Rogoff on debt, growth, and the return of the New Consensus

Professor Rogoff has written an unusually angry letter to the New York Review of Books in response to Trevor Jackson’s critical review of his recent book, Our Dollar, Your Problem. It seems that someone never had a bad review before. Rogoff seems particularly offended that the reviewer did not sufficiently appreciate the success of his book or its favorable reception elsewhere (boo hoo).

But the substance matters more. Rogoff returns to the old argument that very high legacy debt weighs on growth. He acknowledges that the infamous 2010 Reinhart-Rogoff paper contained “one mistake,” but insists that the error did not affect the later and more complete work, which reached the same conclusion. He also argues that high debt may limit a government’s capacity to respond to financial crises, pandemics, and wars. Finally, he complains that progressive economists who once believed in a fiscal “free lunch” are now walking back their views because of the post-pandemic rise in inflation and interest rates.

The first problem is that the 2010 result was not a trivial early-stage slip. The Herndon, Ash, and Pollin replication found selective exclusion of available data, coding errors, and an inappropriate weighting procedure. Correcting those problems changed the alleged result dramatically. For the postwar sample, countries with debt ratios above 90 percent of GDP had averaged growth of 2.2 percent, rather than the minus 0.1 percent reported by Reinhart and Rogoff. More importantly, there was no robust historical cliff at the supposedly fateful 90 percent threshold.

That mattered because the paper was not merely an academic exercise. It became a central intellectual prop for post-2008 austerity. It was cited by US and European officials eager to defend smaller fiscal packages, and to present fiscal retrenchment as a matter of arithmetic rather than of class politics. The notion was that public debt above a certain level produces stagnation, so governments must tighten their belts even in the aftermath of a financial crash. That was always bad economics and worse policy.

Even the IMF later concluded that there was no magic threshold. Growth rates (that reduce the burden of debt), interest rates (that determine the growth of previous debt), currency denomination (never discussed), and the political limits of state action (often related to class issues) are the real issues. A country that issues debt in its own currency and has a central bank willing to act as the fiscal agent of the Treasury is in a radically different position from one that borrows in foreign currency or, as in the eurozone, lacks a genuine lender of last resort and unified fiscal policy.

Note that Rogoff does not discuss the distinction between debt in domestic and foreign currency. The relevant issue is not a universal public debt-to-GDP ratio in domestic currency that slows down growth. The issue is, for most countries, whether they have an external constraint and need debt in foreign currency. Hegemonic countries with the key currency don't face that constraint.

This is hardly a novel insight. Britain’s eighteenth-century experience should be enough to make anyone wary of universal debt thresholds. British public debt rose through the century and reached roughly 260 percent of GDP after the Napoleonic Wars. Yet that debt did not bankrupt Britain. It happened as the Industrial Revolution was underway (perhaps a coincidence). It financed war, helped sustain a powerful fiscal-military state, and formed part of the historical conditions under which Britain industrialized and became the dominant global power. The question, as I argued years ago, is not the size of debt in the abstract, but how it is used and how it is funded. Deficits that create employment, build infrastructure, expand public services, and increase productive capacity are not equivalent to deficits that rescue banks, subsidize rentiers, or finance tax cuts for the wealthy. Functional finance begins from that elementary point.

Rogoff’s invocation of the post-pandemic inflation episode is revealing. The issue is whether inflation and higher interest rates prove that the return of fiscal restraint was necessary, as he seems to think. To be clear; they do not. The pandemic inflation was shaped by supply disruptions, energy shocks, and bottlenecks. It was not a straightforward result of excess demand generated by government deficits, even if government spending did maintain demand and allowed for a fast recovery (that was the point, BTW). What Rogoff’s language reveals is the return of the New Consensus. In this view, inflation is presumed to the result of excessive demand, and higher rates restore discipline. In this context, fiscal policy must once again be constrained by fear of debt.

That was precisely the framework that made austerity appear reasonable after the Global Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis. The return of inflation anxiety now performs a similar ideological function. It allows the old argument to be revived in a new form. For Rogoff and the defenders of the old New Consensus, governments spent too much, public debt is dangerous, and the space for public action must therefore be narrowed. The danger is not simply that this misreads the causes of recent inflation. It is that it prepares the ground for the next round of fiscal restraint when public investment, housing, infrastructure, climate policy, and social protection are badly needed.

There is one final issue. From Rogoff’s letter alone (since I haven't read this great book that is immensely popular and everyone liked but Mr. Jackson), his argument about the dollar appears problematic. He emphasizes the forces that might weaken dollar dominance, including the weaponization of finance, fiscal policy, and threats to Federal Reserve independence. A confidence argument. The overuse of sanctions, to the extent that it leads to the search for alternatives, might be a real source of pressure, the others are more doubtful.

What he does not say is that there are also powerful reasons to expect continuity of dollar hegemony. The dollar is  not sustained by confidence in US market-oriented policies and rule of law abiding institutions, but by deep Treasury markets, a global payment infrastructure, and its correspondent banking and legal jurisdiction, which, in turn, rest upon American military power. The dollar system is resilient, as I noted recently, precisely because it is embedded in a broader fiscal-military architecture. That does not make it eternal. It does mean that predictions of imminent decline are exaggerated. Predicting catastrophe might sell books, but is often poor scholarship.

Bob Pollin on Clintonomics

At The Nation. Few important points. As Bob notes Hillary does invoke the mantle of Clintonomics. In his words:

"In trying to burnish her credentials as a can-do populist and to portray Bernie Sanders as a purveyor of naive socialist fantasies, Hillary Clinton has increasingly invoked Bill Clinton’s presidency as her economic policy lodestar."

 And Bill Clinton's program was not really progressive. Again:

"The starting point for understanding Bill Clinton’s economic program is to recognize that it was thoroughly beholden to Wall Street, as Clinton himself acknowledged almost immediately after he was elected."

 His Treasury Secretary, one of them, was Robert Rubin, ex-chairman of Goldman Sachs. And financial deregulation, which is at the heart of two bubbles, and two recessions, continued in this period. Bob says:

"A major driver here was Wall Street’s craze for Internet start-ups... Throughout the bubble years, Clinton’s policy advisers, led by Rubin and his then protégé Larry Summers, maintained that regulating Wall Street was an outmoded relic from the 1930s. They used this argument to push through the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall financial regulatory system that had been operating since the New Deal. The Clinton team thus set the stage for the collapse of the Dot.com bubble and ensuing recession in March 2001, only two months after Clinton left office. They also created the conditions that enabled the even more severe bubble that produced the 2008 global financial crisis and Great Recession."

A good analysis of the limitations of Clinton's economic policies is in Bob's old paper Anatomy of Clintonomics.

Living wage, fast food walkouts, and Henry Ford's $5

Something I have not posted about, but that deserves attention is the organization of fast food workers this summer, and the series of walk outs to demand a living wage of $15 per hour (see here, for example). Note that the current minimum wage is less than half at $7.25 per hour, last raised in 2009. Figure below shows the real value now is well below the average of the 1960s and 1970s (data for nominal minimum wage here).

Since the 1980s the real minimum wage has fluctuated at a lower level. One can only hope that fast food workers, with the support of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), manage to obtain some concessions from junk food corporations.

For a discussion of the Living Wage see this paper by Bob Pollin, and his book (here).

PS: Only recently I've learned that Henry Ford's famous $5 a day wage (which would be more or less $14 per hour today), which went together with  reduction of work time to 8 hours per day, was controlled by the Sociological Department, which required workers not to drink, that they saved money, that they attended church, that they proved a record of saving part of the wages, and of course it was for married men, not for singles or women, since that would not lead to family values. It was also part of a broader program to make good American citizens of the immigrants in his factory. While some progressives actually liked Ford's program, like the institutionalist economist Commons, others like the radical John Reed were not convinced. For more go here.

Rogaine and Braveheart on Austerity

More on the Reinhart and Rogoff debacle. It says a lot about the state of mainstream economics.

Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth?

Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin show in this new paper that the studies by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff which correlate national debt-to-GDP ratios over 90% with sharp declines in growth are not correct. They find that when properly calculated, meaning using the full data set not just part of it, the average real GDP growth rate for countries carrying a public debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90% is actually 2.2 percent, not -0.1 percent as published in Reinhart and Rogoff (RR). That is, contrary to RR, average GDP growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90% is not dramatically different than when debt/GDP ratios are lower. Reinhart and Rogoff claim the mistake resulted from a technical error involving a spreadsheet, and say that they “do not, however, believe this regrettable slip affects in any significant way the central message of the paper.” You would think that growing at 2.2% rather than a recession of 0.1% would make them think that their results are incorrect.

Is income distribution holding up the recovery?

A friendly debate between Stiglitz and Krugman (and also further comments here) on the role of income distribution in the recovery has been getting some attention in the blogosphere. Note that I don’t think neither Krugman nor Stiglitz would deny that worsening income distribution was not relevant for the crisis, even if they were slower than some heterodox economists like Jamie Galbraith or Bob Pollin, to name two, in emphasizing the role of inequality. The question is whether inequality has been central for the slow recovery in the last few years.

Stiglitz’s main reason for suggesting that the recovery has been stifled by inequality is that “middle class is too weak to support the consumer spending that has historically driven our economic growth.” Krugman, for some reason, thinks that this argument is a long run one, and suggests that while: “it’s true that at any given point in time the rich have much higher savings rates than the poor. Since Milton Friedman, however, we’ve known that this fact is to an important degree a sort of statistical illusion. Consumer spending tends to reflect expected income over an extended period.” However, he thinks that “you can have full employment based on purchases of yachts, luxury cars, and the services of personal trainers and celebrity chefs.” In other words, worsening of income distribution might actually help the recovery.

I find Krugman’s proposition highly unlikely, even if it is possible.

Read the rest at Triple Crisis.

Bob Pollin's new blog

Yeah, a new blog! No really, since there are lots of blogs, but few that are this promising. From Bob's first post:

Yes, another blog is now being launched into the world as I type these words. Does the world really need yet another blog? Obviously, there are lots and lots of them already out there—many, many bad ones, but some good ones as well. There are even lots of good ones out there already dealing with economics and economic policy, which is the focus on this blog as well. So why take up more cyperspace with this blog, on top of all the other ones already going strong?

The aim of this blog will be to develop, extend, and debate the themes that I present in my new little book, Back to Full Employment. In my view, creating a full employment economy is absolutely crucial to creating a decent society—that is, a society in which everyone has the right to earn a reasonable living through their own efforts or the efforts of family members and friends. It’s that simple a point. But at the same time, it turns out to be not so simple. There are large numbers of controversial economic issues around 1) how to get to full employment; 2) how to stay there, once there; and 3) whether full employment should be a basic goal of economic policy to begin with.

Read the rest here.

Back to full employment

Robert Pollin has written a short and very important book titled as this post. Bob is correct in pointing out that the main obstacle to full employment has been political, and that there is no technical reason why we are not pursuing policies that would produce lower levels of unemployment. Note that, as I suggested before, the unemployment problem, as bad as it is right now, is actually worse than you might think.

The full employment goal was attacked almost from the beginning, when it was implemented as the result of the Employment Act of 1946 in the United States. Arguably the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 was the first bullet shot in the war against full employment policies. Intellectually, the notion of the natural rate of unemployment, developed by Milton Friedman, and still part of the box of tools of mainstream economists (including New Keynesians) gave theoretical respectability to the idea that full employment could not be a sustainable policy goal.

But it was the rise of conservatism in the 1970s, and the Volcker-Reagan economic policies, that effectively eliminated full employment from the policy agenda. Pollin's book is a plea to bring back the role of the State in promoting policies that would benefit society as a whole. Further, he argues that the same State capacity that has allowed the US to remain a military power can and should be used to promote industrial development with equitable income distribution. A must read!

PS: See also Bob Kuttner's article on Pollin's book at the American Prospect, and Bob's piece in the Boston Review on the topic of his book.

Bob Pollin on the failure of the fiscal stimulus

A nice paper by Bob Pollin on why the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) failed to produce a vigorous recovery. In his view:

"I advance three reasons for the failure of the ARRA to achieve a strong recovery: 1) The ARRA relied too heavily on tax cuts as a means of bolstering private spending; 2) Household wealth declined dramatically during the recession, tied to the collapse of the financial bubble. This in turn weakened the willingness of households to increase spending; and 3) Credit markets were locked up, especially for smaller businesses, despite the highly expansionary monetary policy stance adopted by the Federal Reserve. Building on these findings, I finally develop a series of policy proposals aimed at promoting both a strong recovery in the short term and at reducing any remaining structural deficit issues in the longer term. The short-term program focuses on extending loan guarantees, especially to small businesses; and taxing the excess reserves held by commercial banks. The longer-term agenda focuses on reducing government costs for health care and the military, and on increasing revenue through establishing taxes on financial market transactions."

The whole paper here.

It's the model stupid!

Brad DeLong, that together with Krugman has been a force for sanity within the mainstream, arguing for more fiscal expansion, shows why we need heterodox economists.  He says in a recent post:

This is a bad time to be an economist. If you were fresh from the womb and had no past opinions to defend, if you had never said anything notable before, it might be a fine time to be an economist. If you are one of those soap-opera characters who has complete amnesia and no memory of anything that they ever said or did or any intellectual position they took before January 1, 2010, it might be a fine time to be an economist. But for the rest of us--we who are now looking back at our opinions and analytic judgments and statements and pronouncements of the past 15 years and thinking: "how could I ever have been so stupid; how could I have missed so much?"--it is a bad time to be economist?

Four years ago we economists were writing learned papers about the "Great Moderation": about how it looked as though the governing institutions of the world economy had finally learned how to control and moderate if not completely eliminate the business cycle--the epileptic seizures of the economy that leave us with pointlessly high unemployment, pointlessly idle capacity, and pointlessly rusting away machines in spite of there being no fundamental cause for machines to be idle, factories closed, and workers unemployed.

Funny, I know of several economists that suggested that an economy based on debt-led consumption, on the basis of asset bubbles, was not sustainable and that a crisis was coming.  It would be tedious to cite all, and I'm lazy and don't want to find links to their papers, but a limited list of names (do a google search) would include Dean Baker, Jane D'Arista, Jerry Epstein, Jamie Galbraith, Wynne Godley, Thomas Palley, Bob Pollin and Lance Taylor (before hand I'm sorry for any significant omissions).  I knew enough to be sure that it was not sustainable.

But I'm glad that the best in the mainstream admit that it was stupid not to see it coming. I would suggest to him that part of the problem of the inability of the mainstream to see it coming is their theoretical framework.  The consensus macroeconomic model, based on an IS curve, a monetary policy rule, and a Phillips Curve with a natural rate of unemployment, in particular because it assumes that the economy automatically returns to the natural rate, is a flawed basis for understanding the real world.