's analysis."

I have noted before that the idea of endogenous money is NOT central for heterodox approaches, since Wicksell and the whole modern New Keynesian consensus adopts it. And perfectly conventional authors like Irving Fisher had introduced debt in their models too. I also noted that Schumpeter is essentially a Real Business Cycle (innovations are nothing but exogenous productivity shocks) author, which thought that both short-run output and employment and long-run growth were determined by supply-side factors. So in general I'm not a great fan of having Schumpeter as a staring point, or the notion that to introduce debt and endogenous money is per se a critique of the mainstream.

In that respect, I tend to agree with Tom's point that it is the way in which endogenous money and debt are introduced in the model that matters. Keen's use of a variation of Fisher's equation of exchange, as pointed out by Tom, is troublesome. In Tom's words:

"The Fisher equation constitutes the monetarist framework for macroeconomics. Income-expenditure accounting constitutes the Keynesian framework and it offers an alternative approach to understanding the AD, credit, endogenous money nexus."

In fact, in the equation of exchange framework the presumption is that demand would adjust (in Steve's approach with endogenous money) up to the point that it meets supply at the optimal level (also something that would be perfectly in line with  Schumpeter). The whole point of the income-expenditure framework is that it puts demand in charge of the level of activity.

At any rate, a good debate that it's worth checking out. Enjoy!

* J.M. Keynes (1937), "Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest," 47, Economic Journal, pp. 241-252. Available here (subscription required).

John King and Marc Lavoie and alternatives to the mainstream

An interview with John King (here), in the World Economic Association Newsletter. Also, chapter 1 of Marc Lavoie's new book on post-Keynesian economics available here.

PS: In Marc's book I'm included in a group of authors that can be classified in more than one category. In his words: "Many eclectic and productive economists go across all or at least two of the categories discussed above, and so could not fit neatly into one of the strands. This is the case of key senior authors such as Philip Arestis, Geoff Harcourt, John King , Barkley Rosser Jr and Edward Nell, or more junior ones like Steve Keen, Mathew Forstater, Mathias (sic) Vernengo and Louis-Philippe Rochon."