On Economic Traditions and the Sociology of the Knowledge

Marx & Smith vs Weber & Bentham 

I often use Randall Collins’ book Four Sociological Traditions in my class discussions and in my own work on the history of economic ideas. Collins’ discussion of economics as the first social science is instructive about how disciplines become autonomous from other fields. Economics emerged earlier than the other social sciences as an independent discipline, in his account, because states had practical reasons to collect information about taxation, trade, population, and public finance. Mercantilism created a body of empirical and administrative knowledge, and later writers, starting with William Petty (he cites François Quesnay and then Adam Smith rather than Petty), transformed these concerns into a more systematic intellectual discipline. Economics was able to establish itself institutionally before sociology because it had both practical applications and a relatively clear object of study.

Collins then shows how economics became increasingly professionalized during the nineteenth century. There is an extensive literature on that (on the American case see Coats, 1988). Classical political economy initially developed partly outside the universities, especially in Britain. In Germany, however, economics became more firmly tied to state administration and university training (on the German Historical School see Kurz, 2016). Later, marginalism and neoclassical economics helped turn economics into a more abstract and specialized academic discipline. Collins’s broader point is that the content of economic theory cannot be separated entirely from the institutional settings in which economists worked.

For Collins, ideas are produced inside social networks and institutions. Intellectual change occurs when institutional spaces open up, when new professional roles become available, and when communities of scholars compete over problems, methods, and prestige. In that sense, the rise of the social sciences – economics and, more interestingly, sociology itself – is a sociological phenomenon. The community makes the discipline.

Read rest here.

Beyond vulgar heterodox economics: a note on the legacy of Pierangelo Garegnani (1930-2011)

My paper, in Italian, which was a modified version of a talk last year, has been published in Moneta e Credito, and is available for download here.

On the origins of Sraffa's equations

Giancarlo de Vivo suggests that the Sraffian equations come from Marx's schemes of reproduction, and that the inspiration was in a footnote from the editor, Karl Kautsky, in the Theories of Suplus Value. Here a letter from Maurice Dobb and Piero Sraffa to Kautsky, from 1929, asking to use his edition as the basis for an English translation (originals in Kautsky's archives):

De Vivo's views are discussed in a book edited by Massimo Pivetti, which is certainly worth reading (I have the Spanish edition). I never thought of this genealogy of the Sraffian price equations as being controversial, but I have been re-reading some discussion about Sraffa's contributions between Pierangelo Garegnani and Marxist authors (from the 1970s) as a result of the events related to the latter's ten year death anniversary, and it did strike to me that it is unclear to most Marxists how closely related the prices of in the Production of Commodities are with Marx's work.

Capitalism Alone Against Itself: Liberal Democratic versus Political Capitalism

I finished Branko Milanovic's thought provoking Capitalism Alone this summer. But I haven't had much time to write on the blog, as you might have noticed. This is certainly not a review, and I would definitely suggest that you go and buy the book as soon as you can and read it. It is a serious discussion of the future of capitalism, that word that, as Heilbroner often reminded us, was at the center of the discipline, but seldom discussed openly by economists. He cited, if memory doesn't fail me that it didn't appear in Mankiw's Principles textbook, at least back then in the 1990s, when it was published. I always note that Allan Meltzer wrote a little book titled Why Capitalism? were he makes no explicit effort in defining it, even though a definition can be gleaned from it.*

The definition most economists use leans more on Max Weber than Karl Marx, or the materialist tradition of the surplus approach upon which he built on. Branko is a pluralistic economist, well read and influenced by several authors, not all of them conventional. The discussion of the definition of capitalism is complex, and he separates, in its modern version two archetypes of capitalism, that are in a mortal battle for global hegemonic power, namely: Liberal Meritocratic Capitalism, represented by the West, and particularly by the United States (perhaps more credibly now after the election), and Political Capitalism, represented by the rise of the rest, with China at the head.

When assessing whether China is capitalistic Branko does use the conventional Weberian definition (p. 87), but that seems to be a pragmatic approach to provide the basis for his argument that China (and Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore too, p. 91) does conform to the Weberian notion of political capitalism, a term used by Weber to discuss ancient forms of capitalism. But there is a concern with how elites maintain control by non coercive forces in Liberal Capitalism, and about the need to create an indigenous capitalist class in Political Capitalism. Both point out to alternative issue of class conflict, of course, and how surplus is extracted from workers, and points to an alternative view of capitalism. There is, in somewhat Marxist tradition a preoccupation with the role of the bourgeoisie, and an nod to Wallerstein that suggested that there are no capitalists without state support, something I would like to have seen more in the book (p. 116).

In fact, the secondary role of the state, to some extent, the absence of a more thorough discussion of the developmental state in the case of the Chinese experience, is one of the problems with the book. Another would be an emphasis with issues of corruption, which seem to me to be of secondary importance, even if the problem might have increased with financial deregulation, and the rise of tax havens. The emphasis of the book is on the changes associated to the increasing mobility of labor and capital and the problems it poses for both systems. Branko thinks that the welfare state is vulnerable with free labor mobility (p.156), undermining the democratic process in liberal capitalism, and that capital mobility, which he sees more through the lens of Global Value Chains, rather than portfolio flows, and that would lead to higher growth in poorer countries, reducing the need for labor mobility. The book also debunks a few myths, like the notion that robots are coming for your job, or the idea that a Universal Basic Income (UBI) would be a panacea for the economic problems caused by globalization and technological change.

* Invariably it is based on notions of the profit motive (some form of rationalization) as required by markets, and private property, or Weber (plus North, if you prefer). For an alternative discussion see this old post on a view based on the surplus approach, including a critique of the Weberian naturalization of capitalism as something that existed in the past and that explains the golden ages of antiquity.

Why do we need a theory of value?

The theory of value and distribution is at the heart of economics. To be clear, when I say that it is at the center, it means that discussions of almost any topic in economics, in one way or another, depend on a certain theoretical position about the theory of value and distribution. However, most economists have no clue about it, about the centrality of value. Not only they don't understand the original and now infamous labor theory of value (LTV), that dominated between Petty and Ricardo (and Adam Smith too, even though that tends to surprise and puzzle most economists),* but also they misunderstand the dominant marginalist paradigm. Some economists actually think that you don't need a theory of value at all, and some don't even understand that they use a conventional (some vulgar form of supply and demand) theory of value. Hence, the reason of this post is to try to help clarify some very basic issues related to the necessity of a theory of value for proper theorizing in economics.

In a sense, this topic was discussed here before, in my post on Sraffa, Marx and the LTV. But it is worth revisiting, and thinking in broader terms, beyond the LTV, to understand why a theory of relative prices is needed in general, to understand almost everything in economics.

Let me start with the authors of the surplus approach. In fact, a bit earlier with the economists that would eventually be known as Mercantilists (if you can talk about a school). If we are allowed to generalize and simplify, the latter believed that the wealth of nations depended essentially on maintaining trade surpluses, and accumulating precious metals. Profits were essentially the result of buying cheap and selling dear, or profits upon alienation, which indicates that, for Mercantilists, profits were generated in the exchange process.

Classical political economy authors, starting with William Petty, emphasize the determination of profits in the process of production, as a residual of output, once the conditions for the reproduction of the productive system were satisfied. So profits are not the result of selling high and buying low, something that could result from the mere fluctuation of market prices, but from the ability to produce beyond what was needed for the simple material reproduction of society. Note that to obtain profits, part of the residual, the surplus over and beyond reproduction requirements, one needs to know the prices of the means of production. That is, one needs to be able to account for the normal prices of the goods that went into the production of all commodities. And these prices would include a normal profit. Again, not the extra gain that might occur from a high market price. So the normal rate of profit is needed to determine prices, and prices are needed to determine the normal rate of profit. This was well understood by both Ricardo and Marx.

Value (the relative prices of commodities) and distribution (the normal rate of profit) are intertwined. Smith knew that the simple LTV (amounts of labor incorporated) was not correct other than in very rudimentary economic systems, with essentially no produced means of production. His solution was to adopt the idea of labor commanded (more on that on my post on Sraffa, and the one on the standard commodity). Ricardo solved this problem, in his corn essay, by assuming that the surplus and the means of production advanced to produce output where all in physical quantities of corn, hence profits could be determined independently from relative prices, as a physical quantity. And Marx adopted the simple labor theory of value in volume one of Capital. Both believed, for slightly different reasons, that their main arguments would hold even if the LTV was not precisely correct.

I am not concerned with the problems with the LVT in Ricardo and Marx (worth noticing that the mathematical solution was not known in their time, and was essentially developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) or Sraffa's solution. It is worth insisting that the LTV does have an analytical solution that is unique, and stable (see my post on the standard commodity for the former, which suggests a Smithian, i.e. labor commanded, version of the LTV is perfectly fine).** That's good, btw. It suggests that the classical political economy notion that there are prices that guarantee the reproduction, and, beyond the the expansion (or accumulation), of the economic system do exist.

Here I want to emphasize the importance of the LTV for the analysis of other aspects of the economy. Ricardo saw the problems of the Smithian adding up theory. That's the notion that prices were composed by the sum of natural wages, profits and rent and that prices would go up if one of its components went up.  In order to determine the rate of profit properly, Ricardo noted the explanation of value was essential. The rate of profit was central because in his view the processes of accumulation depended on the rate of profit. Hence, proper discussion of accumulation and growth depends on a proper theory of value and distribution. Btw, all classical authors assumed that real wages were exogenously determined by institutional and historical circumstances (so there was a role for history and institutions in their theory; also, for accumulation that was seen as too complex to be theorized in the same level of abstraction that value). But even if one is less keen than Ricardo on the role of profits in accumulation, it is undeniable that distribution affects accumulation, and, hence, a proper theory of value and distribution is needed.

Note also, that other things that depend on relative prices are crucially affected by the theory of value and distribution. Classical authors assumed that the process of competition, by which they meant only free entry and not the size or the number of firms in an industry, would lead to a uniform rate of profit. In that sense, the forces of competition were central in forging the structure of production, and, hence, the determination of technological change or to understand the patterns of trade specialization, which cannot be understood without the determination of relative prices. In fact, perhaps the most famous and the most controversial issues coming out of Ricardian economics dealt with international trade and the effects of technical change (the so-called machinery question), and are directly connected to the theory of value.

Even the most crucial macroeconomic problem, the question of output determination (and employment, for a given technique) is affected by the theory of value. Note that classical political economists assumed output as given for the determination of the surplus. And Ricardo accepted Say's Law as a way of determining output and employment (not Marx, btw, so it's NOT a requirement of the surplus approach). But as much as for accumulation understanding of distribution is central for the determination of the level of output, as it is explicit in the Kaleckian effective demand model. the classical long term prices are compatible with levels of output that do not guarantee full employment. And the parametric role of distribution in affecting the size of the multiplier is crucial for output and employment determination. So unemployment is possible in the long run, as a regularity of market economies.

In other words, for a coherent theory of output, accumulation, international trade, technological change and more (taxation, etc.) you need a theory of value and distribution. That is also the case in the mainstream. Marginalism developed in the last quarter of the 19th century, both as a result of the lack of analytical solution in that period for the problems of the LTV and as a reaction to radical revival of the theory (Marxism). The important distinction is that while classical political economy authors dealt only with objective factors, and considered demand as given when determined value and distribution, marginalism incorporated subjective preferences as central for the explanation of long term normal prices, and prices and quantities were determined simultaneously.

Beyond the problems with the marginalist solution for the existence of long term prices (see this on the capital debates) and their switch to the intertemporal approach, which basically only deals with short term prices, their theory is also central for almost everything in economics. In a sense, given that in marginalist analysis distribution is determined by supply and demand, and by the relative scarcity of factors of production, the theory of value and distribution is even more central for other parts of their theory than in the surplus approach. Here the theory of distribution does not affect indirectly the level of output and the process of accumulation. Here the level of employment and, for a given technology, output determination is the same as the theory of distribution. Real wages and the level of employment are determined in the labor market simultaneously. Everything derives from that.

Before getting to the reason why the theory of value and distribution, central for everything, is often ignored, let me note briefly the possibility of a third alternative to value and distribution, beyond the surplus approach and marginalism. That would be the markup theories of pricing. Note that theories of markup pricing essentially describe how firms determine prices. Most of these theories were developed as a result of the imperfect competition literature sparked by Sraffa's famous (1926) critique of Marshallian price theory (see an old post on that here).

First, as it would be known for the readers of this blog (at least the ones that have been reading for a long while), markup pricing is actually dealing with a different set of issues, and Franklin Serrano suggested here that they are different than the classical political economy normal long term prices (the Marxist prices of production or Sraffa's prices), and that Fred Lee and Marc Lavoie were right about that. He argued that some Sraffians (I won't name names), and I would add probably Fred too, thought that Sraffian prices were compatible with the full cost pricing tradition, and I could have included myself in this group.*** Note that what I mean by that is simply that the behavior of firms must be compatible in the real world with the logic of gravitation in classical analysis. In other words, if prices of production imply a normal profit over the full cost for a given technique, then firms somehow must be trying to do that.

But it is clear that the full cost pricing of a particular firm might not be the long run equilibrium price around which market prices gravitate, with free mobility, that is, with competition in the classical sense. In a way, the same circularity suggested above reapers, costs depend on prices (and that involves the profit related to the markup), and prices depend on costs. The firm's individual prices might not be the prices that are required for the reproduction of the economy as a whole. In that sense, markup theories must be grounded on some surplus approach understanding of value and distribution, and they are essentially theories about market prices, meaning short run behavior. In that sense, they run into the same problem than the intertemporal marginalist models, the Arrow-Debreu type, that became more popular after the capital debates, and that led to what Garegnani famously referred to as the change in the notion of equilibrium (that is the abandonment by the mainstream of the notion of long run equilibrium). Some heterodox groups see this as a positive development, but again it implies that they cannot say anything clear about distribution and relative prices, and that has implications for almost any other theory.

I might add here, which is more concerning for some heterodox groups, is that many of these theories are also compatible with marginalist interpretations of the theory of value and distribution. Many imperfect competition theories just suggest simple inverse relations between markups and the price elasticity of demand. This again fall into the type of situation I discussed recently regarding Karl Polanyi, of well-meaning critics of the marginalist mainstream, using marginalist or neoclassical concepts w/o knowing they are doing it (if it's conscious acceptance of the mainstream model, then it's something different).

One last thing in this regard, while markup theories must be grounded on some theory of value and distribution, and my take is that the surplus approach is where it would make sense, the opposite is not true. There is no need for a theory of the firm, of individual behavior, to understand long term prices. Classical political economists certainly discussed behavior, but that essentially entailed some notion related to class, to general social norms, not about what is going on in someone's brain. Even Smith that was certainly concerned with the issue of the role of self-interest in determining the equilibrium outcomes in the market, cannot be assumed to be a precursor of the rational maximizing agents of the mainstream, or of methodological individualism. The same could be said of utilitarian views and Ricardo, who was, to some degree, close to many utilitarians including Bentham. Here too, many heterodox economists think that an alternative theory of behavior is central for economics, and that is why many see behavioral economics as somewhat heterodox.

Finally, getting, even if briefly, to the point of why most economists remain oblivious to the relevance of value and distribution. I would suggest that this is a recent phenomenon. It is the result of what I have discussed here before, the return of vulgar economics (for example, here or here), and that the mainstream has abandoned the long run, and provides only a theory of short run prices. But at the same time the mainstream must revert to the old model in order to promote economic policy. Note that only in that model you can guarantee that markets provide efficient allocation of resources (w/o imperfections), and the price system signals the direction of adjustment. It is often missed by the heterodox groups that resist old classical political economy (often for incorrectly assuming that it is a precursor of marginalism) that their theory of value and their long term prices provide something completely different, an understanding of the conditions for the reproduction of society. That notion, btw, is alive and well in other social sciences (see here or here). Not in economics.

* It survived in the fringes and it was rediscovered by Marx and then much later Sraffa, who actually provided a coherent solution to some of its logical limitations. But after Ricardo, the LTV was never dominant again.

** On the gravitation of market prices towards normal prices see the work by Bellino and Serrano here.

*** My fondness for the subject in part derived from having worked for Wynne Godley at the Levy for two years, who was a disciple of P. S. W. Andrews one of the key authors of the Oxford Economists' Research Group (OERG) behind full cost pricing theories.

On Karl Polanyi and the labor theory of value

The other great transformation

I have discussed Polanyi on the blog before, but not in great detail (see this video posted a few years back from Fred Block for a more in depth discussion). However, writing about Bob Heilbroner's views of economics, and in particular the labor theory of value, reminded me why I have reservations about Polanyi, something that often surprises my friends, since I often cite some of his ideas, and I did put his book on the Top 10 list.

Polanyi has been, indeed, one of the most influential social scientists of the 20th century, even if economists never read him. His notion that markets are embedded in society has been used by political scientists and sociologists to understand the rise of neoliberalism, and the policies of austerity that have had incredible social costs (e.g. Mark Blyth's book Great Transformations). In part, the increasing formalization of economics made his work less popular among economists, proving that Boulding was right when he said that math brought rigor to economics, but it also brought rigor mortis.

The main thesis that free market capitalism leads to unstable political situations, and that this, in turn, would lead to coalitions that restraint and regulate markets, seems to have been vindicated, even if he did not get much recognition when the book was originally published. However, in spite of being a central an relevant author, many of his conclusions suffer from accepting an incorrect view of classical political economy, and ultimately his support for the mainstream (marginalist) theory of value.

He clearly believed, as did many, if not most, economists before the re-edition of Ricardo's works by Sraffa and his later rehabilitation of a version of the Labor Theory of Value (LTV), that classical authors were confused, and were essentially precursors of the neoclassical mainstream. He tells us:

"Apart from some special theories like that of rent, taxation, and foreign trade, where deep insights were gained, the theory consisted of the hopeless attempt to arrive at categorical conclusions about loosely defined terms purporting to explain the behavior of prices, the formation of incomes, the process of production, the influence of costs on prices, the level of profits, wages, and interest, most of which remained as obscure as before."

And there should be no doubt that to a great extent the mistakes of classical authors, in Polanyi's view, were associated with the LTV. He says just before the above passage that:

"Although Adam Smith had followed Locke’s false start on the labor origins of value, his sense of realism saved him from being consistent. Hence he had confused views on the elements of price, while justly insisting that no society can flourish, the members of which, in their great majority, are poor and miserable." [Italics added]

And it is also clear that he adhered to some vulgar version of the marginalist supply and demand story for value. Again in his words, from the his classic book, The Great Transformation:

"Economic value ensures the usefulness of the goods produced; it must exist prior to the decision to produce them; it is a seal set on the division of labor. Its source is human wants and scarcity." [Italics added]

In other words, relative value depends on demand (human wants) and their limited supply (scarcity). Given his background, and the mainstream authors he quotes, Polanyi basically believed in some version of marginalism, perhaps with Austrian undertones.

His bias in favor of neoclassical economics is also evident in his insistence that the beginning of capitalism* can be associated with the organization of the three markets that correspond to the factors of production, namely: labor, land and money (capital), and the implicit notion that the production is a linear process that goes from the factors to final output, in contrast with the classical view of a circular process, in which commodities where produced by means of commodities.

Polanyi was certainly sympathetic to Marx, but he clearly missed a lot, given the marginalist foundations of his analysis. He associated classical political economics with a naturalistic philosophy that tried to explain human behavior in terms of natural causes, and that imposed an extraneous logic to social relations. In view:

"naturalism haunted the science of man, and the reintegration of society into the human world became the persistently sought aim of the evolution of social thought. Marxian economics—in this line of argument—was an essentially unsuccessful attempt to achieve that aim, a failure due to Marx's too close adherence to Ricardo and the traditions of liberal economics."

So Marx wasn't a minor Ricardian, as Samuelson later famously put it (perhaps he was a major one for Polanyi), but his problem was the adherence to the Ricardian LTV.

I should note that Polanyi tends to think and judge classical and neoclassical economics from the point of view their economic policy prescriptions, and the idea of laissez faire, or what is referred to as liberalism in Europe. That is probably also the reason why Veblen coined the term neoclassical, which also gives the incorrect impression of continuity between both schools.

There is a lot that is valuable in Polanyi's analysis, but the problem is that he accepts the notion that prices are determined by supply and demand, and that implies that markets produce efficient outcomes in the marginalist sense of efficient allocation of resources (on the problems of the marginalist theory of value see this post on the capital debates). He does not seem to grasp that the classical notion of competition and long term equilibrium prices did not require optimality in the allocation of resources. Even if Polanyi is critical of the idea that in reality a pure market economy is stable, and even if he insists that free market policies led to a backlash from the losers that required a safety net to reduce the negative impact of market outcomes on society, it is still true that markets are about efficient allocation of resources in his view.

For classical political economists markets were an institutional framework for the reproduction of the material conditions of society, and for the process of accumulation. In the classical framework, equilibrium prices are not the ones that show the relative scarcity of goods and services on the basis of preferences, and limited resources. Normal (natural in Smith and Ricardo, production in Marx) prices are the ones needed to reproduce society. The overall state of preferences were taken as given, something determined by broad institutional and historical circumstances and not something to be formalized.

This matters exactly because the classical long term prices require that one distributive variable be determined beforehand. In other words, with real wages set at the subsistence level, something that was seen as historically and institutionally established in their time, the technical conditions of production (amounts of labor needed to produce, in the simplest version) were sufficient to determine normal prices. This view is actually perfectly compatible with Polanyi's notion of the embeddedness of markets, the idea that labor markets are social constructs and that rules, regulations and other institutional features are central for the creation of markets. In a sense, markets do not just appear out of thin air, in self-organizing fashion.

In other words, what Polanyi documents with this discussion of the expansion of the franchise in Britain in 1832, and the new Poor Laws established in 1834, is not the creation of the labor market as described by neoclassical theory (and that's exactly and incorrectly what he suggests). The institutional changes describe the full and final move from one set of regulations, still resulting from the more paternalistic system that came from pre-capitalist times, to a more punitive system for the working class. What was planned was not laissez faire in the labor market, but less protections to reduce the workers bargaining power. Workers resisted, but only much later, when their voice had a stronger political outlet (mostly with the rise of Labour), they could push back and regain some degree of bargaining power. Polanyi was partially correct, in saying that: "While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way." However, it required taking over, to some degree, the State to bring about the Welfare State. Laissez-faire was planned, for sure, but planning was too.

Classical political economy actually allows one to understand that, since in the surplus approach there is no labor market that is regulated by supply and demand and determines both the real wage and the quantity of employment. Polanyi would have been under much stronger foundation if he understood the role of institutional and historical factors in classical political economy.** The reason that there was a backlash about laissez faire policies is that markets do not produce efficient allocation of resources, something Smith, Ricardo and Marx understood. Keynes' tried to explain why the neoclassical labor market theory was incorrect too. And here too Polanyi, writing just eight years after the publication of the General Theory, has nothing to say about it.

But as much as Polanyi neglected and misinterpreted the works of classical political economy, the same is true of heterodox groups that have brought back the ideas of the surplus approach. And heterodox economists should pay more attention to Polanyi's work and the idea of the embeddedness of markets on a broader social framework.

* To be precise he suggests approvingly that “the Reform Bill of 1832 and the Poor Law Amendment of 1834 were commonly regarded as the starting point of modern capitalism.” In other words, the labor market is at the center of his view of capitalism. Compare this with a Marxist discussion of modes of production that also puts labor relations at the center.

** Polanyi incorrectly suggests that Smith accepts the wage-fund doctrine, a precursor of supply and demand theories, which certainly was developed much later, with Stuart Mill, a transition author, that had already departed from Ricardian economics.

Garegnani on Sraffa and Marx, with an intro by Petri

The Review of Political Economy has done a great service to those interested in political economy, and in particular those concerned with the revival of the surplus approach. It has published the manuscript of Pierangelo Garegnani's unpublished paper.

From Fabio Petri's introduction:

In the last year of his life, Pierangelo Garegnani (1930–2011) worked on revising a paper on Marx’s labour theory of value drafted 30 years before, which had remained unpublished. This revised paper is what is reproduced below. 

The paper had been read at a 1980 Conference on Marx in Bielefeld, Germany. It was a new version, in English, of the paper ‘La teoria del valore: Marx e la tradizione marxista’, published, together with an early Italian version of Garegnani (1984) as well as some other material, in Garegnani’s Marx e gli economisti classici (1981: pp. 55–90); the project had originated in a series of articles published in the Italian weekly Rinascita in 1978 and 1979. In the opening page of an essay on ‘The Labour Theory of Value: ‘Detour’ or Technical Advance?’, Garegnani (1991: pp. 97 and 113, endnote 4) announced the present work as forthcoming, but in fact the paper did not go to print. In September 2010 Garegnani resumed working on the paper, to add to it a further Section IX concerning more recent discussions on Marx and the labour theory of value. He intended to co-author this additional Section with me, and it is from the ensuing collaboration that I have obtained the typescript of the Bielefeld paper, dated 1981, titled ‘The Labour Theory of Value in Marx and in the Marxist Tradition.’ On why this 1981 paper was still unpublished 10 years later, what went wrong with its publication in 1991, and why then the paper remained dormant for nearly 20 more years, Garegnani supplied little information. About these questions one can only wait for when an examination of his papers and correspondence – a vast task yet to be commenced – will possibly allow for a well-founded historical reconstruction of his choices. 

Unfortunately Garegnani passed away in October 2011, before a draft of the additional Section IX could be achieved (see Petri [2015] for further details). But in that last year he also worked on revising the Bielefeld paper, that is the first eight sections of the intended new paper. The result of the revision is presented here. Although not a final version ratified by the author, it is a fully autonomous paper, and quite definitive: the draft contains no incomplete sentences or notes by Garegnani indicating that certain points might need further work. Relative to the 1981 version, it contains additional observations and stylistic improvements, but no changes in the basic arguments. 

The aim and contents of the paper were summarized at some length by Garegnani himself when announcing it in the opening page of the 1991 essay. In that summary, which can now be read as an introduction to the arguments contained in the paper here submitted to the public, Garegnani (1991: p. 97) stresses that the paper is devoted to further confirming the thesis, advanced in Garegnani (1984), that the role of the labour theory of value in the classical approach and in Marx was the ‘technical’ one of providing a ‘measurement independent of distribution, of product, wages and means of production,’ thus allowing a determination of the rate of profits as the ratio of net social product to capital advances, surmounting, in the only – albeit imperfect – way concretely available at the time, the (apparent) vicious circle of a rate of profits dependent on relative prices in turn dependent on the rate of profits. With particular regard to Marx, Garegnani explains, the confirmation is achieved by showing that the traditional interpretations that attribute other roles to the labour theory of value ‘have little foundation in Marx’s own work. This applies in particular to the readings often made of some characteristic concepts of Marx, like his distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘apparent’ relations of the bourgeois system, the distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ labour, the representation of the wage as ‘value of labour power’, or the sense in which Marx refers to labour exploitation – a sense which, as he explicitly states, has little if anything to do with the labour theory of value.’ These interpretations ‘have indeed made it difficult to comprehend a large part of Marx’s theoretical work’. No attempt at diplomacy here! The published 1991 essay is then presented as an appendix to that still unpublished paper, defending the latter’s arguments against the views on Marx’s labour theory of value expressed by Samuelson, Baumol, Myrdal, Meek, Morishima, and Sen. 

There remains to indicate why publishing this paper today is deemed important. The main reason is that Garegnani’s understanding of the role of the labour theory of value in Marx (and of the correct reading of those ‘characteristic concepts of Marx’) appears to be scarcely known outside Italy [1], a fact that has helped the frequent placement of his overall approach in the ranks of an allegedly anti-Marx ‘Sraffian school’. This reaction is hardly surprising in the light of the substantial diversity of Garegnani’s theses from the long-dominant ones. So dominant was the tradition attributing to the labour theory of value indispensable roles other than the one indicated by Garegnani – for example, the role of proving labour exploitation – that it is not difficult to understand that the spontaneous reaction of scholars steeped in the traditional interpretation may have been one of skepticism, if not of hostility, toward a view which, by claiming that nothing is lost by replacing the labour theory of value with Sraffa’s equations, seemed to reject fundamental elements of Marx’s assessment of the nature of the capital–labour relation. The absence of a detailed exposition in English of the arguments Garegnani supplies in support of his views has made it difficult to give those arguments the attentive consideration warranted by the recognized depth of thought of the author. The publication of the present paper aims at making such adequate consideration possible [2]. 

The criticism, in the last sections of the paper, of two Italian scholars absent from recent debates does not seem to be outdated either, because views similar to those they expressed are still present today. The near identification one finds in Lucio Colletti’s (1924–2001) writings of the concepts of fetishism, alienation, and abstract labour continues the long (and still alive) tradition stressing the ‘qualitative’ roles of Marx’s labour theory of value, and has been influential outside Italy too (see, for example, Foley 1982: p. 46, fn. 5). The argument put forward by Claudio Napoleoni (1924–1988), that outside the labour theory of value one cannot view profits as the fruit of exploitation [3], is representative of a widely shared view that helps us to understand the reluctance of many Marxists to replace the labour theory of value with the correct analysis of prices as provided by Sraffa. 

Independently of how convincing it will be found, this paper questions the idea of a so-called ‘Sraffian school’ antithetical to Marx. Leaving aside the analytical and even philological legitimacy of referring to Sraffa’s work and its later developments as any new particular ‘school’ distinct from the modern reappraisal of the classical approach to value and distribution, the paper shows that no such counterposition is applicable to a scholar highly representative of that line of thought, in whose view Marx’s overall approach actually turns out to be strenghtened, rather than challenged, by the correct determination of rate of profits and prices achieved with Sraffa.

Notes

[1] The publication in 1985 of a French version of the Bielefeld paper (Garegnani 1985), also containing a short appendix criticizing Rowthorn (1974), does not seem to have been widely noticed: I have found it cited in only one (unpublished) paper concerned with Marx’s theory of value, Chattopadhyay (2000).

[2] And at supplying at last the needed background to the 1991 essay.

[3] Napoleoni’s argument is available in English in Napoleoni (1991). Garegnani does not cite this article, presumably because of the little time he had to work on the last three Sections, which have remained almost unchanged from the 1981 version.

Most of these issues were briefly tackled in this old post.  Read paper by Garegnani here.

H/T to Franklin Serrano and Sergio Cesaratto for bringing the paper to my attention.

On Sraffa and the History of Economic Thought

Mongiovi, Girardi, McColloch and Vernengo

Bill McColloch, Keene State College (Guest Blogger)

Opening comments, "Roundtable on Sraffian Economics as Part of the Radical Political Economics Tradition," URPE 50th Anniversary Conference, September 28th, 2018.

What should the purpose of studying the history of economic thought be? That purpose doesn't, of course, have to be singular, but it's a question that I regularly feel pushed to answer as I often find myself teaching undergraduate courses in the history of economic thought, as I'm sure many of us do. At one level I feel fortunate to find myself in a heterodox program that welcomes the study of the history of economic thought, and in fact requires our undergraduates to take a course in it. But I also feel the need to justify the course's place in the curriculum. Indeed I normally spend the first day of class questioning, with students the larger purpose of the course. Some arguments seemed destined to fall on deaf ears. As Sraffa suggested of the Classical economists at the outset of his lectures on the advanced theory of value, “the best thing would be to read them in the original – I'm sure you would find them more readable and less abstruse than the modern economists, but I suppose there's very little chance of inducing anyone to read them” (Sraffa Papers, D2/4). Certainly we ought to reject the old claim of Pigou that the HoT is little more than a litany of “the wrong ideas of dead,” but what can we say in its place? Some heterodox historiography exhibits an understandable tendency to treat the history of economic thought as a genealogical project. We want to feel rooted in the past, to feel that we're not quite so alone, or that we were not always so isolated from mainstream discourse. In some cases then, HoT therefore becomes a search for this or that prescient and neglected thinker to remind us that once, is some far off and idealized past there was a more open, more pluralist economics. Thus we tell stories about the heyday of old Institutionalism or of the historical schools and recall times when, to borrow Keynes' phrase, “the weather was delightful and the mind free to be fertile of new ideas.” I worry not only that such an appeal in likely to be entirely lost upon students, but also that this renders it even easier for the mainstream to dismiss or marginalize the history of thought as a pursuit for indulgent specialists.

Already in 1929 Sraffa plainly expressed disdain for these approaches. In his view we must not overlook “the fact that economic theories, whether ancient or modern, do not arise out of simple intellectual curiosity of finding out the reasons for what is observed to happen in the factory or in the marketplace. They arise out of practical problems that present themselves to the community and which must be solved. There are opposite interests which support either one solution or the other and they find theoretical, that is universal, arguments in order to prove that the solution they advocate is conformable to natural laws, or to the public interest, or to the interest of the ruling class or to whatever is the ideology that at the present moment is dominating.” He goes on to suggest that it is only later, as theories undergo some evolutionary process, that they come to be regarded as the outcome of impartial inquiry, and comparatively unassailable for that reason. Sraffa's work is thus a reminder that economic theory is both infused with ideology, and that it is contestable. It is a reminder that the study of the history of thought should not offer a picture of the smooth and orderly ascendance of incontestable truths, but of the rifts, ruptures, and debates that continue to animate the discipline.

Sraffa also suggests that the outcome of our study of the history of thought should not be absolute fealty to the ideas of any one thinker. He rightly suggests that in our study of Ricardo we should recall the it was the distribution of the total product between landowners and the remainder of society that was his principal focus, not the division between wages and profits. Ricardo's own views changed over his lifetime, but as Sraffa suggested, “however the historical point as to the interpretation of Ricardo is settled...it's true to say that Ricardo's views on this point are not very important” (Sraffa Papers, D2/4). Though the question may be central to our own historical moment, it was less so for Ricardo, and played only a minor role in his theory.

In Sraffa's mind Marx's great victory was to have rediscovered the essential meaning of the classical system in an era in which it was increasingly lost to all observers. On Marx's basic triumph, he notes that it was “[s]till more terrific [that] in the middle of the 19th century, a man succeeds, either by accident or by superhuman effort, in getting again hold of the classical theory: he improves it, and draws its practical consequences from it” (Sraffa Papers, D2/4). We might appreciate then that Sraffa's achievement was to draw out a few of the essential elements of classical political economy, and of Marx. What then should be regarded as essential in our own age from Marx? It seems to me that the correct thesis is that capitalism rest upon exploitation, an exploitation of human beings and of nature, and that is remains the task of economics today to speak to this reality and its consequences. Whether Marx's own proof of exploitation can be shown to be true is perhaps of negligible importance. The central suggestion of Sraffa's work, that profits are not the reward of abstinence, or a payment according with the illusory marginal productivity of capital, but instead the portion of the surplus product extracted from those that “concur in its formation”

Archival efforts to more clearly reveal the genesis of Sraffa's own ideas are laudable, and testify to the importance of Sraffa's engagement with Marx as a sustaining motive force in the work that culminated in the Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. But is it important to ask if Sraffa was ‘really’ a Marxist? I would suggest not. Similarly, Sraffa's well-reasoned and foundational criticisms of neoclassical theory have been rehearsed and staged for nearly six decades, to no great destructive effect. In Sraffa's own spirit it seems more important to ask what what “practical consequences” we can draw from this work today. One simple suggestion is that our theory of the functional distribution of income must be institutional and sociological. Insofar as the pace of accumulation is understood to depend on this functional distribution of income, or on the sources of autonomous demand, any non-neoclassical growth model is, at its foundation, an institutional theory of growth. Thus rather rather binding ourselves to a singular approach we might recall Sraffa's suggestion that “[o]ur metaphysics is in fact embodied in our technique; the danger lies in this, that when we have succeeded in thoroughly mastering a technique, we are very liable to be mastered by her” (Sraffa Papers, D3/12/4).

Economic and technological determinism

Mind blowing stuff

A while ago now I discussed technological determinism, and the existence of economic laws, even if not in the same sense that in the so-called hard sciences. This semester I'm teaching a class for first year students (non Econ majors, to clarify for those outside the US) titled somewhat facetiously 'From Fire to Uber.' In fact, the first reading is Heilbroner's 1967 paper discussed in the first link provided above, on whether machines make history.

Bob was on the side of technological determinism. The epigraph was Marx's famous dictum according to which: "the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." And he essentially argued that the computer (he also discussed atomic energy technology, but not biotechnology. The computer, the bomb, and DNA were all part of the immediate techno-scientific developments of the post-war period) would essentially gives us the society with the technician. In fact, reading recently David Graeber's new book (original discussion here), on bullshit jobs, I was reminded of Bob's prediction. Bullshit jobs are essentially the result of the 'computer mill,' that gives society with the bureaucrat.*

Heilbroner and almost anybody else that uses that particular citation of Marx seems to suggest that historical materialism, or Marx's conception of history, requires technological determinism. While it is clear that the idea that the economic structure determines the cultural, political and social superstructure of society is a type of economic determinism, it is less clear to me that Marx accepted technological determinism. And as I noted in a previous post, Marx's conception of history, even if permeated by some economicism (I seem to recall that John Kenneth Galbraith suggested that he agreed on that point with Marx, the prominence of economics, but cannot find the quote anywhere), does not imply historical determinism. Not only he has very little to say about the future of society (including communism), but also all his laws of tendency allowed for countervailing forces that could reverse the original course of events.

In that sense, Marx's economic determinism is a sort of soft determinism, which allows for sociopolitical factors to affect economic developments. Here I'm echoing Nathan Rosenberg (pp. 61-62) who suggested long ago that "Marx's position... cannot be reduced to a crude technological determinism." So one may very well ask why I think that Marx's (or Heilbroner's) soft economic determinism does not imply technological determinism. Ultimately the reply hinges on what drives technology, which is a component of the supply side of the economy, and what drives the economy, supply side forces or demand side factors.

In my view, as stated too many times in this blog, the process of growth is demand driven. The adoption of machines (investment) in general results from the needs to adapt productive capacity to demand. In that sense, the computer and the society with the bureaucrat that it created are the result of growing economy and for the most part, as much as in the case of the society with the steam-mill, the one with the computer has been heavily dependent on the role of the state. In fact, there are few sectors in which the role of the state in the development of a technology are more evident than in the case of the computer (see here, for example), the internet and the derived technologies. Sure, I'm probably, like Bob a soft determinist, but with reverse causality.

Probably population growth (which was the main, or only, source of growing demand in pre-modern societies) and the State, and more importantly inter-State warfare, have been the driving forces for socioeconomic change, and technological developments have been the result. Of course, if the Military-Industrial Complex gives you the computer, then the computer may require the bureaucrat. So there are feedback mechanisms. It's the proverbial chicken and egg story. But in my view, demand driven stories of growth break with the technological determinism of the mainstream (neoclassical) and certain Marxist interpretations of history.

* In Graeber's view is not really information technology though. Bullshitization is a development of financialized or neoliberal capitalism (I'll discuss my views on that in another post). I should add that Graeber thinks that the computer has led to a new economic mode of production that he refers to as Managerial Feudalism.

Marx Capital turns 150

Marx's capital (Volume 1) was published September 14, 1867, exactly 150 years ago. Below a few links to posts on Marx written over the years.

What makes capitalism capitalism? (on the definitions of capitalism as a mode of production)

Sraffa and Marxism or the Labor Theory of Value, what is it good for? (on the labor theory of value)

Was Marx right? Nice of you to ask, but... (on common misconceptions about Marx)

A Note on the Concept of Vulgar Economics (an important idea, often neglected)

Garegnani on Sraffa, Ricardo and Marx (on the relation of Marx with classical economics)

The last Marxist? Or shortchanging Hobsbawm (a critique of The Economist's obituary)

And this one on why Marx and Keynes are essential for a coherent heterodox alternative to the mainstream:

The meaning of heterodox economics, and why it matters

Economic Regularities and "Laws" and the Riksbank Prize too

I've been reading The Nobel Factor: The Prize in Economics, Social Democracy, and the Market Turn by Avner Offer, Gabriel Söderberg, an interesting critique of the use of the Nobel Prize to undermine the Welfare State, essentially by conservative groups in Sweden, that were influential within the Central Bank (Riksbank), that disliked the Social Democratic policies in place in the 1960s. I have been critical of the Riksbank prize before (see, for example, here or here; check also Lars Syll's blog who often discusses the limits to the Nobel in economics), and this book is an interesting discussion of the socio-political forces behind the creation of the prize. I highly recommend it.

Having said that, I should note that the alternative to mainstream marginalist (neoclassical) economics is not Social Democracy. I guess one can actually be Social Democratic (Liberal in the US  New Deal sense of the word) and neoclassical. A good chunk of the Old Keynesians of the Neoclassical Synthesis sort were, and there are a few New Keynesians that are like that (many are simply Neoliberal). The alternative to marginalism, in my view, is a combination of the old surplus approach (classical political economy), particularly regarding value and distribution, and the Keynesian (and Kaleckian) analysis, regarding macro.

Also, I'm somewhat troubled by Offer and Söderberg tendency to read the Kuhnian ideas on the growth of knowledge in a nihilistic way, suggesting that economics cannot be seen as 'scientific' (surely a loaded term with more than one definition), and that there are no regularities in economics. They, for example, say that:

Feynman began by ‘looking for a new law’. But after three centuries, economics has yet to come up with a single non-obvious ‘law’, or universal regularity.

Don't get me wrong, regularities in economics are historically constrained, but there are more than a few. As any regular reader of this blog would know, I'm particularly fond of Okun's Law (and also of its inseparable fraternal twin Verdoorn's Law). I do think there is an important regularity behind the so-called Thirlwall's Law (that developing countries without a reserve currency face a balance of payments constraint more often than not), even if I don't think it is a "law" like the other two. In particular, I think that if one thinks of the persistent forces that operate within a particular mode of production, there are many other regularities that should (and to some extent are) part of economic analysis.

There are many mechanisms that capture the workings of those regularities in the economic system, like the multiplier and the accelerator. Theoretical constructs that are measurable, even if that is difficult and open to criticism. I guess I'm okay with the use of the term economic law, in a certain context. I suppose Marx also thought that capitalism, and other modes of production, were to some extent amenable of analysis on the basis of certain regularities, certain laws of motion, if one prefers (and, yes, that opens a discussion about determinism, but I'll leave that for another post).

Kindleberger (who I was lucky to see giving a talk in honor of Heilbroner years ago) wrote a little book on economic laws. The Iron Law of Wages, that Kindleberger discusses in his book, is very problematic (some discussion of that here), like the law of supply and demand, or the law of diminishing returns (they are not laws in my view, if that needs to be clarified). The other two Kindleberger discusses are much better, namely: Engel's Law and Gresham's Law. At any rate, for what is worth, I do think that there are many regularities that make economics scientific. Yes, sure social sciences are not like the hard sciences, but we do not live in post-modern world in which no regularities exist. But that does not undermine the authors' critique of the Riksbank prize, I might add.

How Capitalism is Killing Itself

Short documentary on the limits of capitalism mostly based on an interview by Richard Wolf. I find the simplistic explanation of exploitation at the end (around minute 27:30) based on the time of work (prices proportional to labor incorporated) to be problematic (for a discussion of the Labor Theory of Value, LTV go here). At any rate, worth watching whether you agree with Wolf's interpretation of Marx and capitalism or not.

A Terse Elucidation of Marx’s Concern with Alienation in the Mature Writings

By David Fields

Note: The references below are drawn from The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker.

Is Marx’s concern with aspects of alienation subsumed in his mature writings? To suggest so is a falsity. Marx’s depiction of the proletariat becoming, in the Hegelian sense, emancipated from the objective conditions of estranged labour, is not withered as the analysis moves toward the technical conditions of production. Marx’s humanism is still apparent.

In Wages, Labour, and Capital, Marx explicates that labour power is a life activity (204). It is the manifestation of human creativity, so that when it is sold as a commodity, a worker, in fact, sacrifices his life; the “product of his activity is no longer the object of his activity” (204-205). Life, as such, no longer has meaning.

Marx asks a pertinent question: “And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc.-does he consider this twelve hours’ weaving, spinning, drilling turning, building, shoveling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life” (205)? The answer is a resounding no: “On the contrary, life brings for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed […] The twelve hours’ labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling etc., but [only] as earnings […] If the silkworm were to spin in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage-worker” (205).

Another example is Marx’s attention to commodity fetishism: “In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place” (207). This actuality is mystified given that “the noble reproductive [labour] power that the worker surrenders to the capitalist [for sustenance]” (209) is the mechanism that generates the “means of employment” (210), of which labour, which by definition “possesses nothing but its capacity to labour” (208), socially depends on. This social dependency is the force that manufactures ‘false consciousness for “to say that the worker has an interest in the rapid growth of capital is […] to say that the more rapidly the worker increases the wealth of [capitalists], the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him” (211).

In Marx’s Grundrisse, there are more examples of where Marx alludes to alienation. For instance, Marx begins his analysis with a scathing critique of Enlightenment ideology: “The [rational] individual [who] belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades […,] which brings natural independent, autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract”, is an “ideal whose existence is [systematically] project[ed] […] by [the] detach[ment] [of the individual] from [his] natural bonds” (222). Hence, “forms of social connectedness confront the individual as mere means toward his private purposes, as external necessity” (223). And to suggest that material production, of which forms the bedrock of society, is determined “by isolated individual[s] […] is as much as an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other” 223). Society “does not consist of [isolated] individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which […] individuals stand” (247).

In continuance with a concrete understanding  of the nature of commodity fetishism, Marx indicates that the unity of production, distribution, and consumption is a mystification that clouds the reality that the worker is inherently an agent in production, of which the worker’s social position determines its pattern of distribution, and ultimately its pattern of consumption (223-234)…the unperceived “mutual interaction” that consummates the capitalist system as an “organic whole” (236).

Furthermore, Marx discerns that when labour exchanges with capital in the selling of labour power, a worker “divests himself” of his “vital forces” to the submission of superfluous “forced labour”, surplus value, of which work in production is in excess of that which is necessary for the means for “mere subsistence”, to generate a “general form of [capitalist] wealth (247-249). This facet of capitalism is striking for that it inevitably blinds the worker from realizing that his social condition is, indeed, a relation of domination similar to that of slavery, or what Marx defines as “direct forced labour” (250). Work in capitalist production is “indirect forced labour” for that wealth generated from labour is not accumulated for the gratification of overlords, but exploited to foster general industriousness that generates the means of employment, the means of subsistence, of which labour, by definition, socially depends on. Workers are nothing else than soulless cogs in a wheel, an “alien person”, whose objective social conditions appear as separated, independent, and of another kind (252-253).

Examples of Marx’s adherence to the thesis of alienation are also prevalent in Das Kapital. We again see commodity fetishism highlighted: “A commodity is […] a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason the products of labour become commodities, social things, whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses” (320). Commodities thus appear, according to Marx, as a social hieroglyphic (322), an alienating state of existence where one “cannot decipher the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them […] in the same way [that] light from an object is perceived […] not as the subjective excitation of the optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself” (321).

Marx also rehashes his argument, albeit in condensed form, of labour power as a life-activity that is ultimately dispossessed in capitalist exchange. When a capitalist purchases labour power for capitalist production, “the labourer, instead of being in a position to sell commodities in which his labour is incorporated, must sell that very labour-power, which exists in his living self” (337). Workers are free in the double sense; on the one hand, “as a free man, [the worker] can dispose of his labour power as his own commodity, on the other hand […] he has no other commodity for sale, which is short of everything necessary for the realization of his labour power”. This is an estrangement whose unadulterated existence makes the so-called rational-maximizing individual a self-perpetuating mythological understood form of social life (324).

In hindsight, Marx’s interest with the social conditions of alienation is not abandoned as he matures. To suggest that this is indeed the case would be to assume that there is supposedly an epistemological break between Marx’s early and later writings. This, however, would ignore a critical comprehension of Marx’s work as a totality.

Originally posted on URPE Blog

Teaching Marx in Lewisburg

I've been teaching an Intermediate Political Economy course, substituting Berhanu Nega, who regularly teaches this course. The text used, and it was already in the bookstore, is Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt's Understanding Capitalism, which puts an emphasis on individual behavior as the main difference with the marginalist view, and is not the best choice, in my view. At any rate here are a few old posts on Marx, which is central to the first part of the course (towards the end Veblen becomes more important; I guess at Bucknell this is the way we introduce Marxism and Institutionalism; glad I'm teaching it and having a better perspective on our curriculum).

What makes capitalism capitalism? (on the definitions of capitalism as a mode of production)

Sraffa and Marxism or the Labor Theory of Value, what is it good for? (on the labor theory of value)

Was Marx right? Nice of you to ask, but... (on common misconceptions about Marx)

And why not this one, on why Marx and Keynes are essential for a coherent heterodox alternative to the mainstream:

The meaning of heterodox economics, and why it matters

PS: The course has other books and texts, which complement the main text. I highly recommend the one by my colleagues Sackrey, Schneider and Knoedler Introduction to Political Economy.

Claudio Sardoni on the possibility of a Marxist explanation of the current crisis

New ROKE paper by Claudio Sardoni. From the abstract:

The object of the paper is to explore whether, or to what extent, a Marxian explanation of the current capitalist crisis is possible. The answer is that, although Marx’s theory offers important insights to understanding the ultimate causes of capitalist crises, it is not able to provide a fully satisfactory explanation of typical crises of contemporary capitalism. In particular, Marx’s analysis cannot account for the long periods of stagnation following the eruption of financial and economic crises. In Marx’s analytical context, crises are followed by recovery and growth in a relatively short span of time. It is argued that the main reason for Marx’s inability to explain crises of contemporary capitalism is that he developed his analysis by considering free-competitive economies, whereas modern economies are characterized by monopolistic competition. A more satisfactory explanation of the current crisis requires going beyond Marx’s original contributions.

Read rest here (subscription required).

Ernesto Screpanti on Marx's Labor Theory of Value and The 'New Interpretation'

New Working Paper by Ernesto Screpanti. From the abstract:

Marx’s theory of labour value is flawed. This note summarizes the main reasons why this is so. At the same time, it claims that the theory of exploitation does not depend on a labour embodied valuation and can be expounded by resorting to the theory of production prices. Almost all Marxists have now accepted this truth. Most of them have been convinced by a ‘new interpretation’ which has been able to translate the price of net output into an amount of ‘living labour’ and the rate of exploitation into a ratio between unpaid and paid labour. What produced such a surprising result is the use of labour productivity as a numeraire.

Read rest here.

For more on Marx and LVT, see here.

Masters of Money: Marx

Got to see the one on Marx, which is below. Come to think about it, not only Hayek is an odd choice for a conventional view of capitalism (even Friedman, I suggested Schumpeter in the previous post, would be a better one), but also the title is a weird one. Not sure Marx was a master of money, whatever that means.

The whole thing is a bit shallow. The equalization of Stalinism and the limits of the Soviet system with Marx's theories, and even the complete lack of discussion of Marx's ideas (on that read this). Seriously, Rajan and Roubini never read Marx. No serious economics scholar of Marx was interviewed. Yes Harvey and Ali, or Zizek for that matter, are not economists, even if they have read Marx. And Marx was, above all, an economist, even if that's the field in which he is not studied anymore. Also, the notion that capitalism is just profit seeking behavior is preposterous (for more on that). On the positive side, from my perspective, the type of crisis discussed is a realization crisis.

Footnote on the notion that Marx's propositions still are very radical, as said in the intro to the BBC episode: it should be taken with a grain of salt. Yes he thought that communism would abolish private property, but was also for "a heavy progressive or graduated income tax... free education for all children in public schools... [and the] abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form." So some of these ideas are now common sense. Radical stuff indeed.

Their advice, if you want to understand it better you should read it. Yes, given the stuff they did, you probably should.

Samuelson as a historian of economic thought

Steven Medema, together with Anthony Waterman, has published a series of papers by the late Paul Samuelson on the history of economic thought. Note that the scale and the range is more impressive than I expected. As they say in the intro:

"Paul Samuelson once referred, self-disparagingly, to 'the 5 per cent of my published papers that deal with the history of economic science' (54, 3). But D.P. O’Brien (2007, 336) regards this as a 'significant underestimate.' Nearly 140 articles, essays, or memoirs listed at the end of this volume, appearing over a period of forty-four years from 1946 to 2009 and comprising perhaps 20 percent of his scholarly publications, are clearly identifiable as studies of the history of economic thought."

I only know a bit of his writings on the Keynesian Revolution, and on Marx, who he famously, and incorrectly in my view, labeled as a "minor post-Ricardian." Now I learn that Samuelson thought also that Ricardo, in his estimation, was "the most overrated of economists."

I suppose that his views on Ricardo help understand his reservations about Marx. Also, and so far I have read the introduction (so I am relying on the editors), he seems to side with Malthus in his debate with Ricardo. Again, that makes sense. At any rate, worth reading and more to follow.

PS: It occurs to me that Samuelson's interest in Sraffa (he wrote an entry for the 1987 edition of the Palgrave, and according to Eatwell, wanted to write the main entry), who is cited profusely in the volume, the ultimate interpreter of Ricardo (and for me of Marx too), is no coincidence. 

Book Review of Foster & McChesney's "The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China"

The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China. John Bellamy Foster & Robert W. McChesney Hardcover: 224 pages. Publisher: Monthly Review Press (September 1, 2012). Language: English. ISBN-13: 978-1583673133

By David Fields

Over-accumulation stemming from the so-called golden age of global capitalism has ensued an era of underconsumption as exemplified by low profit rates and chronic excess capacity. As such, what has taken place is an historical transformation towards the process of financialization. With an inability to absorb effectively economic surpluses, concerning the promotion of rising wages along with productivity, NFCs, or non-financial corporations, are coerced to paying a larger share of their internal funds, specifically via debt leveraging (including consumers), to financial institutions. These financial institutions, which are increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people, have become some of the most powerful actors. Increasing concentration of control within the financial sector lends credence to Marx's (1894: 544-45) argument that what Foster & McChesney call the age of monopoly finance capital is one in which

[t]he credit system, which as its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralization, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.

Read rest here.

Massimo Pivetti on Interest Rates and Gross Profit Margins In Recent Experience of Advanced Capitalism

From a paper prepared for the colloquium “What have we learnt on Classical economy since Sraffa?” Paris, October 2014

According to the monetary explanation of distribution, as elaborated over the past 25 years on the basis of a well known suggestion by Sraffa, the normal rate of profit would be arrived at in each sphere of production by adding up two autonomous components: the rate of interest on long-term riskless financial assets, plus a normal rate of profit of enterprise, viewed as a component of normal production costs and reflecting objective (or widely perceived as objective) elements of risk attached to each different productive employment of capital. Since the normal margins for profit, given production techniques, depend on normal profit rates, the same two variables, the rate of interest and the rate of the profit of enterprise, would govern also the course of net normal profit margins in the different production spheres. For any given set of profits of enterprise, the long-term rate of interest would thus act in the economy as the regulator of the ratio of prices to money wages. Once the normal profit of enterprise in each sphere of production is taken as given, in that it is determined separately from both the rate of interest and the rate of profit, attention is focused in this approach on the rate of interest.

Read rest here.