Economic Regularities and "Laws" and the Riksbank Prize too

I've been reading The Nobel Factor: The Prize in Economics, Social Democracy, and the Market Turn by Avner Offer, Gabriel Söderberg, an interesting critique of the use of the Nobel Prize to undermine the Welfare State, essentially by conservative groups in Sweden, that were influential within the Central Bank (Riksbank), that disliked the Social Democratic policies in place in the 1960s. I have been critical of the Riksbank prize before (see, for example, here or here; check also Lars Syll's blog who often discusses the limits to the Nobel in economics), and this book is an interesting discussion of the socio-political forces behind the creation of the prize. I highly recommend it.

Having said that, I should note that the alternative to mainstream marginalist (neoclassical) economics is not Social Democracy. I guess one can actually be Social Democratic (Liberal in the US  New Deal sense of the word) and neoclassical. A good chunk of the Old Keynesians of the Neoclassical Synthesis sort were, and there are a few New Keynesians that are like that (many are simply Neoliberal). The alternative to marginalism, in my view, is a combination of the old surplus approach (classical political economy), particularly regarding value and distribution, and the Keynesian (and Kaleckian) analysis, regarding macro.

Also, I'm somewhat troubled by Offer and Söderberg tendency to read the Kuhnian ideas on the growth of knowledge in a nihilistic way, suggesting that economics cannot be seen as 'scientific' (surely a loaded term with more than one definition), and that there are no regularities in economics. They, for example, say that:

Feynman began by ‘looking for a new law’. But after three centuries, economics has yet to come up with a single non-obvious ‘law’, or universal regularity.

Don't get me wrong, regularities in economics are historically constrained, but there are more than a few. As any regular reader of this blog would know, I'm particularly fond of Okun's Law (and also of its inseparable fraternal twin Verdoorn's Law). I do think there is an important regularity behind the so-called Thirlwall's Law (that developing countries without a reserve currency face a balance of payments constraint more often than not), even if I don't think it is a "law" like the other two. In particular, I think that if one thinks of the persistent forces that operate within a particular mode of production, there are many other regularities that should (and to some extent are) part of economic analysis.

There are many mechanisms that capture the workings of those regularities in the economic system, like the multiplier and the accelerator. Theoretical constructs that are measurable, even if that is difficult and open to criticism. I guess I'm okay with the use of the term economic law, in a certain context. I suppose Marx also thought that capitalism, and other modes of production, were to some extent amenable of analysis on the basis of certain regularities, certain laws of motion, if one prefers (and, yes, that opens a discussion about determinism, but I'll leave that for another post).

Kindleberger (who I was lucky to see giving a talk in honor of Heilbroner years ago) wrote a little book on economic laws. The Iron Law of Wages, that Kindleberger discusses in his book, is very problematic (some discussion of that here), like the law of supply and demand, or the law of diminishing returns (they are not laws in my view, if that needs to be clarified). The other two Kindleberger discusses are much better, namely: Engel's Law and Gresham's Law. At any rate, for what is worth, I do think that there are many regularities that make economics scientific. Yes, sure social sciences are not like the hard sciences, but we do not live in post-modern world in which no regularities exist. But that does not undermine the authors' critique of the Riksbank prize, I might add.

New Title: The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crises

From the abstract:

The Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007-2008 reminds us with devastating force that financial instability and crises are endemic to capitalist economies that lack powerful and dynamically changing financial regulations that can keep the powerful forces of leverage and credit within sustainable bounds. Economists from Marx to Keynes, and Minsky to Kindleberger have well understood this profoundly important fact, yet the dominant mainstream economics of "rational expectations", "efficient markets" and "laissez-faire" that rationalized widespread financial liberalization and still dominates the economics profession has gotten it, literally, "dead wrong". The Handbook of The Political Economy of Financial Crises describes the theoretical, institutional, and historical factors that can help us understand the forces that create financial crises - with an emphasis on the crisis of 2007- 2008 - and the strengths and weaknesses of varying theoretical perspectives and policy approaches that have tried to comprehend and limit these financial tsunamis.

See more here.

NOTE: Although all of the chapters will be invaluable to the reader, one in particular that will be worth much perusing is by Prof. James Crotty on the irrelevance of efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which can preliminarily be seen here .

What can we learn from the Depression?

Free Exchange has discussed in a recent post the academic views on the Great Depression. They suggest that recent research (say the last 20 years or so) has produced a different view, and "that many traditional views about the causes of the Depression have been overturned by academics in recent decades." In particular, they suggest that neither protectionism nor the financial crash are seen as central anymore. They correctly note that the dominant view, associated to Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin,* now puts an emphasis on the effects of the Gold Standard (note that Keynes also emphasized the role of the Gold Standard, to which he referred to as a 'barbarous relic'). 

And by the way that means that the consensus is that a demand shock caused the Depression. Note that a few authors have pushed the Real Business Cycle (RBC) story in recent times. For example, Prescott argues that:

“In the 1930s, there was an important change in the rules of the economic game. This change lowered the steady-state market hours. The Keynesians had it all wrong. In the Great Depression, employment was not low because investment was low. Employment and investment were low because labor market institutions and industrial policies changed in a way that lowered normal employment.”

In other words, the changes in incentives led to less supply of labor and less demand for investment goods by firms. Same ideas have been put forward by Cole and Ohanian, and by popularizers like Amity Shlaes in her The Forgotten Man. However, most of the New Deal regulations that the revisionists abhor, actually came to late to have caused the Depression. They generally try to explain the 'slow' recovery (growth averaged 8% in the first FDR term) as a result of the New Deal, and leave the question of what was the supply side shock that caused the Depression.

Lucas, who converted to RBC at some point in the 1980s, asked (cited here) poignantly: "Where is the productivity shock that cuts output in half in that period? Is it a flood or a hurricane? If it really happened, shouldn't we be able to see it in the data?" For that reason Lucas still believes, like Friedman, that the Fed did it. And if one is going to blame regulation for the duration of the Depression, one must deal with the fact that in the 1950s, if anything, labor and financial regulations were as stringent, if not more, than in the 1930s and unemployment was fairly low.

A more subtle critique of the conventional view, and its emphasis on the Gold Standard comes from Christina Romer. She suggests that the path of American output and unemployment before 1931 can be explained quite well with only domestic factors, and that even after 1931, international factors affected American economic conditions mainly through their impact on American policy decisions. Note that that this is not incompatible with Kindleberger's view that the US, in the process of becoming the hegemon, was central for the global economic collapse.

This should cast some doubts on FE's conclusion that:

"putting all the blame on Wall Street for the Great Depression -- or on bankers in the current crisis -- does not stand up to historical scrutiny. The responsibility may more properly lie in a complex combination of factors, like how global financial systems are structured."

Romer notes that in the US the collapse in consumption was more important than in other economies (harking back to Peter Temin's reply to Friedman that it was the collapse in consumption, not monetary policy, that caused the Depression). And the collapse in the demand for consumer durables, which depended on credit for their purchase, was affected by financial conditions. Romer argues:

“Both the initial recession in the United States in the summer of 1929 and the acceleration of the decline in late 1929 and 1930 are ultimately attributable to the stock market boom and bust of the late 1920s. The stock market boom is the prime explanation for why the Federal Reserve was pursuing tight monetary policy starting in 1928. The stock market crash is the prime source for the collapse in durable goods purchases starting in November 1929.”

So the financial bubble and the crash did matter, and John Kenneth Galbraith (among others) was correct about it. I would add that income distribution, which we know from Piketty and Saez, was as bad in the 1920s as now, did also play a role in the bubble and the expansion of private indebtedness. So Wall Street was to blame indeed, as much as it should be too in the recent Great Recession.

* Kindleberger, in his classic The World in Depression, goes further and suggests that it was the absence of an hegemon that acted as a source of demand in situations of crises (distressed markets), as a stabilizer of exchange rates, and as a source of international finance (an international lender of last resort) that caused  the Depression, since the UK was incapable and the US unwilling to assume that position. The Depression was essentially an hegemonic crisis.

PS: For further reading my forthcoming paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics here.

Peter Temin on the strange death of economic history

Peter Temin recounts in this paper the vanishing (apparently complete by 2010) of economic history from the MIT curriculum. History of thought has probably vanished even before, if it was taught at all. He says that:

"Economic history at MIT reached its peak in the 1970s with three teachers* of the subject to graduates and undergraduates alike. It declined until economic history vanished both from the faculty and the graduate program around 2010."

He notes that the most famous economic historian graduated from MIT was Christina Romer, which, it must be emphasized, in her famous paper on the Great Depression claims that fiscal policy (and to a great extent the New Deal) was not responsible for the recovery. For her it was the non-sterilized inflows of gold that increased the money supply [yep, the most important historian graduated at MIT is more of a Monetarist than a Keynesian; New Keynesians are peculiar that way; for more go here].

Ideologically this is the result of the same forces that led to Fukuyama's hubristic announcement of the death of history after the fall of real communism in Eastern Europe. And the New Economic History, that received two of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economics (aka the Nobel, but not really) given to North and Fogel, is part of the problem, as Temin notes. He says:

"In terms of the class struggle ... the coalition of theory and econometrics left economic history out of power in the counsels of economics. Proponents of the New Economic History were using more and more econometrics in their work, but they were no match for theorists."

That is why Temin does not consider the work of Acemoglu, including his recent Why Nations Fail to be good economic history. In his words the book:

"is an example of Whig history in which good policies make for progress and bad policies preclude it. Only transitions from bad to good are considered in this colorful but still monotonic story. The clear implication is that if countries can copy the policies of English-speaking countries, they will prosper."

For my critique of the book go here. At any rate, economic history, as well as history of economic thought, should be at the center of the teaching of economics.

* Temin who was hired to replace W.W. Rostow, Evsey Domar and C. P. Kindleberger.