Laissez-faire policies, self-adjusting market system, and neoliberalism

Classical political economics was in part a discourse for the rising bourgeoisie, and as such most of its members – that accepted some version of the labor theory of value and that distribution was conflictive – were for laissez-faire policies. That was certainly the case of the Physiocrats, and of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the two most accomplished of the British political economists.

However, the classical analytical scheme did not assume full employment of labor or that the economic system was self-adjusted. Competition meant that market prices fluctuated around the natural prices, but those did not imply efficient allocation of resources. The notion that markets are self-adjusting with a tendency to full employment was a development of the last quarter of the nineteenth-century, and part of the so-called Marginalist Revolution. Marginalism also implied that each factor of production, capital and labor, received a share of income in accordance with the services rendered in production. Distribution was harmonious and not conflictive.[i] However, that did not imply that marginalist authors were all for laissez-faire.

It is clear that laissez-faire policies – leaving markets to its own devices without government intervention – could theoretically lead to efficient outcomes in the new theoretical scheme. But many marginalists authors believed that imperfections were relatively common in the real world and that under these circumstances some degree of government intervention was required. Market imperfections were a central reason for government intervention, before the Keynesian Revolution. In addition, most marginalists believed that economics was a science, technical in nature and not an art that required understanding of political factors, like class interests, wage bargaining, the power of capitalists, etc. These were imperfections, and they required government intervention. That was certainly the dominant view within marginalism associated with Cambridge University in England, and with its main academic figure Alfred Marshall.[ii]

Marginalists were part of a late nineteenth-century trend that believed in the power of experts, technocrats, in a period in which economics was becoming professionalized, and independent of the moral sciences. They were policy advisors. Simplifying considerably, one may say that classical authors were for laissez-faire, but not for the self-adjusting nature of capitalism, while marginalists were for the notion that markets are self-regulated, but less keen on hands-off governments. The conjunction of the two, the notion that laissez-faire capitalism is self-adjusting, was a distinctive feature of some of the marginalist authors, in particular the ones associated with the Austrian school, with Ludwig von Mises and his disciple Friedrich Hayek. That is, it is only with the rise of neoliberalism that laissez-faire and the self-adjusting nature of capitalism become associated.[iii]

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[i] The notion that distribution is harmonious and not conflictive as assumed by classical authors precedes marginalism or neoclassical economics, and was fundamentally developed in the period after the abandonment of Ricardian economics by pamphleteers and political economists that were afraid of the social implications of the work by David Ricardo, and the development of Socialist theories. Nassau Senior is probably the key author, and Frédéric Bastiat and Harriet Martineau the popularizers of the new dogma. Karl Marx referred to these post-classical authors as vulgar economists, and the term seems fitting.

[ii] Arthur Cecil Pigou, Marshall's main disciple, and John Maynard Keynes' teacher, was concerned exactly with the imperfections caused by externalities that required some sort of government intervention. These would be taxes or subsidies, depending on the nature of the externalities.

[iii] Later, in the 1940s after encountering insurmountable problems with his theory of cycles and the notion of capital, when he distanced himself from economics, Hayek exposed a different argument in favor of laissez-faire policies based on complexity and unintended consequences of government intervention. In this case, the argument was that government failures were worse than market failures or imperfections.

The rise of vulgar economics and the end of dissent

Funny thing, the rise of vulgar economics, which I discussed before (here, here, and here; see also this and this papers for more on the topic) didn't just lead to the ostracism of heterodox approaches to economics. It also led to a significant decrease in the debate within the mainstream. Or at least is what the figure below, from the interesting blog post by Joe Francis, seems to indicate. At some point in the 1960s, more than 20% of the papers in the main journals were a reply, a comment or a rejoinder to the work of someone else. Not anymore.

It is clear that the Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution seemed to increase debate within the mainstream, and that, as Joe says, the: "decline in debate... appears to have been associated with the emergence of a ‘neoliberal’ hegemony from the 1970s onwards." That's essentially correct.

And the decline in debate explains why Lucas could say in the early 1980s that: "at research seminars, people don't take Keynesian theorizing seriously anymore; the audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another." And also why if you wanted to publish you basically had to accept the crazy New Classical models. Krugman admitted to that before, as I've already noticed. He argued that: “the only way to get non-crazy macroeconomics published was to wrap sensible assumptions about output and employment in something else, something that involved rational expectations and intertemporal stuff and made the paper respectable.” You must remember, you don't publish, you don't get tenure. So crazy models became the norm.

Not only heterodox economists were kicked out of mainstream departments, and had to create their own journals in the 1970s, but also the pressure within the mainstream to conform and silence dissent was strong indeed. Note that many, like Blanchard and Woodford for example, in the mainstream continue to suggest that there is a lot of consensus between New Keynesians, and Real Business Cycles types. In fact, they say there is more agreement now than in the 1970s. How is the consensus methodology in macroeconomics, you ask. From Blanchard's paper above:

"To caricature, but only slightly: A macroeconomic article today often follows strict, haiku-like, rules: It starts from a general equilibrium structure, in which individuals maximize the expected present value of utility, firms maximize their value, and markets clear. Then, it introduces a twist, be it an imperfection or the closing of a particular set of markets, and works out the general equilibrium implications. It then performs a numerical simulation, based on calibration, showing that the model performs well. It ends with a welfare assessment."

And yes that is also the basis of New Keynesian models. The haiku basically describes the crazy models in which reasonable results must be disguised if you're to be taken seriously in academia. When everybody agrees, there is little need for debate. And you get stuck with crazy models. The lack of debate within the mainstream to this day is also, in part, what provides support for austerity policies around the globe, even when it is clear that they have failed.

Academics back students in protests against economics dogma

From The Guardian:

A prominent group of academic economists have backed student protests against neo-classical economics teaching, increasing the pressure on top universities to reform courses that critics argue are dominated by free market theories that ignore the impact of financial crises.

The academics from some of the UK's most prestigious institutions, including Cambridge and Leeds universities, said students were being short-changed by their courses, and they accused higher education funding bodies of being a barrier to reforms.

In a startling attack on the agencies that provide teaching and research grants, they said an "intellectual monoculture" is reinforced by a system of state funding based on journal rankings "that are heavily biased in favour of orthodoxy and against intellectual diversity".

Read rest here.

Neoliberalism, neoclassical economics and the return of vulgar economics

The term Neoliberalism has been used with increasing frequency over the last few decades. But is often a confusing term, also used interchangeably with neoclassical economics by some authors (in fact if you look at the graph below you can see that as the use of neoliberalism increased, the use of neoclassical went down). I'm not necessarily against the use of the term, but I do think that semantic clarity is needed if the term is to be used with any propriety. I discussed some of these issues in my review of Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, by Stedman Jones here.

As I noted before, in my exchange with Noah Smith, the term neoclassical is a bit of a misnomer. The term presupposes a continuity between the old classical political economy authors of the surplus approach -- the authors from Petty to Marx, including Quesnay, Smith and Ricardo, that assumed that real wages (distribution) were exogenously given -- and marginalists (the neoclassical ones), which assumed that real wages (equilibrium ones in the long run) are determined by supply and demand (endogenously) like any other price.

In that sense, Smith (Ricardo was a radical and his classification is more complicated, and Marx was a critical revolutionary socialist) was a liberal in the sense of wanting Laissez-Faire, but his theoretical framework was very different from neoclassical authors like Friedman, a modern champion of free markets. In other words, the policy stance in favor of non-intervention and freedom of markets is a poor guide for the underlying theoretical framework or the political views of the author.

The liberalism of the classical authors was based on the notion that the rising bourgeoisie had a revolutionary role (something noted by Marx in his Communist Manifesto), and was a reaction against Mercantilism and the remnants of the Ancien Régime. Neoliberalism, in contrast, should be seen as the resurgence of a free market ideology, after the onsloghut on neoclassical economics by the Keynesian Revolution. It was the ideology of the anti-New Deal, anti-Keynesian conservatives, which was finally victorious in the 1970s, when the marginalist ideas had already proven to be either incoherent or/and irrelevant by the capital debates.

In other words, while the old liberalism was a progressive ideology at the service of the nascent capitalist system radical transformation of the structure of production and the social relations associated with it, the modern resurgence of neoliberalism is a conservative ideology at the service of the maintenance of the status quo. It is fundamentally what I referred before as the return of vulgar economics.

PS: Note that many neoclassical economists are not neoliberals in the sense of radical defenders of the free market ideology. In fact, the majority, the so-called New Keynesians, are willing to accept significant amounts of government intervention to deal with market failures, even if by the 1990s they had accepted much of the more radical stuff (think of Larry Summers, which last week quite correctly noted that more government spending is needed to get us out of the recession, but back in the 1990s believed in expansionary fiscal contractions and financial deregulation. On the latter no word).

Why is neoclassical economics so resilient?

For non economists the Great Recession proved that economists are not serious. The Queen of England after a visit to the London School of Economics in 2008 asked how it was possible that economists failed to predict the crisis (yes, it is a bit ironic that woman that has only a decorative role essentially asks what is the role of economists if they cannot foresee crises). Her precise words were: "It's awful. Why did nobody see it coming?"

Many answers followed, some really bad, and others more to the point. And yes several economists, fundamentally heterodox ones, saw it coming. But the mainstream has remained, not only one step behind in the understanding of what has happened and why, but very reluctant in catching up with heterodox authors, which is not completely disconnected from the resilience of austerity as a policy to deal with the crisis.

Note that this crisis has been very different than the Great Depression, a period that became known for the revolutionary changes in economic theory as "The Years of High Theory," fundamentally as a result of a homonymous book published by G.L.S. Shackle in 1967. The question is why the previous crisis, during the inter-war period, led to a serious effort to rethink the discipline, but this time around nothing much happened.

In my view the only way to understand why the profession did not react to its own failure, by the way something that contrary to many others I did expect, is in light of the history of ideas, and the failures of the previous revolutionary changes during the years of high theory. First, it is important to note that Shackle himself, in ways that are very similar to the mainstream (even though Shackle was the missing link, if there is one, between Post Keynesians and Austrians), suggested that the revolutionary ideas of Keynes and Sraffa, that where at the core of the changes in the 1920s and 30s, basically meant that market imperfections imply that marginalism is a limited guide for the real world (for more see papers here and here). The point is that both Keynes' Principle of Effective Demand, and Sraffa's critique of Marshall, which led him to a revision of price theory and to the recovery of the old and forgotten theories of the surplus approach culminating with his 1960 book and the critique of the logical consistency of marginalist theories, were radical departures from neoclassical theory.

Also, it is important to note that back in the inter-war period, although the marginalist school was dominant in the UK, with Marshall reigning supreme in Cambridge, and Continental Europe, Austrians, Swedes and Italians (were Walrasian economics had more influence) at the front of the pack, in the US, which was then becoming the new hegemonic power, the predominance of marginalism was less clear. In fact, most institutions, like the American Economic Association, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and several universities were dominated by institutionalists. It is, in fact, only with the Keynesian Revolution, with Hicks, Hansen and then Modigliani (the one to introduce the fix wage model) that a certain version of Keynesianism, more neoclassical, that marginalism becomes dominant in the US. It is with the Keynesian Revolution that neoclassical economics became dominant in the US.

So the point is that a certain version of marginalism, that suggested that imperfections were at the heart of the problem, became dominant in the US, and that was a departure from the previous dominant school, but one that had significant problems. When those problems became evident in the 1960s in the midst of the capital debates, this sort of neoclassical synthesis Keynesianism came under attack, and the monetarist and New Classical counter-revolutions were possible. The return of vulgar economics was inevitable at that point. In this context, the profession lost capacity to understand reality, since it became, to a great extent, pure apologetics for free markets. Also, this counter revolution explains why authors like Krugman (which still learned his economics from old Keynesians) are surprised by the fact that the profession has forgotten basic things (the dark age of macroeconomics is his very apropos term).

Finally, the last reason why this time around the crisis did not lead to serious rethinking of the limitations of the dominant paradigm is that, while in the inter-war period Fascism and Communism were real threats (and the latter a threat to capitalism), this time around there is no significant alternative contender. Not only the US supremacy is uncontested in any serious way, but also the economic system itself is safe.

Note that vulgar economics, the shallow apologetic of markets, was dominant in the post-Ricardian period (from the 1830s onwards) and was not seriously contested until the inter-war period (Marxism, the only serious development within the surplus approach, and, hence, within scientific economics, was marginal of course). So this current state can, and most likely will, continue for a long while. Heterodox economists should prepare for the long winter. Teaching, maintaining serious and autonomous research (meaning that dialogue with the mainstream is less important that original research trying to understand the real world) and producing new heterodox economists (the production of heterodox economists by means of heterodox economists) are the tasks ahead.

The capital debates: A brief introduction

Teaching on the capital debates this and last week. So here are some thoughts, based on my class notes and the required readings (see below). The capital debates remain a puzzling chapter in the history of economic ideas. Nearly everyone accepts that the British (as opposed to the Massachusetts) Cambridge won the debate, something Paul Samuelson acknowledged early on.[1] Yet, no one seems to grasp the full implications and relevance of the debate itself. Typically it is assumed that the capital debates relate simply to problems of aggregation, and that the use of aggregate production functions and aggregative measures of capital are still justifiable, for simplicity’s sake. However, contrary to this viewpoint the capital debates did not rest upon the possibility of building aggregate measures.

The capital debates are associated with the very notion of capital. Classical political economy authors, from William Petty to Karl Marx, including Quesnay, Smith and Ricardo, treated the process of production as a circular one. In this context, capital is a produced means of production,[2] rather than a factor of production used in the process of obtaining final goods. The most important result of the capital debates is that, once capital is defined as produced means of production, there is no direct relation between the relative abundance or scarcity of the means of production and its remuneration. Distribution, in other words, is not governed by supply and demand.

Since the Marginalist Revolution, and the rise of the so-called neoclassical school, the notion that relative prices are determined by supply and demand, and that these reflect the relative abundance or scarcity of all goods and services – including factors of production – became consensual. As a result, the supply and demand for capital became the determination for the remuneration of capital. The more abundant is capital, the lower its remuneration, and vice versa if it is scarce. Conflict has no role to play in the determination of distribution, and social classes vanished entirely from analysis.

Additionally, substitution leads to the full utilization of resources and their optimal allocation. If capital is scarce and expensive, and labor abundant and cheap, economic agents substitute labor for capital and fully utilize labor. Thus, despite the abundance of labor, its relative cheapness, through the principle of substitution, leads to full employment. Indeed, unhampered markets do lead to the veritable best of all possible worlds.

It is the logic of the principle of substitution, based on relative scarcities that the capital debates shattered. Contrary to the neoclassical parable, the capital debates showed that it is not generally possible to obtain a univocal relation between remuneration and relative scarcity. For example, assume that we have two commodities produced with capital and labor, and that one can be said to be univocally more capital abundant than the other. In this case, as capital becomes more abundant the profit-to-real-wage ratio will fall, more capital will be used, and more of the capital-intensive good will be produced. However, it is possible that one good would be more capital intensive at high levels of the profit-to-real-wage ratio, and that the other becomes the capital intensive good at lower levels of the same ratio. That is, we would have factor intensity reversal. In the instance of factor intensity reversals, the conventional relation between factor scarcity and relative prices breaks down.

In this situation, it would be possible that as the profit-to-real-wage ratio falls, more labor will be used, and more of the labor-intensive good will be produced. In other words, there would be reverse capital deepening and a lower rate of profit associated with a reduction in the use of capital. Substitution moves in the wrong direction, so to speak, and more of the scarce factor is demanded. A simple algebraic exercise may help understand the point.

Let’s assume that there are two methods of production, associated to the manufacture of capital (iron) and consumption (corn) goods respectively. The prices are determined by:

(1) pc=wlc+rpkkc
(2) pk=wlk+rpkkk

where the subscripts refer to consumption and capital, l and k are the technical coefficients of production, and w and r are the real wage and rate of profit. Using pc as a numeraire and solving for pk we obtain:

(3) pk=(1-wlc)/rkc

From (3) into (2) we get:

(4) [(1-wlc)/rkc]=wlk+rkk[(1-wlc)/rkc]

Simplifying, and solving for w we find:

(5) w=(1-rkk)/[lc+(lkkc-lckk)r]

If the expression in the small parenthesis in the denominator is equalized to zero we obtain a wage-profit frontier that is linear. This assumption is what Samuelson (1962, p. 225, n. 7) refers to as the equi-proportional assumption. Figure 1 shows the choice of technique under this assumption.

Figure 1

The firm chooses the highest rate of profit for a given real wage, which implies that as the rate of profit falls the firm must choose the more capital intensive (b in this case). In this case, the neoclassical parable works; there is an inverse relation between factor intensity and its remuneration.

Once, the assumption of equi-proportional capital to labor ratios in the machine and consumption sectors (which would mean in Marxist terminology the same organic composition of capital in both sectors) is dropped the wage-profit frontier is not linear anymore. If we assume that the capital goods sector is more capital intensive than the consumption sector then the wage-profit frontier will be concave (as shown in Figure 2).

Figure 2

In this case, we have two switches; at high levels of the rate of profit the firm choose technique a, which is more labor-intensive, and as the rate of profits falls it switches to b the capital-intensive one as prescribed by neoclassical economics. However, at even lower levels of the rate of profit, the firm switches back to the more labor intensive technique. Reswitching and reverse capital deepening, hence, result from the dismissal of the equi-proportionality assumption, which is what one would expect in a world with several goods.

The implications for neoclassical theory cannot be overstated. First and foremost, there is no relation between relative scarcity and the remuneration of factors of production, and, as a result, distribution is not simply the product of market forces. Further, there is no guarantee that all resources will be fully utilized.[3]

It must be noted that, even though the capital debates are fundamentally about the logical coherence of the neoclassical approach, the results of the capital debates have important empirical implications. Neoclassical theory makes strong predictions vis-à-vis substitution effects and the relation between relative scarcity and remuneration. Yet the capital debates suggest that some of those predictions might not be consistent, and, as a result, the absence of those relations might be expected in the real world.

The most obvious prediction is the inverse relation between investment (capital intensity) and the rate of interest (its remuneration). As it is well known, there is little evidence that investment is sensitive to variations in the real rate of interest. In a rare survey of the empirical literature on the determinants of investment Robert Chirinko (1993, p. 1906) argues, “[T]he response of investment to price variables tends to be small and unimportant relative to quantity variables.” In other words, interest rates have little effect on gross capital formation, and the substitution effects that imply that agents use the cheaper factor of production are not operative. Further, the empirical evidence suggests that investment reacts to quantity variables, meaning the level of activity. This suggests that the income effects tend to be larger tahn substitution effects and that a firm facing less demand will not buy capital goods, even if the interest rate is low. These results underscore the empirical relevance of the capital debates.[4]

Similarly, the capital debates highlighted the futility of using the aggregate production function to measure the growth and productivity performance of real economies. The theoretical problems with the aggregate production function, associated to the notion of capital as a scarce resource, are compounded by the impossibility of disentangling it from the identity of income with the structure of the functional distribution of income (Felipe and Fisher, 2003). In other words, if one runs a regression of income on capital and labor, as is often done by those using a production function, it necessarily follows that income grows because capital and labor grow. Furthermore, changes in income distribution also affect income growth, as total income (net of taxes) is by definition the wage multiplied by labor utilized in production plus capital multiplied by its remuneration.

In this way, the capital debates demolished the theoretical foundations of neoclassical economics, and provided significant empirical evidence that those neoclassical models and their resultant policy prescriptions should be viewed with a healthy measure of skepticism.

Faced with the impossibility of using both the notion of aggregate capital and the principle of substitution, neoclassical economics opted to apply the principle of substitution to each kind of capital good taken as a distinct factor of production, by using the Arrow-Debreu model of intertemporal general equilibrium (Garegnani, 1976; Milgate, 1979). Even though the idea of intertemporal equilibrium, in which capital is treated as a vector of heterogeneous capital goods, was first developed by Eric Lindahl and then popularized by John R. Hicks in the 1930s, and used by Arrow and Debreu in the 1950s, it was only after the capital debates that it came to be dominant within the mainstream.

The problem with the use of heterogeneous capital goods is that it implies a change in the traditional method of economics. Normal equilibrium positions are associated to a uniform rate of profit; however, when dealing with heterogeneous capital goods that are not substitutable between each other, it becomes necessary to discard the notion of long run equilibrium. In Arrow-Debreu models all prices are short run prices, associated to differential rentals for each capital good, and any change in the data of the system – preferences, technology, and information for given initial endowments – affects the direction to which the economy adjusts (Petri, 2003).

In other words, the forces of competition that lead capitalists to those sectors with higher remuneration and establish a uniform rate of profit do not operate in the Walrasian world.[5] Hence, the Walrasian models are incapable of ascertaining tendencies in real economies, a defect that is not mitigated with the introduction of imperfections (Stiglitz, 1993, p. 109), which Stiglitz calls the post-Walrasian and post-Marxist paradigm. Far from increasing the realism of the model, the casting about of such lifelines only complicates the results of an exceptionally unrealistic one.

Information imperfections, and other related imperfections like price rigidities or lack of rationality, once introduced leave the Arrow-Debreu model unable to produce Pareto efficient solutions, or even market equilibrium, since some markets may not exist. Additionally, the introduction of imperfections renders the aggregative model prone to suboptimal outcomes. Suboptimal results in the presence of imperfections suggest that in their absence markets would still produce optimal outcomes.[6]

Some authors tend to confuse the imperfectionist arguments, and the implicit support that they provide for policy intervention, as a break with orthodoxy. While it is clear that they provide space for flexibility in policy advice, they remain firmly based on orthodox grounds.[7] The capital debates, in contrast, showed that unhindered markets, free of imperfections of any type, do not lead to market efficiency in general.

Faced with the logical problems that neoclassical aggregative models are riddled with on the one hand, and the irrelevance of general equilibrium models on the other, neoclassical economists did what any rational agent would do: disregard the critiques and in so doing, their deleterious results, and proceed as if nothing had happened. However, an innovative, if not peculiar, development generated a curious division of labor within neoclassical economics. Aggregative models were deployed for the purposes of teaching and policymaking, while the Arrow-Debreu model became the retreat of neoclassical authors when questioned about the logical consistency of their models. In this response, a harsh tradeoff between logical consistency and relevance was cultivated in the very core of mainstream economics.

The degree of fragmentation – as Roncaglia (2005, p. 468) so aptly expresses it – and confusion in the mainstream today is the result of such inconsistency at the core of economics, and not uniquely, as is frequently asserted, because of the demise of the Keynesian consensus. The collapse of the certainties provided by the old aggregative neoclassical model has brought about an often cynical defense of market-oriented policies for their own sake. The return of Vulgar Economics, which “sticks to appearances … [and] believes that ‘ignorance is a sufficient reason’” (Marx, 1867, p. 307) is complete.

Notes:
[1] See Samuelson (1966). A typical position is that of Robert Lucas (1988, p. 36) who notes the victory of the British argument, and yet remains oblivious to the problems of using the aggregate production function in the same paper.

[2] For Marx (1867, p. 189) capital also involved a social relation between the owners of the means of production and those forced to sell their labor power. For him, capital “can spring to life, only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence meets in the market with the free laborer selling his labor-power.”

[3] Both results are important, for example, for the Keynesian possibility of unemployment equilibrium. Keynes’ (1936, p. 243) emphasis on the unimportance of the natural rate of interest not only implies that the supply and demand for capital (loanable funds) do not determine the equilibrium rate of interest, but also that the conventional rate of interest may be set at such a level that brings about persistent unemployment.

[4] In the same way, the empirical evidence seems to contradict the notion that higher wages would lead to substitution of cheaper factors of production for labor. The exemplary case is the well-know study of the fast food industry in New Jersey, which found a positive correlation between the minimum wage and employment (Card and Krueger, 1995).

[5] That GE models do not support the notion that the abundance of a factor of production will be associated with lower remuneration has been pointed out by a survey of those models (Bliss, 1975).

[6] The same is valid for Bowles and Gintis’ (1993, p. 84) notion that market exchanges are usually contested and endogenous enforcement costs are not zero, and, as a result, there are conflicts of interest among exchanging parties. Therefore, if enforcement costs were nonexistent the Arrow-Debreu results would prevail. It must be noted that all the literature on post-Walrasian economics presumes continuity between the classical political economy authors and the post-marginalist revolution economics, which would mean that there are no significant distinctions between Smith, Marx, Walras and Arrow.

[7] Colander et al. (2004), for example, seems to suggest that several of the post-Walrasian developments can be seen as breaking up with orthodoxy. For a critique see Vernengo (2010).

Additional Readings:

Bliss, Christopher (1975), Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income, Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier North-Holland.

Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis (1993), ‘The revenge of homo economicus: Contested exchange and the revival of political economy’ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1), 83-102.

Card, David and Krueger, Alan (1995), Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chirinko, Robert (1993), ‘Business fixed investment spending: Modeling strategies, empirical results, and policy implications’, Journal of Economic Literature, 31(4), 1875-1911.

Colander, David, Rick Holt, and J. Barkley Rosser Jr. (2004), “The changing face of mainstream economics,” Review of Political Economy, 16, pp. 485-99.

Felipe, Jesus and Franklin Fisher (2003), ‘Aggregation in production functions: what applied economists should know’, Metroeconomica, 54(2-3), 208-262.

Garegnani, Pierangelo (1976), ‘On a change in the notion of equilibrium in recent work on value: a comment on Samuelson’, in M. Brown, K. Sato and P. Zarembka (eds), Essays in Modern Capital Theory, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Heim, John J. (2009), ‘Which Interest Rate Seems Most Related to Business Investment?’, American Society of Business and Behavioral Sciences E-Journal, 5(1), February.

Keynes, John M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York: Harcourt Brace.

Lucas, Robert (1988), 'On the Mechanics of Economic Development,' Journal of Monetary Economics 22 (1), pp. 3–42.

Marx, Karl (1867), Capital, NY: International Publishers.Capital, NY: International Publishers.

Milgate, Murray (1979), 'On the origin of the notion of ‘intertemporal equilibrium’,' Economica, 46(181), 1-10.Economica, 46(181), 1-10.

Petri, Fabio (2003), ‘A ‘Sraffian’ critique of general equilibrium theory, and the classical Keynesian alternative’, in F. Petri and F. Hahn (eds), General Equilbrium: Problems and Prospects, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 387-421.

Samuelson, Paul (1962), “Parable and Realism in Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function,” Review of Economic Studies, 29(3), pp. 193-206.

Samuelson, Paul (1966), ‘A summing up,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(4), 568-583.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(4), 568-583.

Vernengo, M. (2010), 'Conversation or Monologue? On Advising Heterodox Economists,' Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 32(3), pp. 389-96.

A Note on the Concept of Vulgar Economics

The concept of vulgar economics, developed by Karl Marx, is often cited, but seldom properly used or understood. In the preface to the second German edition to Capital Marx said that:

"[The] period, from 1820 to 1830, was notable in England for scientific activity in the domain of Political Economy. It was the time as well of the vulgarising and extending of Ricardo’s theory, as of the contest of that theory with the old school."

It is important to note that Marx clearly knew that "the theory of Ricardo already serves, in exceptional cases, as a weapon of attack upon bourgeois economy," in particular, because Ricardo was the first to show conclusively the necessary oposition between wages and profits, and the conflictive nature of the capitalist system. The problem with post-Ricardian economics was that it could not claim to be scientific and at the same time argue that the capitalist system was harmonious. For him:

"Men who still claimed some scientific standing and aspired to be something more than mere sophists and sycophants of the ruling classes tried to harmonise the Political Economy of capital with the claims, no longer to be ignored, of the proletariat. Hence a shallow syncretism of which John Stuart Mill is the best representative. It is a declaration of bankruptcy by bourgeois economy."

So vulgar economics was the dominant, or common, view of Political Economy after Ricardo, which was fundamentally apologetic and dismissed the Ricardian conflictive view of capitalist economies.

Also, it is important to note that, although critical of bourgeois economics (Quesnay, Smith, Ricardo), Marx knew his theory built on their analysis. He says:

"As early as 1871, N. Sieber, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Kiev, in his work 'David Ricardo’s Theory of Value and of Capital,' referred to my theory of value, of money and of capital, as in its fundamentals a necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. That which astonishes the Western European in the reading of this excellent work, is the author’s consistent and firm grasp of the purely theoretical position."

So the excellent work of Professor Sieber correctly grasps Marx's theoretical position, according to Marx, and says that it is "a necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo." I'll leave for another post the discussion of the current state of economics, and in what sense one can talk of a return of vulgar economics.