Showing posts with label Adam Smith. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Adam Smith. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 21, 2026

Smith, Hamilton, and the Revenge of the Mercantilists

Heinz Kurz recently gave a very stimulating lecture, "The Wealth of Nations (WN) at 250: The Revenge of the Mercantilists" at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and I was the commentator. His central point was that Adam Smith has been badly served by both his admirers and his critics. Smith was not the apostle of selfishness, laissez-faire, and the minimal state imagined by later free-market ideologues. Political economy was, for him, a branch of the science of the statesman, concerned with the institutions and policies required to promote prosperity, liberty, and justice.

Kurz rightly emphasized Smith’s distrust of merchants and manufacturers. Smith understood that business interests do not automatically coincide with the public interest. Merchants frequently seek monopoly, protection, and political privilege. The “mercantile system” was objectionable not simply because it involved state intervention, but because the state had been captured by particular interests. This reminded me of what Bob Heilbroner used to say, the enemy in the WN is not the state, but monopolies.

Kurz also criticized the revival of economic nationalism associated with Donald Trump. Trump’s policies reproduce some of the errors criticized by Smith, especially the obsession with bilateral trade balances and the confusion of particular corporate interests with the national interest. But Trumpism is not really a restoration of historical mercantilism. Mercantilism was part of a broader process of state formation, institutional development, naval power, public finance, and industrial transformation. Trump has tariffs, but no coherent development strategy.

This is where I would place the emphasis somewhat differently. The historical success of the Italian City States, Netherlands, Britain, and later the United States rested not simply on trade protection and some degree of what today is called industrial policy. It depended on the construction of a fiscal and monetary architecture based on the so-called Military-Fiscal State. Taxation, public debt, public banks, central banking, infrastructure, where central elements of the Military-Fiscal, and Fiscal-Naval, state. These institutions made sustained developmental policy possible. Trump revives the rhetoric of mercantilism while neglecting the other elements that successful countries actually used. I discussed why Trump's protectionism would not birng back manufacturing jobs here.

Kurz’s discussion also raises an old notion about Smith’s “Physiocratic prejudice.” Following a line of interpretation originating with Piero Sraffa, Kurz argues that Smith continued to give agriculture and “corn” a privileged position within his analytical system, even though Smith explicitly rejected the Physiocratic doctrine that agriculture alone was productive. On an analytical level, there is no doubt that Professor Kurz is correct and that the foundation of the Smithian growth model is Physiocratic. 

Kurz's argument is subtler than simply saying Smith believed only agriculture was productive. Instead, Kurz reconstructs Smith's analytical system in Sraffian terms and argues that Smith distinguishes "necessaries" (corn) from luxuries. Corn is treated as the only genuine basic commodity, because every production process ultimately requires workers' subsistence. Manufacturing therefore cannot become the independent engine of cumulative growth. Consequently Smith retains what Sraffa calls a "Physiocratic prejudice." Notice that Kurz's criticism concerns the architecture of Smith's growth theory, not Smith's explicit statements about productive labor.

Tony Aspromourgos provides a counterpoint, with a more direct textual reading of Smith. Textually, Smith clearly regarded manufacturing, transportation, and commerce as contributors to the social surplus. Aspromourgos stresses that Smith rejected the Physiocratic view outright: "The capital error of this system ... seems to lie in its representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, as altogether barren and unproductive." He notes that Smith systematically repudiates the Physiocratic limitation of productive labor to agriculture in Book IV of WN. This reflects the difference between a historical-institutional reading of Smith's aims and the theoretical basis of his model.

Ronald Meek, in a classic paper, suggests another way of looking at the issue. Smith was not primarily constructing a timeless model of production in the manner of Ricardo or Sraffa. His central concern was historical development, in particular the movement from hunting to pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society, and the corresponding transformation of property, law, government, and social classes. Agriculture may therefore be historically central without being the only analytically productive sector.

This has implications for the interpretation of Alexander Hamilton, and Hamiltonian protectionism, often defended as the first in a long line of American protectionists, an American School, as Michael Hudson has called it.* Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures should not be read as a theoretical rejection of Smith. Hamilton relied on distinctly Smithian mechanisms, the division of labor, the extent of markets, the vent for surplus that created demand for agricultural output. His disagreement concerned the policies appropriate to a new, agrarian republic rather than the underlying theory.

Hamilton did not believe that the policy appropriate to an already industrial and financially developed Britain could simply be transferred to the United States. Public credit, a national bank, taxation, and the encouragement of manufacturing were historically specific applications of political economy to American conditions. In that sense, Hamilton was not a mercantilist in Smith’s pejorative meaning. He was a Smithian developmental statesman.

Paradoxically, Jefferson’s agrarian ideal was closer to the Physiocratic privileging of agriculture, while Hamilton’s emphasis on manufacturing, urbanization, finance, and the division of labor was closer to the dynamic elements of Smith’s commercial society. Kurz’s lecture therefore provides an excellent starting point for recovering a Smith who was neither a free-market ideologue nor an opponent of developmental statecraft.

* On the American School or Political Economy Tradition see my substack post here. 

Thursday, June 4, 2026

On Mirowski and neoliberalism

New post on Substack that argues that Mirowski is right that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to textbook neoclassical economics, since it is a broader political and institutional project (see the old debate here). But I defend that, on a theoretical, the reverse point is correct. Neoliberalism also cannot be separated from marginalist economics, that is in a sense broader than neoliberalism. All neoliberals must be in some sense neoclassical, I argue.

The more detailed reasons are in the Substack post. The gist is that the public policy rhetoric of neoliberalism invokes Adam Smith's laissez-faire and classical liberalism, but its analytical core comes from neoclassical ideas about the theory of value and the notion of markets as superior coordinating mechanisms. The key distinction is therefore that classical liberalism provides neoliberalism with political legitimacy, while neoclassical economics provides its theoretical foundation. Mirowski helps clarify neoliberalism as a movement, but the post argues that his account underplays the common marginalist ground uniting its different strands.

Thursday, May 14, 2026

Review of Glory Liu's Adam Smith's America

My review of Glory Liu's Adam Smith's America. The book is a valuable history of the many American reinventions of Smith, from the Founding era to the Chicago School. But, as I argue in my review, the central problem is not simply that Smith was read selectively, or that his moral philosophy was ignored. The deeper issue is that Smith belonged to the classical surplus tradition, concerned with production, distribution, accumulation, and conflict, while modern interpreters often read him through the later neoclassical framework of equilibrium, efficiency, and individual optimization.

Monday, March 9, 2026

The Wealth of Nations at 250! Misunderstood icon of free markets

Today, March 9th, marks the 250th anniversary of the publication of The Wealth of Nations (WN) in 1776. Adam Smith may also be one of the most misunderstood thinkers in the history of economics. Smith is not the father of modern economics, neither of capitalism, a term he never used.

In modern discussions Smith is often portrayed as a precursor of contemporary economics, something like an early version of the Arrow-Debreu model of competitive equilibrium. I remember Sam Bowles suggesting that (he actually said something to the effect that Smith, Marx and Arrow, all said the same thing) at a talk at the University of Utah. In that interpretation, Smith supposedly discovered that self-interested individuals interacting through markets generate optimal outcomes, the infamous “invisible hand.”

Many books, including most classics on the topic suggest that interpretation. For example, yesterday WAPO had an op-ed (actually two; the other was much less problematic) by Jesse Norman, who will be publishing a book titled, you guessed, Adam Smith: Father of Economics. He correctly notes that the: "250th anniversary is not a moment for hagiography. It is an opportunity to recover a way of thinking that is directly relevant, indeed urgent, to the economic, social and political challenges we face today." He goes on to analyze essentially the question of tariffs with modern economic notions. Note that back in the 1790s, just after Smith passed, Alexander Hamilton, using Smithian ideas and method achieved very different policy conclusions.*

These readings of Smith as a father of modern economics and a champion of free market capitalism tells us far more about modern neoclassical economics than about Smith himself. The conceptual universe of modern economics is fundamentally different from that of classical political economy, the tradition to which Smith belonged.

Smith should be understood as part of a broader intellectual tradition that begins not with him but with William Petty, and continues through Cantillon, the Physiocrats, Ricardo, and ultimately Marx, what later came to be called the surplus approach. This tradition was concerned with the material conditions for the reproduction of society, the generation of surplus, and the process of accumulation.

In that framework, economics was not primarily about individual choice or utility maximization. It was about the reproduction of society. Seen in this light, Smith’s analysis was fundamentally about social conflict and the distribution of income, not about harmonious equilibrium among optimizing individuals. The core problem of political economy was explaining how societies generated and distributed the surplus that allowed accumulation and growth.

Another common myth is that Adam Smith founded economics. In reality, Smith was the great systematizer of a body of ideas of the surplus approach. Political economy emerged gradually during the Scientific Revolution and the early modern period. Petty, Cantillon, and the Physiocrats had already developed crucial insights about value, production, and economic reproduction before Smith wrote the WN. Smith’s real contribution was to organize these insights into a coherent framework and to place them at the center of his critique of the mercantilist system he saw as dominant. His book certainly helped establish political economy as a distinct intellectual discipline.

Nor was Smith the theorist of capitalism in the modern sense. The term itself was not part of his vocabulary. Smith spoke instead of commercial society, a stage in historical development characterized by the expansion of markets, manufacturing, and exchange.** He was certainly against the mercantile system, and believed that Physiocracy had incorrectly limited the creation of wealth to agriculture. But his defense of the system of natural liberty was not a defense of free markets in the modern sense.

Modern defenders of free markets often claim Smith as their intellectual ancestor. But the relationship between the liberalism of classical authors (not classical liberalism, which brings another series of confusions) and neoliberalism is far more complicated. Smith’s defense of laissez-faire was largely a reaction against the mercantilist system and the remnants of feudal regulation that constrained economic activity in the eighteenth century. The liberalism of Smith and Ricardo was historically progressive; it aimed to dismantle the privileges of the Ancien RĂ©gime and promote economic development.

Neoliberalism, by contrast, emerged in the twentieth century as a reaction against the Keynesian and welfare-state reforms of the New Deal era. Its central objective has been to limit the ability of democratic governments to regulate markets or redistribute income. In that sense, neoliberalism is better understood as a revival of what Marx called “vulgar economics”, rather than a continuation of the classical tradition.

Perhaps no concept has been more abused than Smith’s invisible hand. In modern economics it is often interpreted as a general theorem about markets producing optimal outcomes. But in Smith’s text the metaphor appears in a very specific context: merchants preferring domestic investment for reasons of security, which incidentally supports domestic employment. That is a far cry from the sweeping claim that all self-interested behavior leads to socially optimal results.***

Smith was also deeply skeptical of concentrated economic power. His famous warning that “people of the same trade seldom meet together… but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public” reflects a profound concern with monopoly and collusion. Competition, not the invisible hand, was the mechanism that restrained self-interest. He was anti-monopoly, not anti-state. In fact, he was for taxes to fund public education, a radical proposition back then (and now if you believe libertarian views that education is not a public good).

If you want to understand more about Smith ideas I recommend Tony Aspromourgos' The Science of Wealth: Adam Smith and the framing of political economy. For a book that puts in perspective how the legacy of Smith evolved in the 19th century read  After Adam Smith: A Century of Transformation in Politics and Political Economy by Murray Milgate and Shannon Stimson.

* On the distortions on Smith's views within the American context see my comments on  Glory M. Liu's book Adam Smith's America: How a Scottish Philosopher Became An Icon of American Capitalism. 

** On Smith's views on history and the four stages of development see the classic paper by Ronald Meek.

*** On that see the revised entry on the Invisible Hand by Tony Aspromourgos for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.

PS: He also did not build up on the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, who, in turn, cannot be seen as a precursor of classical political economy or of Smith. On that see this post.

 

Monday, January 19, 2026

On the Language of Economics on NPR's Marketplace

Last December, I spoke with Sean McHenry for a segment on NPR’s Marketplace about the meanings behind the words economists use. While only a short excerpt aired today, the full exchange dove into the philosophical, historical, and political layers that underlie economic language, especially through the lens of Adam Smith and the evolution of economic thought.

We began with Smith, not the pop-icon version who supposedly preached markets above all else, but the Smith who drew from Newtonian mechanics to describe economic processes. Smith’s idea that market prices gravitate toward natural prices wasn’t just a metaphor, it was grounded in his belief that economic laws were as natural and immutable as the laws of physics. This analogy wasn't poetic fluff; it was the intellectual architecture of 18th century economics.

This matters because metaphors shape how we understand the world. Terms like natural rate of unemployment or neutral interest rate don’t just describe, they legitimize. They imply inevitability, naturalness, and neutrality, even when real-world consequences (job loss, mortgage spikes) are anything but neutral.

Smith's project was a materialist science concerned with the accumulation of wealth. For him the natural functioning of the economy did not lead to optimal outcomes. Still, the intervention of the mercantilist and feudal institutions impaired the natural process of wealth accumulation. After the marginalist revolution of the late 19th century, interventions affected the natural tendencies of the market to produce optimal outcomes. That is the world in which we still live, when it comes to economists metaphors. Meaning a world in which markets do produce optimal outcomes, unless there imperfections.

We also discussed the ideological undertones of terms like churn in labor market language. While economists may use it as a tidy description of movement in and out of jobs, for someone who's lost work, the term can feel like a euphemism that sanitizes real economic pain. It's this kind of language, precise, clinical, but emotionally distant, that can obscure the lived experience behind the data. The notion is that there might be pain, but in the long run that will not be a problem (Keynes was reacting to this notion with his famous quote about all being dead in the long run).

In my history of thought course at Bucknell, I walk students through how economic terminology evolved, from classical theories of value to modern utility and preference-based models. We interrogate the shift from political economy to economics, and what gets lost when we strip politics (class conflict) from the analysis. Even terms that seem neutral, like neutral interest rate or natural rate of unemployment, are packed with assumptions about how markets work, very often skewing issues of power, and distributional conflict.

Economics has long striven to present itself as a hard science, borrowing the language and posture of physics. But unlike physics, economics deals with entrenched political structures and it is harder to separate the ideological and analytical elements in a particular theory. The profession’s reliance on technical jargon and tidy models sometimes masks the messy, contested, and deeply political nature of the economy itself.

As one of the editors of the upcoming fourth edition of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, I’m part of a team trying to decolonize the dictionary, bringing in voices from underrepresented regions, grappling with the absence of concepts like power, and reassessing the dominance of certain Western-centric assumptions. I also it requires a return to some of the forgotten ideas of the classical political economy authors that made the political or socially conflictive element of the reproduction of society central to their analytical inquires (see my Palgrave lecture here).

Language is never just descriptive. It is to some extent normative. It tells us what to value, what to question, and what to accept as given. Political economy, at its best, can be a powerful tool for understanding and improving social conditions. But that requires constant reflection, not just on models and data, but on the words economists use, the histories economists tell, and the blind spots economists perpetuate.

You can catch the edited interview on NPR’s Marketplace with Sean McHenry here.

Thursday, December 28, 2023

What's the deal with The Smiths

 

With friends like this...

This is NOT a review of the Smiths (the band), and neither of (or at least not a full one) of Glory M. Liu's (relatively) new book Adam Smith's America: How a Scottish Philosopher Became An Icon of American Capitalism. For a proper review go read Kim Phillips-Fein's one. In a sense, the book remind me of Bernard Shaw's famous saying that UK and the US were two countries divided by the same language. Here the gap is between fields, and there are two gaps, one within economics, modern mainstream economics and old classical political economy. Liu is a political scientist by training, and what she takes as economists views, including the understanding of the history of the discipline, are fundamentally from a mainstream perspective.

The phrase by Sraffa, that I have cited before fully applies here. He said:

"The classical economists said things which were perfectly true, even according to our standards of truth: they expressed them very clearly, in terse and unambiguous language, as is proved by the fact that they perfectly understood each other. We don’t understand a word of what they said: has their language been lost? Obviously not, as the English of Adam Smith is what people talk today in this country. What has happened then?" [Sraffa, Nov. 1927, D3-12-4, front page, 14]

In particular, the continuity in what has been aptly referred to as the surplus approach from William Petty to Smith, and the well documented trajectory from the ideas of Petty to Cantillon, to Quesnay, and then to Smith is lost in her relatively thin discussion of political economy aspects of Smith. The book by Tony Aspromourgos, On the Origins of Classical Economics: Distribution and value from William Petty to Adam Smith, is required reading on this subject. Smith clearly builds upon the core of the surplus approach, as developed by Petty-Cantillon-Quesnay, in particular on the question of the notion that manufacturing activities are productive. That is certainly an important aspect associated to the disputes between agrarian and industrial views of society.

But while there are differences in their views with respect to what might be termed the model of development (agrarian vs manufacturing), there is clear analytical continuity between Smith and the Physiocrats. They are all concerned with the material reproduction of society, in which the surplus (and, hence, profits and distribution) is a residual, and wages are at the level of the socially and institutionally determined (not merely physiologically) by the needs of survival of the working class. Smith saw distribution as conflictive. That's an analytical point that cannot be dismissed, and is not discussed in Liu's book at all.

This matters to some extent, because the general argument in Liu's book -- which is for the most part correct, that Smith ideas have been used by different groups to promote agendas that were not originally part of Smith's arguments, and that he was a complex author with more depth than often transpires in these several versions of reinvented Smiths (hence, the Smiths) -- misses the actual point of the original Smith. In her view, the nuance is provided by the fact that Smith was a moral philosopher and that in his other major work (and in his Lectures on Jurisprudence, based on students notes, and published posthumously), The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), a Smith different from the one of The Wealth of Nations (WN) appears. Smith cannot be seen as a defender of selfish behavior, since he is clearly critical on TMS (the so-called Das Adam Smith Problem, about which Liu makes more than one should), neither an unqualified supporter of unregulated capitalism, since he qualified it, including in the WN (for example, with his approval of the Navigation Acts; I would add of the Bank of England). That's fine, but displays a limited understanding of the relation of Smith's and the surplus approach with modern economics.

Smith is misread by modern economics NOT because he was not an unqualified defender of unmitigated, unregulated, laissez-faire capitalism (which he wasn't), but because theoretically his economic system did not imply that markets produced optimal outcomes. His defense of laissez-faire and of commercial societies was not based on the allocative efficiency of markets (neither then intervention could be supported as a way to preclude inefficiencies), but simply as needed break with the remnants of feudal institutions that hampered the process of accumulation. As Marx noted in his The Poverty of Philosophy (Works, vol. 6: 176): "The Classics, like Adam Smith and Ricardo, represent a bourgeoisie which, while still struggling with the relics of feudal society, works only to purge economic relations of feudal taints, to increase the productive forces and to give a new upsurge to industry and commerce."

Of course, to sort this out one has to get into the theory of value.* The labor theory of value (LTV) (in an early and rude state of society) meant that the long term (natural) prices were determined by the relative amounts of labor, and supply and demand only determined short term market prices. This theory implied that profits were determined as a residual, for a given level of output and with real wages given, for historical and institutional circumstances, at the level of subsistence. The implication is that the theory did not imply the full utilization of labor, and that distribution is conflictive. So Smith's policy defense of laissez-faire was not based, like modern neoclassical versions (in particular the Chicago School that Liu's discusses in more detail, including Stigler, pictured above), on markets producing the optimal allocation of resources, including the full utilization of labor.

It is clear that Smith is not a forerunner of Marx, something that the latter understood. Marx shared an analytical framework with the classical authors, but rejected their a-historical categories. He argued that:

"Economists like Adam Smith and Ricardo, who are the historians of this epoch, have no other mission than that of showing how wealth is acquired in bourgeois production relations, of formulating these relations into categories, into laws, and of showing how superior these laws, these categories, are for the production of wealth to the laws and categories of feudal society." (Ibid.).

But it is also clear that the theoretical foundations of his policy views was very different than those that were built from the developments of the Marginalist Revolution, and closer, in fact, to Marx's own analytical framework. On that Milgate and Stimson (2009), in their very useful After Adam Smith, are also clear. They say:

"Indeed, if the contemporary economic case for liberty is ultimately made in terms of the language of the market, which if left unimpeded by the state is capable of solving a static problem of allocating a fixed supply of resources, then we have moved well beyond these eighteenth-century thinkers such as Smith. In this sense it might be reasonable to ask whether what we understand today as free market theory—against which a modern form of nationalist- led trade policies might be said to operate—is different in important ways from the eighteenth-century political economy from which it is said to have originated. It might also be well to ask just how that transformation of the conceptual framework of political economy and its relationship to politics that came about after Smith took shape" (2009: 32).

Without an understanding of the changes in political economics (and its transition to economics) after Adam Smith, one is left with the puzzle noted by Sraffa almost a century ago.

* On the reasons for the need for a theory of value go here. For more on the limits and problems of the LTV see this and this.

PS: I should note that Liu tells the story of Stigler's T-Shirt that read Adam Smith Best Friend (Nathan Rosenberg's paper on that here). Back when, my PhD students in Utah, did a T-Shirt on my suggestion that there should be an alternative to Stigler's one. The Heterodox Students Association (HESA) T-Shirt read: I read Adam Smith and Understood it. Enough said. Old post on that. A recurring theme around here.

Friday, February 11, 2022

Classical Political Economy or the Surplus Approach

Here our other conversation with LP Rochon, about the chapter on Classical or Surplus approach authors. My co-author, Suranjana Nabar-Bhaduri and I talk about the Real Bills Doctrine, Bullionism, Say's Law the implications for theories of crisis. And about several authors, Smith, Ricardo, Tooke and more.

Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Economics without Gaps: on Ibn Khaldun and non-Western traditions in the history of ideas

Ibn Khaldun, Arab scholar

A piece* from a few years ago, has again become somewhat popular and it has been making the rounds. It suggests that the Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun developed the ideas of classical political economics in the late XIV century, about half a millennia before Adam Smith, often seen as the father of classical economics, and of modern economics. Some would suggest that Khaldun was the real father of economics (or stepfather in the first essay on top). To a great extent, the discussion of the role of non-western scholars tries to show that an Eurocentric bias has dominated the history of economic thought. This discussion goes hand in hand with the notion that the Rise of the West and the so-called Great Divergence are relatively recent phenomena.

There are many elements in that assessment that are correct. Schumpeter's massive History of Economic Analysis does mention Khaldun in passing on his discussion of historical sociology, but he also argues that between the ideas of classical antiquity and scholastic thinking there was a great gap.** In his words: "So far as our subject is concerned we may safely leap over 500 years to the epoch of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), whose Summa Theologica is in the history of thought what the south-western spire of the Cathedral of Chartres is in the history of architecture." There is little recognition of the role of Arab scholars in maintaining and expanding the knowledge of classical antiquity in almost all fields. And in the field that eventually would be associated with political economy, Khaldun's Muqaddimah, or Introduction (or Prolegomena), does indeed provide significant progress over the work of classical antiquity.

His work essentially deals with the cyclical rise and fall of caliphates, and analyzes the material conditions for these historical circumstances. Robert Irwin in his intellectual biography of Khaldun, reminds us that: “Arnold Toynbee, who produced a twelve-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations, described Ibn Khaldun’s theoretical treatise on history, the Muqaddima, as 'undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever been created by any mind in any time or place'.”

However, while all of that is correct, and should lead to a more encompassing understanding of the role of non-western economic thinking, it is also important to bear in mind what was the contribution of Ibn Khaldun, how it fits in the history of ideas, and also in what sense classical political economy authors have an original theoretical framework. That tradition, it is worth noticing starts really with Sir William Petty, not Smith, as noted by whom I would suggest is the first serious historian of economic ideas, Karl Marx, in his Theories of Surplus Value. Furthermore, it is important to be careful and avoid the normal confusion of seeing Adam Smith as the father of modern, meaning marginalist (or neoclassical), economics. As a general principle, I would also be critical of the notion that the history of economic ideas is the repository of old versions of modern economic theory, that have to be deciphered and understood in modern guise. It was exactly this kind of thinking that led many marginalists, like Alfred Marshall, to suggest that they were expanding on the ideas of classical authors like David Ricardo, when in fact they were subverting them.***

I would suggest that there are two important differences between Ibn Khaldun and the Anglo-French tradition of the surplus approach, associated with the Petty-Cantillon-Quesnay-Smith-Ricardo (and I would add Marx; on the first three that form the basis for the work of the surplus approach see this chapter by Tony Aspromourgos) line of evolution. First, while Khaldun is interested in the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations, associated to the sedentary, urban, mercantile caliphates bordered by nomadic, desert populations, Smith developed at the same time and independently from Turgot (on that see Ronald Meek), a linear four stage theory of economic development, from hunting (and gathering), to pastoral, then agricultural, and finally commercial societies, which is the term he used for societies like the England of the time, were manufacturing activities and financial relations were significantly developed. These ideas would lead to Marx's materialist conception of history based on the notion of modes of production, evolving from ancient slavery and feudalism to capitalism.

It seems that while a perception that, what we now call, the social sciences are historical in nature was clearly in Khaldun's writings, the conception of history, and the scope of the analysis was different than the one in Smith. The reason is not only related to the fact that Khaldun was writing in the Middle Ages, before the rise of capitalism, but also, and more importantly it seems, Khaldun was looking at the specific circumstances of Arab societies, even if there were universal lessons in his analysis. The evolution from hunter-gathering to agriculture and to manufacturing are more universal. Further, Marx's conception of modes of production emphasizes the method and the social relations of production by which surplus is extracted from workers. Command and coercion in the context of slave and feudal societies, and market relations in the case of capitalism.

The second difference is related to the notion of surplus, and the source of value. It is true that there was a notion of a surplus beyond what is needed for survival in Khaldun's work, and that it allowed in his view for crafts and division of labor, or specialization, as would be discussed by classical authors much later. And there was also a clear sense that labor was the source of value, and that a producer must cover the costs of production. Some have argued that one can see the labor theory of value (LTV) in Khaldun's writings. However, it is clear that the conception of profits and of prices in Khaldun was not in conformity with the LTV.

He argues in chapter 5 of the Muqaddimah that: "Commerce is a natural way of making profits. However, most of its practices and methods are tricky and designed to obtain the (profit) margin between purchase prices and sales prices. This surplus makes it possible to earn a profit." In other words, the surplus results from selling at a higher price than purchased in the process of exchange. Profits were not a residual obtained in the process of production for Khaldun, after the conditions for reproduction of society, in particular the subsistence of the labor force, was obtained. This is, of course, the whole point of classical political economy. The understanding of the objective, material conditions for the reproduction of society. Profits were obtained in the process of production, and that would allow to understand accumulation, since the surplus was the basis for economic growth. Accumulation and not the cyclical fluctuations of civilizations were at the center of classical political economy analysis, reflecting, perhaps, the dynamic nature of capitalist societies.

These differences suggest that Khaldun was, most likely, an important source for scholastic, and mercantilist/cameralist authors to which classical authors were to some extent responding in their own writings. Mercantilists authors also thought in terms of profits in the process of exchange, which was to some extent to be expected in pre-capitalist societies with a large mercantile sector. These were essentially agrarian societies, and the transformation of the structure of production was not yet significant.  Recognizing the role of Arab scholars in preserving the texts and the knowledge of ancient scholars, and their ability to move beyond the ancients is crucial for the proper understanding of the evolution of economic ideas. But it is important understand their actual contributions to avoid more confusion in the history of ideas.

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* In this piece it is suggested that the history of thought textbooks by Screpanti and Zamagni and by Roncaglia are mainstream texts, and put in the same category with Blaug's book. That is of course a misconception. The former differentiate between classical and marginalist traditions, and do not argue for the continuity, as Blaug does, and can be seen as clearly heterodox in nature.

** Spengler (1964) is the classic study on Khaldun by western historians of economic thought. Although his essay is careful about Khaldun's contribution it might give to much credence to the notion that the "economic literature of Islam can be traced to the Economics of Bryson", for the ancient Greek philosopher. 

** It is worth noticing that the piece cited at the beginning suggests that Khaldun is a precursor of Smith, presumably because of the division of labor, but without a distinction of productive and unproductive activities, but also of Alfred Marshall. We are told that Khaldun "analyzed markets which arise based on the division of labor and examined market forces in a simple didactic way which is very similar to the attitude of Alfred Marshall. The invention of supply and demand analysis wasn’t invented in the 19th century: the islamic scholar also described the relationship of demand and supply." Supply and demand forces were well-known before Khaldun. Marginalism suggested that long-term prices, what Smith called natural prices, were determined by those forces.

Saturday, December 12, 2020

Poor Richard Goes to London: The Economic Ideas of Benjamin Franklin


Another episode of my podcast on The Worldly Philosophers Go to Washington: From Alexander Hamilton to Janet Yellen. The ideas of early classical political economists and their influence in America are analyzed in this episode. The role of Sir William Petty’s ideas in the development of Benjamin Franklin’s early policy proposals is discussed. It is noted how Franklin had a firm grasp of the main economic theories of his time, even before some of these ideas were fully developed in Europe, by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith. In fact, some of Franklin’s original ideas influenced European political economists. The notion that the influence of economics is a recent phenomenon cannot be supported by the evidence.

Tuesday, April 28, 2020

Das Adam Smith problem

A short lecture on Adam Smith's problem for a Principles class. This might be of more general interest, and perhaps something to watch during the quarantine. The book I used for the lectures on history of economic ideas was Heinz Kurz's Economic Thought: A Brief History, a book that I highly recommend. The discussion here is heavily influenced by Tony Aspromourgos' book The science of wealth: Adam Smith and the framing of political economy, another one you should read if you have the opportunity.

Saturday, August 19, 2017

A theory of economic policy and the role of institutions

Nicola Acocella published a paper in the Journal of Economic Surveys (a free, preliminary version is available here) on the development of the theory of economic policy. Acocella is clearly fully aware of the differences between classical political economics and marginalism (neoclassical economics).* And he dismisses the pre-margnialist views on economic policy as being unsystematic and devoid of general principles.
In his words:
Most classical writers and the marginalists had suggested cases where public intervention was in order. This had been so for Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817), Mill (1848), Marshall (1890), Walras (1874-1877, 1898). But these cases were mainly what Walras called ‘examples of empirical policy’ rather than consistent policy. They were certainly dictated on the basis of an analytical evaluation of the circumstances suggesting them, but were not part of a systematic and consistent assessment of the foundations and the articulation of public policy.
In his view, economic policy as an autonomous discipline, meaning one based on theoretical principles, only started with Sidgwick,  Marshall and Pigou, that is, with Welfare Economics or Social Choice Theory, which apparently now is referred to as Implementation Theory (I didn't know that, I might confess). So it is in the debate of the 1930s, with Robbins and his followers and critics, and more fundamentally with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem that he sees the development of the main themes of a theory of economic policy.

He also suggests that before the development of a the theory of economic policy proper "the ‘night-watchman’ position became an exception as most classical and marginalist economists tended to state a number of specific or general cases where government intervention was in order." I'm not fully convinced about that. Sure there were some views about government intervention, but for the most part the Victorian consensus, among economists (not necessarily in practice, meaning actual economic policy) was for free trade, adherence to the rules of the Gold Standard, and sound finance. The idea of the minimal state was probably dominant, and the exceptions, particularly among marginalists that dominated in the UK at least, were associated to market failures.

The two major obstacles to this dominant view that government action was possible, in Acoccela's view were due to Arrow and Lucas. In his words, these 'vital failures' were: "the impossibility of taking people’s preferences as a reference for public action, underlined by Arrow (1951) and ‘radical’ objections to effectiveness of public action of the kind raised by Lucas (1976)." I should note that it seems that, in his view, the major critiques have been successfully dealt with, by Sen and his followers in one field and New Keynesians in the other, and the current consensus would be that government action is possible and desirable.

In this view, then, the history of the development of of the field is one in which the profession goes from being in favor of government action up to the development of the theory (essentially the from the beginning of marginalism to the 40s), broadly speaking, to being critical from the 50s to the 80s, with a slow return to a more interventionist consensus ever since. And maybe this describes well the field of Implementation Theory. But it strikes me as being at odds with conventional views of what the profession thinks about the role of government over time.

I mean, normally you would think of the profession as being essentially for laissez-faire, the reason why sometimes there is a conflation of classical and marginalist authors, and then after the Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution (even if not complete, and dominated by an imperfectionist view) there would be an interventionist turn, which starts to be contested in the 1970s, with the Conservative Revolution and the Great Inflation. The apotheosis of the return of the market would come with the fall of the Soviet Union, shock therapy and the so-called Washington Consensus. The question would be to what extent this neoliberal dominance has been undermined by the last Global Financial Crisis (I would say less than what people think).

I also think that the dismissal of the classical political economy approach to economic policy, which was based on historical understanding of the specific conditions of a particular situation, is a mistake, and that there is a lot be learned from that tradition. Note that for classical political economy authors history and institutions, and, hence, policy analysis, were at a different level of abstraction, and had a different relation with the core of the theory (value and distribution). At any rate, this is an interesting paper worth reading.

* For example, he is careful to note that the meaning of the invisible hand in Adam Smith is often out of context. However, he argues that: "we use the term ‘invisible hand’ as a metaphor of the Smithian position as well as of later theories, in particular neo-classical thinking, which has then prevailed, even if the latter are deprived of some social aspects of the working of the market that certainly were in Adam Smith." This reading of Smith leaves room for intervention in the case of imperfections, and seems to follow the ideas of Acoccela's mentor, the famous Italian economist Federico Caffè.

Wednesday, January 25, 2017

Adam Smith on the origins of first generation public banks


I discussed in a previous post the reasons why the Bank of England is considered a central bank, but not its precursors. I did not pay enough attention in that post to the reasons for which the early public banks were created. Adam Smith discussed that in his magnum opus. From the Wealth of Nations:
“The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the state by a reformation of its coin can effectually re-establish its currency. But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not always be able to reform its currency… In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted, that foreign bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid not in common currency, but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain bank, established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state; this bank being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly according to the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally established with this view, though some of them may have afterwards been made subservient to other purposes.” (WN, Book IV, chapter III)
The creation of a stable unit of account, which was essential for international trade, seems to be central for their creation. Proof of the importance of foreign exchange for this small, trade oriented, states is that this banks had a monopoly on foreign exchange clearing. In a sense, to guarantee the unit of account, and, as a result trade, was essential for government revenue which was to a great extent tied to the fortunes of foreign trade. In some sense, this preoccupation with a stable of unit of account is not unrelated to the function as a fiscal agent of the state.

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Wealth of Nations at 240


Last month Keynes' General Theory was 80. Today Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations turns 240 (h/t Paulo Gala)! Below the often misunderstood quote on the notorious invisible hand. He says:
"As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it." [9th paragraph, in chapter 2 of book IV; full chapter here]
Note that the quote is related to international trade, and the fact that those that buy domestic rather than foreign products help the local economy, even if that is not their direct intent.

Monday, April 27, 2015

On free trade and economics consensus: a response to Mankiw

Mankiw tells us in his most recent NYTimes column that economists agree that Free Trade is good. He links to a poll in which, essentially, mainstream economists of different persuasions, some Keynesian and some not, and different political views, some liberal and some conservative, say that trade agreements are good. He backs his argument by suggesting that theoretically the argument is at the heart of the economics profession since the beginning; I guess an argument of authority.

And no better authority than Adam Smith. Mankiw says:
"The economic argument for free trade dates back to Adam Smith, the 18th-century author of 'The Wealth of Nations' and the grandfather of modern economics. Smith recognized that the case for trading with other nations was no different from the case for trading with other individuals within a society."
And it is true, Adam Smith was for laissez-faire, in general, and thought that less intervention in trade would be good. But there is in Mankiw's argument an implication that does not follow from careful analysis of Smith's doctrines, namely: that Adam Smith can be seen as a forerunner of modern neoclassical trade theory based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) comparative advantage argument (for the limitations of that theory go here).

Comparative advantage implies that countries should specialize on the production of commodities for which they have a lower opportunity cost. Specialization would increase productivity domestically, and importation of goods for which other countries have a lower opportunity cost would lead to mutual advantageous trade to all parties involved. This was actually first noted by Ricardo and Torrens more than 40 years after the publication of the Wealth of Nations. Smith believed that absolute advantage, meaning lower costs of production, not comparative advantage determined trade patterns.

Smith thought that free trade was a better policy than protectionism, since he believed that trade would expand the potential markets for home producers, which would lead to more division of labor, that is, higher productivity, leading to lower costs, more access to external markets and additional growth. A cumulative process of export growth and higher labor productivity, referred to as the vent-for-surplus model, was behind Smith trade optimism. It is important to note, however, that Smith's vent-for-surplus works in both directions. Higher costs (e.g. higher real wages) may lead to loss of external markets, no incentives for additional division of labor, and stagnation of domestic industry. In his model, success breeds success, but failure breeds failure.

There were very good reasons for Smith to think that free trade would be good for England in the late 18th century, and there even might be good reasons in the United States now, or at least for American corporations that would gain access to markets abroad. But the argument is far from universal, and the dressing of Smith's theory in modern garb is dangerous (for a classic explanation of Smith views on trade go here; subscription required; or here; also needs subscription).

The idea of absolute advantage, used by Smith, suggests that there is space for managing trade. I noted before that the opposite of Free Trade is not Protectionism, but Managed Trade. Nobody really wants to be in a completely closed economy, probably not even North Koreans. And once you admit a certain amount of management, say for sanitary rules to avoid importing poisoned toys, for example, or for security reasons to preclude defense secrets to leak out, you are discussing what are the good reasons for managing trade. Perhaps employment should be one of the reasons for managing trade. Free trade versus protectionism is a false dichotomy. The question is: how much management and for the benefit of whom (and who bears the costs of more or less trade as a result).

Note that comparative advantage theorems assume that employment is fixed, in the Ricardian system perhaps below full employment, and in the modern neoclassical HOS theory at full employment. Not surprisingly, on employment Mankiw tells us:
"Economists respond that full employment is possible with any pattern of trade. The main issue is not the number of jobs, but which jobs. Americans should work in those industries in which we have an advantage compared with other nations, and we should import from abroad those goods that can be produced more cheaply there."
That full employment is possible with any pattern of trade is theoretically true. But from that does not follow that comparative advantage should guide trade. That is a theoretical non-sequitur and is simply wrong. The US could pursue using macroeconomic policies (not the lower taxes for the rich that Mankiw advocates, but that is another story) full employment.* That would lead to high current account deficits, which for the US, because of the privileged position of the dollar, are sustainable. But that is not true for most countries.

In that case, if free trade is pursued, absolute advantage might determine trade specialization, and lead to large current account deficits that would be unsustainable and lead to a balance of payments crisis, the need for austerity, with lower growth and unemployment following. Even in the US, patterns of trade integration might lead to the elimination of good manufacturing jobs being substituted by low paying service jobs, something that has led to trade unions' reasonable rejection of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In other words, "which jobs" one can get if one "import[s] from abroad those goods that can be produced more cheaply there [sic; that's actually absolute not comparative advantage]" might end up leading to lower wages at home.

For that reason it is hard to agree with Mankiw when he says that:
"People tend to underestimate the benefit from conserving on labor and thus worry that imports will destroy jobs in import-competing industries. Yet long-run economic progress comes from finding ways to reduce labor input and redeploying workers to new, growing industries."
And there is evidence for that. The most famous FTA signed by the US with Mexico, has not favored workers in Mexico or the US, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), even if corporations and wealthy individuals have benefited in both countries as shown in these reviews of the evidence by Robert Blecker and Mark Weisbrot and co-authors. So if mainstream economists agree on this, once again it is because they ignore logic (that does no require for trade to be determined by comparative advantage) or evidence (which suggests that FTAs might hurt workers).

* And also there is not tendency to a natural rate of unemployment, which Mankiw, of course, also defends.

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

Stop bashing GDP!


So everybody hates the Gross Domestic Product! The New York Times and the Financial Times have recently published articles criticizing the main measure of production in the economy. This is certainly not new, and criticism of the value of GDP for certain purposes, as a measure of well-being, for example, have led in the past to the creation of other variables like the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, which includes GDP per capita (actually Gross National Income per capita), life expectancy at birth and average years of schooling for adults.

In fact, the NYTimes article basis for the supposedly dramatic "Rise and Fall of the GDP" is it's inability to measure well-being, and in it the author emphasizes its disadvantages when compared to the HDI. The NYTimes piece quotes Sen, the godfather of HDI, complaining about the "silliness about identifying growth with development." Of course, since GDP is only about the material growth of the economy, it would be an incomplete measure of development.

The most common type of critique is that GDP does not count many things, like environmental degradation, or happiness (yep, I know; check Putnam's ideas in the NYTimes piece; talk about silliness), or almost all non-market transactions for that matter, or is slow to adjust to new products and services introduced in the market, and that it's not particularly good for understanding inequality (Robert Reich's complaint in FT's piece; check the full list of complaints in both articles linked above). The best defense is provided by William Nordhaus, who argues compellingly that: “if you want to know why GDP matters, you can just put yourself back in the 1930 period, where we had no idea what was happening to our economy.”

First, GDP is not a measure of everything, and it certainly has limitations. But it does measure relatively well the material production in a given year, and provides the basis for understanding the process of accumulation, which is central for understanding the dynamics of capitalism. And actually, if you look at functional distribution of income in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which are used to calculate GDP, you do have one of the best measures of income inequality! Yes growth of the flow of goods and services produced in a country in a year is not tantamount to development, but without growth developing countries cannot achieve the levels of well-being of advanced economies, so growth is kind of a pre-requiste (and yes, growth involves environmental degradation, and we should try to minimize it). Further, with GDP one can obtain a fairly good measure of productivity (labor productivity), which is the basis for the Wealth of Nations, if you believe that dude Adam Smith.

My beef with the profession is not the use of GDP growth as a measure of material progress, but the fact that a limited, supply-constrained, individual maximizing utility, market-friendly, neoclassical version of the process of growth and development is the dominant one. But GDP is fine. Like price indexes, which also are limited and sometimes inaccurate, is an essential tool for understanding the real world.

Friday, January 24, 2014

Geoff Schneider on Adam Smith and Karl Marx

Available here the Power Point presentation for Geoff's Principles class on Smith and Marx. For more you can read chapters 2 and 3 in his textbook Introduction to Political Economy (here if you want to buy it).

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

George Stigler and the labor theory of value

George Stigler, author of the famous The Theory of Price, winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize (aka the Nobel) and Friedman's best friend at Chicago, suggested  long ago that: "the professional study of economics makes one politically conservative." His reasons for that particular view are extensive, but one factor was associated with the decline of the dominance of the labor theory of value and the rise of the supply and demand (marginalist) approach, that he embraced. In his words:
"It could be argued that there is one powerful factor making for conservatism: the inability of a very radical young economist to get a desirable university post. It is indeed true that a believer in the labor theory of value could not get a professorship at a major American university, although the reason would be that the professors could not bring themselves to believe that he was both honest and intelligent, and I hope they are not improper in their demand that a professor be at least tolerably honest and presumptively intelligent."
Funny thing is that the following year a little monograph was published that demonstrated that the basic propositions of the labor theory of value could be retained. By using the device of the standard commodity, Sraffa reveals that the profit rate can be determined as a physical ratio independently from relative prices, and that the rate of profit is determined by the objective conditions of production and the need of reproducing the system (for more on the standard commodity go here).

Also, the capital debates led to the conclusion (admitted by Samuelson) that the neoclassical (marginalist) theory was unable to show that relative scarcity determined relative prices and income distribution. In other words, while it is possible to hold a version of the labor theory of value, at least the Smithian labor commanded (in terms of the standard commodity, as suggested by Sraffa), it is not possible to say that supply and demand explain value and distribution.

So Stigler got it all backwards. We are left with the alternative that radical young economists have a hard time finding desirable university posts for purely ideological reasons. Actually lack of honesty and/or intelligence might be an asset rather than a handicap in the economic profession.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

Ben Franklin, Consumption and the Industrial Revolution

The idea that demand expansion was central for the Industrial Revolution, in Keynesian fashion, was at some point dominant among economic historians. It was, for example, explicit in both Phyllis Deane and David Landes famous books about it, both published in 1969 (The First Industrial Revolution and The Unbound Prometheus, respectively).

It is also well-known that Adam Smith recognized that productivity growth (the division of labor) was limited by the extent of the market (demand), so that growth and the wealth of nations, which depended on productivity growth, and not on the accumulation of foreign reserves (gold) or trade surpluses as defended by Mercantilists, was in a sense demand-led.

Ben Franklin is not often cited in relation to his economic writings, but he was knowledgeable in the main developments of his time.  He was both a defender of the labor theory of value, and of paper currency in his famous A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency, and the consensus is that his ideas came essentially from William Petty, the father of the surplus approach according to Marx.

As it turns out Franklin had also something to say about the role of demand in the process of industrialization in Britain. He said in Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc. (here) that:
"But in Proportion to the Increase of the Colonies, a vast Demand is growing for British Manufactures, a glorious Market wholly in the Power of Britain, in which Foreigners cannot interfere, which will increase in a short Time even beyond her Power of supplying, tho' her whole Trade should be to her Colonies."
In other words, he suggests that the role of higher demand by the colonies was essential in the process of industrialization. I should note that there is no consensus among those that defend the demand side story of the industrial revolution between domestic demand or foreign demand, but increasingly the literature associated to the changes in the patterns of consumption in Britain suggests that it was domestic markets (e.g. Maxine Berg and her discussion of the consumer revolution).

Monday, July 22, 2013

Hamilton's Reports and the American Economic System


Alexander Hamilton's reports to Congress go against the grain of much of the core principles of mainstream economics. Hamilton had read the main economic authors of his time, including David Hume and Adam Smith, both of which had a much more critical view of public debt than Hamilton did. He was also influenced by policy makers like Jacques Necker (see here; subscription required), a Genevan banker and finance minister of France just before the Revolution, and Robert Morris, who is often referred as the Financier of the Revolution (see Ron Chernow's biography of Hamilton).

The Hamiltonian plan, which was to a great extent based on the British economic model, was based on the need to consolidate all debts incurred by the states under the Federal government, and to provide the latter with revenues from foreign trade, implying tariffs, and excise taxes (e.g on whisky) to allow to pay the interest on the new national debt. Hamilton argued famously in his Report on Public Credit that a well-funded national debt would be under certain circumstances a blessing, and writing about Jeffersonians* -- which would surprisingly look not very different than some members of the current GOP -- said that: "a certain description of men are for getting out of debt, yet are against all taxes for raising money to pay it off."

Further, he was for a national bank, being instrumental in the founding of the First Bank of the United States, modeled on the Bank of England. Not only the bank would promote the expansion of credit, but also it would provide funding for the government. Further, he was very clear that tariffs on foreign trade were needed not just to raise revenue, but also for the protection of domestic industry. In his famous Report on Manufactures, which advanced ideas on infant industry later developed by Frederich List (for other more recent critics of free trade go here and here), he said:
"The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formidable obstacle, than either of those, which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same branch into a country, in which it did not before exist. To maintain between the recent establishments of one country and the long matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to forbid a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and protection of government."
All the elements of his economic plan, discussed in his five reports to Congress (available here), were central in what eventually became known as the American System, usually associated to Henry Clay.

* Jefferson abhorred public debt, but was very fond of private debt, being constantly indebted. In 1815 he sold his library, in part to pay his debts, which formed the basis of the Library of Congress.