Capitalism Alone Against Itself: Liberal Democratic versus Political Capitalism

I finished Branko Milanovic's thought provoking Capitalism Alone this summer. But I haven't had much time to write on the blog, as you might have noticed. This is certainly not a review, and I would definitely suggest that you go and buy the book as soon as you can and read it. It is a serious discussion of the future of capitalism, that word that, as Heilbroner often reminded us, was at the center of the discipline, but seldom discussed openly by economists. He cited, if memory doesn't fail me that it didn't appear in Mankiw's Principles textbook, at least back then in the 1990s, when it was published. I always note that Allan Meltzer wrote a little book titled Why Capitalism? were he makes no explicit effort in defining it, even though a definition can be gleaned from it.*

The definition most economists use leans more on Max Weber than Karl Marx, or the materialist tradition of the surplus approach upon which he built on. Branko is a pluralistic economist, well read and influenced by several authors, not all of them conventional. The discussion of the definition of capitalism is complex, and he separates, in its modern version two archetypes of capitalism, that are in a mortal battle for global hegemonic power, namely: Liberal Meritocratic Capitalism, represented by the West, and particularly by the United States (perhaps more credibly now after the election), and Political Capitalism, represented by the rise of the rest, with China at the head.

When assessing whether China is capitalistic Branko does use the conventional Weberian definition (p. 87), but that seems to be a pragmatic approach to provide the basis for his argument that China (and Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore too, p. 91) does conform to the Weberian notion of political capitalism, a term used by Weber to discuss ancient forms of capitalism. But there is a concern with how elites maintain control by non coercive forces in Liberal Capitalism, and about the need to create an indigenous capitalist class in Political Capitalism. Both point out to alternative issue of class conflict, of course, and how surplus is extracted from workers, and points to an alternative view of capitalism. There is, in somewhat Marxist tradition a preoccupation with the role of the bourgeoisie, and an nod to Wallerstein that suggested that there are no capitalists without state support, something I would like to have seen more in the book (p. 116).

In fact, the secondary role of the state, to some extent, the absence of a more thorough discussion of the developmental state in the case of the Chinese experience, is one of the problems with the book. Another would be an emphasis with issues of corruption, which seem to me to be of secondary importance, even if the problem might have increased with financial deregulation, and the rise of tax havens. The emphasis of the book is on the changes associated to the increasing mobility of labor and capital and the problems it poses for both systems. Branko thinks that the welfare state is vulnerable with free labor mobility (p.156), undermining the democratic process in liberal capitalism, and that capital mobility, which he sees more through the lens of Global Value Chains, rather than portfolio flows, and that would lead to higher growth in poorer countries, reducing the need for labor mobility. The book also debunks a few myths, like the notion that robots are coming for your job, or the idea that a Universal Basic Income (UBI) would be a panacea for the economic problems caused by globalization and technological change.

* Invariably it is based on notions of the profit motive (some form of rationalization) as required by markets, and private property, or Weber (plus North, if you prefer). For an alternative discussion see this old post on a view based on the surplus approach, including a critique of the Weberian naturalization of capitalism as something that existed in the past and that explains the golden ages of antiquity.

The Unreal Basis of Neoclassical Economics

By Al Campbell, Ann Davis, David Fields, Paddy Quick, Jared Ragusett and Geoffrey Schneider

originally posted here

Introduction
Ten years after the financial crisis, we still find mainstream economists engaging in overly simplistic analysis that does not accurately capture the dynamics of the real world. People studying economics need to know that the principles of mainstream economics are hopelessly unrealistic. In this short article, we demonstrate that the ten principles of economics in Gregory Mankiw’s best-selling textbook are divorced from reality and reflect an extreme and unwarranted bias towards unregulated markets.[ii] Mankiw’s “Ten Principles of Economics” should more accurately be titled “Ten Principles of Unrealistic Neoclassical Theory.”

Mankiw’s Principle #1:  People Face Tradeoffs/There is no such thing as a free lunch.
Mankiw ignores the historical determination of the distribution of resources and the crucial distinction between those whose income comes almost entirely from the performance of labor and those whose income comes from their ownership of capital. As a result he is unable to recognize the political power that results from the concentration of wealth in the capitalist class, and to analyze the distributional impact of decisions in which those who gain are often significantly different from those who lose. In addition, history is full of accounts of forcible appropriation of resources that appeared to be “free” to those who acquired them.

Mankiw’s Principle #2:  The Cost of Something Is What You Give Up to Get It/Opportunity Cost
Insofar as individuals are able to make decisions, their choices can be described as “giving up” one opportunity in order to take up another. This tells us nothing about the determination of the choices that are available to them. The “choice” of a worker as to whether to take on a dangerous job or face eviction from a home requires a very different analysis than one suitable for a discussion of the choice between apples and oranges. On a different level, an analysis of the “trade-off” between income now and increased income in the future requires an understanding of ecological limits to the growth of material production.

Mankiw’s Principle #3:  Rational People Think at the Margin.
Neither consumers nor producers, nor humans in many other social roles, generally act on the margin. The assertion of marginal analysis that decisions must be such as to equate marginal benefit with marginal cost is simply a restatement of the first derivative condition resulting from maximization subject to a constraint, rather than a reflection of real human choice. Mainstream theory then defines behavior according to this mathematical construction even though it does not govern actual choice in the real world. But more important is the presumption that all decision-making is guided by the well-being of isolated individuals, and thus that “rationality” consists of behavior that maximizes the benefit of the individual decision–maker. This dismisses the fact that people are social animals whose decision-making recognizes the interaction between individuals, and it ignores how in the real world people make decisions considering their whole situation under possible alternatives, material restraints, imperfect information, their cognitive abilities, the existing power structures, and culture.

Mankiw’s Principle #4:  People Respond to Incentives.
This is tautological. Furthermore, models based on monetary incentives by selfish, isolated individuals and firms in perfectly competitive markets are unrealistic and ignore crucial real world issues. Monetary incentives are not all that matters. In the real world people make many decisions on the basis of their evaluation of the resulting well-being of many people beyond themselves, or on social and cultural norms.

Mankiw’s Principle #5:  Trade Can Make Everyone Better Off.
Trade can increase total production, but trade has distributional impacts, with winners and losers. Trade in modern capitalism tends to foster inequality while undermining wages and working conditions for many laborers. This principle promotes unregulated trade, but unregulated trade has not proven to be the best route to economic development, nor is it good for all people. In the real world, infant industries, immiserating growth, terms of trade shocks, and increasing inequality render this principle useless as a policy guide.

Mankiw’s Principle #6:  Markets Are Usually a Good Way to Organize Economic Activity.
As there are no measurable units by which one can classify all specific economic activities in the real world as “good” or not, principle #6 is nothing more than a neoclassical ideological declaration of faith. Markets are human creations that operate differently in various economic systems, and the various existing and potential economic systems themselves are human creations. The first real question then is if under an existing system private capitalist markets driven by the profit motive do better than possible alternative human creations for providing the good or service, potentially driven directly by the desire to meet specific human needs. Important examples providing evidence of the inferior performance (efficiency and effectivity) of private capitalist market-driven systems are well run social security systems and single-payer health care systems. Avoiding the error of accepting the system as given, a deeper question would be if under some different economic system, which was not built to favor capitalist accumulation, alternatives could outperform profit-driven markets operating in capitalist systems.

Mankiw’s Principle #7:  Governments Can Sometimes Improve Market Outcomes.
Behind this assertion is the idea that markets are natural and could run without any government intervention, and that such natural markets tend to be efficient but sometimes are not quite optimal. In those cases the efficiency of markets could be improved by government tweaks. To the contrary, in the real world all markets are created by governments, which both establish the rules of the game and enforce them, and thereby determine market outcomes. If the government passes laws requiring that food be safe, that changes the market for food, and yields different market outcomes than if those laws did not exist. With this understanding, principle #7 is reduced to the not very profound statement that because governments create markets, they have the ability to create them with better or worse outcomes. Further, the issue always ignored by neoclassical economics of social divisions is particularly important for considering “better market outcomes”: better for whom? Market rules are shaped by power structures to benefit some classes and other social groups more favorably than others (for example capitalists at the expense of workers, First World countries at the expense of Third World countries, etc.).

Mankiw’s Principle #8:  A Country’s Standard of Living Depends on Its Ability to Produce Goods and Services.
Higher GDP per capita does not necessarily result in a higher material standard of living for all people within, as well as between, countries. Furthermore, neoclassical economics operates with a definition of “standard of living” as the amount of goods and services consumed, so this principle reduces to the not quite tautological, but not very insightful, claim that the amount of goods and services consumed in a country depends on its ability to produce them. In the real world what people are concerned with is their quality of life, which includes social respect, power to act on one’s desires, conditions of work (and not just pay), social relations, and much more. Neoclassical economics does not address the extension of principle #8 to what people in the real world are actually concerned with, their quality of life, for which the goods and services produced are just one among many determinants.

Mankiw’s Principle #9:  Prices Rise When the Government Prints Too Much Money.
Since the neoclassical definition of “too much money” is the amount that makes prices rise, this is a tautology. In the real world the relationship between prices and the money supply is complex: expanding money might cause a jump in prices or it might cause no price increases at all, depending on many other things in the economy.  The applied policy transformation of this into the incorrect claim that “prices rise when the government prints more money” is an ideological artifice, used today to justify austerity policies and keeping wages low.

Mankiw’s Principle #10:  Society Faces a Short-Run Tradeoff between Inflation & Unemployment.
The relationship between inflation and unemployment is complex and does not follow a systematic pattern. By the 1970s data from the real world had caused textbooks to go from Phillips Curves to Shifting Phillips Curves to abandoning them entirely. In view of that experience, principle #10 of a short-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment has become a neoclassical ideological justification for challenging those who advocate policies that would reduce the rate of unemployment, by fostering fears of inflation that may never materialize.
In conclusion, Mankiw’s so-called “Ten Principles of Economics” ignore crucial realities of the economic world. In particular, Mankiw excludes power imbalances, inequality, social forces, development experiences, the realities of market behaviors, laws and outcomes, realistic measures of quality of life, and recent macroeconomic data from his principles. It is hard to imagine a less useful set of ideas to guide modern societies in designing a good economic system. Unfortunately, almost all other mainstream principles of economics textbooks parrot these same principles. Students of economics will have to look elsewhere for useful analysis of the economy and how to build a democratic economy and society that works for all.

References
Mankiw, Gregory. Principles of Economics, 7^th Edition. Stamford, Connecticut: Cengage. 2015.

End-notes
[i] In a subsequent article, we will offer a set of principles of radical political economy to provide a more realistic, alternative approach.
[ii] The authors are members of the steering committee of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE). The ideas presented in this article are those of the authors and not of URPE. The purpose of this article is to make readers aware that there are alternatives to the principles of economics put forth by mainstream economists. We synthesize the critiques of mainstream economics by radical political economists in order to give students and teachers ammunition to confront the unrealistic paradigm of neoclassical economics that currently dominates the profession.

On free trade and economics consensus: a response to Mankiw

Mankiw tells us in his most recent NYTimes column that economists agree that Free Trade is good. He links to a poll in which, essentially, mainstream economists of different persuasions, some Keynesian and some not, and different political views, some liberal and some conservative, say that trade agreements are good. He backs his argument by suggesting that theoretically the argument is at the heart of the economics profession since the beginning; I guess an argument of authority.

And no better authority than Adam Smith. Mankiw says:

"The economic argument for free trade dates back to Adam Smith, the 18th-century author of 'The Wealth of Nations' and the grandfather of modern economics. Smith recognized that the case for trading with other nations was no different from the case for trading with other individuals within a society."

And it is true, Adam Smith was for laissez-faire, in general, and thought that less intervention in trade would be good. But there is in Mankiw's argument an implication that does not follow from careful analysis of Smith's doctrines, namely: that Adam Smith can be seen as a forerunner of modern neoclassical trade theory based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) comparative advantage argument (for the limitations of that theory go here).

Comparative advantage implies that countries should specialize on the production of commodities for which they have a lower opportunity cost. Specialization would increase productivity domestically, and importation of goods for which other countries have a lower opportunity cost would lead to mutual advantageous trade to all parties involved. This was actually first noted by Ricardo and Torrens more than 40 years after the publication of the Wealth of Nations. Smith believed that absolute advantage, meaning lower costs of production, not comparative advantage determined trade patterns.

Smith thought that free trade was a better policy than protectionism, since he believed that trade would expand the potential markets for home producers, which would lead to more division of labor, that is, higher productivity, leading to lower costs, more access to external markets and additional growth. A cumulative process of export growth and higher labor productivity, referred to as the vent-for-surplus model, was behind Smith trade optimism. It is important to note, however, that Smith's vent-for-surplus works in both directions. Higher costs (e.g. higher real wages) may lead to loss of external markets, no incentives for additional division of labor, and stagnation of domestic industry. In his model, success breeds success, but failure breeds failure.

There were very good reasons for Smith to think that free trade would be good for England in the late 18th century, and there even might be good reasons in the United States now, or at least for American corporations that would gain access to markets abroad. But the argument is far from universal, and the dressing of Smith's theory in modern garb is dangerous (for a classic explanation of Smith views on trade go here; subscription required; or here; also needs subscription).

The idea of absolute advantage, used by Smith, suggests that there is space for managing trade. I noted before that the opposite of Free Trade is not Protectionism, but Managed Trade. Nobody really wants to be in a completely closed economy, probably not even North Koreans. And once you admit a certain amount of management, say for sanitary rules to avoid importing poisoned toys, for example, or for security reasons to preclude defense secrets to leak out, you are discussing what are the good reasons for managing trade. Perhaps employment should be one of the reasons for managing trade. Free trade versus protectionism is a false dichotomy. The question is: how much management and for the benefit of whom (and who bears the costs of more or less trade as a result).

Note that comparative advantage theorems assume that employment is fixed, in the Ricardian system perhaps below full employment, and in the modern neoclassical HOS theory at full employment. Not surprisingly, on employment Mankiw tells us:

"Economists respond that full employment is possible with any pattern of trade. The main issue is not the number of jobs, but which jobs. Americans should work in those industries in which we have an advantage compared with other nations, and we should import from abroad those goods that can be produced more cheaply there."

That full employment is possible with any pattern of trade is theoretically true. But from that does not follow that comparative advantage should guide trade. That is a theoretical non-sequitur and is simply wrong. The US could pursue using macroeconomic policies (not the lower taxes for the rich that Mankiw advocates, but that is another story) full employment.* That would lead to high current account deficits, which for the US, because of the privileged position of the dollar, are sustainable. But that is not true for most countries.

In that case, if free trade is pursued, absolute advantage might determine trade specialization, and lead to large current account deficits that would be unsustainable and lead to a balance of payments crisis, the need for austerity, with lower growth and unemployment following. Even in the US, patterns of trade integration might lead to the elimination of good manufacturing jobs being substituted by low paying service jobs, something that has led to trade unions' reasonable rejection of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In other words, "which jobs" one can get if one "import[s] from abroad those goods that can be produced more cheaply there [sic; that's actually absolute not comparative advantage]" might end up leading to lower wages at home.

For that reason it is hard to agree with Mankiw when he says that:

"People tend to underestimate the benefit from conserving on labor and thus worry that imports will destroy jobs in import-competing industries. Yet long-run economic progress comes from finding ways to reduce labor input and redeploying workers to new, growing industries."

And there is evidence for that. The most famous FTA signed by the US with Mexico, has not favored workers in Mexico or the US, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), even if corporations and wealthy individuals have benefited in both countries as shown in these reviews of the evidence by Robert Blecker and Mark Weisbrot and co-authors. So if mainstream economists agree on this, once again it is because they ignore logic (that does no require for trade to be determined by comparative advantage) or evidence (which suggests that FTAs might hurt workers).

* And also there is not tendency to a natural rate of unemployment, which Mankiw, of course, also defends.

Lars P. Syll on how wrong Krugman & Mankiw are on loanable funds

By Lars P. Syll

Earlier this autumn yours truly was invited to participate in the New York Rethinking Economics conference. A busy schedule didn’t allow me to “go over there.” Fortunately some of the debates and presentations have been made available on the web, as for example here. Listening a couple of minutes into that video one can hear Paul Krugman strongly defending the loanable funds theory. Unfortunately this is not an exception among “New Keynesian” economists. Neglecting anything resembling a real-world finance system, Greg Mankiw — in the 8th edition of his intermediate textbook Macroeconomics — has appended a new chapter to the other nineteen chapters where finance more or less is equated to the neoclassical thought-construction of a “market for loanable funds."

Read rest here.

For an explication and presentation of the extent to which LFT is derivative of modern neo-Wicksellian macroeconomics, see here.

How Keynesianism became a dirty word: not Hayek, the New Deal is the real cause

Noah Smith, now writing regularly for Bloomberg, had a piece on this subject. There are a few good points on how New Keynesians are really followers of Friedman, something Mankiw admitted long ago, and how everybody including conservative economists (meaning GOP economists like John Taylor and Ben Bernanke) are New Keynesians (these would be the potty trained GOP economists, not your supply-side fringe economists like Arthur Laffer). Note that this is essentially correct as pointed out here before, since New Keynesians accept fully Friedman's notion of a natural rate of unemployment, while Keynes explicitly said he wanted to reject the twin concept of a natural rate of interest.

Noah also suggests that Keynes only wanted stabilization policies, and no redistributive policies, which is more open to debate. Keynes was certainly a moderate reformer trying to save capitalism from itself, and was no fan of the Soviet experiment. On the other hand, he was an Asquith liberal, meaning concerned with the expansion of the welfare system, and knew that laissez-faire, if it had advantages in the past, was essentially dead.

In the General Theory (GT) he famously starts chapter 24, on his social philosophy, with the idea that: "the outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes." That is, income distribution is squarely in the middle of his preoccupations, and the socialization of investment at the center of his solution (let alone the euthanasia of the rentier). Using public investment, and one would imagine taxes, to deal with employment and income distribution, plus compressing the remuneration of rentiers, and keeping low rates of interest to expand the safety net, are not simply stabilization policies.

On the main topic of his piece, however, Noah is simply wrong. He argues that the reason why: "people think Keynesianism is socialism-lite [is] the fault of Keynes’s main intellectual opponent, Friedrich Hayek." First, while it's true that Keynes and Hayek had a few debates in the 1930s (but the key Keynesian author in these debates was actually Sraffa, not Keynes), prompted by Lionel Robbins plan to make the London School of Economics (LSE) an alternative to Cambridge, it is preposterous to say that Hayek was the main intellectual opponent of Keynes. In the GT, it was his own teacher Pigou, and the Marshallian tradition in Cambridge that Keynes was battling. In his personal debates Robertson was certainly more relevant than almost any other conventional (Marshallian) economist. Hayek was irrelevant.

Second, Hayek basically vanished, literally, after the 1940s only to reaper in the 1970s as a result of his dubious "Nobel"/Bank of Sweden's prize (see Sissela Bok's, Myrdal's daughter, story on that topic). By that time Keynes and Keynesianism were already dirty words. Early on Keynesian ideas were associated, fairly or not, with Roosevelt and the New Deal in the US, and then to the war coalition government in the UK, the Beveridge Report and the post-war Labour reforms. Keynesian economists were in many cases persecuted, like Lauchlin Currie, the first economist to work inside the White House, and one of the early Keynesians. But by the 1950s and 1960s (particularly after the Kennedy administration) one kind of Keynesianism was dominant anyway (the Kennedy tax cut and the economists working for his administration are the symbol of the dominance of Keynesian ideas).

So you ask why indeed did Keynesianism become a dirty word? Simply because even if Keynes had differences with Roosevelt (FDR was actually a sound finance guy) and with Labour, his ideas did provide the intellectual basis for New Deal policies, particularly after the 1937-38 recession, and for the expansion of the Welfare State in general. The economists that where against these policies by the 1940s were in the minority. Mont Pelerin is, if anything, prove of their sheer irrelevance. Friedman years later would complain about how ostracized he was (but less than Hayek, since he accepted the ISLM/Phillips curve apparatus of the Neoclassical Synthesis Keynesians; and that's why New Keynesians, who are really followers of Friedman, can say they are Keynesian, by the way). Liberalism, in the US sense of the word, was at its height. But the rise of conservatism (Goldwater was a joke back then) eventually transformed liberalism into a dirty word (that's why we use progressive now rather than liberal).

Hayek was resuscitated very much like conservative ideas. By the big bucks of business leaders and their think tanks that were against the New Deal. The rise of Hayek or of his renewed respectability results from the same forces that explain why Keynesianism and the New Deal kind of welfare policies fell in disrepute, to the point that Niall Ferguson could say that Keynesianism was flawed because Keynes was childless and gay. Oh well.

PS: In fact, the title of this blog is related to the view that Keynesianism is a dirty word, and that some people (Galbraith) unashamedly teach naked Keynesianism to innocent college kids. For more see here.

Mankiw and the myth of one economics

I avoid commenting on Mankiw's blog, since it is, in my view, the worst of the mainstream. I'm okay with Krugman, who at least uses neoclassical economics to try to understand the world (although his economics makes it difficult for him). But Mankiw is a different animal, and seems to be more about justifying the worst of conservative policies. Also, he is the sort of the leader of New Keynesians (or was at some point), which is a terrible misnomer used by fundamentally anti-Keynesian authors [Mankiw is only Keynesian when it is convenient for the 1%; he is against higher taxes, since that would make productive people like him work less; yes a good reason to for higher taxes on the wealthy indeed!].

At any rate, I'll make an exception this time, since I think the topic is relevant. In a recent column on the NYTimes, on the new head of the CEA, an ex-student of his, he said:

"The field of economics offers a lens through which to view the world. For those who buy into it and pursue it as a career, it provides a foundation of a personal and political philosophy. It forever sets you apart — for better or worse — from mere muggles. 

For economists working for politicians, as both Jason and I have, there is an inevitable tension between where the logic of the discipline leads you and what your political allies would like to hear."

This reminds me of the title of Dani Rodrik’s book One Economics, Many Recipes. The notion is that there is only one economics, one field in which there is agreement for the most part. This myth is perpetuated, not only by Mankiw, but by the likes of Krugman and other more progressive mainstream authors too. Like Rodrik, for example.

This is very revealing of their views of what economics is, and what economists do. I commented before on Rodrik's views of economics. Rodrik’s definition of economists is interesting, not so much for what it says, but because of what he feels he needs to say. Rodrik says in his Has Globalization Gone Too Far that: “when I mention ‘economists’ here, I am, of course, referring to mainstream economics, as represented by neoclassical economists (of which I count myself as one).”

The clarification must dispel any doubts of where he stands. He may be critical of certain aspects of the globalization process, but God forbid somebody misconstructs his critique and takes him for a heterodox economist! One is led to believe that Rodrik thinks that the consequences of not being part of the ‘gang’ must be pretty harsh.

In fact, in a post in his blog, nicely titled “Is Neoclassical Economics a Mafia?,” Rodrik conveys the following story: “some years ago, when I first presented an empirical paper questioning some of the conventional views on trade to a high profile economics conference, a member of the audience (a very prominent economist and a former co-author of mine) shocked me with the question ‘why are you doing this?’” Clearly his co-author was concerned with the effects that being critical of free trade might have on Rodrik’s career. Rodrik’s co-author is, most likely, just a good friend, but his question reveals a lot about the dark corners of the edge of the profession.

The point is that neoclassical economics is the only acceptable 'economics', not because logic and empirical evidence compel one to follow the marginalist principles, but because of the sociological pressures of being part of the dominant paradigm and the need to engage in normal science. So being an 'economist' in Mankiw's sense might separate you from mere muggles, but it might make you a member of the Cosa Nostra!

The fairy tale the super rich earn their money is exactly what it is, a fairy tale!

From Jared Bernstein

Larry Mishel has a useful blog up responding to Greg Mankiw’s piece defending the top 1% (for much more discussion of Greg’s essay, start here and click through the many links).I’ll get to Larry’s point in a moment, but one thing re Greg’s paper. Much of the criticism, which I’ve (predictably) found resonant, is directed at a) his failure to comprehend that the opportunity set facing families and their kids on the have-not side of the inequality divide is diminished, and b) the role that inequality itself has played in that outcome (I’ll have a second post up soon on point b—it’s one I’ve consistently stressed in these parts).

Read rest here.

Romney's economic plan and the confidence fairy

Romney's economic plan is out, and not surprisingly is all about confidence fairies. Glenn Hubbard, one of the co-authors (with John B. Taylor, Greg Mankiw and Kevin Hassett) argues in the Wall Street Journal that the recession has been caused by uncertainty. In his words:

As a consequence, uncertainty over policy—particularly over tax and regulatory policy—slowed the recovery and limited job creation. ...  the Obama administration's large and sustained increases in debt raise the specter of another financial crisis and large future tax increases, further chilling business investment and job creation.

So too much regulations and spending is what is causing the slow recovery. This is interestingly enough what the manuals of Hubbard, Mankiw or Taylor would say (all are supposedly New Keynesian economists, whatever that means), which still present the simple Keynesian model in which spending determines the level of output (the old 45o degree Hansen model, which encapsulates the logic of the multiplier).

So what is the solution for these GOP New Keynesians? Four points:
growth and recovery first, and it stands on four main pillars:

• Stop runaway federal spending and debt. The governor's plan would reduce federal spending as a share of GDP to 20%—its pre-crisis average—by 2016. This would dramatically reduce policy uncertainty over the need for future tax increases, thus increasing business and consumer confidence.

• Reform the nation's tax code to increase growth and job creation. The Romney plan would reduce individual marginal income tax rates across the board by 20%, while keeping current low tax rates on dividends and capital gains. The governor would also reduce the corporate income tax rate—the highest in the world—to 25%. In addition, he would broaden the tax base to ensure that tax reform is revenue-neutral.

• Reform entitlement programs to ensure their viability. The Romney plan would gradually reduce growth in Social Security and Medicare benefits for more affluent seniors and give more choice in Medicare programs and benefits to improve value in health-care spending. It would also block grant the Medicaid program to states to enable experimentation that might better serve recipients.

• Make growth and cost-benefit analysis important features of regulation. The governor's plan would remove regulatory impediments to energy production and innovation that raise costs to consumers and limit new job creation. He would also work with Congress toward repealing and replacing the costly and burdensome Dodd–Frank legislation and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Romney alternatives will emphasize better financial regulation and market-oriented, patient-centered health-care reform.

In short, reduce taxes (the effective corporate income tax is well below 25% and several corporations do not pay much or anything in fact), which mainly helps the wealthy, and has little impact on income, cut spending (contradicting what they teach), cut and privatize Social Security and health programs, and more deregulation. The non sequitur with cutting welfare programs or the craziness (or dishonesty) of arguing for deregulation (eliminate Dodd-Frank) even if they call this disingenuously 'better financial regulation' is astonishing. And yes the idea is that somehow all these measures would create an environment in which job creators would feel safe to invest.

Brad DeLong and Menzie Chinn do a great job debunking this terribly poor and dangerous economic plan.

Know what you're teaching

Greg Mankiw wrote a response to his students, who protested his teaching, in his last New York Times column. He basically blames the students for not knowing enough economics. He goes on to say that the complaints of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, in support of which the students had boycotted his class, are also a “grab bag of anti-establishment platitudes without much hard-headed analysis or clear policy prescriptions.”

He also suggested that students boycotted the wrong class, since his lecture that day was on inequality. Note that his views on inequality are strictly based on conventional mainstream neoclassical theory. Inequality for him is based on education (see here his critique of Krugman’s views on inequality). So basically the top 1% are more educated, more productive and, as a result, receive more. You cannot protest market forces.

Read the rest here.

New Monetarists, scientists or engineers?

Back in 1994, when the New Keynesian (NK) label, if not the models, were relatively new, Ball and Mankiw argued that Milton Friedman was closer to the NK approach than the New Classical (NC)/Real Business Cycle (RBC) one. For them (see here, 1994, p. 9):

"although traditionalist are often called 'new Keynesians,' this label is a misnomer. They could just as easily be called 'new monetarists.'"

The whole point was that monetarists believed in the non-neutrality of money in the short run and in sticky prices, like NKs. Now there is an explicit New Monetarist model with sticky prices here, and a growing literature surveyed by Stephen Williamson and Randall Wright here. Williamson has a blog here.

New Monetarists seem to build on ideas developed by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace in the early 1980s (here, for example). A simple introductory presentation is given by Champ and Freeman (here). The theoretical framework is in general based on overlapping generations models, in which monetary policy can affect relative prices and, as a result, change the intertemporal consumption, labor supply, and investment decisions of rational maximizing agents.

As Williamson says:

"Monetary policy matters due to distortions in intertemporal prices, for example the anticipation of higher money growth and higher inflation acts as a tax on labor supply and reduces output."

Not sure if he thinks that the current slow growth is to be blamed on the expansion of the money supply after the recession, and higher inflationary expectations, leading to an increase in the demand for leisure time (a reduction on labor supply, that will be taxed by the higher inflation). That would explain why he thinks that the Fed should sell bonds, and raise the interest rate (not a joke!). At any rate, the whole New Monetarist approach is fundamentally, like New Classical authors in general, concerned with microfoundations. In this case, microfoundations in the money market.

This kind of approach reminds me of another Mankiw paper on the nature of macroeconomic research. For him macro, from the Keynesian Revolution until the rise of Lucas and the New Classical school, was dominated by what he calls engineers, that is problem solvers. From Lucas on it has been dominated by scientists, meaning those that search first principles.

So the first group was concerned with empirical regularities, like Okun's Law, while the latter emphasized rational intertemporal maximizing economic agent models, like in the Ramsey model. New Monetarists are clearly in the latter camp. So are we better off with the rise of the "scientific" macroeconomists? Here is why Mankiw's paper is so important. He candidly tells us (p. 19):

"The sad truth is that the macroeconomic research of the past three decades [the 'scientific' micro-founded stuff] has had only minor impact on the practical analysis of monetary or fiscal policy. The explanation is not that economists in the policy arena are ignorant of recent developments. Quite the contrary: The staff of the Federal Reserve includes some of the best young Ph.D.’s, and the Council of Economic Advisers under both Democratic and Republican administrations draws talent from the nation’s top research universities. The fact that modern macroeconomic research is not widely used in practical policymaking is prima facie evidence that it is of little use for this purpose. The research may have been successful as a matter of science, but it has not contributed significantly to macroeconomic engineering."

No kidding, great science that has nothing to say about the reality of how to solve actual economic problems. The rise of sci-fi macroeconomists. Welcome to the Twilight Zone!

Honest economists and other unicorns

So Dean Baker just nailed Greg Mankiw.  Bush's Council of Economic Advisors's chairman (yep he was part of that economic team) asks three questions in his NYTimes column.  Namely:

1) How long will inflation expectations remain anchored?

2) How long will the bond market trust the United States? 

3) How long will it take for the economy’s wounds to heal? 

The reply to the first (I changed the order) is pretty good, in part because it dismisses the whole exaggeration about the role of expectations (what people think you think they might think will actually happen).  Also, and more importantly Dean emphasizes that wages have been subdued (to say the least; and one might add with unemployment at this level and years of weakened unions no chance of recovery anytime soon), and the only source of inflationary pressures are higher commodity prices.  He elegantly puts aside Mankiw's nonsense about the credibility of the Fed.

The second question is also dealt with the same clear understanding of economic principles that mainstream economists (that missed the coming crisis, and where cheerleaders of the policies that got us here seem to be oblivious to).  It is worth quoting Dean on this one.  He points out that:

"The idea being pushed by many in policy circles that at some point the bond markets will lose faith in the ability of the U.S. government to pay its debts is absurd on its face. This would be like saying that if I issued iou's, that were payable in my iou's, that the markets would be worried about my ability to meet my commitments."

It is, in fact, a very common idea, even in progressive circles, as I noted in my previous post.  Mankiw's notion that a day of reckoning for US debt is inevitable is disingenuous, which seems to be a pattern in certain mainstream circles.

On this I should say that all so-called New Keynesian economists, that is, those that think that involuntary unemployment might exist, and did not fall for Real Business Cycles and other crazy theories (please somebody explain to me how the last crisis was a real one!), that have advised Republican governments (John Taylor, in his recent rants against Krugman, is another example) are in a similar pickle.  They have to defend ideas (e.g. cutting taxes for the rich) that are clearly wrong for political reasons.  This means that Republicans are left with cranks that actually believe in supply-side economics and Santa Claus, and reasonably informed neoclassical economists that say things that they know are not quite correct.

But on question two, as Dean notes, if insolvency is not a problem, and inflation is not going to get out of hand, interest rates will remain low and there is no reason why the government cannot go on borrowing to finance its deficits.  If anything deficits should be larger.

Which gets him to the last question.  And yes, he asks how could "honest economists debate" whether the recession was actually worse than expected.  Dean is to nice to say that they might be clueless, in which case they should not be teaching in the "best" universities or writing for the Times, let alone advising government, or they are just not honest.  And yes, we do need more stimulus.

PS: Democrats have the reasonably well informed neoclassical (mostly New Keynesian) economists, but also some very good heterodox economists (which do not get the amount of influence they should, but that's another story).  In the Democratic camp the reasons for crazy things, like the belief that deregulation would increase financial stability, followed the monetary incentives (let's call it that).  But at least most of their economists do believe that unemployment is a problem.

Striking inanity

Mankiw thinks that the scatterplot below is striking. He should read an intro textbook (I imagine even his text presents the simple Keynesian model).

What drives both is the expansion of autonomous demand. Demand increases output, and as per Okun’s Law reduces unemployment. Investment follows the accelerator, that is, as output increases firm’s investment also increases to maintain the relation between productive capacity and income. How is this striking?

ISLM: what is it good for?

The ISLM model persists in most undergraduate textbooks, and even though it has vanished from graduate courses*, it remains central to the way economists think about policy issues.  The main reason it survives is not so much that it allows a relatively simple intro to policy issues to undergrads, as some argue, but the fact that it captures the interaction between real and monetary phenomena which was central for Keynes’ General Theory (still worth reading), and is flexible enough to accommodate divergent views, often reflected in different inclinations of the curves.

It is also true that the conventional interpretation of the ISLM is fraught with problems.  But the ISLM model is incredibly flexible and can accommodate most critiques.  For example, a few years back a reader asked Mankiw why he still taught that the Fed controls money supply, rather than control the rate of interest, which would be more relevant.  His reply was not particularly good (just an ad for his book), but the fact remains that it is easy to change the LM to reflect the fact that central banks control the rate of interest.  The ISLM with a horizontal LM is sometimes referred to as the ISMP, where MP stands for monetary policy rule, and for the most part this is done for the benefit of students (i.e. you can buy the new text with the updated ISMP model for $150!).

The ISLM can also accommodate an investment function in which the level of activity, rather than the rate of interest, is central, which is more empirically accurate, and different consumption functions in which other elements besides disposable income appear.  More importantly the ISLM does not imply a natural rate of unemployment, which often appears in the supply side part of the macro course.  In other words, the ISLM allows for relevant discussion of policy issues, and clarification of policy differences.  Besides, compare this model with the consumption theory you get in micro, and this is still one of the most relevant things you can learn in economics.  The other would be not to trust economists!

* David Colander suggests that it’s not taught in graduate courses because more sophisticated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) are more important.  DSGE models are based on the aggregation of individual maximizing behavior, and have been less relevant for policy analysis than old fashion macroeconometric models based on the old Keynesian theory.  The whole conference on the ISLM, in which you can find Colander’s paper is available here

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