Showing posts with label The Economist. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Economist. Show all posts

Sunday, September 27, 2026

The Economist Turns its Back on Reality

 
False equivalency? You bet*
 
The Economist just published one of its lead articles on the Brazilian election, with the rather dramatic title "Brazil turns its back on the future." The basic argument is not particularly original. Brazil is a country with enormous potential, but it does not grow enough, spends too much, has too much debt, and now voters are faced with two dismal choices that are both equally bad. Lula on the left and Flávio Bolsonaro on the right.
 
There are many problems with the piece (where to start?). The most obvious is the strange equivalence between Lula and Bolsonaro's son. The article itself recognizes that Lula is a democrat and that Flávio questions the reliability of the voting machines and has suggested that he might not accept an electoral defeat. It also notes, almost in passing, that his main political proposal is essentially to pardon his father, who was convicted for his role in the attempted coup after the 2022 election. These things are not exactly equivalent to being old and not cutting government spending enough.
 
The discussion of corruption is even stranger. I have said this many times over the years, but it's worth repeating. There is simply no material evidence that Lula personally received money from the corruption schemes associated with Petrobras or anything else (e.g. the infamous apartment). His enemies looked very hard (and they had every incentive to find something). Lava Jato was one of the most extensive anti-corruption investigations anywhere in the world. The leaked conversations from the so-called Vaza Jato, and the subsequent decisions concerning Judge Sergio Moro's partiality, hardly strengthened the argument that Lula was convicted on the basis of solid evidence. My view has always been simple on this matter. If there was evidence that Lula personally pocketed money, after all these years somebody would presumably have produced it. The absence of evidence is not evidence against its existence, but it makes a pretty strong case. Many politicians have been caught with Swiss accounts and other hard to explain funds. Not Lula.
 
The contrast with Flávio is remarkable. The old 'rachadinha' investigation alleged that millions of reais had been diverted through employees of his office.** The case was eventually derailed by judicial rulings excluding evidence, not by the discovery that the underlying transactions never took place. More recently Flávio had to acknowledge his relationship with Daniel Vorcaro after recordings contradicted his previous denials. He had arranged financing from Vorcaro for a movie glorifying his father (you couldn't make this stuff up), and Reuters reported that messages obtained in the Banco Master investigation showed the two referring to each other as "brother." Flávio denies that there was any quid pro quo or illegal conduct (yeah, sure, and I believe in Santa Claus). Yet The Economist manages to subsume the whole thing under the proposition that Brazil has a generic problem of "entrenched corruption," for which Lula and Flávio are somehow equally inadequate responses.

To be clear, corruption exists in Brazil. It exists everywhere. I see no particular reason to think that Brazil is uniquely corrupt (certainly compared with a United States in which the current president has repeatedly blurred the lines between public office and his private business interests). The relevant question is who did what, and what evidence exists. Corruption cannot simply be invoked as a magic word to erase rather obvious differences. One is forced to conclude that the newspaper's (as they refer to themselves; it's a magazine) writers are too gullible, or they don't really care about corruption at all. This is just a smokescreen for their real issue: the "fiscal problem." Their economic argument is perhaps more conventional, but not much better. On the economics they are closer to Flávio's views (I mean the people around him; he has no views on anything). 

According to The Economist, excessive government spending raises debt, which raises interest rates, which crowds out investment and prevents Brazil from growing (the old Treasury view Keynes fought in the 1930s; truly nothing new under the sun). Therefore Brazil needs deep spending cuts. Something like Milei, which they also keep promoting as somewhat of an example for the region. Renan Santos (who?), the libertarian candidate, apparently has the ideas that "match the moment most closely." That tells you how out of touch they are, and also why this is a disguised defense of Bolosnaro's kid, who had Milei in the launch of his campaign (and has an Econ advisor promising deep cuts like Milei; or as promised by Elon Musk's failed DOGE).

Lula's problem, in my view, has been almost exactly the opposite. His government has been far too concerned with fiscal restraint. As I noted in my previous post, the government has accepted a fiscal framework designed essentially to constrain the growth of government spending, and the evolution of Bolsa Família is illustrative of how cautious fiscal policy has remained. If you accept a demand-led, view of growth (admittedly The Economist and most of the profession does not), this matters enormously. Government spending is one of the central sources of autonomous demand. If autonomous expenditures grow slowly, demand grows slowly, and induced investment will also grow slowly. There is no mysterious mechanism by which cutting spending produces the private investment necessary to accelerate growth. The confidence fairy has been around for a long time in discussions of Brazil (and has not acquired much empirical support with age).

Even the debt argument is somewhat circular. High interest rates themselves increase the government's interest bill and therefore public debt. Then the higher interest bill is presented as evidence that fiscal policy is unsustainable and government spending must be reduced. The political intention should be straightforward to understand. High rates transfer income toward rentiers, increase the fiscal deficit, and then the resulting deficit becomes an argument for cutting social expenditure. I discussed essentially the same mechanism recently in another context.

But the really egregious aspect of The Economist piece is political. The newspaper (okay I'll play ball) likes to portray itself as a defender of classical liberalism (although economically it has been closer to neoliberalism for a very long time). Yet when confronted with an election between a conventional center-left president who has respected democratic institutions and an authoritarian candidate who questions elections, wants to free the leader of an attempted coup, has a long history of corruption allegations (that are pretty credible), and comes from a political milieu with well-documented connections to Rio's militias (that he doesn't deny, BTW), the decisive issue apparently remains whether somebody is willing to cut government spending deeply enough. Fiscal austerity, it seems, trumps liberal democracy. That says considerably more about The Economist than it does about Brazil. Shame on them!
 
* There is a little joke on bets, that Lula tried to regulate, and now has forbidden. 
** There is also the issue of his chocolate store, with crazy high profits (and all involving cash deposits), used to launder the proceeds of the scheme. The funny thing is that there was a chocolate shop not far from my dad's apartment (that was in Buenos Aires, so no connection), that was always open, but over many years, I never saw a single client. And while other, seemingly more profitable, shops went out of business, this one persevered. I always joked that it was a front for something. Apparently it is true, chocolate shops are a good front for the mafia.

Friday, May 8, 2026

Stiglitz on Keynes and the instability of capitalism

 
Stiglitz delivering the 6th Godley-Tobin Lecture in 2023*

The Economist published a short piece by Joseph Stiglitz on Keynes. I would agree with Stiglitz's on the broad political point that Keynes was not a revolutionary socialist, as I have discussed before. He wanted to save capitalism from itself, as they say. Stiglitz essentially says the same. For him: “Roosevelt’s pragmatism and Keynes’s ideas saved capitalism from the capitalists,” because unfettered capitalism in a prolonged depression might not have survived. He also says Keynes was “no left-wing radical,” believed in the market economy, and saw intervention as a “minor fix” rather than a revolution.

Stiglitz correctly suggests that Keynes remained a liberal, not a socialist, and that he was a moderate in politics even if he was willing to experiment pragmatically with policy. In that he differs from Jim Crotty, and Rod O'Donnell's work on Keynes political views, who suggest he was a socialist. Stiglitz, in contrast, suggests that Keynes understood that laissez-faire capitalism had to be transformed or transcended, but he did not abandon bourgeois liberal society. In my paper I say he was “a revolutionary in economic theory, but a moderate in his politics.”

The key difference between Stiglitz interpretation and my view is on theory. Stiglitz’s Keynes is still, to a significant extent, the Keynes of mainstream Keynesianism. Markets can fail badly, can remain in unemployment for long periods, and government spending is needed to stabilize demand. But he frames the issue partly as one of slow self-correction. Even if there are forces bringing the economy back to full employment, “they worked too slowly” to avoid hardship. That leaves open a conventional reading in which Keynes is mainly an imperfectionist, for whom markets may eventually work, but sluggish wages, prices, interest rates, failed expectations related to uncertainty, or financial frictions that make the adjustment too slow.

The disagreement is not over Keynes’ politics, but over the depth of his theoretical break. Stiglitz emphasizes Keynes as the economist who showed that government could stabilize an inherently unstable capitalist economy. I would emphasize Keynes as the economist who broke with Say’s Law and developed the Principle of Effective Demand. That is why, in my interpretation, Keynes is not simply saying that markets adjust too slowly to full employment, rather he is saying there is no automatic tendency to full employment even with flexible wages and prices. Even if he had to resort to uncertainty at the end, because in many ways he remained too close to mainstream Marshallian principles.

The point is not that Keynes thought capitalism was intrinsically chaotic in the sense of constantly tending toward breakdown. Rather, he thought it could be economically stable in a bad equilibrium, capable of persisting for long periods at sub-normal levels of output and employment. He said so in the General Theory, capitalism is “not violently unstable,” and may remain in “a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a considerable period without any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards complete collapse."

Stiglitz emphasizes instability in the more conventional economic policy sense. Capitalism produces deep fluctuations, depressions, recessions, and crises, and Keynes showed that government could counteract them. That is true, but it risks making Keynes look like someone whose main theoretical contribution was to show that capitalism is unstable and needs stabilization policy. The Keynes of the 1920s essentially defended that. In my view, Keynes’ more radical theoretical point, only developed in the early 1930s, was different, the system can be stable without being self-correcting to full employment.

Stiglitz stresses Keynes as the theorist of crisis prevention and macroeconomic stabilization, which is fair enough. Certainly that is the dominant view on Keynes. I would stress Keynes as the theorist of stable underemployment capitalism. The danger, for Keynes, was not simply that capitalism would spiral mechanically into economic collapse. The danger was that a system capable of remaining stuck below full employment would generate social and political pressures that could undermine liberal capitalism itself. It was politically unstable, but not necessarily in economic terms.**

Keynes wanted to save capitalism, but not because he thought markets were simply fragile and prone to immediate economic disintegration. He wanted to save capitalism because persistent unemployment and stagnation made the liberal order politically vulnerable, both to Soviet style socialism and fascism. His policy prescriptions aimed at full employment domestically in the face of the rising tide of fascism and communism, both of which he abhorred, as I noted in the paper linked above.

This makes Keynes neither a simple imperfectionist nor a crude instability theorist that believed the system to be on a knife-edge. He was trying to say something subtler. Capitalist economies may be stable enough to survive economically at low levels of activity, but precisely that stability at underemployment makes them politically dangerous. The economic problem is not automatic collapse, but the absence of any reliable automatic mechanism restoring full employment. It was a political problem, and it remains so, even if there are some important changes from his time.

Today, at least in the United States and other advanced economies, the problem is less often mass unemployment in the Keynesian sense than the quality, security, remuneration, and social meaning of employment. Capitalism may deliver low levels of unemployment while still producing precarious, poorly paid, or socially degrading jobs, thereby reproducing a different form of political instability.

* Stiglitz's Godley-Tobin Lecture is free for download here.

** Capitalism would undermine political stability. On a recent post on Schumpeter (the one in the Substack) I suggested that: "The irony is that Schumpeter thought that markets were efficient and capitalism would collapse, while Keynes thought that markets produced suboptimal results, and that capitalism might survive." I would add, Schumpeter thought that democracy would undermine capitalism, Keynes thought that capitalism would undermined democracy.

Friday, September 24, 2021

Debt in foreign currency or Too Much Government Intervention?

Interview with an Argentinean radio (yes, in Spanish) on the Evergrande collapse and its possible consequences. It is clear to me that the dangers come more from having debt in foreign currency than the typical critique about crony capitalism, and the lack of credibility that The Economist, for example, has put forward. In The Economist view:
Evergrande shows the importance of deeper financial reforms. But what might they look like? Liberal reformers have longed for a clean-up of bad debts, a loosening of controls over prices (including the exchange rate), transparency and independent courts that can enforce property rights. Such a system would allocate capital better and be less prey to moral hazard.

Seriously. For those that think that the craze about financial liberalization was over with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

Sunday, June 10, 2018

Football (soccer) and Capitalism

Not The Economist's field of expertise

The World Cup is about to start. The Economist has run a piece suggesting that "the World Cup [is] the fulfillment of some of our most cherished values." And yes the cherished values are essentially free trade, the raison d'être for the creation of the magazine (that has a problem of self-image and refers to itself as a newspaper), and more generally laissez-faire capitalism, of which the publication is one of the most important cheerleaders.

There are many of these, pardon the directness, garbage pieces that suggest that football (soccer for the gringos) explains the working of capitalism (see, for example, this popular book). And, yes, the most obvious explanation for the confusion is that football does not explain the market or globalization, or how the world works, or any other way of expressing modern capitalism. It's the other way round, capitalism explains football.

In the magazine's view, the reasons for why football explains economic success is that it is somewhat like a decentralized market, and provides, like an invisible hand, when not curtailed by State intervention, one would guess, for the best to win. A no less Darwinian (or Spencerian) survival of the fittest than often advocated for economies. In their words:
Football can also teach countries how to spot and hone human capital. The best performers not only have systems for finding gifted children, but also ways of spotting late developers who failed to make the first cut. Their academies turn out intelligent, creative players rather than dribbling automatons. Then, if they are clever, they drop their best footballers into a competitive market.
The idea is that in places where there are free market like mechanisms to find the best players you end up with the best teams that go on to win the World Cup. There are too many problems with this view, both with the view of how the economy and capitalism work, but also about football. I will tackle just a few.

Think about the notion that markets select the winners, which are the best players, as an analogy of markets selecting the best firms, the best economic practices. Development is just a question of open and free (unregulated) markets. Yet, the actual record for that is thin at best. It is well known now that even the English experience that led to the Industrial Revolution (IR) in the 19th century was far from being a laissez-faire story. Not only the boom was related to a huge increase in the size of public debt, and the financing of a vast Fiscal-Military State, but also the size of the bureaucracy increased significantly.

"British bureaucracy doubled in size during the 18th century. At the beginning of the century, state employees were estimated at 12,000, a number that had grown to 16,267 by 1797, and 24,598 by 1815," according to Roger Morriss. In other words, the state size doubled during the IR. Markets themselves require a significant amount of regulation. And here the example used by Ha-Joon Chang regarding child labor is always illustrative. Note that during the IR children were exploited working long hours in inhuman conditions (Hamilton suggested in his Report on Manufactures the positive effects of factories, since they would put idle children and women to work). Eventually, after a lot of social pressure (Marx and Engel's Manifesto demands the abolition of child labor) the freedom of firms to hire free willing children was curtailed. Markets are by definition a set of norms and regulations, and the very notion of a completely unregulated market is a bit of a ruse.

Now let's think about football. What country has won the most, you ask. Brazil, with 5 wins in 1958, 1962, 1970, 1994 and 2002, and 2 final losses in 1950 and 1998. Note that Brazil is not a developed country. Nor the US, or Sweden (advanced economies, even if very disimilar in many ways) have ever won a (male) World Cup. The link between development, and the quality of the football played is not particularly strong. Also, I might add, World Cups are tournaments, with elimination games, subjected to chance and luck, and not championships in which every team plays against the other, and the winner is the one that won more points overall. Hungary in 1954, the Netherlands in 1974, Brazil in 1982, and Argentina in 2014 (that's my view, some might have different candidates) were, arguably, the best teams, but did not win the World Cup.

The Economist tries to suggest that authoritarian regimes, with more closed societies, and one would assume markets, would do worse in the World Cup. They do say that "dictatorships are rubbish at football." And they note that Argentina in 1978, under General Videla, was the last time a country ruled by a dictatorship has won. The list should also include Italy in 1934 and 1938 under Mussolini, and Brazil in 1970 under General Medici. The argument is a bit hollow. Brazil, again, has won with both dictatorships and democratic governments (and so did Argentina in 1986 with Maradona and the return of democracy, which sadly doesn't win games). In all fairness, football has nothing to say about capitalism or why nations fail (or not).

The development of capitalism, on the other hand, does say quite a bit about football. Football, or the rules set by the British in Victorian times, that have changed little, I might add, emerged during the first era of globalization. The game spread with the spread of English manufacturing products, and the trade routes. Teams often appeared in ports, like Boca and River in Buenos Aires, or Santos in Brazil. Also, the elites in developing countries copied not only the patterns of consumption of the wealthy in developed economies, but also their hobbies, and football spread to the posh clubs of developing countries. In that high class environment, black players were often discriminated. In Rio de Janeiro followers of Fluminense still are referred to as 'pó de arroz' (baby powder), since players of African descent tried to camouflage the color of their skin to be able to play (Vasco da Gama was the first team to field black players, in the 1920s).

Football developed in places connected by trade with the British, and where patterns of consumption were being imitated, which explains why some parts of Latin America were early developers. Arguably, in many parts of Asia and Africa, income levels were too low for the patterns of consumption of the British upper classes to spread. Or in the United States the patterns of consumption followed their own trajectories, since at this point, the US was becoming the center of global consumption and imposing its own patterns of consumption on the globe. Accident, and history play a role. But it says a lot that the American version of football did not take off as the British one, meaning that institutions are path-dependent. By the way, that path-dependency also explains why more or less the same national teams keep winning. Tradition is a very strong predictor of who would win the cup. Kids don't play football (soccer) in the US, since their sports icons are in other fields.

By the 1920s football started to professionalize, and the markets, cherished by The Economist, for ball players became relevant. The professionalization of sports started in the 1920s, but the crisis of of capitalism in the 1930s, reduced the impetus of free market forces. Teams were not all powerful, and given the structure of clubs in many countries, football was not yet a business like the others. The backlash against capitalism meant that sports, and football were used by nationalist and populist (mostly right wing) regimes to promote national pride. Hitler, that was invested in the success of the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936, wanted to win the World Cup in France in 1938, but Mussolini's Italy thwarted his plans.

It is with the end of World War II and the victory of the allies, and the with the rise of American hegemony, that football slowly becomes a business like any other. The fundamental impulse for the changes came after the collapse of Bretton Woods, and the Neoliberal turn in the global economy. Increasing market integration and financial deregulation, facilitated the rise of modern football. Clubs became business, with the rise of the European super leagues, imitating the US market. Note that this is the period of the rise of American football (with the creation of the Super Bowl in 1967) and the professionalization of tennis (the 1970s). Even the US tried to develop a market in the 1970s, with Pelé joining the New York Cosmos.

Players were bought and sold in markets, and still are. In the early times, rarely a player would become even moderately wealthy. Several players that would put to shame even the great of these days ended in poverty (Mané Garrincha comes to mind). Very few players are unionized, and most of them do not make the huge amounts of a Messi or a Neymar. Not only, free markets are not a solution for the wealth of nations, but the free market model for football has been detrimental for players and for the sport. Something similar could be said about other sports (I'm thinking about the NBA finals, and the overwhelming dominance of the Warriors). At any rate, The Economist should stick closer to their field of expertise.

PS: I'll probably blog a bit more about football during the World Cup.

Thursday, October 20, 2016

Nominal and Real Interest Rates

The persistence of low interest rates has dominated the news. In general related to whether the Fed will or will not increase the interest rate by the end of the year. The Economist tried a few weeks ago to put things in perspective, and suggested not only that the current nominal rates close to zero are unprecedented, but it sort of indicated that the negative real rates are also to some extent a new phenomenon. The explanations for low rates can be found here, and the consequences, according to The Economist here (btw, for them is a pension crisis; and yeah, just wait this will be used to call for privatization).

I'm not particular keen, as you know, on the idea of a savings glut, as an explanation for the low rates. The reason is much simpler and is associated to the fall out from the previous crisis. But at any rate I just wanted to check the data. They showed the nominal short term rate in the UK (below), which is not very different from what can be found in other sources used here before (like this one).
However, they only show the real rate for the last three decades or so (see below). This seems to suggest, even though is never quite stated, that the current trend, with lower real rates is also unprecedented. But that is not the case.
In fact, what is really unprecedented is the fact that in previous eras of low or negative real rates, as far as I can judge from the data, were caused by relatively high levels of inflation, while now it is essentially the result of very low nominal rates (see below for previous eras of low or negative real rates; btw, my graph matches theirs, but the period is shorter for the nominal rate, and way longer for the real rate).
This seems to suggest to me that the explanation must be related to the short term nominal rate, which is a policy decision of the central bank, rather than something that affects the levels of inflation, and according to some theories (the loanable funds) what that does to savings. If I'm right then, the cause of the low rates is the financial excess of the last three decades, that forced central banks to keep rates low to save the economy, and preclude further problems. Very unlikely that would change any time soon.

Friday, April 10, 2015

The Economist on the end of economic history


The Economist has noticed Peter Temin's paper on the death of economic history (on which I had posted before) and suggests that "since the financial crisis there has been something of a minor revival." There isn't much of an explanation of why there is a revival, or much evidence for the revival, I might add. The reason alluded for the supposed revival is that "three big questions in economics over the past few years have become battles over economic history, rather than theory in its own right." These three questions would be the effect of public debt on growth, the causes of inequality, and the effects of inflation and deflation.

The economic history content in the debates related to the three questions, in all fairness, is thin at best. And the problems with the debates actually do arise from a common acceptance of neoclassical economics, and are, thus, rooted in theory. Reinhart and Rogoff are not economic historians, and their discussion of debt, for example when compared to John Brewer's discussion of the role of debt in the rise of the British Military-Fiscal State, is poor at best. There is some discussion of the correlation with growth, inflation and currency movements, with limited understanding of causality. Which, as it turns, was botched by the misuse of data. The same can be said about Piketty (and now this Rognlie twist; he had vanished; my previous issue with him here), that uses mainstream theory that does not fit his data (which is better and shows the rise of inequality in the last three decades), but lacks any sense of history. There is no understanding of the social forces behind the rise of inequality in Piketty's work. And the idea that those that are afraid of inflation now have some basis on the history of "the risk hyperinflation has posed to democracy" is beyond preposterous. Not just because there is no risk of hyperinflation in any advanced economy at the moment (and that shows lack of theoretical understanding of what causes this phenomenon), but worse, it tends to obscure that the Great Depression, not the 1923 hyperinflation, brought down the Weimar Republic. Seriously, unemployment, the collapse of the economy creates the conditions for the rise of fascists (go check Greece now)

Note that marginalism always had a complicated relation with economic history. The German Historical School can be seen, or at least some authors within the school like Roscher and Schmoller, as noted by Bill McColloch (see second essay here), as part of the marginalist school. And Max Weber's views, which put Marx's relation between the economic base and the superstructure upside down, might be seen as the basis for a neoclassical theory of history. But the fact is that Weberian analysis was never embraced or even well understood in mainstream circles, even if it would be the kind of theory of history that would fit their analysis. The same applies to Douglas North's New Institutionalism.

My impression is that the decline of economic history, and history of economics I would add, within the mainstream of the profession, a subject that as noted by Temin had peaked in the 1970s, is essentially tied to the result of the capital debates, the rise of what I referred to as the return of vulgar economics, and the segregation of heterodox economists. It's a particular problem of the broader crisis of economics. And the revival is overstated. As much as the mainstream did not, and will not be abandoned in spite of its evident failures during the last (current) crisis, do not expect economic history courses (or history of thought ones) to be reinstated or created in the departments at the 'top' universities. The average mainstream economist will remain ignorant of history and the history of its own field. The Economist writers are a good example of the consequences of that.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

The Economist is concerned with debt-deflation

Or so it seems (see here; subscription required). They say: "If falling prices endure, then debts, fixed in nominal terms, are harder to pay." Indeed. As Keynes had said back in 1936: “if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency, — with severely adverse effects on investment.”

In other words, if prices fall, indebted agents owe in real terms more than before. This could affect both firms and consumers. If the price of houses fall, but the mortgage debt remains the same, consumers own more debt in real terms and consumption might fall. In the same vein, if prices are falling and the firm nominal debt is fixed, the real debt increased and investment might decline. Keynes emphasized the role of investment. The sequence of events is given by:

P↓⇒(Debt/P)↑⇒I↓⇒Y↓

The Economist basically argues for Central Banks to change the inflation target. The Blanchard and Krugman idea, even though The Economist does not propose 4% as the new one. I would still argue for fiscal policy. The whole inflation target idea is a confidence fairy too (as noted before).

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

The L-word

Lowflation is the new dirty word now. The Economist says that deflation, not lowflation, in Europe is the world's biggest economic problem. But they also suggest that low inflation (lowflation is the neologism; some suggest that the term was coined by Reza Moghadam from the IMF) is as bad as deflation. In a recent article they note that most countries are undershooting their official or unofficial inflation targets. The Economist says:
"In America, Britain and the euro zone central banks have a 2% target for inflation. In all three, it is below that target. In Italy, Spain and Greece, which have experienced wrenching crises and recessions, it is below zero (as it also is in Sweden and Israel). Japan, which finally escaped from deflation in 2013 after more than a decade of struggle, is battling not to return. Leave out the effects of a consumption-tax increase and inflation there is barely half way to its 2% target. Even in China inflation is below 2%, compared with a 4% central government target (see chart 1)."

They also suggest that the: "the catalyst for the latest deflation scare is ... [the fall in] the price of a barrel of oil ... from $115 at the end of June to about $85 today, prompting a sharp drop in headline inflation." Yes lower commodity prices might play a role, but it is the weak recovery and the excessively contractionary policies in developed countries that are to blame for lowflation.

The Economist at least gets the dangers of lowflation/deflation right, and it's pure Keynes. They say that: "The belief that money made tomorrow will be worth less than money today stymies investment; the belief that goods bought tomorrow will be cheaper than goods bought today chokes consumption." Keynes version of debt-deflation emphasized more the effects of falling prices on debt and investment that consumption, but is essentially the same point. He said: "if the fall of wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency, — with severely adverse effects on investment."

Also, The Economist reports that even Wall Street economists (admittedly Buiter is an Old Keynesian with ties to Jim Tobin) like:
"Willem Buiter of Citigroup thinks this [fiscal expansion] would be a 'no-brainer' for America, which badly needs better public infrastructure and which can issue virtually unlimited volumes of treasury bills thanks to the dollar’s reserve currency status. In Europe, Mr Buiter says, the equivalent would be for the EU to permit peripheral countries to run larger deficits with the ECB independently initiating QE to buy the resulting bonds."
This is relevant, since today many expect the Fed to announce the end of QE. 

Tuesday, March 11, 2014

On Argentina's secular decline: why The Economist is wrong

The Economist had a few weeks ago an issue on Argentina (here; subscription required), which I wanted to address, but had no time before today. The argument implies that the current Argentine woes (discussed here before) are part of a pattern which is associated to the long decline in income per capita from the late 19th century and early 20th century until now.

The Economist suggests that:
"In 1914 Argentina stood out as the country of the future. Its economy had grown faster than America’s over the previous four decades. Its GDP per head was higher than Germany’s, France’s or Italy’s. It boasted wonderfully fertile agricultural land, a sunny climate, a new democracy (universal male suffrage was introduced in 1912), an educated population and the world’s most erotic dance. Immigrants tangoed in from everywhere. For the young and ambitious, the choice between Argentina and California was a hard one."
In a sense that's true. According to Maddison's data in 1913 Argentina per capita GDP (in 1990s dollars) was 3,797 while France and Germany had respectively 3,485 and 3,648 (data available here). However, the reasons for the decline in the 20th century are based on simplistic notions, typical of the so-called New Institutionalism of North and more recently Acemoglu and Robinson (for a critique go here). In their words:
"Building institutions is a dull, slow business. Argentine leaders prefer the quick fix—of charismatic leaders, miracle tariffs and currency pegs, rather than, say, a thorough reform of the country’s schools."
They blame corruption and populism (mind you currency pegs were actually typical of liberal governments, both the ones that adopted the Gold Standard, an international institution, back when the economy was fine according to The Economist, and during the 1990s during the Neoliberal experiment, that The Economist fully supported; but I'm glad that now they admit that currency pegs might be sometimes dangerous. The Economist is not for the Gold Standard anymore, it seems. Any day now they will abandon their beliefs on free trade).

On a different note they also suggest that commodity production might be a problematic path to development (yes, The Economist again has a positive take on Prebisch-Singer; see before here). They say:
"Commodities, Argentina’s great strength in 1914, became a curse. A century ago the country was an early adopter of new technology—refrigeration of meat exports was the killer app of its day—but it never tried to add value to its food (even today, its cooking is based on taking the world’s best meat and burning it). The Peróns built a closed economy that protected its inefficient industries; Chile’s generals opened up in the 1970s and pulled ahead. Argentina’s protectionism has undermined Mercosur, the local trade pact. Ms Fernández’s government does not just impose tariffs on imports; it taxes farm exports."
In other words, Pinochet was great (Chile is developed it seems; again according to Maddison's data the Chilean GDP per capita in 1990 dollars in 2008 was 13,185 while the Argentine was 10,995. Not much of a difference; back in 1913 Chile's was 2,968 and like Argentina's high for Latin America's standards. In other words, while France and Germany had in 2008 22,223 and 20,801 respectively in 2008, both Chile and Argentina had fallen behind), and redistribution towards the poor (read Perón and the Kirchners) is bad. That's why the lesson is "that good government matters."

Don't get me wrong, the State matters, and a developmental state matters a lot. However, when and how you connect with global markets also matters. While France and Germany might have had a slightly smaller GDP per capita in 1913 than Argentina, they were quite ahead in the second Industrial Revolution, with firms that were leaders in steel production, in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, and with a developed network of firms and universities producing first rate scientists and technological innovations. Meanwhile, Argentina (but also Chile) produced mostly commodities (and only adopted imported technology) and the vast majority of their exports were concentrated in one or two commodities exported to a limited number of countries. Hence, only someone with the limited understanding of The Economist would have thought that Argentina and Chile were in 1913 as developed as France and Germany.

The lesson is more complex than The Economist's 'the state matters' (interestingly enough if markets did matter, which is their traditional motto, specialization in commodities due to comparative advantage should pose no problems). The state matters, but so does your colonial past (being an exploitation colony rather than a settlement one is a problem), what you export matters, and the access to international capital markets also matters (France and Germany got a Marshall Plan to reconstruct, since the US was afraid of Uncle Joe, but in Argentina we weren't that lucky). The parable of Argentina is a rich one, from which many should learn, but The Economist still has no clue.

PS: Don't get me wrong, building schools is nice, and Argentina actually produced three Nobel prizes in sciences (the last one in the 1980s), but schools alone do NOT produce development.

PS': Also, why is Messi a symbol of Argentina's secular decline?

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

The super-cycle of commodities is NOT over, it's just not super anymore

Or at least is what The Economist says (here). Graph below shows a very long series for commodity prices.

Note that the cycle (super or not) is less visible than the trend (hints of Prebisch-Singer). At any rate, the fall in 2009 and the recovery and then slow fall after 2011 imply that the overall index is now higher than at the lowest point in the series, the late 1990s, and around the same place it was in the early 1950s.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

What can we learn from the Depression?

Free Exchange has discussed in a recent post the academic views on the Great Depression. They suggest that recent research (say the last 20 years or so) has produced a different view, and "that many traditional views about the causes of the Depression have been overturned by academics in recent decades." In particular, they suggest that neither protectionism nor the financial crash are seen as central anymore. They correctly note that the dominant view, associated to Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin,* now puts an emphasis on the effects of the Gold Standard (note that Keynes also emphasized the role of the Gold Standard, to which he referred to as a 'barbarous relic'). 

And by the way that means that the consensus is that a demand shock caused the Depression. Note that a few authors have pushed the Real Business Cycle (RBC) story in recent times. For example, Prescott argues that:
“In the 1930s, there was an important change in the rules of the economic game. This change lowered the steady-state market hours. The Keynesians had it all wrong. In the Great Depression, employment was not low because investment was low. Employment and investment were low because labor market institutions and industrial policies changed in a way that lowered normal employment.”
In other words, the changes in incentives led to less supply of labor and less demand for investment goods by firms. Same ideas have been put forward by Cole and Ohanian, and by popularizers like Amity Shlaes in her The Forgotten Man. However, most of the New Deal regulations that the revisionists abhor, actually came to late to have caused the Depression. They generally try to explain the 'slow' recovery (growth averaged 8% in the first FDR term) as a result of the New Deal, and leave the question of what was the supply side shock that caused the Depression.

Lucas, who converted to RBC at some point in the 1980s, asked (cited here) poignantly: "Where is the productivity shock that cuts output in half in that period? Is it a flood or a hurricane? If it really happened, shouldn't we be able to see it in the data?" For that reason Lucas still believes, like Friedman, that the Fed did it. And if one is going to blame regulation for the duration of the Depression, one must deal with the fact that in the 1950s, if anything, labor and financial regulations were as stringent, if not more, than in the 1930s and unemployment was fairly low.

A more subtle critique of the conventional view, and its emphasis on the Gold Standard comes from Christina Romer. She suggests that the path of American output and unemployment before 1931 can be explained quite well with only domestic factors, and that even after 1931, international factors affected American economic conditions mainly through their impact on American policy decisions. Note that that this is not incompatible with Kindleberger's view that the US, in the process of becoming the hegemon, was central for the global economic collapse.

This should cast some doubts on FE's conclusion that:
"putting all the blame on Wall Street for the Great Depression -- or on bankers in the current crisis -- does not stand up to historical scrutiny. The responsibility may more properly lie in a complex combination of factors, like how global financial systems are structured."
Romer notes that in the US the collapse in consumption was more important than in other economies (harking back to Peter Temin's reply to Friedman that it was the collapse in consumption, not monetary policy, that caused the Depression). And the collapse in the demand for consumer durables, which depended on credit for their purchase, was affected by financial conditions. Romer argues:
“Both the initial recession in the United States in the summer of 1929 and the acceleration of the decline in late 1929 and 1930 are ultimately attributable to the stock market boom and bust of the late 1920s. The stock market boom is the prime explanation for why the Federal Reserve was pursuing tight monetary policy starting in 1928. The stock market crash is the prime source for the collapse in durable goods purchases starting in November 1929.”
So the financial bubble and the crash did matter, and John Kenneth Galbraith (among others) was correct about it. I would add that income distribution, which we know from Piketty and Saez, was as bad in the 1920s as now, did also play a role in the bubble and the expansion of private indebtedness. So Wall Street was to blame indeed, as much as it should be too in the recent Great Recession.

* Kindleberger, in his classic The World in Depression, goes further and suggests that it was the absence of an hegemon that acted as a source of demand in situations of crises (distressed markets), as a stabilizer of exchange rates, and as a source of international finance (an international lender of last resort) that caused  the Depression, since the UK was incapable and the US unwilling to assume that position. The Depression was essentially an hegemonic crisis.

PS: For further reading my forthcoming paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics here.

Friday, October 11, 2013

The Economist thinks bubbles are rational

Or at least is what they suggest in the popular blog Free Exchange. They bring back Peter Garber's research on the Tulipmania, and more recent research by Earl Thompson, which suggests that "the market for tulips was an efficient response to changing financial regulation." They conclude by arguing that:
"It is easy to claim that bubbles are irrational. They seem to represent a deviation of prices from fundamental values—and they contradict basic economic theory. But there has been little attempt to understand how speculation actually works. The example of tulipmania shows the importance of doing that—rather than relying on lazy quips about 'animal spirits' or irrationality."
The notion is related to the idea of the Arrow-Debreu models in which short term prices (they don't have long term prices associated with a uniform rate of profit) do reflect the fundamental values associated to the preferences of agents and the given technology and factor endowments. In this context, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that the prices of financial assets reflect all market information, and as a result those prices would not deviate from their fundamentals. In other words, according to the EMH, bubbles do not exist.

Rational bubbles assume that rational behavior may still be associated with deviations of asset prices away from their fundamental values. In general, a self-confirming belief that asset prices depend on a variable that is intrinsically irrelevant, that is, not part of market fundamentals, is assumed. Much discussion goes into the behavioral assumptions that would make rational bubbles possible. Justin Fox's The Myth of the Rational Market, which I reviewed here (subscription required) provides an accessible introduction.

John Eatwell (here; subscription required) noted that a more relevant question than the rationality or not of bubbles is whether they are useful or not. Railroads were built on bubbles, and the dot.com bubble even left some infrastructure in terms of telecommunications that has been useful. Other bubbles, like the one associated with the subprime, are less obviously useful.

Finally, note that the old capital debates are still important to understand the limitations of much of this literature. Garegnani and Petri have noted that even the short run Arrow-Debreu models must bring investment to equality to full employment savings, and as a result some notion of a natural rate of interest is implicitly needed. And then all the problems of the aggregative model apply. So it is not possible to show that long term prices do reflect fundamentals associated with preferences, technology and endowments.

PS: On the related topic of whether the Bubble Act (financial regulation), that followed the South Sea Bubble, led to lower rates of growth see here. For the capital debates go here.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

The IMF and The Economist (re)discover the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis

Free Exchange, one of the The Economist's blogs, had a post recently on the secular declining prices of commodities. The post suggest that there is significant evidence in favor of the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis (PSH), based on an IMF paper (available here).

Note that the notion that there is something correct about the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis is not really news. José Antonio Ocampo has written several papers recently (see here and here) showing that overall terms of trade for commodity producers did not go well, particularly in two periods the 1930s, and the 1980s, which drive the negative long-term trend. But it is true, as we noted with Esteban Perez (see here), that many respectable authors still suggest that PSH must be wrong.

Note that while Prebisch did read Marx, and early in his life he considered himself a Socialist, it is far from clear that he can be referred to as Marxist, or suggest that PSH is a Marxist theory (for more on Prebisch see this review of his recently published biography). In fact, many interpretations are compatible and sometimes based in neoclassical suppositions.

Prebisch actually defended the idea of declining terms of trade in a way that is really compatible with classical (meaning surplus approach and Marx) views on long-term price determination. He suggested in his famous 1949 paper that the cause of tendency of commodity prices to fall with respect to manufactured goods prices was related to wage setting in the center and periphery.

In the boom wages went up in the center, but not so much in the periphery, since industrial workers in the center were organized and could demand higher salaries, while that was not possible for the agricultural and mining workers in the periphery. In the recession, in turn, while wages fell in the periphery, they did not in the center. It was the fall in wages in the periphery, associated to the weak labor force that led to lower prices of commodities. Class conflict, and not just technological change (or patterns of demand, as in some explanations of PSH), was at the heart of the asymmetries between the center and the periphery.

Hence, industrialization in the periphery, and the re-organization of the labor force, would imply that more workers in the periphery would be able to keep part of the benefits of higher productivity. Industrialization would be good for the production of the commodity sector, since prices of commodities would go up, with higher wages in the periphery. [For more on Prebisch's views go here]. Note that the classical explanation for long-term prices can be used to explain periods in which the trend for commodity prices was positive too [see for example this video of a talk by Franklin Serrano here].

Funny thing is that Free Exchange, after noting that PHS might be correct, published another post here in which they argue that Free Trade is still the best policy, because:
"the persistence in economic history of the idea that free trade provides the optimal long-run conditions for growth may be a better reason than any other why The Economist still supports free trade today— just as it did 170 years ago."
I will not get again into the problems with Free Trade (you can go here and here), but obviously if in the long-term specialization in commodities does not tend to be a good idea, a trade policy that leads to that pattern of specialization cannot be defended. At least not in a coherent fashion!

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Lies, damned lies and The Economist

The World in 2013 by The Economist has been out for a while. Got it at the airport this weekend and read a few pieces. Really bad. Nothing new. One piece caught my attention though. On the fiscal cliff and the elections this terrible article says:
"Mr Obama will maintain that his victory, along with continued Democratic control of the Senate, constitute a mandate for his version of deficit reduction. But in fact the elections produced mixed results: Mr Obama narrowly won the popular vote and the Republicans retained their majority in the House of Representatives."
First, facts; yes the GOP won the House, but Democratic House candidates won more of the popular vote than their Republican counterparts. Redistricting or Gerrymandering is what explains this failure of democracy. Dems probably need more than 55% of the popular vote to win the majority in the House.

Note also that with a much thinner victory in 2004, Bush actually claimed he had a mandate, and proceeded to try to privatize Social Security, which was eventually a failure (because even the GOP base doesn't want that). Bush won with a margin of 2.4% of the votes (the second one; the first one was 5 to 4), while Obama won re-election with a 3.8% advantage. Obama had 51% of the vote while Clinton in 1996 had only 49.2% (Perot took votes from the GOP, and the margin of votes over Dole and Perot was just 0.1%; yes 0.1 not 1%!). And some people suggest that if not for the Lewinsky affair Clinton would have privatized Social Security.

So if anything this election produced a clear result, not mixed, for Obama and in favor of maintaining social spending and the Keynesian policies stimulating the recovery, with higher taxation on the rich at the top of the agenda. The deficit, as several polls have shown, was not an issue. The only bad thing about the fiscal cliff deal was the increase in payroll taxes. But The Economist has a different view.

The second, and by no means less important, lie spread by The Economist is that: 
"a long-term fix to America’s big deficits, [requires changes to the] rickety tax code and ballooning spending on 'entitlements', meaning the federal government’s health-care and pension schemes."
If you believe this Social Security is spending should be ballooning.  Hardly the case. See the graph below, with the mains spending categories as a share of GDP (data here).
Note that the only that is really increasing throughout the whole period is health spending (blue line). Welfare spending has gone up during the crisis, and interest spending down, and they should reverse in a few years when the recovery is complete (welfare spending is already way down from its peak). Social Security spending too increased a bit, but not much (and is actually in surplus now) since the crisis, and the reason is that people that can't find jobs and can retire tend to do it. Defense spending has expanded considerably after the two wars, and is the only kind of spending that was not caused by the recession.

On health spending note, however, that the countries that spend less, and have as good health outcomes as the US or even better, are those with a public health option. At any rate, note that this notion that the US has an entitlement problem is bogus, as much as Obama's narrow victory and need for a compromise. If anything he fell short of his promises and should had delivered a long term solution for health spending, i.e. the public option.


Friday, April 20, 2012

Just prices, elephants and kings



Well I'm not going to get medieval on your rear ends. Yep just price is the old scholastic idea that there is a fair or ethical price that can be charged for a commodity, and beyond that the producer is obtaining unfair earnings. It was the basis for the attacks on usury. David Friedman (1987), in the old New Palgrave (the one edited by Eatwell, Milgate and Newman) argued that the dominant view suggested that the just price was "the price which allowed the producer to maintain his proper place in society."

I wouldn't expect The Economist to come on the side of ethics in market relations, but that's what they have done. The Economist already has a fair price for YPF (see here), the oil company that was partially nationalized by the government of Argentina.
"Argentina could presumably mollify Spain by paying a fair price for YPF—which would most likely be half of the $15 billion or so the company was worth before the Argentine government began harassing it."
Fairness is a strange argument to use in favor of Repsol (the Spanish firm that owned most of YPF). They bought it for $13 billion in 1999, made $15.7 billion in in dividends over the whole period, plus $6.2 billions for the selling of part of the assets. So they made approximately $8.9 billions. And the fair or just price would be another $7.5 billion according to The Economist.

Of course, this price is not connected to the value of the assets, or how well the firm was managed, which says how much it can produce (output in 2011 was at 61% of the 1999 level). It must be a way for Spain to maintain its proper place in the world. Or at least the King, who is apparently incapable of maintaining his elephant hunting hobby. God save the King, then.