Showing posts with label Shackle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shackle. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

What made Keynes, Keynes

A few years back, a paper of mine was rejected in a prestigious heterodox journal, because it failed to grasp the importance of Keynes' sexual diaries. In fact, I had not read them (guilty as charged). My research was outdated, I was told by an angry referee (number 1, as it turns out). Not long after, I was asked to referee, for the same journal, I might add, a paper on Keynes' sexuality and its possible implications for his economic thought. The paper dealt with Keynes' sex diaries from the early twentieth century and suggested that Keynes' sexuality, together with his broader philosophical views, may help explain some of his later economic ideas. The question is interesting, not least because it has often been raised in different contexts and with very different political implications.

A decade ago or so, Niall Ferguson suggested that Keynesian profligacy was connected to Keynes' homosexuality and his alleged lack of concern for future generations. The notion that Keynes' theory was a short run one because he was childless has a long pedigree, associated to other conservative luminaries like Joseph Schumpeter. Same arguments were made by Murray Rothbard, as noted in the paper linked above. Ultimately, the argument is analytically weak, since it tries to move directly from biography to policy conclusions without establishing the relevant links.

The paper I read was sympathetic to Keynes and tried to connect his sexuality to his sensibilities about the economy as a whole, his views about “the good,” his relation to G.E. Moore’s philosophy, and eventually his views on uncertainty, money, and economic life.

Still, the broader problem remains. It is one thing to say that personal experiences, including sexuality, help shape the sensibilities of an author. That is almost certainly true, and in some sense trivial. It is another thing to claim that sexuality explains a particular set of analytical propositions. That is a much more ambitious claim, and it is far harder to sustain. In the case of Keynes, the relevance of the sex diaries for understanding the central analytical ideas of The General Theory (GT) is far from obvious.

There is no doubt that Keynes' philosophical views mattered. His early engagement with Moore, the Bloomsbury milieu, and his rejection of certain Victorian conventions all shaped his conception of life, morality, beauty, friendship, and the good society or the good life. These things may also have influenced his impatience with narrow utilitarianism and with purely mechanical views of economic behavior. But the difficult question is how one moves from those philosophical and personal sensibilities to the concrete analytical propositions that define Keynes' contribution to economics.

The question of exactly what was Keynes' main contribution to economic thought is often vaguely answered, and even within Post Keynesian groups there is considerable disagreement. If the answer is simply uncertainty, as for many in the heterodox camp, then the argument is incomplete. Keynes certainly gave increasing importance to uncertainty, especially in his 1937 response to critics of GT. Chapter 12, with its discussion of long-term expectations, conventions, and the famous beauty contest metaphor, is central to that interpretation. But Keynes’s contribution cannot be reduced to uncertainty.

Moreover, uncertainty alone does not make Keynes distinctive. Frank Knight and Friedrich Hayek also thought uncertainty was central to economic life, yet they reached very different conclusions from Keynes. G.L.S. Shackle, a student of Hayek and an important figure in some Post Keynesian interpretations of Keynes, combined elements of both Keynesian and Hayekian views. This suggests that the recognition of fundamental uncertainty can be grounded in very different theoretical frameworks and can lead to very different policy conclusions. The harder question, then, is not whether Keynes cared about uncertainty, but why uncertainty had the role it did in his broader theory of capitalism.

In my view, the central proposition of the GT is not simply uncertainty in a monetary economy, but the principle of effective demand. Keynes' main analytical break was with Say’s Law and with the idea that investment would automatically adjust to full-employment savings, even if slowly. The point of the GT, as Keynes himself made clear, was first of all a theory of employment. Autonomous spending determines income. Investment does not adjust automatically to full-employment saving. The level of activity can settle below full employment, not as a temporary deviation caused by rigidities, but as a normal outcome of a monetary production economy.

Uncertainty matters in that argument, but it is not central to the argument. It is the uncertainty about autonomous demand that matters. In fact, Keynes’s emphasis on uncertainty only became more explicit as he responded to critics and tried to explain why investment could not be treated as a simple function that smoothly adjusted to the full-employment level of saving, in part as a result of his acceptance of significant elements of marginalist economics. If uncertainty is presented as the core explanation, there is a danger of turning Keynes into an imperfectionist that believed that markets would work well enough if only expectations were less volatile and in the presence of full information. That was not Keynes’s deeper point.

His more radical proposition was that capitalism could be economically stable at less than full employment. It was precisely that economic stability below full employment that made the system politically unstable.

There is also a comparative problem. Michal Kalecki developed a version of the principle of effective demand independently, and arguably before Keynes. Kalecki's intellectual background was very different, shaped by Marx and Marxist authors rather than by Moore and Bloomsbury. This raises the question of how Kalecki's sexuality shaped his theory of effective demand. In that light, the question seems less compelling. That does not mean that biography is irrelevant. But it does suggest that the route from personal life to analytical theory is indirect, mediated by intellectual traditions, political commitments, historical circumstances, and theoretical problems internal to economics.

There is also the issue of Keynes' own intellectual development. Keynes' philosophical views were formed relatively early, if we are to believe Robert Skidelsky, and many other authors on the matter. But his economic views changed considerably over time. The Keynes of the Tract on Monetary Reform, the Treatise on Money, the Macmillan Committee, and The General Theory are not the same. If his basic philosophical and personal sensibilities were already present early on, the questions is  why did the principle of effective demand emerge only later, after the debates with the Cambridge Circus in the early 1930s. These questions cannot be answered simply by appealing to sexuality or early philosophical commitments.

A more plausible position would be that Keynes' sexuality and personal life formed part of a broader rejection of Victorian moral and social conventions. That rejection may have made him more open to questioning established economic doctrines, including the neoclassical faith in adjustment mechanisms, thrift, and the moral virtues of saving. It may also have contributed to his skepticism toward purely ascetic or efficiency-centered views of social life. Keynes did not think economics was an end in itself. He thought economic arrangements should be judged in relation to broader human purposes. In that limited sense, his philosophical and personal world mattered.

But the analytical core of Keynes' economics still has to be explained analytically. His theory of effective demand emerged from concrete debates about saving, investment, money, employment, and the failures of orthodox theory in the context of the Great Depression. His sexuality may help us understand Keynes as a person, and perhaps some of his broader sensibilities. It does not, by itself, explain the logic of the GT.

It is also a peculiar feature of the literature on Keynes' broader philosophical views to portray his motivations in a somewhat simplistic way as being apolitical. He had concerns with the good life, but not the public good. To accept the notion that Keynes was apolitical flies in the face of his extensive participation in the political process, not just as a bureaucrat, but more importantly as a direct participant in political campaigns, involved in the drafting of government program for Lloyd George in the 1929 election, for example.

Ultimately, the more interesting question is not whether sexuality caused Keynesian economics. It did not. The question is whether Keynes' position as an outsider to certain social conventions helped him imagine capitalism differently from the orthodox economists of his time. That seems plausible. Perhaps a good social scientist, a good economist, has to be more than "mathematician, historian, statesman, [and a] philosopher – in some degree," as Keynes suggested. They need to be a bit of an outsider, to see things from an alternative perspective.

Even then, what made Keynes, Keynes was not simply his personal life. It was his ability to transform a set of philosophical, political, and historical concerns into a powerful analytical critique of the self-adjusting market economy.

Monday, September 16, 2013

Robert Skidelsky on Hayek, Keynes and Common Sense

Robert Skidelsky at a Liberty Fund event, not too long ago. Note that in the opening remarks he says: "I'm going to talk about the conditions of liberty, which seems a good topic of conversation for a Liberty Fund event. Owing to the hazards of the weather, I find myself the sole representative of common sense this afternoon." Not sure what the weather conditions had to do with it, but I must agree, given the venue.

The whole thing here. My only major disagreement is that I really do not think that Hayek is the great rival of Keynes, or even one of the major economists of the 20th century, given his contributions. On the neoclassical front, Hicks, Modigliani, by bringing neoclassical results in the long run, but opening space for Keynesian policies in the short run, associated to rigidities an imperfections, and even Friedman, with the return of the concept of the natural rate, were more relevant than Hayek.

Who was Keynes great rival? While he was alive his debates were with his Cambridge peers, Pigou and Robertson, more than with Robbins, Hayek and the LSE economists. In fact, a good chunk of the younger LSE economists became, in different degrees, Keynesian (e.g. Hicks, Kaldor, Lerner, and even Shackle). But if I had to say, his great rival was himself, which would probably fit his very elevated sense of self-worth. In particular, his inability of getting rid of marginalist (neoclassical) elements of his theory is what ultimately opened the door for the Neoclassical Synthesis.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

On Austrians and the natural rate of interest

I don't often write about Austrians. As I noted before the reason is that, as a school of thought, Austrians are kind of irrelevant. They are part of the marginalist mainstream, but are often confused as heterodox (sometimes even Austrians don't know that they are neoclassical). In fact, Hayek was for the most part forgotten after Sraffa and others showed the inconsistencies of his theories in the 1930s, and if Austrians understood the consequences of the capital debates, their come back in the 1970s would seem even less reasonable.

Throughout their underground period, from the 1940s to the 70s, they were part of 'secret' societies in which only the initiated (complete adherence to the ideology) could participate, like the Mont Pèlerin Society, and creating think tanks, like the conservative Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), to promote the laissez faire ideology (note this had no basis in theory, since they cannot prove that markets produce efficient allocation of resources with a uniform rate of profit, but I'll get back to that below).

It was the rise of the conservative movement, a sort of Polanyian reaction to the Welfare State, that brought back all sorts of laissez faire cranks, and brought in the coattails Hayek and his disciples. In contrast to Milton Friedman, that used a fairly regular ISLM cum Phillips curve model, with the added natural rate, Hayek produced no relevant innovation, besides some poetry about the complexity of markets and uncertainty (which is why some confuse him with an heterodox author; blame Shackle for this).

Sissela Bok, the daughter of Gunnar Myrdal,* co-winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize with Hayek in 1974, recounts in her biography of her mother Alva [Alva Myrdal, Gunnar's wife received a real Nobel, the peace one in 1982] that the prize was given to Hayek by the Swedish economics establishment as a way to demean the prize. And if this is not enough, the guy that was supposedly for freedom, and for economic freedom because that one is central for political freedom, defended Pinochet. So really there is no economic or moral reason to take Austrians too seriously.

In sum, Austrians are really the most ideological wing of the neoclassical school, with all the other theoretical problems that the mainstream has. There is not much relevant to discuss there. So you might ask what is the post doing here. The reason is that there has a been a debate between Lord Keynes (nope not that one, the author of the very good blog Social Democracy for the 21st Century) and a Spanish Austrian author, and I was asked about my opinion. So here it is.

Some Austrians seem to think that their theory does not require a natural rate of interest. This might be the result of an incomplete understanding of Sraffa's 1932 critique of Hayek, in which he showed that there were as many own rates of interest (Sraffa's term) as commodities. At any rate, in the this recent debate the Austrian author says that in order to have a cycle Austrian don't need a natural rate and that:
"it suffices with showing that there is a mismatch between the term and risk structure that the marginal lenders (savers) are willing to fund and the term and risk structure associated with investment taking place in the economy." Or in Spanish in the original post: "le basta con mostrar que existe una descoordinación entre el plazo y el riesgo de las inversiones que están dispuestos a financiar los ahorradores marginales y el plazo y el riesgo asociados a las inversiones que se están efectuando en la economía."
So basically you need a mismacth between savings and investment. And dude, yes at the actual intersection of these two curves (often well behaved with savings being upward-sloping and investment downward-sloping) is an equilibrium interest rate, that would eliminate the mismatch. That's your natural rate. So, yes Austrians do have a natural rate**, even if they don't know it. Note that the capital debates show exactly that the idea of natural rate of interest inversely related with capital abundance (supply and demand) is not tenable. The poetry on market efficiency depends on being able to prove that. That's why the neoclassical project, and with it Austrians, has been derailed. It is really zombie economics.

* Myrdal coined the term monetary equilibrium to refer to the Wicksellian notion of an equilibrium between the natural and monetary or bank rates of interest. He also was a proto-Keynesian, and the key economist in the initial social democratic governments of the 1930s.

** According to Garegnani, in fact, even the inter-temporal Arrow-Debreu models, which supposedly do not have a uniform rate of profit, require a natural rate of interest to bring about the equilibrium of investment with full employment savings.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Sraffa and the Marshallian system

(Sraffa circa 1976)

G. L. S. Shackle argues in The Years of High Theory that ‘there began in the mid-1920s an immense creative spasm, lasting for fourteen years until the Second World War, and yielding six or seven major innovations of theory, which together have completely altered the orientation and character of economics’ (Shackle, 1967, p. 5). However, by 1967, the two most important developments of this period—Keynes’s principle of effective demand and Sraffa’s criticism of the marginalist theory of value—were rapidly fading from the main corpus of mainstream theory.

The relative ease with which neoclassical economics reasserted its main conclusions is, in fact, explained by Shackle’s account of those years. First, Sraffa’s critique of the Marshallian theory of value is seen only as a step in the development of the theories of imperfect competition by Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin. Second, Keynes’s General Theory is seen as stating that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations (Shackle, 1967, p. 129). Both developments can be interpreted as asserting that market imperfections render neoclassical theory, although internally coherent, irrelevant for the analysis of the real world.

Also Shackle’s failure in 1967 — well after the publication of Production of Commodities — to acknowledge the importance of the revival of classical political economy to the debates of the 1930s represents a serious inadequacy of his interpretation of ‘the years of high theory’.

Before getting into Sraffa's critique of Marshall, it is worth noticing that Sraffa came to economics via monetary economics, like Ricardo and Keynes. His dissertation for the Law Degree, L’Inflazione Monetaria in Italia Durante e Dopo la Guerra (subscription required), dealt with postwar inflation and the return to the Gold Standard, the same topic of Keynes’s Tract on Monetary Reform. According to Eatwell and Panico (subscription required), in the analysis of the asymmetric effects of inflation and deflation Sraffa reveals the heterodox character of his position, more akin with the works of the classical authors and Marx than the conventional marginalist analysis. The notion that social conflicts and monetary factors determine the normal real wage was part of Sraffa’s analysis, although several elements of his analysis were still conventional, e.g. the acceptance of the Quantity Theory and of the Purchasing Power Parity theory.

Sraffa’s criticism of the Marshallian theory of supply represents an analogous situation, in the sense that some elements of the conventional marginalist views were still present. Marshall’s or Sraffa’s dilemma (which appears in Sraffa's 1926 paper) refers to the incompatibility between increasing returns and perfect competition. It is a long period problem. Sraffa’s critique can be summarized in the following way. First, rising costs derive from diminishing returns to substitution, and, therefore, in the general case where there are no fixed factors, increasing costs do not seem to exist. Secondly, increasing returns are incompatible with perfect competition. In the long period, when the firm cannot experience marginal costs arising from the existence of some fixed input, there can be no diminishing returns. Replication is always possible, except for the case of indivisibilities. In addition, Sraffa showed that increasing returns to scale are inconsistent with the notion of perfect competition.

In the case of increasing returns, the average cost is decreasing, implying that the marginal cost is below average variable cost, and, hence, there is no infinite, non-zero solution for the profit maximization problem. In other words, there is a tendency for the firm to expand to infinite size. Sraffa’s argument proves the failure of perfectly competitive assumptions to determine any equilibrium of the individual firm. Two alternatives are opened by Sraffa’s critique of Marshallian theory. If it is not legitimate to treat average cost as either increasing or decreasing within the framework of perfect competition, we are left with the result that the only satisfactory assumption is that of constant returns. On the other hand, ‘everyday experience shows that a very large number of undertakings work under conditions of individual diminishing costs’ (Sraffa, 1926, p. 543), which suggests that we should instead abandon the notion of perfect competition.

Sraffa considered the imperfect competition approach to be the only logical way to develop the theory of value along Marshallian lines. However, he showed no inclination to pursue this solution, and he appears to have already been working toward the revival of the classical approach. The origins of this project can be traced back to his early draft of the opening propositions of the Production of Commodities, which he asked Keynes to read in 1928 (Sraffa, 1960, p. vi). The reasons for not pursuing imperfect competition were never quite explained by Sraffa, but are fairly reasonable to infer (note that in Cambridge it was two of his students, Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson, that developed the imperfect competition theory).

Note that in order to obtain partial equilibrium, which is what the Marshallian model presumes, one must assume that prices in a particular industry are not affected by and do not affect the prices in other industries. Hence, externalities have to be internal to the industry, since otherwise production in one sector would affect the prices in other industries [perfect competition in partial equilibrium, the U-shaped cost curves and the equilibrium at the minimum with marginal cost equal marginal revenue, require also that externalities are external to the firm, since if they weren't the firm would became a monopolist; of course externalities that are internal to an industry and external to firms are an empty set]. That seems to be a dead end. Sraffa was already interested in the determination of long term prices. By this time, the summer of 1927 when he was preparing his ‘Lectures on Advanced Value Theory’ that he gave from 1928 until 1930, it was already clear to him that he needed to start from classical preocupation of determining relative prices and one of the distributive variables (the rate of profits or wages) strictly in material terms, that is, the quantities of labor and commodities needed to produce commodities.

For further on Sraffa's critique of Marshall see Gary Mongiovi's paper here (subscription required). For a general critique of Shackle's stance in the history of 'the years of high theory' read this one. For the implications of Sraffa's 1960 book for economics go to this old post (yes on the capital debates!).

Thursday, July 26, 2012

Why is neoclassical economics so resilient?

For non economists the Great Recession proved that economists are not serious. The Queen of England after a visit to the London School of Economics in 2008 asked how it was possible that economists failed to predict the crisis (yes, it is a bit ironic that woman that has only a decorative role essentially asks what is the role of economists if they cannot foresee crises). Her precise words were: "It's awful. Why did nobody see it coming?"

Many answers followed, some really bad, and others more to the point. And yes several economists, fundamentally heterodox ones, saw it coming. But the mainstream has remained, not only one step behind in the understanding of what has happened and why, but very reluctant in catching up with heterodox authors, which is not completely disconnected from the resilience of austerity as a policy to deal with the crisis.

Note that this crisis has been very different than the Great Depression, a period that became known for the revolutionary changes in economic theory as "The Years of High Theory," fundamentally as a result of a homonymous book published by G.L.S. Shackle in 1967. The question is why the previous crisis, during the inter-war period, led to a serious effort to rethink the discipline, but this time around nothing much happened.

In my view the only way to understand why the profession did not react to its own failure, by the way something that contrary to many others I did expect, is in light of the history of ideas, and the failures of the previous revolutionary changes during the years of high theory. First, it is important to note that Shackle himself, in ways that are very similar to the mainstream (even though Shackle was the missing link, if there is one, between Post Keynesians and Austrians), suggested that the revolutionary ideas of Keynes and Sraffa, that where at the core of the changes in the 1920s and 30s, basically meant that market imperfections imply that marginalism is a limited guide for the real world (for more see papers here and here). The point is that both Keynes' Principle of Effective Demand, and Sraffa's critique of Marshall, which led him to a revision of price theory and to the recovery of the old and forgotten theories of the surplus approach culminating with his 1960 book and the critique of the logical consistency of marginalist theories, were radical departures from neoclassical theory.

Also, it is important to note that back in the inter-war period, although the marginalist school was dominant in the UK, with Marshall reigning supreme in Cambridge, and Continental Europe, Austrians, Swedes and Italians (were Walrasian economics had more influence) at the front of the pack, in the US, which was then becoming the new hegemonic power, the predominance of marginalism was less clear. In fact, most institutions, like the American Economic Association, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and several universities were dominated by institutionalists. It is, in fact, only with the Keynesian Revolution, with Hicks, Hansen and then Modigliani (the one to introduce the fix wage model) that a certain version of Keynesianism, more neoclassical, that marginalism becomes dominant in the US. It is with the Keynesian Revolution that neoclassical economics became dominant in the US.

So the point is that a certain version of marginalism, that suggested that imperfections were at the heart of the problem, became dominant in the US, and that was a departure from the previous dominant school, but one that had significant problems. When those problems became evident in the 1960s in the midst of the capital debates, this sort of neoclassical synthesis Keynesianism came under attack, and the monetarist and New Classical counter-revolutions were possible. The return of vulgar economics was inevitable at that point. In this context, the profession lost capacity to understand reality, since it became, to a great extent, pure apologetics for free markets. Also, this counter revolution explains why authors like Krugman (which still learned his economics from old Keynesians) are surprised by the fact that the profession has forgotten basic things (the dark age of macroeconomics is his very apropos term).

Finally, the last reason why this time around the crisis did not lead to serious rethinking of the limitations of the dominant paradigm is that, while in the inter-war period Fascism and Communism were real threats (and the latter a threat to capitalism), this time around there is no significant alternative contender. Not only the US supremacy is uncontested in any serious way, but also the economic system itself is safe.

Note that vulgar economics, the shallow apologetic of markets, was dominant in the post-Ricardian period (from the 1830s onwards) and was not seriously contested until the inter-war period (Marxism, the only serious development within the surplus approach, and, hence, within scientific economics, was marginal of course). So this current state can, and most likely will, continue for a long while. Heterodox economists should prepare for the long winter. Teaching, maintaining serious and autonomous research (meaning that dialogue with the mainstream is less important that original research trying to understand the real world) and producing new heterodox economists (the production of heterodox economists by means of heterodox economists) are the tasks ahead.