Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts

Monday, July 28, 2025

Capital controls in the US?

financial Archives - Glasbergen Cartoon Service

In a recent Financial Times op-ed, Michael Pettis argued that the US should impose capital controls. In his view, the traditional view according to which capital inflows necessarily lower domestic interest rates and spur productive investment is based on a misunderstanding of how capital flows affect modern economies. This might have been true for rapidly growing developing economies with high investment needs and limited domestic savings, where foreign capital truly relieved a saving constraint. However, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, modern financial systems can expand credit largely unconstrained. In this environment, capital inflows into advanced economies like the US, do not primarily finance new, productive investments.

In the modern context, capital inflows often lead to an increase in household or fiscal debt. Policymakers use this credit growth to sustain domestic demand and prevent recessions that would otherwise be caused by the leakage of demand abroad due to trade deficits. This is a "beggar thy neighbour" dynamic -- a term coined by Joan Robinson, and the reason she appears in the FT piece, even though she was referring to competitive depreciation and trade restrictions, not capital flows -- where trade deficits are caused by shifts in spending to foreign goods, forcing domestic businesses to reduce output. Further, this reliance on rising household or fiscal debt to absorb foreign capital inflows and the resulting trade deficits is unsustainable in the long run. It leads to rising debt levels and distorted economic structures. He concludes that restricting capital inflows would directly address the problem of aligning a country's external position with its domestic needs.

There are many problems with these views. On a theoretical level, he does suggest, as Vicky Chick in a paper that Lance Taylor liked and used in his courses, in the earlier period savings was necessary for investment. Essentially Say's Law. That is certainly not the case. Even in the 19th century, with less developed financial markets, banks had the ability to create credit, and savings (a flow) did not finance investment. Also, interest rates do not depend on the capital flows and the available funds, and are essentially an exogenous variable controlled to a great extent by the monetary authority (that was true in the past too).

More importantly, it is unclear that the external situation of the US, indebted in its own currency is unsustainable. What is the problem that this would be solving? There is no fiscal problem either, irrespective of the downgrade of US debt by Moody's recently (Standard & Poor's and Fitch had done it years ago). In fact, capital controls would affect the international role of the dollar and would be a major misstep, since it would directly affect the ability of foreigners to use dollars, and restrict its use in international financial markets. Not that this would have any chance of happening with Bessent, a Wall Street operator, as Treasury Secretary.

Private debt (not public) is considerably more dangerous than public debt, since when the government gets indebted, if it uses the money to promote growth, it directly affects its ability to pay back the debt, since its revenue is tied to the level of economic activity. That is why public debt tends to fall not by cutting spending and promoting adjustment and reducing the amount of debt, but by promoting growth and reducing the relevance of debt with respect to ability to repay. So, Pettis is not incorrect in noting that the US has depended more on private debt, which is riskier. But capital controls would do little to limit this dynamic. Policies that expand the remuneration (wages) of the people at the bottom (i.e. better income distribution) and that are more lenient with private debtors would have better results.

Regulation of financial markets too should play a role. In particular, the predatory lending practices that are still rampant in the US more than a decade and half after the 2008-9 financial crisis. But in all fairness, if there is something the US can do to grow faster and avoid financial problems, it would simply be more spending (perhaps a mix of infrastructure and social transfers) and lower interest rates. One can hope.

Friday, February 28, 2025

Serrano, Summa and Marins on Inflation, and Monetary Policy

This is the full round table on Inflation and Monetary Policy organized by the Bucknell Institute for Public Policy (BIPP), with Franklin Serrano, Ricardo Summa and Nathalie Marins.

Tuesday, February 20, 2024

On the possibility of a recession at the Rick Smith Show

My brief interview at the Rick Smith Show on the likelihood of a recession this year, and the unfounded fears about public debt in the United States.

Tuesday, March 1, 2022

Ukraine: what will be done and what should be done?

 By Thomas Palley


While rightly condemning Russia for its invasion, the mainstream media continues to selectively report the history behind these events. In my view, its omissions are intentional and contribute to the tragedy. They inflame public understanding, render a diplomatic resolution more difficult, and lock us into a worse trajectory.

Let me make further clear my argument: (1) President Putin is head of the Russian state which is under slow-motion implacable attack by US-led NATO. (2) After failing to secure a satisfactory diplomatic resolution, he has taken action to head off that attack.

If you accept those two propositions, the Ukraine story is massively more complicated than simply claiming Putin is an aggressor and we (the US) are good. There will be no lasting peace until that complexity is fully engaged.

Read rest here.

Saturday, November 7, 2020

Is the Worldly Philosophy Dead?

 
Instead of videos a series of podcasts on the history of political economy, and its relation to economic policy in the United States. This is based on a course I teach for undergraduates.

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Globalization Checkmated? Political and Geopolitical Contradictions Coming Home to Roost

By Thomas Palley (Guest blogger)

The deepening of economic globalization appears to have ground to a halt and the process may even unravel a little. The sudden stop has surprised economists, whose belief in globalization has strong parallels with Fukuyama’s (1989) flawed end of history hypothesis. The paper presents a simple analytic model that shows how economic globalization has triggered political and geopolitical contradictions. For the system to work, politics within countries and geopolitics across blocs must be supportive of the system. That is missing. The model is applied to a global economic core consisting of the US, China, and the European Union. It is revealing of multiple tensions, fracture lines, and contradictions. Within the US, globalization has delivered economic outcomes that have estranged the electoral bases of both major political parties. It has also delivered outcomes that are inconsistent with the US neocon geopolitical inclination. President Trump is a product of those forces, and he will likely prove to be a historically significant figure. That is because he has surfaced geopolitical contradictions that cannot be swept back under the rug. Ironically, his biggest impact may be on the European Union, particularly Germany, which is being compelled to recognize the neocon nature of the US and the vulnerabilities of dependence on US exports and technology. China was already aware of its vulnerabilities in those regards.

Read rest here.

Tuesday, April 10, 2018

China and US Trade Tensions in one graph

The graph below illustrates the reasons for the concerns in the US and the somewhat erratic, but more combative position of the Trump administration.

Note, also, that China is closing the gap on R&D spending and on the technological front, at a faster pace that I would have predicted (more on that for a later post).

PS: I only got noticed this today, but Wolff's column is also about US-China relations. I suppose it's the topic now.

Monday, April 11, 2016

A Short Account of The Rise of Neoliberalism

By David Fields

Between roughly the early 1940’s and early 1970’s, the financial architecture of the world economy centered on a US engineered Keynesian accumulation agenda, as a response to the devastation wrought by the Great Depression. The capitalist institutional structure, or social structure of accumulation (Kotz, McDonough, and Reich, 1994), rested on finance being subservient to the promotion of  industrial enterprise. With socially-engineered capital-labor compromises in core-capitalist countries, neo-colonial governing institutions in the periphery, and the Bretton Woods system (along with the Marshall Plan), the immediate post-World War II era was a so-called ‘golden age’ of ‘regulated capitalism’.

By the late 1960’s, nevertheless, capital movements began to undermine the Bretton Woods preoccupation with capital controls, as US officials began actively encouraging the growth of the Euromarket—the pool of unregulated dollar reserves concentrated in the City of London. Moreover, with traditionally marginalized segments of the population in core capitalist countries demanding social, political, and economic rights, and national liberation movements in the periphery overthrowing oppressive governments, calls for expanded role of the state in meeting citizen’s needs dramatically circumscribed global capital accumulation. Pressures for higher nominal wages spawned wage-price spirals. Consequently, the rate of profit fell in core capitalist countries (Dumenil and Levy, 2004: 24).

The globalization of finance became the means for international financial markets to allow industrial enterprise to rebuild the conditions for future profitability. From the 1970’s, activity in financial markets began to rise relative to non-financial economic activity, reflecting not international traded goods and services, but speculative capital flows. Foreign exchange transactions in the world economy rose from $15 billion per day in 1973 to $80 billion in 1980 and $1,260 billion in 1995 (Kotz, 2008). In this sense, the inherent conflict between financial and non-financial capital became relatively obsolete.

Speculative capital flows, however, began to undermine the capacity for the US to guarantee the convertibility of dollars into gold at fixed parity (Triffin, 1960). In 1974, Nixon closed the gold window and loosened capital controls. This marked the end of the Bretton Woods arrangement and the breakdown of the social structure of accumulation that specifically rested on material expansion.

The deregulation of financial markets established a global market of mobile financial capital, yet Keynesian inspired institutional arrangements remained intact, especially the maintenance of cheap money policy for aggregate demand management. As such, hyper-inflationary crises stemming from labor militancy, coupled with international capital movements, turned real rates of interest negative by the mid 1970’s. Although the US became a financial hegemon (cf. Fields & Vernengo, 2013), so to speak, in the sense that its currency became a global fiat money standard, allowing the US to borrow in international markets in its own currency (and essentially perform macroeconomic policy on a global scale), without the friction of gold, price instability undermined real rate of return. As a result, global commitment to deflationary policies was marked by the appointment of Paul Volker as the chairman of the US Federal Reserve in 1979.

The Volker ‘shock’, as it came to be known, reflected the complete shift from finance subservient to industry to industry subservient to finance with the imposition of fiscal and monetary discipline as the means to constrain the capacity of national governments to pursue expansionary policies (that ultimately favor the working class). The high real interest rates set in motion an increasing financial-market orientation of US-led global capitalism. As interest payments, as a factor in capitalist investment (with respect to expected future earnings), rose substantially from 1980 to 1982, leading to the worst recession (at the time) since the Great Depression, a new organization of capitalism was introduced. Capital would no longer rest on production, sales, and growth, but on a speculative strategy of ‘downsize and distribute’ for immediate short-term maximization of shareholder value (Campbell, 2004; Lozonick & O’Sullivan, 2000).

If the monetary authority increases and maintains high interest rates for long periods of time, then for given nominal wages and given nominal exchange rates, there will be falls in real wage and appreciations in the domestic currency. Tight monetary policy will be sustainable, if, and only if, the depression of real wages is accepted, i.e. there is an absence of real wage resistance, and if exporting industries affected by currency appreciation do not have the power to react. The US was victorious in this capacity through successful attacks on labor, along with institutionalizing the so-called Washington Consensus (cf. Meeropol, 1998; cf. Pollin, 2005).

Originally posted on URPE Blog.

References:

Campbell, A. (2004): “The Birth of Neoliberalism in the US: A Reorganization of Capitalism.” in A. Saad-Filho & D. Johnston (ed.) Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press

Duménil, G. & D. Lévy (2004): Capital Resurgent. Boston: Harvard University Press.

Fields, D. & M. Vernengo (2013): “Hegemonic Currencies during the Crisis: The Dollar versus the Euro in a Cartalist Perspective.” Review of International Political Economy, 20(4): 740-759

Lazonick, W. & M. O’Sullivan (2000): “Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance.” Economy and Society, 29(1): 13-35

Kotz, D. (2008): “Neoliberalism and Financialization.” Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, mimeo

Kotz, D., McDonough, T. and Reich, M. (1994) (eds.): Social structures of accumulation: The political economy of growth and crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meeropol, M. (1998): Surrender: How the Clinton Administration Completed The Reagan Revolution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press

Pollin, R. (2005): Contours of Descent: U.S. Economic Fractures and the Landscape of Global Austerity. London and New York: Verso

Triffin, R. (1960): Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Austerity and the weak recovery

From Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza's new Levy Strategic Analysis:
"over the last 25 years policymakers in Washington have become increasingly fiscally conservative. The current recovery is the only one in the postwar period during which government expenditure has decreased in real terms. Fiscal austerity, together with weak foreign demand, has put the entire burden of supporting aggregate demand on the private sector spending in excess of its income and borrowing. This has led to a rapid increase in the private sector debt-to income ratio in the United States."
Read full report here.

Wednesday, October 21, 2015

On the Way to the Great Depression: The Demand Regime of the US Economy (1900-1929)

New Working Paper by Ahmad Borazan. From the abstract:
It has become commonplace to raise the analogy between the recent experience of the dynamics of income distribution and growth, and that of the era before the Great Depression. However, no study of the demand regime has been done for the early twentieth century period; this study attempts to fill that gap in the literature. Based on a Kaldorian model, I estimate whether the demand regime of the pre-Great Depression era for private domestic output was wage-led or debt-led. The results of the study show the demand regime was wage-led with a considerable role of private debt in driving aggregate demand. Furthermore, I discuss the Roaring Twenties period and argue that increased income inequality led to the rise of destabilizing channels that propped up demand which contributed to increasing economic fragility on the way to the Great Depression.
Read paper here.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

IMF wants austerity and social security reform in the US

Blanchard presenting the WEO Report at the Spring Meetings

The new edition of the bi-annual World Economic Outlook is out (there is one in April and one in October). Olivier Blanchard, from MIT, and the IMF's Economic Counsellor since 2008, is the intellectual force behind the report. In the IMF's view, in the case of the United States:
"The next prominent policy challenge will be a smooth normalization of monetary policy. Building political consensus around a medium term fiscal consolidation plan and supply-side reforms to boost medium-term growth—including simplifying the tax system, investing in infrastructure and human capital, and immigration reform—will continue to be a challenge." [Italics added]
Fiscal consolidation is IMF speak for austerity. Austerity is really about less spending, and higher taxes, but fiscal consolidation should be about the results, meaning lower deficits and debt. Note that austerity is NOT the best way to get fiscal consolidation. Also, normalization of monetary policy can only mean higher interest rates. So for the IMF we are at the natural rate, or so it seems.

In the case of the US labor markets are seen as flexible enough, so immigration is seen as central for keeping real wages low, rather than further deregulation. Yes, supply side reforms are often about lowering real wages. They do not provide much in terms of what austerity would mean. Again from the report:
"Addressing the issue of potential growth will require implementation of an ambitious agenda of supply-side policies in a fractious political environment. Forging agreement on a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan is a high priority... [This] will require efforts to lower the growth of health care costs, reform social security, and increase tax revenues." [Italics added]
Reform social security is IMF speak for cutting and delaying benefits, and increasing payroll taxes. Not necessarily privatize it, although some might be in favor of that at the IMF. So supposedly in the US the priority is to promote austerity by reforming social security. The New IMF is great.

On the plus side, the IMF has rediscovered the accelerator (I checked a few older versions and have seen no trace of the accelerator in the last couple of reports) and the report shows:
"estimates of how much investment weakness can be explained by output dynamics based on investment models estimated at the individual-country level. The analysis is based on the conventional accelerator model of investment... A key assumption is that firms adjust their capital stock gradually toward a level that is proportional to output. In addition, firms are assumed to invest to replace capital that depreciates over time... The empirical literature has found strong support for this model, as in Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel 1995 and Lee and Rabanal 2010 for the United States, and, more recently, in IMF 2014a and Barkbu and others 2015 for European economies."
Funny, so supply responds to demand, that is, firms adjust their supply capacity to expected demand, but all reforms for growth are based on supply side factors. Yeah, way to use the right theory, but keep the wrong policy advice.

Sunday, March 15, 2015

L-P Rochon on Making sense of U.S. and Canadian labour market data

By Louis-Philippe Rochon
If you’re watching labour market statistics on both sides of the U.S. and Canadian border, you might think our economies are heading in very different directions. But a closer look shows that there are striking — and troubling — similarities. The U.S. economy seems to be outperforming expectations, according to labour market data released last week. In February alone, the it added more than 295,000 jobs; the 12th time in a row monthly job creation was at least 200,000. Job creation is widespread across all sectors and demographics, suggesting a firmly-rooted recovery. Unemployment has shrunk to 5.5 per cent, which is where it stood in May 2008. Finally, as the Secretary of Labour, Thomas E. Perez, boasted last week, February marks the first time in more than three decades that unemployment fell in all 50 states. What more could you say? Apparently, the U.S. is on course for a strong growth spurt, fuelling fear of inflation, which may convince the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates sooner than expected. But we mustn’t believe everything the man behind the curtain is saying. 
Read rest here.

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Where revenue comes from

Not sure if I posted something similar before. At any rate, no surprises. Before the New Deal excise and other indirect taxes were the vast majority of the administration's revenue. Since then the individual income tax become the central source of revenue. Since the 1970s corporate income taxes fell, and were essentially compensated by higher payroll taxes. In other words, first more progressive, then more regressive. Updated data here.

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Overall federal fiscal results for the US, 1993-2014

Prompted by my post on Brazil yesterday. Graph below shows fiscal results for the US as a share of GDP.
For more go to the original post here.

PS: On the switch between Democrats and Republicans regarding deficits and the 'size' of government see this debate.

Wednesday, May 7, 2014

On why the Golden Age of Capitalism was better than this revived Gilded Age

No need for a lot of discussion. The Golden Age of Capitalism (in the graph 1947-79)--the world that resulted from the reforms to deal with the Great Depression (the New Deal) and the reorganization of the world after the victory against Fascism, with strong unions, high taxes for the rich, and a string of social programs for the poor and minorities--was a better world.

Thursday, February 20, 2014

The United States of Poverty and Inequality

Over the last three decades the wealth of the nation's very richest 1% has grown ten times that of the average worker, and over that time period that same elite has captured more than half of the entire income increases, leaving the bottom 99% to divide the remaining gains. This is all based on a new state-level study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), The Increasingly Unequal States of America: Income Inequality by State, which looks at how inequality has seized hold of the national economy both in the generation leading up to the great recession of 2008 and in the several years following the so-called 'recovery'.
The levels of inequality we are seeing across the country provide more proof that the economy is not working for the vast majority of Americans and has not for decades; it is unconscionable that most of America’s families have shared in so little of the country’s prosperity over the last several decades. 
Check out the state-by-state map on inequality generated by the study.

And for a recent analysis by Dr. Gerald Friedman on the so-called 'recovery', see here

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Paul Davidson and the good old days for workers


Letter from Paul published in The Economist edition of November 2nd.
* SIR – “Labour pains” (November 2nd) pointed out that the share of wages in national income has fallen after being nearly constant for decades after the second world war. During the post-war decades the middle class prospered because of the full-employment policies started by Franklin Roosevelt and continued by both Democratic and Republican presidents and Conservative and Labour governments in Britain.

In this period the growth of union power, enshrined in legislation and policies, pursued the sharing of monopoly rents and profits of corporations with their workers. By the 1970s, however, the seeds were sown for the beginning of the end of middle-class prosperity. The anti-union policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher made it socially and politically popular to see unions as the villains in the economy. This was quickly supplemented by firms outsourcing to foreign countries where an hour’s worth of labour was paid a much lower real wage.

But now, a new threat is growing that will further hollow out the middle class and make even more significant differences in the distribution between the top 1-2% and the rest of society. This threat is automation. You correctly indicate that policymakers should think about broadening capital ownership as a way of boosting income to workers and restoring a prosperous middle class.

For a creative approach to restoring middle-class prosperity, I recommend the work of Professor Robert Ashford in the forthcoming issue of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics called “Beyond Austerity and Stimulus: Democratising Capital Acquisition With the Earnings of Capital As a Means of Sustainable Growth”. Professor Ashford proposes a capital-ownership broadening policy that big companies adopt to produce enhanced earnings for their employees, customers, and other poor and middle class people; enhanced corporate profit and growth; reduced need for welfare dependence; and enhanced sovereign creditworthiness.

Paul Davidson
Editor
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
Boynton, Florida
You can see this letter and others here.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

Why did Marx understand America better than Europeans do today

I somehow didn't see this one before. On June 28, James Galbraith delivered a keynote lecture to the 50th anniversary symposium of the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. The talk is titled "How Come Europeans Understood the Political Economy of America So Much Better in 1861 than Today, and What Did Karl Marx Have to Do with That?" Listen to the audio here.

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Jamie Galbraith on Europe and the United States

Yannis Varoufakis posted a translation of an interview given by Jamie Galbraith here. Among other things Jamie suggests that:
"the dominant European narrative of the United States now as then is utterly misleading. It’s the notion that we have somehow in the thirty years since Ronald Reagan transformed ourselves into a free-market, deregulated, privatized, flexible labor market, weak-welfare-state country, which, if you just cast your memory back to the 60′s and 70′s, a totally unrecognizable view of the country, a country that was built by Roosevelt and Kennedy and Johnson, especially Roosevelt and Johnson, and which had extended even into the Nixon administration, which had and has a very substantial social insurance, public investment and regulatory framework. Many things about this have been under assault, some of them have failed entirely, including the regulation of finance, but this is not a Hayekian vision that has triumphed, but rather the one I described in my book, The Predator State. The real politics of the country controls these apparatuses and how much of the benefits are diverted to cronies and oligarchs and political constituents, which captures what happened in the Clinton and the Bush years – and ongoing, of course."
This was first discussed by Jamie in his paper "What is the American Model Really About," which argues that the public sector supports more than half of the economic activity in the US, and in so doing is the main force behind the growth of the economy as a whole.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

Debt, wages and the fiscal cliff

It is well known that while real wages kept the pace with labor productivity up to the early 1970s in the United States, they have lagged ever since, as shown in Figure 1. The causes of the collapse of the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism that allowed for expanding wages in the advanced economies are complex and diverse, but it is clear that the demise of the Keynesian consensus and full employment policies was at center stage.

One of the important consequences of the stagnation of wages in the United States has been the increasing reliance on debt as a source of funds for spending. Pivetti and Barba (2009) have argued that rising household indebtedness should be seen essentially as a reaction to stagnant real wages and the cutbacks in the welfare state. In other words, financialization has been the counterpart of enduring changes in income distribution. A point that has also been raised by Jamie Galbraith in his new book Inequality and Instability.

Read the rest here.