Showing posts with label Socialism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Socialism. Show all posts

Sunday, June 14, 2026

Rod O’Donnell on Keynes and Liberal Socialism

Hits and Mises (click for the joke)

I have been rereading again Rod O'Donnell's work on Keynes' political and social philosophy. I had not read his 1989 book, Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics, in a long while. The occasion is the forthcoming 7th Workshop on Demand-led Growth in Rio, organized by Ricardo Summa, where I will discuss an extension my discussion of Keynes' political views, and in particular of the question of whether Keynes should be understood as a liberal or as a socialist. I had already discussed James Crotty's important contribution to this debate in my paper for Tom Palley's forthcoming Festschrift, available here. Crotty, in Keynes Against Capitalism, argues that Keynes wanted to replace the capitalism of his time with what Keynes himself called "liberal socialism." O'Donnell's case is in some ways older and, in my view, more careful, but it moves in the same direction.
 
O'Donnell's interpretation is that Keynes' economics cannot be separated from his ethical and political philosophy. Keynes was not merely trying to fix some technical problem in the theory of employment. His economics was part of a broader project concerned with the conditions for a civilized life. Keynes' social philosophy was about much more than the level of output and employment. It was about the possibility of reducing insecurity, limiting the power of the money motive, preserving individual freedom, and creating the material conditions for the good life.
 
In the two chapters on political philosophy in the 1989 book, O'Donnell presents Keynes as a liberal, but not as an old laissez-faire liberal. Keynes was not committed to the idea that private interest automatically promoted the public good. He believed that capitalism had to be managed, that the state had to take responsibility for investment, employment, public works, education, health, the arts, and the broader conditions of civilization. According to him, Keynes was also deeply critical of the moral foundations of capitalism, especially of the acquisitive mentality and the social prestige attached to money-making. 
 
That is why O'Donnell sees Keynes as moving beyond capitalism in the long run. For him, Keynes did not admire capitalism. He thought it was ugly, unstable, and morally corrupting. For O'Donnell, the instability is deeply connected to Keynes' views on probability and uncertainty. O'Donnell sees Keynes as believing capitalism is not self-stabilizing, largely because investment and economic life are organized around uncertain expectations, money, and private profit rather than social purpose. In this view, Keynes preferred capitalism to the alternatives available in his own time, above all Soviet central planning and fascism, but not because he regarded capitalism as an ideal social order.
 
O'Donnell is right to insist that Keynes' defense of capitalism was qualified. But I am less sure that Keynes wanted to transition to an alternative social arrangement. His disregard for some aspects of capitalism seems more aesthetic, at least based on his several bios, including Skidelsky's one, and in his writings like 'My Early Beliefs.' He might have thought that the pursue of profit was vulgar, and that the good life resided in the arts and the pursuit of beauty. But beauty and arts were defined in an avant-garde, elitist way. I doubt he saw beauty in a football game (or soccer as people calls it in the US). As I noted in the paper linked above, following Skidelsky, Keynes wanted to preserve the social arrangements in which he was brought up, the presuppositions of Harvey Road, as Harrod would have called them.
 
In his later 1999 essay on Keynes and socialism, O'Donnell pushes this further. Keynes, he argues, should be taken seriously as a "liberal socialist." The term, of course, was used by Keynes himself. O'Donnell's point is that socialism should not be reduced to Marxism, public ownership, class struggle, or revolutionary transformation. If socialism is understood more broadly as the use of social control for public purposes, then Keynes can be understood as a socialist of a particular kind.
 
There is something to this. Many of Keynes' views would now be seen as social democratic. Full employment policy, redistribution, social security, public works, capital controls, the euthanasia of the rentier, the socialization of investment, and the rejection of laissez-faire all became part of the language of the postwar welfare state. In that sense, Keynes does not fit the later caricature of liberalism as simply market liberalism. He is closer to the use of the term in the United States. But he belongs to a different tradition, the New Liberal tradition.
 
Peter Clarke's Liberals and Social Democrats shows that there was a group of left Liberals before Keynes, figures such as L. T. Hobhouse, J. A. Hobson, Graham Wallas, and the Hammonds, who moved British liberalism beyond the Gladstonian night-watchman state. They were all close to the Fabian Socialists, the Webbs, and Shaw, in varying degrees, and they all had a break with Fabianism. They accepted that formal liberty was not enough in a society marked by poverty, unemployment, inherited privilege, and social destitution. In that respect, they were close to what would later be called social democracy. That's Clarke's point to some extent, they were liberals and social democrats.
 
Indeed, one could say that they were among the intellectual ancestors of Keynes' liberalism. They were certainly moving away from liberalism, but, in my view, they fell short of social democracy, certainly as it was defined at that time, since they were averse to class conflict politics, and detached from any conception of the working class as the agent of political change. They were not Fabian Socialists (who mostly accepted marginalist economics), let alone Marxists, and certainly did not join Labour. They felt well represented by the Liberal Party under Asquith, and Lloyd George's People's Budget. In fact, Clarke suggests that Hobson's theories could be seen as shaping the policies of the Liberal administration.

Keynes' own political position is easier to understand in that context. He was not a socialist or a social democrat. He was a New Liberal, or perhaps a late heir to New Liberalism, who thought that liberal civilization could survive only if laissez-faire was abandoned. His political project was not to replace capitalism with working-class power, but to preserve a civilized, decentralized, liberal society by reforming capitalism from above. Managed by an educated elite, and not workers themselves. What distinguished him from the earlier New Liberals was that he developed a theory of why capitalism, although stable in purely economic terms, could settle into persistent unemployment and fail to resolve social conflicts harmoniously, thereby becoming politically unstable. But his theory was far more radical than his politics. He remained, as noted by Palley here, deeply antagonistic to the politics of class antagonism.
 
This does not mean that Keynes was against workers, at least not in any simple sense. On the contrary, his policies were favorable to workers. Full employment strengthens workers. Redistribution improves the bargaining position of workers. Public works reduce unemployment and insecurity. Low interest rates and the euthanasia of the rentier weaken capital. But none of this makes Keynes a socialist if socialism has anything to do with the working class as a political subject.
 
He was elitists and paternalistic when it came to workers. Keynes did not ground his politics in labor. He did not regard trade unions, class struggle, or workers' control as the foundations of a new social order. He certainly did not call for the abolition of private property or the collective ownership of the means of production (well duh!). Indeed, it is not even clear that he would have accepted the more moderate Labourite objective of bringing the commanding heights of the economy under public ownership as desirable in itself.
 
This is why the distinction between policies favorable to workers and working-class politics matters. Keynes wanted full employment, but not because he had adopted a socialist theory of class power, and the need for alternative ways of arranging productive forces. He wanted to prevent capitalism from producing the social conditions that could lead to revolutionary politics, authoritarianism, or collapse. In that sense, the old claim that Keynes wanted to save capitalism remains broadly correct, but it must be qualified. He wanted to save capitalism from laissez-faire capitalism. The educated bourgeoisie, people like him, would be in charge. That was illustrated by his remarks on Bretton Woods conference as a "monkey house" because of the presence of delegates from the dominions and other lesser countries.

This is also why the New Liberal connection is more useful than the socialist label. The New Liberals were reformers who understood that liberty required social conditions. They were critical of poverty and unearned income. They supported social reform and the early welfare state. But they were not socialists in the sense of grounding politics in class struggle, collective ownership or an alternative to the capitalist system. Keynes radicalized this tradition in the context of the interwar crisis, the collapse of the gold standard, mass unemployment, and the failure of orthodox economics. But he did not abandon its basic political orientation.
 
This is the crucial point. O'Donnell is right that Keynes was not a laissez-faire liberal. He is also right that Keynes used the term liberal socialism, and that Keynes' policies moved far beyond orthodox Liberal Party economics. But the problem is that O'Donnell can call Keynes a socialist only by expanding the meaning of socialism so much that it begins to cover what is more precisely called New Liberalism.
 
The paradox, then, is that Keynes' economics was more radical than the economics of many socialists of his time. Labour politicians were often trapped in sound finance and Treasury orthodoxy, while Keynes was willing to experiment with public works, managed investment, and the abandonment of old rules. But Keynes remained, in political terms, closer to the liberal tradition to which he repeatedly declared his allegiance. The confusion comes from the fact, as I emphasized in the paper linked above, that Keynes was never a socialist, but socialists eventually converted to Keynesianism. However, post-war socialists and social democrats used Keynesian tools in the fight to promote labor power. Keynesian means, but not Keynesian ends.

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

What made Keynes, Keynes

A few years back, a paper of mine was rejected in a prestigious heterodox journal, because it failed to grasp the importance of Keynes' sexual diaries. In fact, I had not read them (guilty as charged). My research was outdated, I was told by an angry referee (number 1, as it turns out). Not long after, I was asked to referee, for the same journal, I might add, a paper on Keynes' sexuality and its possible implications for his economic thought. The paper dealt with Keynes' sex diaries from the early twentieth century and suggested that Keynes' sexuality, together with his broader philosophical views, may help explain some of his later economic ideas. The question is interesting, not least because it has often been raised in different contexts and with very different political implications.

A decade ago or so, Niall Ferguson suggested that Keynesian profligacy was connected to Keynes' homosexuality and his alleged lack of concern for future generations. The notion that Keynes' theory was a short run one because he was childless has a long pedigree, associated to other conservative luminaries like Joseph Schumpeter. Same arguments were made by Murray Rothbard, as noted in the paper linked above. Ultimately, the argument is analytically weak, since it tries to move directly from biography to policy conclusions without establishing the relevant links.

The paper I read was sympathetic to Keynes and tried to connect his sexuality to his sensibilities about the economy as a whole, his views about “the good,” his relation to G.E. Moore’s philosophy, and eventually his views on uncertainty, money, and economic life.

Still, the broader problem remains. It is one thing to say that personal experiences, including sexuality, help shape the sensibilities of an author. That is almost certainly true, and in some sense trivial. It is another thing to claim that sexuality explains a particular set of analytical propositions. That is a much more ambitious claim, and it is far harder to sustain. In the case of Keynes, the relevance of the sex diaries for understanding the central analytical ideas of The General Theory (GT) is far from obvious.

There is no doubt that Keynes' philosophical views mattered. His early engagement with Moore, the Bloomsbury milieu, and his rejection of certain Victorian conventions all shaped his conception of life, morality, beauty, friendship, and the good society or the good life. These things may also have influenced his impatience with narrow utilitarianism and with purely mechanical views of economic behavior. But the difficult question is how one moves from those philosophical and personal sensibilities to the concrete analytical propositions that define Keynes' contribution to economics.

The question of exactly what was Keynes' main contribution to economic thought is often vaguely answered, and even within Post Keynesian groups there is considerable disagreement. If the answer is simply uncertainty, as for many in the heterodox camp, then the argument is incomplete. Keynes certainly gave increasing importance to uncertainty, especially in his 1937 response to critics of GT. Chapter 12, with its discussion of long-term expectations, conventions, and the famous beauty contest metaphor, is central to that interpretation. But Keynes’s contribution cannot be reduced to uncertainty.

Moreover, uncertainty alone does not make Keynes distinctive. Frank Knight and Friedrich Hayek also thought uncertainty was central to economic life, yet they reached very different conclusions from Keynes. G.L.S. Shackle, a student of Hayek and an important figure in some Post Keynesian interpretations of Keynes, combined elements of both Keynesian and Hayekian views. This suggests that the recognition of fundamental uncertainty can be grounded in very different theoretical frameworks and can lead to very different policy conclusions. The harder question, then, is not whether Keynes cared about uncertainty, but why uncertainty had the role it did in his broader theory of capitalism.

In my view, the central proposition of the GT is not simply uncertainty in a monetary economy, but the principle of effective demand. Keynes' main analytical break was with Say’s Law and with the idea that investment would automatically adjust to full-employment savings, even if slowly. The point of the GT, as Keynes himself made clear, was first of all a theory of employment. Autonomous spending determines income. Investment does not adjust automatically to full-employment saving. The level of activity can settle below full employment, not as a temporary deviation caused by rigidities, but as a normal outcome of a monetary production economy.

Uncertainty matters in that argument, but it is not central to the argument. It is the uncertainty about autonomous demand that matters. In fact, Keynes’s emphasis on uncertainty only became more explicit as he responded to critics and tried to explain why investment could not be treated as a simple function that smoothly adjusted to the full-employment level of saving, in part as a result of his acceptance of significant elements of marginalist economics. If uncertainty is presented as the core explanation, there is a danger of turning Keynes into an imperfectionist that believed that markets would work well enough if only expectations were less volatile and in the presence of full information. That was not Keynes’s deeper point.

His more radical proposition was that capitalism could be economically stable at less than full employment. It was precisely that economic stability below full employment that made the system politically unstable.

There is also a comparative problem. Michal Kalecki developed a version of the principle of effective demand independently, and arguably before Keynes. Kalecki's intellectual background was very different, shaped by Marx and Marxist authors rather than by Moore and Bloomsbury. This raises the question of how Kalecki's sexuality shaped his theory of effective demand. In that light, the question seems less compelling. That does not mean that biography is irrelevant. But it does suggest that the route from personal life to analytical theory is indirect, mediated by intellectual traditions, political commitments, historical circumstances, and theoretical problems internal to economics.

There is also the issue of Keynes' own intellectual development. Keynes' philosophical views were formed relatively early, if we are to believe Robert Skidelsky, and many other authors on the matter. But his economic views changed considerably over time. The Keynes of the Tract on Monetary Reform, the Treatise on Money, the Macmillan Committee, and The General Theory are not the same. If his basic philosophical and personal sensibilities were already present early on, the questions is  why did the principle of effective demand emerge only later, after the debates with the Cambridge Circus in the early 1930s. These questions cannot be answered simply by appealing to sexuality or early philosophical commitments.

A more plausible position would be that Keynes' sexuality and personal life formed part of a broader rejection of Victorian moral and social conventions. That rejection may have made him more open to questioning established economic doctrines, including the neoclassical faith in adjustment mechanisms, thrift, and the moral virtues of saving. It may also have contributed to his skepticism toward purely ascetic or efficiency-centered views of social life. Keynes did not think economics was an end in itself. He thought economic arrangements should be judged in relation to broader human purposes. In that limited sense, his philosophical and personal world mattered.

But the analytical core of Keynes' economics still has to be explained analytically. His theory of effective demand emerged from concrete debates about saving, investment, money, employment, and the failures of orthodox theory in the context of the Great Depression. His sexuality may help us understand Keynes as a person, and perhaps some of his broader sensibilities. It does not, by itself, explain the logic of the GT.

It is also a peculiar feature of the literature on Keynes' broader philosophical views to portray his motivations in a somewhat simplistic way as being apolitical. He had concerns with the good life, but not the public good. To accept the notion that Keynes was apolitical flies in the face of his extensive participation in the political process, not just as a bureaucrat, but more importantly as a direct participant in political campaigns, involved in the drafting of government program for Lloyd George in the 1929 election, for example.

Ultimately, the more interesting question is not whether sexuality caused Keynesian economics. It did not. The question is whether Keynes' position as an outsider to certain social conventions helped him imagine capitalism differently from the orthodox economists of his time. That seems plausible. Perhaps a good social scientist, a good economist, has to be more than "mathematician, historian, statesman, [and a] philosopher – in some degree," as Keynes suggested. They need to be a bit of an outsider, to see things from an alternative perspective.

Even then, what made Keynes, Keynes was not simply his personal life. It was his ability to transform a set of philosophical, political, and historical concerns into a powerful analytical critique of the self-adjusting market economy.

Saturday, November 25, 2023

Was Keynes a Liberal or a Socialist?

A Socialist Rag

My old Will Lyons  Lecture at Franklin & Marshall College in the Spring of 2021 is now a working paper. Prof. Lyons was a Bucknell Graduate, and a professor at F&M. The topic was based on the, at that time, recent reading of Jim Crotty's book. From the abstract:

Right-wing critics of Keynes have often suggested that he was a socialist. His policy proposals were very often described as a slippery slope that would lead society into a totalitarian nightmare. Alternatively, from the left, Keynes was often seen as a reformist that intended to preserve the essence of capitalism. His reforms were mere window dressing on an exploitative system. The scholarship on Keynes also remained divided. However, in the last few decades a more robust position in favor of Keynes’ socialist affiliation was developed, particularly in the careful scholarship by Rod O’Donnell and James Crotty. This paper suggests that while Keynes was a pragmatist willing to experiment in economic policy, and fully aware of the need to transform and transcend laissez-faire capitalism, he remained a liberal, in particular because Labourites, and most socialists, remained conservative in their economic policy outlook. Keynes was a
revolutionary in economic theory, but a moderate in his politics.

Read paper here.

Thursday, March 30, 2023

Review of Crotty's "Keynes Against Capitalism" (forthcoming in ROKE)

It should not be a surprise that John Maynard Keynes is often seen as being relatively conservative by many progressively inclined or radical economists, that often tend to prefer the views of Michal Kalecki, or the more radical approach of Keynes’ favorite disciple, Joan Robinson. That is not the case in James Crotty’s book Keynes Against Capitalism, who takes a diametrically opposite view. He tells us that: “It is almost universally believed that Keynes wrote his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [GT from now on], to save capitalism from the socialist, communist, and fascist forces that were rising up during the Great Depression era”, but in his view, that “was not the case with respect to socialism. The historical record shows that Keynes wanted to replace then-current capitalism in Britain with what he referred to as ‘Liberal Socialism’” (Crotty, 2019: 1-2). His Keynes was anti-capitalist and, in some sense, a socialist. The notion that Keynes was a socialist often encounters as much resistance as the notion that he was somewhat conservative, of course.

The book is divided in three parts. The first part of the book traces the development of Keynes’ ideas in the inter-war period starting with his significant role during the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles, and the publication of his instant bestseller, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, that made him a worldwide celebrity, to development of the revolutionary ideas in the GT. The second part analyzes the theoretical ideas of the GT, and how they provide the foundations for a radical and socialist remaking of British capitalism. The third and last part discusses Keynes’ program in action, in the buildup to the war, and during World War-II, and its relevance for our days.

The first part of the book suggests that the Keynesian Revolution started in the 1920s with the slow evolution of Keynes’ thinking about the problems of the British economy, and his rethinking of neoclassical economics. Crotty uses the term classical, as did Keynes, creating unnecessary confusion, in particular because of his own sympathies with Marxist economics, that builds critically on the classical surplus approach. Crotty makes an important point, often neglected in the discussions of Keynesian economics. For Keynes the need for a new theory derived from an appreciation of the historical and institutional changes of British capitalism. Crotty argues: “Keynes’s core belief [was] that the West had entered a completely new historical era in which the institutions and policies currently used to regulate economic life were totally inappropriate. He associated himself with the American institutionalist economist John R. Commons’s view that Europe and America were currently in transition to a new historical epoch in which the main task was to create a new ‘regime which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces’” (Ibid.: 81).

The doctrines of laissez-faire, that were well adapted to the Victorian Era, were not suited for the world that emerged from World War-I, in which mass production, mass consumption and the rise of organized labor required a certain degree of government intervention to manage the economy. This is the best and most original part of the book, in which Crotty reminds us that: “Keynes’s enthusiastic and consistent support for state control of most large-scale capital investment is not the only ‘radical’ policy position overlooked by mainstream ‘Keynesian’ economists; his support of detailed industrial and labor-market policy has escaped their attention as well” (Ibid.: 87). The emphasis on the importance of industrial and labor policies, in particular, their direct connection with Keynes’ opposition to the return to Gold Standard and his support of the coal miners’ strike of 1926, are central to understand his need to rethink his economic theory.

However, even in this part, there is a neglect of an important element of Keynes’ trajectory, and for the development of the ideas exposed in the GT. Crotty forgets to note that Cambridge monetary theory was quite underdeveloped in the 1920s, and was based mostly on an Appendix to Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, and his evidence to some Royal Commission, and was in fact being developed by Keynes and his colleague Dennis Robertson during the 1920s. At that point it was unclear that this was a complete rupture with Marshallian economics on monetary affairs, as much as Piero Sraffa was starting to break with the marginalist theory of value and distribution with Keynes’ support. In fact, Keynes’ thought that his book A Treatise on Money was the culmination of the development of the alternative theory, which he defended as a member of the Macmillan Committee, and that argued that the Depression resulted from the high interest rates, that prevented investment from adjusting to full employment savings, as a result of the Gold Standard. This view was perfectly compatible with neoclassical economics, even if Keynes already advocated for public works, an unorthodox policy, as a solution for the crisis.

However, it was at this point, exactly as a result of the criticism of his book by the young economists of the Circus – a group that included besides Sraffa and Robinson, the latter’s husband, Austin, Richard Kahn, and James Meade – that Keynes finally developed in 1932, relatively late, his main theoretical contribution to economics, the Principle of Effective Demand. In other words, while the 1920s were formative, it was only with the Great Depression and his immersion in pure theory in the early 1930s that Keynes finally broke with orthodoxy in theory. The fact that he changed his diagnosis of the Depression, and adopted a whole new theory right after the publication of what should have been his major theoretical work to the date, led to the traditional complain that Keynes was inconsistent and held more than one view at the same time. Friedrich Hayek and Keynes’ opponents at the London School of Economics would make a of this inconsistency one of their main criticisms of Keynesianism.

This is also relevant because it shows that Peter Clarke is correct when he argues that: “The Suggestion that he [Keynes] wrote The General Theory because he had an axe to grind in immediate policy arguments is wide of the mark” (Clarke, 1991: 163). In other words, Keynes’ views on policy issues could be defended, and in fact he did defend them in the 1920s as noted by Crotty, even before he developed the notion that changes in the level of income were the mechanism by which savings adjusted to investment, and not the other way round. The fact that Crotty suggests that the GT was written: “to convince economists and members of Britain’s intellectual, business, and political elites that the theory that informed their economic worldview and provided essential support for the disastrous conservative economic policies of the era was fundamentally flawed” (Crotty, 2019: 161) seems incorrect.

This is compounded by the fact that Crotty accepts Keynes’ theory of interest and the notion of a marginal efficiency of capital in the second part of the book, and as such is forced, as Keynes was, in particular in the famous 1937 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) amply cited by Crotty, to use the argument of fundamental uncertainty to preclude the possibility that a sufficiently low interest rate would equilibrate investment to full employment savings. Crotty centers his analytical interpretation of Keynes on chapter 12 of the GT, and his defense of the GT in the QJE paper. The argument is essentially one associated with uncertainty and financial instability. In his words: “The outbreak of pessimism and the loss of confidence in the conventions that underlie expectation formation will also cast a pall over the bond market, a point Keynes also stressed in his 1937 defense of The General Theory in the QJE” (Ibid.: 266). It is clear that the abandonment of the marginalist, or neoclassical, notion of a marginal efficiency of capital would actually strengthen Crotty’s point, but for some reason he neglects the important results that followed from the capital debates in the 1960s, which were central for the completion, on a theoretical level, of the Keynesian Revolution in theory.

On the issue of Keynes’ adherence to some form of socialism, Crotty also makes a valiant case for his position. He provides copious circumstantial evidence, and quotes the famous phrase by Keynes in which he says that: “I am sure that I am less conservative than the average Labour voter; I fancy that I have played in my mind with the possibilities of greater social changes than come within the present philosophies of Mr. Sidney Webb, Mr. Thomas, or Mr. Wheatley. The republic of my imagination lies to the extreme left of celestial space” (Keynes, 1926: 308-309). The part that Crotty forgets to cite is the subsequent phrase, in which he tells us: “Yet—all the same—I feel that my true home, so long as they offer a roof and a floor, is still with the Liberals” (Ibid.). Certainly, many of Keynes’ policy proposals were radical. They moved in the direction that was compatible with socialist or social democratic views. And he recognized he had many common goals with Labour and the Fabian Socialists. But he called his views liberal socialism, and remained an Asquith New Liberal all his life.

Liberalism also spoke to Keynes political and social outlook in ways that Labour or Socialism never did. He was an elitist, the product of Eton and King’s College, Cambridge, and a member of the Apostles and the Bloomsbury group. To some extent Labour reciprocated. Philp Snowden, Labour’s first chancellor of the exchequer, was a committed defender of the Treasury View, and an avowed anti-Keynesian. Hugh Dalton, Clement Atlee’s first chancellor of the exchequer, was averse to Keynesian policies, and for him Keynesianism: “was virtually a deathbed conversion, for only in his fourth, final, fatal Budget of November 1947 did he explicitly relate his measures, which stepped taxes across the board, to the problem of controlling inflation… The paradox is that a Keynesian approach was directed chiefly to the problem of keeping demand down, not up” (Clarke, 1991: 186-87). But if there is a future for socialism, Crotty’s view that Keynes’ ideas remain relevant is correct, and there could be no sensible socialism without a good dose of Keynesianism.

References:

Clarke, P. 1991. A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher, London: Hamish Hamilton.

Crotty, J. 2019. Keynes Against Capitalism: His Economic Case for Liberal Socialism, London: Routledge.

Keynes, J. M. 1926. “Liberalism and Labour,” in A. Robinson and D. Moggridge (eds.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Essays in Persuasion, Volume IX, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Sunday, May 23, 2021

Was Keynes a Liberal or a Socialist?

A shorter version at the ISET conference of my Will Lyons Lecture at Franklin & Marshall. And yes, I think Harrod and Skidelsky were right (not Crotty and O'Donnell). He was definitely an Asquith Liberal.

Monday, December 28, 2020

Leo Panitch and the Lessons from Socialist Defeats

 


A few weeks ago I bought the little book on top (a new edition of a previously published one, I think). Sadly not long after I learnt of Leo Panitch's untimely death (obit by Chibber here). The book tries to account for three recent defeats of the democratic socialist left in recent times, even though it was written before the ultimate defeat of Bernie Sanders by the establishment candidate earlier this year. He and his co-authors discuss the rise of democratic socialism, and the consequences of the defeat, or one might say the caving, suffered by Syriza, which they point out was "the only party to the left of traditional social democracy in Europe that succeeded in winning a national election"* (p. 29), and what they call "the devastating defeat Corbyn suffered at the hand of Boris Johnson in December 2019" (p. 67).

The main lesson about the Syriza failure, even before the somewhat expected electoral defeat in 2019, was the absence of a Plan B. It could not back it's challenge to the Troika's austerity plans, since there was no plan for exiting the Euro, and they assume that would have led to leaving the European Union too. They say: "There was a marked lack of seriousness, if not dishonesty, behind the tendency to treat the referendum as proving, not just the massive public support for resisting further Troika-imposed draconian austerity (which was the question actually posed) but that the same support would have existed for leaving the eurozone, and most likely the EU, in light of the capital and import controls that this inevitably would have led to." In a sense, the notion is that there was support (from the middle class?) for pushing against the Troika, but not really for leaving the Euro. On Syriza's betrayal of the No Referendum see the old post by Stavros Mavroudeas here.

The lessons in the Corbyn case are less clear to me. They praise the Labour Party's 2019 Manifesto as being "more coherent and progressive [than the 2017 one], especially in making the environmental crisis rather than the need for export competitiveness, the overarching framework for the radical industrial strategy" (pp. 67-68). But they seem concerned fundamentally with how markets would punish a more radical government, and with the absence of "plans to deal with capital flight or a run on the pound" and the silence on "how and when to introduce controls over the movement of capital" (p. 65; although that seems more about the 2017 Manifesto). That notion of the dangers of capital blackmailing left of center governments seems to be part of their general view. They also tell us (p. 82), regarding the Meidner Plan in Sweden to socialize the ownership of the means of production,  that it was "resisted by Palme's Social Democratic government... [because] it had a fatal flaw: why would owners, knowing there is a timetable for their expropriation, continue to invest?"

Of course, a left of center governments could use monetary policy tools to avoid capital flight (including higher rates, and not just controls), and investment depends considerably more on whether the economy is growing or not. But my main problem with the discussion on Corbyn's defeat is their unwillingness to deal with the issue of Brexit and the role it played in his defeat more explicitly. My views on Brexit have not changed much since this post, so I'll avoid getting into it. But it seems clear that, like in the United States, in order to discuss the economic grievances of the working class, the left of center parties must be willing to discuss more directly the problems of economic integration.

Sanders has been doing that, and yet, he lost a second time. The book cannot discuss that, since it was written, it seems, before April and the victory of Biden in the primary. Here the issues of the inability to win, to a great extent because the party machine makes it impossible, opens the discussion of whether fighting inside the Democratic Party is the correct strategy. Like Michael Harrington, I believe that there is little alternative. I'm not sure that's their view in the book. At any rate, they do praise Bernie for having "a class-focused campaign" (p. 71) and spend a good amount of ink (pp. 74-86) criticizing Elizabeth Warren's firm based rather than class-based struggle for democracy (p. 87). It seems that a reform both of the primary system within the Democratic Party and an elimination of the electoral college are needed for a democratic (lower case) society in the US.

If there is a lesson, although it's not expelled out explicitly in the book, is that the forces of neoliberalism are incredibly strong, and resilient. Perhaps, that's a lesson that could have been seen in the several defeats of the left in Latin America with the end of the pink tide a few years ago. In the case of Latin America, lawfare, the use of the media, and the international institutions, and more recently even military force (in the case of Bolivia)+ were central to defeat left of center governments. In the case of Chile, it's worth remembering the role of the Constitution in tying the hands of left of center administrations, and how a referendum was needed to overturn Pinochet's charter. And the book suggests correctly in my view that "democratization can't occur without changing the context within which economic units, and thus workers, relate to each other" (p. 85). At any rate, Panitch always forced us to reflect, and this last book continues to do so.

* Podemos in Spain is part of the government coalition, of course.

+ Although international organizations like the Organization of American States were crucial too, and the coup was eventually defeated by the democratic forces on the left.

Saturday, March 21, 2020

World War II, not the New Deal, is the model for COVID-19 macroeconomic policies

Central planning (Socialism?) in democratic societies

There is a lot being written on the causes and cures for the economic consequences of the Coronavirus (COVID-19). The predictable distinction is among those that think that this is essentially a demand shock, mostly to services, and those that are concerned with the disruption to supply chains. And to some extent both are correct. But that is not the more relevant problem here, which is whether we need just more government or a change in the nature of the governmental interventions.

Neil Irwin, from the New York Times, provides a suitable and simple explanation of the demand shock story. Note that a demand shock often goes together with significant financial implications, as agents with reduced revenue tend to default on loans or payment streams to any liabilities. The Economist noted the risk associated with excessive corporate debt, and the possibility that the virus might trigger a debt-deflation type crisis in financial markets. On the fragility of corporate balance sheets see also this insightful piece by Michalis Nikiforos. Many economists have talked in favor of this interpretation, and certainly there is a lot to be said about this view, which I tend to agree with, by the way.

The fiscal expansion plans put forward by the administration have been mostly seen through the lens of a regular demand shock version of the recession. They include things like a bailout of certain sectors hit hard by the sudden decline in demand, like the airlines, and checks to those that have lost their jobs, besides the Fed injecting liquidity to reduce the financial effects of the demand shock. In that sense, not very different from the fiscal package and financial rescue of the 2008 crisis.

Of course, macroeconomic policies in 2008, even though they did preclude a fall in unemployment of the magnitude that had occurred in the 1930s during the Great Depression, were flawed in many ways. They did rescue banks, but left many to lose their houses for one (and Obama's Justice Department did not prosecute in any significant way the many financial excesses of Wall St); it was also probably on the smaller side, leading to a prolonged, but very slow, recovery, in which labor market conditions remained relatively poor for many workers, even with low levels of unemployment by the end. All things that increased the problems at the bottom of the income distribution and helped explain Trump's political victory in 2016. Hence, there is reasonable fear that these policies might not work well this time around again. Besides, there is a case to be made that this crisis is not fundamentally a demand shock.

A prominent defender of the latter is Dean Baker. He says: "Our problem is not creating demand in the economy, the problem is keeping people more or less whole for a possibly extended period in which much of the economy is shut down." And as he notes, sending checks to people directly will fall short of a solution. Checks will be irrelevant for many, that have secure jobs, and insufficient for many, since it will be too little, or because some people might be directly excluded from such programs, like undocumented immigrants with US born children. Dean's alternative is to send money directly to companies that would keep workers employed and inactive, helping in the recovery too. Of course this solution deals fundamentally with those in the labor market, and not with those in more precarious situations.

I see the problem as being essentially a demand shock, note that the increase in unemployment insurance applications was marked last week, to a great extent associated to Coronavirus layoffs. Obviously nobody would deny the supply side effects of the crisis, even though these are less disruptive in the short run, in my view. Nobody is being laid off because the company is unable to obtain intermediary goods for production, or at least not on significant numbers. It is the sudden collapse of demand that matters. But that misses the point of the kind of demand and supply shocks that have hit the economy. These are localized, uneven shocks and an efficient policy reaction requires targeted interventions. The kind of intervention we need is one that one the demand side tries to maintain the ability of families with cash flows problems (the ones laid off and those that were already outside the formal job market), and on the supply side that redirects production to the sectors that would experiment a surge in demand.

The most typical analogy in times of macroeconomic crises is the Great Depression, and progressives, not incorrectly go searching for ideas in the New Deal tool box. However, the New Deal was mostly about regulation, in its first phase, and about spending, in particular after the Roosevelt Recession. The kind of intervention we need is more akin to World War II, one in which government agencies have ample powers to requisite, produce or fund private corporations to produce what is needed as vital effort for survival, as alluded by Jamie Galbraith in his recent piece on the virus. For example, we need to reconvert the economy to produce more ventilators, which are in short supply, and also to ration the ability of families to hoard certain key central consumer goods, to preclude localized scarcity of essential items like hand sanitizer. We need planning, not just more government spending. And, yes, that means Socialism (or Social Democracy). This was something that no US citizen would have been surprised about, in particular after the incredible collapse of the market economy in the early 1930s, and it should not be a surprise that Socialism is somewhat more popular now. COVID-19 makes it clear why markets cannot cope with global crisis like a pandemic.

Another central element of the World War II effort was the generous and strategic concern with the global impact of US policies. Lend-lease, even before the US entry in the war, was central for allowing the UK resist the Nazi onslaught, and the subsequent program with the Soviet Union was crucial for them to be able to resist, and eventually win the war in the European front. In order to defeat Nazism, the US authorities were willing to cooperate with a Communist government, and provide significant resources. A similar approach should be used to deal with nations that are not seen as allied (like the Soviets then), but that in a particular context should be helped, like Iran, and Venezuela, which are and will be under extreme duress during the pandemic. The negative effects on the US image associated to the tightening of the sanctions, and the impediments to IMF loans under these circumstances, will be hard to reverse.

Finally, some think that this would be a short lived V-shaped recession. Meaning that once the main social distancing policies are lifted, the economy will recover swiftly. Note, however, that the duration of the measures is contingent on its own success. The more successful we are at flattening the curve, meaning reducing the contagion rate, to avoid overwhelming the health system, the longer the economic disruption will be, and the more we would need a planned economy.

PS: Portuguese translation here.

Monday, May 4, 2015

Keynes on Socialism

"The question is whether we are prepared to move out of the nineteenth century laissez-faire state into an era of liberal socialism, by which I mean a system where we can act as an organized community for common purposes and to promote social and economic justice, whilst respecting and protecting the individual - his freedom of choice, his faith, his mind and its expression, his enterprise and his property" (Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, volume XXI, p. 500).

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Al Campbell: Designing Socialism - Visions, Projections, Models

Edited by Al Campbell
This highly readable volume explores what contemporary models of socialism have to offer for envisioning a better world and developing feasible alternatives to neoliberalism and pervasive inequality. The book is organized around clearly stated questions that capture core issues and debates. Concise contributions from leading thinkers address the theoretical and historical justification for socialism, what a socialist society would look like, how self-interest and the interests of society can be reconciled, the stages and productive forces of socialism, and how socialist growth differs from capitalist growth. Two related book reviews are included. This volume was originally published as a special issue of Science & Society VOLUME 76, NO. 2, APRIL 2012
See here.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

Capitalism, Socialism and all that

Allan Meltzer has written a book in defense of Capitalism (Why Capitalism?). The funny thing is that nowhere he tries to define capitalism, which he seems to equate with market economies and other inane concepts. If there is a definition in his book is that capitalism is a system based on "a foundation of a rule of law, which protects individual rights to property, and, in the first instance, aligns rewards to values produced."* I'll get to some of the issues with the book on another post [I discussed the meaning of capitalism before here].

Note that the term capitalism only became more widely used in the 1930s, when the system was hit by its most severe crisis in history, and when alternative systems became more attractive. The figure below show the use of the various terms, not just modes of production, like Capitalism (and Communism, which does have a connection to an ancient mode of production) but also political ideologies (these two are often confused in political discussions).
Note that Socialism has declined considerably since the late 1970s, and more so after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Social Democracy (the Northern European term) was never as popular as Socialism (the Southern European one).

Note also that the term capitalism as a proxy of market economy, or laissez faire, more of an ideology related to economic policy than a proper description of a mode of production was always more popular than the alternatives expressions. If you use alternatives to capitalism you can see that none has been particularly catchy.
While it is difficult to foresee a crisis of a mode of production, and certainly I would agree that the 2007-9 crisis, as bad as it is, does not mark the beginning of the end of Capitalism, I think it is far from clear that alternatives to the free market ideology (Meltzer's capitalism) are not possible. But a proper discussion would require that Meltzer understood the difference between the ideology of free markets, and the existence of modes of production.

I could go on the problems of this confusion, but here is a simple reason why Marx should be still in the curricula of economics. And Marx should be required reading even for those that disagree with him [as much as neoclassical manuals are read by heterodox people]. The quality of the historical understanding of the development of Capitalism, even by economists with reasonably well researched economic history books [I'm referring to Meltzer's history of the Fed, here and here, which I think is misguided, but well researched and relevant] is appalling. Meltzer should avoid writing about why capitalism is good until he learns what Capitalism is.

* If this was true you should have some sort of relation between productivity and remuneration, which is hardly the case.