Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts

Sunday, September 27, 2026

The Economist Turns its Back on Reality

 
False equivalency? You bet*
 
The Economist just published one of its lead articles on the Brazilian election, with the rather dramatic title "Brazil turns its back on the future." The basic argument is not particularly original. Brazil is a country with enormous potential, but it does not grow enough, spends too much, has too much debt, and now voters are faced with two dismal choices that are both equally bad. Lula on the left and Flávio Bolsonaro on the right.
 
There are many problems with the piece (where to start?). The most obvious is the strange equivalence between Lula and Bolsonaro's son. The article itself recognizes that Lula is a democrat and that Flávio questions the reliability of the voting machines and has suggested that he might not accept an electoral defeat. It also notes, almost in passing, that his main political proposal is essentially to pardon his father, who was convicted for his role in the attempted coup after the 2022 election. These things are not exactly equivalent to being old and not cutting government spending enough.
 
The discussion of corruption is even stranger. I have said this many times over the years, but it's worth repeating. There is simply no material evidence that Lula personally received money from the corruption schemes associated with Petrobras or anything else (e.g. the infamous apartment). His enemies looked very hard (and they had every incentive to find something). Lava Jato was one of the most extensive anti-corruption investigations anywhere in the world. The leaked conversations from the so-called Vaza Jato, and the subsequent decisions concerning Judge Sergio Moro's partiality, hardly strengthened the argument that Lula was convicted on the basis of solid evidence. My view has always been simple on this matter. If there was evidence that Lula personally pocketed money, after all these years somebody would presumably have produced it. The absence of evidence is not evidence against its existence, but it makes a pretty strong case. Many politicians have been caught with Swiss accounts and other hard to explain funds. Not Lula.
 
The contrast with Flávio is remarkable. The old 'rachadinha' investigation alleged that millions of reais had been diverted through employees of his office.** The case was eventually derailed by judicial rulings excluding evidence, not by the discovery that the underlying transactions never took place. More recently Flávio had to acknowledge his relationship with Daniel Vorcaro after recordings contradicted his previous denials. He had arranged financing from Vorcaro for a movie glorifying his father (you couldn't make this stuff up), and Reuters reported that messages obtained in the Banco Master investigation showed the two referring to each other as "brother." Flávio denies that there was any quid pro quo or illegal conduct (yeah, sure, and I believe in Santa Claus). Yet The Economist manages to subsume the whole thing under the proposition that Brazil has a generic problem of "entrenched corruption," for which Lula and Flávio are somehow equally inadequate responses.

To be clear, corruption exists in Brazil. It exists everywhere. I see no particular reason to think that Brazil is uniquely corrupt (certainly compared with a United States in which the current president has repeatedly blurred the lines between public office and his private business interests). The relevant question is who did what, and what evidence exists. Corruption cannot simply be invoked as a magic word to erase rather obvious differences. One is forced to conclude that the newspaper's (as they refer to themselves; it's a magazine) writers are too gullible, or they don't really care about corruption at all. This is just a smokescreen for their real issue: the "fiscal problem." Their economic argument is perhaps more conventional, but not much better. On the economics they are closer to Flávio's views (I mean the people around him; he has no views on anything). 

According to The Economist, excessive government spending raises debt, which raises interest rates, which crowds out investment and prevents Brazil from growing (the old Treasury view Keynes fought in the 1930s; truly nothing new under the sun). Therefore Brazil needs deep spending cuts. Something like Milei, which they also keep promoting as somewhat of an example for the region. Renan Santos (who?), the libertarian candidate, apparently has the ideas that "match the moment most closely." That tells you how out of touch they are, and also why this is a disguised defense of Bolosnaro's kid, who had Milei in the launch of his campaign (and has an Econ advisor promising deep cuts like Milei; or as promised by Elon Musk's failed DOGE).

Lula's problem, in my view, has been almost exactly the opposite. His government has been far too concerned with fiscal restraint. As I noted in my previous post, the government has accepted a fiscal framework designed essentially to constrain the growth of government spending, and the evolution of Bolsa Família is illustrative of how cautious fiscal policy has remained. If you accept a demand-led, view of growth (admittedly The Economist and most of the profession does not), this matters enormously. Government spending is one of the central sources of autonomous demand. If autonomous expenditures grow slowly, demand grows slowly, and induced investment will also grow slowly. There is no mysterious mechanism by which cutting spending produces the private investment necessary to accelerate growth. The confidence fairy has been around for a long time in discussions of Brazil (and has not acquired much empirical support with age).

Even the debt argument is somewhat circular. High interest rates themselves increase the government's interest bill and therefore public debt. Then the higher interest bill is presented as evidence that fiscal policy is unsustainable and government spending must be reduced. The political intention should be straightforward to understand. High rates transfer income toward rentiers, increase the fiscal deficit, and then the resulting deficit becomes an argument for cutting social expenditure. I discussed essentially the same mechanism recently in another context.

But the really egregious aspect of The Economist piece is political. The newspaper (okay I'll play ball) likes to portray itself as a defender of classical liberalism (although economically it has been closer to neoliberalism for a very long time). Yet when confronted with an election between a conventional center-left president who has respected democratic institutions and an authoritarian candidate who questions elections, wants to free the leader of an attempted coup, has a long history of corruption allegations (that are pretty credible), and comes from a political milieu with well-documented connections to Rio's militias (that he doesn't deny, BTW), the decisive issue apparently remains whether somebody is willing to cut government spending deeply enough. Fiscal austerity, it seems, trumps liberal democracy. That says considerably more about The Economist than it does about Brazil. Shame on them!
 
* There is a little joke on bets, that Lula tried to regulate, and now has forbidden. 
** There is also the issue of his chocolate store, with crazy high profits (and all involving cash deposits), used to launder the proceeds of the scheme. The funny thing is that there was a chocolate shop not far from my dad's apartment (that was in Buenos Aires, so no connection), that was always open, but over many years, I never saw a single client. And while other, seemingly more profitable, shops went out of business, this one persevered. I always joked that it was a front for something. Apparently it is true, chocolate shops are a good front for the mafia.

Friday, November 2, 2018

The End of Brazilian Democracy


As noted in my previous post on this, there was a good chance that the Neo-Fascist candidate Jair Bolsonaro would win the election in Brazil. And he did, with approximately 39 percent of all votes. There are only a few things that I want to point out about this.

The Workers' Party (PT) candidate received about 32 percent of all votes. Note that 29 percent or so did not vote, in one way or another. So PT maintained almost one third of the electorate in this election, while its rival in the previous 6 elections (PT was the winner or close runner up going back to 1989), the Social Democrats (PSDB), has vanished. And the defeat of PT was possible only with years of judicial harassment, the illegitimate imprisonment of the party leader (Lula), the blocking of his candidacy, precluding him from giving interviews, and the relentless media campaign against PT, tarnishing the party as corrupt. In that sense, the result is not unexpected, and puts in question the meaning of democracy in Brazil, to say the least.

The second important point is that the economic situation will certainly not improve, for those that think that the Brazilian problem was  simply  political instability. In fact, the incoming administration would be a more radical version of the neoliberal post-coup government of the last two years. They are trying to negotiate social security reform, meaning cutting off benefits, and partial privatization, before the end of the year to avoid the political costs associated with it. That on top of the labor reform that was approved last year. The notion is that one would allow for higher savings, since people would be forced to save for retirement, and the other would allow for lower wages, with one leading to higher investment and the other to higher employment. Of course, the logic behind that is hard to sustain, and the evidence regarding this kind of structural reforms is very clear about their failures. Expect lower wages, and higher poverty in old age. And no growth.

The rest is based on the vague rhetoric of the minimal state, meaning spending less (and also taxing less), liberalization and privatization, with a strong geopolitical alignment with the United States (meaning leaving aside even right wing governments in Latin America, like Macri in Argentina). The question is whether they will really promote fiscal adjustment. Paulo Guedes, the incoming minister of the economy (with the finance and planning ministries unified) has suggested that a zero deficit will be pursued (an idea that seems that of an ideological fanatic rather than someone with experience in this matters). It also seems that there will be a greater willingness to allow for a more depreciated real, perhaps creating an exchange rate target. Note that these discussions were very superficial and went hand in hand with the revived idea of using the external reserves for financing the buying of public debt in reais.

I'm more skeptical than Luis Nassif about the the possibility of higher growth related to the competitiveness of a depreciated real. Btw, this was a well-known New Developmentalist proposition, and I'm not sure how it fits with Guedes's Chicago Boy credentials. At any rate, if that happens expect more inflation, and additional contractionary effects of the depreciation. On the second point, the use the reserves to pay down debt in reais there is nothing good to say. It's preposterous. There is no need to use dollars to finance debt in domestic currency. And the whole point of that huge pile of dollars is to avoid a crisis like the Argentine one.

Perhaps, the last two issues that I want to emphasize are the more important ones, and somewhat counter intuitive, relating to his relation to populism and corruption. There is a widespread view that the incoming president is nationalist and that somehow links him to other right-wing populists in the world, like Trump. While it's true that his origins are in a sort of right-wing militaristic nationalism, it is clear that he was willing very fast to shed any ideas regarding the protection of national economic interests. His economic policies will promote free trade and privatization, and will go in the opposite direction of the global trends. Unlike Trump that has been somewhat nationalistic in his trade renegotiations with the North American partners and more clearly with China, Bolsonaro will give up any leadership role in Latin America and discard Mercosul. In part that is the result of Bolsonaro adapting to the needs of the political system in Brazil, and understanding that in order to get elected he would have to signal to the local elites his willingness to promote neoliberal policies.

And that's the most important thing that everybody missed with his election. No, he is not the result of the vote of people tired with corruption. Some (perhaps many) uninformed voters might have that as their main reason for voting him. He's an entrenched politician, with almost three decades in congress (even if an irrelevant one). Bolsonaro is the enthronization of the corruption, meaning the normal back and forth pork barrel politics that allows for policies to be passed in congress. He is the product of that. The elites thought they could use congress, for the impeachment, and the Car-Wash (Lava-Jato) operation against corruption to deliver the government to a PSDB candidate. They failed partially. Bolsonoro rather than the PSDB was the lucky inheritor of the destruction of Brazilian democratic institutions.

But the coalition that was behind the coup is still in power. That is clear with the acceptance of a cabinet position by Sergio Moro, the Car-Wash judge.* That is, the same coalition that allowed all administrations to govern since the return of democracy will be put in place with an increasing role of smaller parties (many connected to Evangelicals; this should be part of another discussion, since it did have a role in his rise, but here again he used that more than representing these movements). And the corruption will continue, but it will not be investigated.

People that voted for him were tired of the inability of PSDB to win elections, and they were essentially anti-PT because they hated the social improvements of the good decade of growth and inequality reduction. The key to the victory was wiping out of one third of the vote, creating high levels of abstention. These are people in the middle, that decided that between a right-winger flirting with authoritarian rule and PT there was no good alternative (and the media, including the international one, facilitated that message). Perhaps, the epitome of that behavior was the ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Even Cardoso, that Bolsonaro had suggested in the past should have been murdered by the military, said he would not vote for him, but did not endorse Haddad, the PT candidate.

So in my view, the one third of the vote indicates that PT will remain, in spite of all these pressures, the main left of center party in the country in the near future. PT is NOT dead (we will see in the next few years, but that's my bet). Second, expect neoliberal policies to worsen the economic crisis in course. Bolsonaro is not a nationalist in the mold of Trump, although he has authoritarian tendencies, and democracy is at risk. And he is the result of a corrupt bargain to promote the return of the same ruling elites that were in place before PT. How long can he govern without economic recovery, you may ask. Look south to Argentina for an answer. Three years into a disastrous administration it's still unclear that the Peronist left could mount a viable alternative in next year election. So we will have very though years ahead.

* He is the judge responsible for Lula's process, and that paved the way to Bolsonaro's victory (even though he probably preferred a PSDB victory) is going to be the equivalent of the attorney general, the minister of justice.