Sunday, August 16, 2026
Sunstein on Hayek's Conservatism and Liberalism
Thursday, June 4, 2026
On Mirowski and neoliberalism
New post on Substack that argues that Mirowski is right that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to textbook neoclassical economics, since it is a broader political and institutional project (see the old debate here). But I defend that, on a theoretical, the reverse point is correct. Neoliberalism also cannot be separated from marginalist economics, that is in a sense broader than neoliberalism. All neoliberals must be in some sense neoclassical, I argue.
The more detailed reasons are in the Substack post. The gist is that the public policy rhetoric of neoliberalism invokes Adam Smith's laissez-faire and classical liberalism, but its analytical core comes from neoclassical ideas about the theory of value and the notion of markets as superior coordinating mechanisms. The key distinction is therefore that classical liberalism provides neoliberalism with political legitimacy, while neoclassical economics provides its theoretical foundation. Mirowski helps clarify neoliberalism as a movement, but the post argues that his account underplays the common marginalist ground uniting its different strands.
Wednesday, May 6, 2026
What made Keynes, Keynes
A few years back, a paper of mine was rejected in a prestigious heterodox journal, because it failed to grasp the importance of Keynes' sexual diaries. In fact, I had not read them (guilty as charged). My research was outdated, I was told by an angry referee (number 1, as it turns out). Not long after, I was asked to referee, for the same journal, I might add, a paper on Keynes' sexuality and its possible implications for his economic thought. The paper dealt with Keynes' sex diaries from the early twentieth century and suggested that Keynes' sexuality, together with his broader philosophical views, may help explain some of his later economic ideas. The question is interesting, not least because it has often been raised in different contexts and with very different political implications.
A decade ago or so, Niall Ferguson suggested that Keynesian profligacy was connected to Keynes' homosexuality and his alleged lack of concern for future generations. The notion that Keynes' theory was a short run one because he was childless has a long pedigree, associated to other conservative luminaries like Joseph Schumpeter. Same arguments were made by Murray Rothbard, as noted in the paper linked above. Ultimately, the argument is analytically weak, since it tries to move directly from biography to policy conclusions without establishing the relevant links.
The paper I read was sympathetic to Keynes and tried to connect his sexuality to his sensibilities about the economy as a whole, his views about “the good,” his relation to G.E. Moore’s philosophy, and eventually his views on uncertainty, money, and economic life.
Still, the broader problem remains. It is one thing to say that personal experiences, including sexuality, help shape the sensibilities of an author. That is almost certainly true, and in some sense trivial. It is another thing to claim that sexuality explains a particular set of analytical propositions. That is a much more ambitious claim, and it is far harder to sustain. In the case of Keynes, the relevance of the sex diaries for understanding the central analytical ideas of The General Theory (GT) is far from obvious.
There is no doubt that Keynes' philosophical views mattered. His early engagement with Moore, the Bloomsbury milieu, and his rejection of certain Victorian conventions all shaped his conception of life, morality, beauty, friendship, and the good society or the good life. These things may also have influenced his impatience with narrow utilitarianism and with purely mechanical views of economic behavior. But the difficult question is how one moves from those philosophical and personal sensibilities to the concrete analytical propositions that define Keynes' contribution to economics.
The question of exactly what was Keynes' main contribution to economic thought is often vaguely answered, and even within Post Keynesian groups there is considerable disagreement. If the answer is simply uncertainty, as for many in the heterodox camp, then the argument is incomplete. Keynes certainly gave increasing importance to uncertainty, especially in his 1937 response to critics of GT. Chapter 12, with its discussion of long-term expectations, conventions, and the famous beauty contest metaphor, is central to that interpretation. But Keynes’s contribution cannot be reduced to uncertainty.
Moreover, uncertainty alone does not make Keynes distinctive. Frank Knight and Friedrich Hayek also thought uncertainty was central to economic life, yet they reached very different conclusions from Keynes. G.L.S. Shackle, a student of Hayek and an important figure in some Post Keynesian interpretations of Keynes, combined elements of both Keynesian and Hayekian views. This suggests that the recognition of fundamental uncertainty can be grounded in very different theoretical frameworks and can lead to very different policy conclusions. The harder question, then, is not whether Keynes cared about uncertainty, but why uncertainty had the role it did in his broader theory of capitalism.
In my view, the central proposition of the GT is not simply uncertainty in a monetary economy, but the principle of effective demand. Keynes' main analytical break was with Say’s Law and with the idea that investment would automatically adjust to full-employment savings, even if slowly. The point of the GT, as Keynes himself made clear, was first of all a theory of employment. Autonomous spending determines income. Investment does not adjust automatically to full-employment saving. The level of activity can settle below full employment, not as a temporary deviation caused by rigidities, but as a normal outcome of a monetary production economy.
Uncertainty matters in that argument, but it is not central to the argument. It is the uncertainty about autonomous demand that matters. In fact, Keynes’s emphasis on uncertainty only became more explicit as he responded to critics and tried to explain why investment could not be treated as a simple function that smoothly adjusted to the full-employment level of saving, in part as a result of his acceptance of significant elements of marginalist economics. If uncertainty is presented as the core explanation, there is a danger of turning Keynes into an imperfectionist that believed that markets would work well enough if only expectations were less volatile and in the presence of full information. That was not Keynes’s deeper point.
His more radical proposition was that capitalism could be economically stable at less than full employment. It was precisely that economic stability below full employment that made the system politically unstable.
There is also a comparative problem. Michal Kalecki developed a version of the principle of effective demand independently, and arguably before Keynes. Kalecki's intellectual background was very different, shaped by Marx and Marxist authors rather than by Moore and Bloomsbury. This raises the question of how Kalecki's sexuality shaped his theory of effective demand. In that light, the question seems less compelling. That does not mean that biography is irrelevant. But it does suggest that the route from personal life to analytical theory is indirect, mediated by intellectual traditions, political commitments, historical circumstances, and theoretical problems internal to economics.
There is also the issue of Keynes' own intellectual development. Keynes' philosophical views were formed relatively early, if we are to believe Robert Skidelsky, and many other authors on the matter. But his economic views changed considerably over time. The Keynes of the Tract on Monetary Reform, the Treatise on Money, the Macmillan Committee, and The General Theory are not the same. If his basic philosophical and personal sensibilities were already present early on, the questions is why did the principle of effective demand emerge only later, after the debates with the Cambridge Circus in the early 1930s. These questions cannot be answered simply by appealing to sexuality or early philosophical commitments.
A more plausible position would be that Keynes' sexuality and personal life formed part of a broader rejection of Victorian moral and social conventions. That rejection may have made him more open to questioning established economic doctrines, including the neoclassical faith in adjustment mechanisms, thrift, and the moral virtues of saving. It may also have contributed to his skepticism toward purely ascetic or efficiency-centered views of social life. Keynes did not think economics was an end in itself. He thought economic arrangements should be judged in relation to broader human purposes. In that limited sense, his philosophical and personal world mattered.
But the analytical core of Keynes' economics still has to be explained analytically. His theory of effective demand emerged from concrete debates about saving, investment, money, employment, and the failures of orthodox theory in the context of the Great Depression. His sexuality may help us understand Keynes as a person, and perhaps some of his broader sensibilities. It does not, by itself, explain the logic of the GT.
It is also a peculiar feature of the literature on Keynes' broader philosophical views to portray his motivations in a somewhat simplistic way as being apolitical. He had concerns with the good life, but not the public good. To accept the notion that Keynes was apolitical flies in the face of his extensive participation in the political process, not just as a bureaucrat, but more importantly as a direct participant in political campaigns, involved in the drafting of government program for Lloyd George in the 1929 election, for example.
Ultimately, the more interesting question is not whether sexuality caused Keynesian economics. It did not. The question is whether Keynes' position as an outsider to certain social conventions helped him imagine capitalism differently from the orthodox economists of his time. That seems plausible. Perhaps a good social scientist, a good economist, has to be more than "mathematician, historian, statesman, [and a] philosopher – in some degree," as Keynes suggested. They need to be a bit of an outsider, to see things from an alternative perspective.
Even then, what made Keynes, Keynes was not simply his personal life. It was his ability to transform a set of philosophical, political, and historical concerns into a powerful analytical critique of the self-adjusting market economy.
Monday, August 18, 2025
Marginalist Bastards move center stage
I just finished Quinn Slobodian's new book, Hayek's Bastards. In parallel, I read another interesting book called The Marginal Revolutionaries by Janek Wasserman (Slobodian writes one of the blurb endorsements; Tyler Cowen says it is “the best overall history of the Austrian school”).
They cover slightly different things, but interrelated. Slobodian is looking at the alt-right, the paleo-libertarians, mostly in the United States (some discussion of the Alternative for Germany, AfD, and of Milei, towards the end), and the book is deeply steeped in the theories of Austrian and neo-Austrian authors, in particular since they did have a central role in the rise of both neoliberalism, and the more radical versions of market fundamentalism. The book by Wasserman looks at the history of the Austrian school, its eventual disappearance in its home country, and its development in the United States. Slobodian’s book is relevant in order to try to understand how the alt-right, or the radical right, in the United States, and to a lesser extent globally, has developed.
But at the same time, they have significant problems. I would say both books—particularly Wasserman's book—are more about what one may call gossip. In other words, they are about the relationships between the Austrians themselves, between them and the foundations that finance them, as well as the networks and connections that allow them to have political influence, with politicians and businessmen and wealthy donors. Wasserman spends a lot of time on the divisions and the fights, from early on, between Carl Menger and his disciples, like Böhm-Bawerk, or between Schumpeter and all the others, or between Mises and all the others (they were certainly a difficult bunch). However, one would not learn anything significant about the Austrian theory of capital, or its limitations (even if the topic is mentioned), from reading his book. To use Schumpeter’s useful distinction, there is a lot about vision, and almost nothing about analysis.
In the case of Wasserman, there is no significant discussion of what theoretical assumptions connect and make Austrians “Austrians,” in a sense. The book goes all the way back to Menger and the developments that come after that, but it makes very little of the connection with the German Historical School (only the methodological debate emerges, but nothing about how many authors of the latter, like Knies, were closer to marginalism than it is often understood; the ties are significantly more important than is implied in the book which delves a lot on the clash between Menger and Schmoller).
Slobodian tries to connect, more deeply, his discussion of the many characters in the alt-right to what he sees as the main characteristics of the new right, on an analytical level, which he refers to as “the three hards”: hard money, hard borders, and hard-wired culture, which is to say, biological racism. Note that two of those are policy measures, not a fundamental analytical category. And biological racism derives from misconceptions about biology, not economics.
My fundamental problem with the two books is that they miss the point that the strength of Austrian economics, perhaps its main advantage, is that it is a non-formalized, more or less accessible version of neoclassical economics, of marginalist economics.* And that that is the foundation of the right-wing views of society, which hinge on the notion that markets do produce optimal outcomes (that is also at the core of neoliberalism). At the end of the day, right-wing policies are based on the notion that markets are efficient, and that government intervention, in particular, to promote some sort of income distribution, will create inefficiencies.
The notion that markets are efficient is not a notion that can be traced back to old classical political economy authors, like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who were certainly for capitalism, for laissez-faire, and for free markets in general, but for very different reasons than modern neoliberals. There was no notion, in classical political economy, that markets produced an efficient allocation of resources—certainly not labor, meaning full employment of labor; not even in their version of Say's Law. Nobody would have thought that in 18th or early 19th century England that markets produced full employment. The concern with unemployment is from the end of the 19th century. Fabian Socialists and reformists New Liberals were concerned with that. That is one of the key presuppositions of neoclassical economics, efficient allocation of resources, of marginalism, which appeared at that time.
As I noted somewhere else, Austrians are the fundamental basis of neoliberalism. Why? Because while Cambridge neoclassicals—early marginalists from Jevons to Marshall to Pigou—did believe that markets produced optimal outcomes, in terms of policy, particularly Pigou, but to some extent Marshall too, thought that market failures (they didn't use that term) implied that under certain circumstances, government intervention was acceptable. That is the basis of Pigouvian taxes, and the Marshallian notion of externalities plays a crucial role in all of that.
The Austrian school is exactly the one that suggests, first, that markets do produce optimal outcomes and an efficient allocation of resources, in the same way as the British marginalists and the School of Lausanne (Walras and Pareto, and so on). But at the same time, and contrary to the Cambridge marginalists, they believe that government failures (another term not used at the time) are more important than market failures, and therefore, that government intervention is always a bad thing. So, in that sense, it's neoclassical economics and marginalism that are at the core of the alt-right, and the importance of Austrian economics is that they push that argument—Hayek's bastards, if you will—to the extreme. Murray Rothbard (not Milei's dog) plays a crucial role in all that.
In that sense, the “three hards” of the alt-right are not particularly new and not necessarily defining, although certainly many people on the modern alt-right do believe in those three things. I’m not sure one should discount neoliberals that are not biological racists from this group, for example. Cultural racists will do too.
But those three things do not necessarily constitute the foundation upon which they build their arguments. Hard money and hard borders can be defended on the basis of significantly different theoretical views. For example, Ricardo, back in the 19th century, was for hard money, but for reasons that were different from the somewhat monetarist views of modern Austrian economists. They also have some sort of notion of stateless money, in their Bitcoin version and whatnot, which Hayek sort of pushed (but that's another issue). Old Institutionalists like Ely or Commons were for closed borders, and they and other Progressive reformers were certainly not right wingers. Note that those three things—hard money, hard borders, and a scientific racism—were things that Social Darwinists like William Graham Sumner held back in the 19th century. Which would make the alt-right a 19th century phenomenon. Btw, Sumner was a proto-marginalist (Marx’s would probably have classified him as a vulgar economist).
I think the theoretical basis of the right (alt or not) is in neoclassical economics, even though not all neoclassicals are right wingers (far from it). Also, the basis for the alt-right, and the rise of the more radical ideological version of the right-wing should be seen in the long period of increasing inequality and lower growth that started in the 1970s. That is missing in these books. In other words, I would have liked more analysis and less discussion of ideological views.
PS: A lot of the same stuff on the rise of the right in the US is covered in Brian Doherty's Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the Modern Libertarian Movement, cited once in Slobodian's book. I recommend it too, with these two books.
* As such, and there is no doubt that Austrian economics is marginalist (it's in the title of Wasserman's book) and is part of the mainstream (which is neoclassical), even if they were (which they are not) fringe from a social point of view. Austrians are NOT heterodox, no matter what Wasserman or others suggest. Also, I should note, as explicitly discussed by Wasserman, Austrian held positions at Harvard and other elite universities, were close advisors to governments and international organizations, and received financial support from donors and foundations, besides the ultimate accolade, the Bank of Sweden Economics Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel (to Hayek). In other words, not so fringe after all. That notion is part of a culture of victimization.
Friday, July 9, 2021
Laissez-faire policies, self-adjusting market system, and neoliberalism
However, the classical analytical scheme did not assume full employment of labor or that the economic system was self-adjusted. Competition meant that market prices fluctuated around the natural prices, but those did not imply efficient allocation of resources. The notion that markets are self-adjusting with a tendency to full employment was a development of the last quarter of the nineteenth-century, and part of the so-called Marginalist Revolution. Marginalism also implied that each factor of production, capital and labor, received a share of income in accordance with the services rendered in production. Distribution was harmonious and not conflictive.[i] However, that did not imply that marginalist authors were all for laissez-faire.
It is clear that laissez-faire policies – leaving markets to its own devices without government intervention – could theoretically lead to efficient outcomes in the new theoretical scheme. But many marginalists authors believed that imperfections were relatively common in the real world and that under these circumstances some degree of government intervention was required. Market imperfections were a central reason for government intervention, before the Keynesian Revolution. In addition, most marginalists believed that economics was a science, technical in nature and not an art that required understanding of political factors, like class interests, wage bargaining, the power of capitalists, etc. These were imperfections, and they required government intervention. That was certainly the dominant view within marginalism associated with Cambridge University in England, and with its main academic figure Alfred Marshall.[ii]
Marginalists were part of a late nineteenth-century trend that believed in the power of experts, technocrats, in a period in which economics was becoming professionalized, and independent of the moral sciences. They were policy advisors. Simplifying considerably, one may say that classical authors were for laissez-faire, but not for the self-adjusting nature of capitalism, while marginalists were for the notion that markets are self-regulated, but less keen on hands-off governments. The conjunction of the two, the notion that laissez-faire capitalism is self-adjusting, was a distinctive feature of some of the marginalist authors, in particular the ones associated with the Austrian school, with Ludwig von Mises and his disciple Friedrich Hayek. That is, it is only with the rise of neoliberalism that laissez-faire and the self-adjusting nature of capitalism become associated.[iii]
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[i] The notion that distribution is harmonious and not conflictive as assumed by classical authors precedes marginalism or neoclassical economics, and was fundamentally developed in the period after the abandonment of Ricardian economics by pamphleteers and political economists that were afraid of the social implications of the work by David Ricardo, and the development of Socialist theories. Nassau Senior is probably the key author, and Frédéric Bastiat and Harriet Martineau the popularizers of the new dogma. Karl Marx referred to these post-classical authors as vulgar economists, and the term seems fitting.
[ii] Arthur Cecil Pigou, Marshall's main disciple, and John Maynard Keynes' teacher, was concerned exactly with the imperfections caused by externalities that required some sort of government intervention. These would be taxes or subsidies, depending on the nature of the externalities.
[iii] Later, in the 1940s after encountering insurmountable problems with his theory of cycles and the notion of capital, when he distanced himself from economics, Hayek exposed a different argument in favor of laissez-faire policies based on complexity and unintended consequences of government intervention. In this case, the argument was that government failures were worse than market failures or imperfections.
Wednesday, June 30, 2021
Bitcoins and El Salvador
I haven't written about bitcoin in a long while, in part because it is somewhat irrelevant, like all notions of a future dominance of private currencies (another of Hayek's incredible blunders; more problems with Hayek here and here). Note that nation states are fine and well, and not going anywhere, and hence national currencies will remain dominant. Only a weak state without its own currency (El Salvador is dollarized; on that see here and here) would make bitcoins legal tender. But more on that later.
Even though it's discussed in my old post, let me first explain why bitcoin makes little sense as a currency. The first thing to note about bitcoiners is that they think that the state management of the currency is prone to abuse, and that the value of money, and, hence the price level (or its change, i.e. inflation) suffers as a result. The slow and persistent mining of bitcoins, in this view, is what leads to a stable price level. The value of money depends on its scarcity, according to some version of the Quantity Theory of Money (or if they were more sophisticated some notion of a natural rate, and that would work at full employment). Of course, that notion breaks down pretty fast, since inflation is seldom related to excess printing of money by the central bank.
Note that the value of bitcoins has recently collapsed from about 60,000 to around 33,000. It's closer to 34,000 or so now. At any rate, to make things simpler, and rounding things up, the price has been halved, in dollars. In other words, if you bought with one bitcoin something that costed US$60,000 now you need approximately 2 bitcoins rather than one to buy the same thing. Prices doubled in bitcoins in just a few days. That's a doubling of the price level, an increase of 100%, or very high inflation in bitcoins. So inflation in bitcoins (and in any currency really) has little relation with the amount of money. Exchange rate depreciation is crucial, as well as other costs (on alternative theories of inflation see here).
In other words, bitcoin is simply an asset, as gold since it was demonetized almost 50 years ago by Nixon, with the closing of the gold window (or 1968, if you take the link to Fed notes). It is something that is purely relevant for speculation, contrary to some other financial assets that might be relevant for other uses, even industrial uses like gold. Don't get me wrong, block chain technology and digital currencies might become relevant, but that would be once national governments and central banks, which are moving slowly in that direction, decide to adopt them.
I haven't read much on Bukele's decision to make bitcoin legal tender. But the notion that this would be good for the population is crazy. Notice that if you send one bitcoin, and the value collapses before its collected and changed back to dollars, in a period in which the price is reduced by half, then the person receives half the amount of dollars. The fluctuations of asset prices could be wild, and the losses staggering. And El Salvador depends heavily on remittances from the US; something around 20 percent of GDP. The only possible relevant use for bitcoins is for illegal transactions, other than speculation in which someone can win huge amounts, while many lose their pants. Other than that, this is a decision that compounds other terrible decisions taken by previous administrations, like dollarization and entering the free trade agreement with the US.
Tuesday, June 22, 2021
The end of Friedmanomics?
Zachary Carter, of Price of Peace fame (a good book that I recommend, btw), wrote an interesting piece on Milton Friedman's legacy, which I think is, as Hyman Minsky said of Joan Robinson's work, wrong in incisive ways. But even before we get to his main point, that the era of Friedmanomics is gone, it is worth thinking a bit about the way he approaches the history of ideas. This is clearly a moral tale for Carter, with good guys and bad guys. Gunfight at high noon. It is more about vision than analysis, in the terminology of Schumpeter.
He starts, like Nancy MacLean in her Democracy in Chains -- I discussed only tangentiallyFriday, May 4, 2018
The end of neoliberalism?
So let me tackle that issue, captured beautifully in Blyth's tweet above (mind you mark might have been talking just about Neoliberalism in the US, as Cornel West did here), and in the process make the two brief comments I wanted to add on Mirowski. And to make sure, I don't think the era of Neoliberalism is over, in the US or globally. In fact, in many places Neoliberalism is resurgent (certainly in Latin America; I'll have something to say on Argentina soon).
The first issue, before one can discuss whether it ended or not, is what it was. Mirowski says that neoliberals are not just or fundamentally neoclassical, libertarian, classical liberals, or conservatives, and that they have, to some extent, created the confusion. That is in a sense the negative definition of Neoliberalism.
On a more positive sense, he argues that the role of the market is clearly central for Neoliberalism. Mirowski says:
"... neoliberal doctrine instead set out actively to dismantle those aspects of society which might resist the purported inexorable logic of the catallaxy, and to reshape it in the market’s image. For neoliberals, freedom and the market would be treated as identical. Their rallying cry was to remove the foundation of liberty from natural rights or tradition, and reposition it upon an entirely novel theory concerning what a market was, or should be."In his view, Neoliberalism is a movement, and not simply a set of ideas (like for example, Keynesian macroeconomics or classical political economics). And again, I must emphasize that I do agree with him, that it is a movement that revolves around the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS). He refers to the group as the Neoliberal Thought Collective (NTC). A scientific community in the same mold of Thomas Kuhn's normal scientists. Harvey, in the above mentioned book, argues that it is a movement whose goal is to reestablish the power of capital, and disembed capital from the welfare costs imposed during the Keynesian consensus era. And certainly that seems to be the glue of the group.
However, in his response to my comment, Mirowski suggests that I commit a mistake in suggesting that Neoliberalism is subsumed in (a subset of neoclassical economics). And of course, in a certain way, if you think of a movement, it would seem that I had it indeed incorrectly and that neoclassical might be part of the Neoliberal group, but many Neoliberals are not.
However, while it is true that in that sense Neoliberalism is broader than neoclassical economics, since its scope is wider, and less of school of thought than an ideological movement, it is also true that as a movement Neoliberalism must substantiate its arguments on the basis of a set of ideas (as Keynes dixit, ideas govern the world, not vested interests).





