Showing posts with label Martin Wolf. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Martin Wolf. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 5, 2026

Neo-Mercantilism and the Return of Global Imbalances

In a recent Financial Times column, Martin Wolf argues that the United States and China are engaged in a "war of neo-mercantilists." China, in his view, is particularly well equipped for this struggle because of its enormous manufacturing base, high savings rate, technological advances and control over strategic supply chains, including batteries, solar panels, rare-earth processing and electric vehicles. The United States has important advantages of its own, particularly in energy and finance, but its industrial policy is less coherent.

Wolf's argument is closely connected to the old debate on global imbalances, that has been recently revived and analyzed by Adam Tooze, who correctly notes some of its limitations.* Like the earlier discussions of the "global saving glut," exchange-rate manipulation and excess Chinese saving, Wolf's column interprets China's persistent trade surplus as a central source of international instability. Weak Chinese domestic demand and an allegedly undervalued renminbi allow China to export its excess production, forcing other countries to absorb deficits and suffer the contraction of their tradable sectors. The "second China shock" is thus presented as a more technologically sophisticated version of the same basic imbalance.

China's surpluses create adjustment problems for other countries, and its industrial exports can undermine manufacturing elsewhere, as they did in the US (see this old post). But Wolf's argument places too much weight on macroeconomic imbalances as the source of Chinese power. China did not acquire its position in electric vehicles, telecommunications, renewable energy, machinery and artificial intelligence simply because its exchange rate was depreciated or because its savings rate was high. An undervalued exchange rate can assist industries that already exist. It cannot create technological capabilities, engineering knowledge, supplier networks or integrated industrial systems. Here both the role of the Chinese developmental state, and the US own openness to the Chinese economy, in what has been called development by invitation, played a role.

These capabilities resulted from a long process of industrial policy, public investment, directed credit, technology acquisition and the protection and expansion of domestic firms. The trade surplus is better understood as one manifestation of this productive transformation than as its fundamental cause. China could raise wages, expand consumption and reduce its external surplus while retaining most of its industrial and technological power. Conversely, a revaluation of the renminbi would not recreate the productive capacities that have disappeared in the United States. It would require industrial policy in the US, which by the way, was never completely abandoned either (see here).

The focus on imbalances also obscures the monetary and financial hierarchy of the international system. Wolf treats China as a major creditor and the central manufacturing economy. The latter is correct, but the dollar remains the principal international currency, US financial markets remain the main destination for global wealth, and the Federal Reserve remains the ultimate provider of international liquidity. In other words, the notion that the US is a debtor that depends on funding from China is an analytical misconception rooted in a misconception about the working of the international monetary system. The United States can run external deficits in its own currency in a way that no peripheral economy, and not even China, can. This is no burden imposed on the United States by foreign savings. It confuses US strength, its financial power, with a weakness.

The conflict between China and the United States is therefore not adequately described as a confrontation between a surplus country and a deficit country. It is a struggle between China's growing productive and technological power and the continuing monetary, financial and geopolitical power of the United States. Global imbalances are part of this conflict, but they are not its underlying explanation. Wolf sees many of the relevant facts, but the old language of savings, exchange rates and current accounts prevents him from fully connecting them.

The literature on the imbalances is built on a fundamentally misleading premise, that global imbalances reflect excess saving in some parts of the world flowing into the main deficit country, the US. In that story, the rest of the world finances American excess consumption. But this reverses causality. It is not Chinese or German thrift that drives the system, but the central role of US demand, finance, and the dollar. Capital does not passively flow from savers to borrowers. It is actively created within a hierarchical monetary system in which the United States occupies a privileged position. The US expenditures lead to higher level of activity globally, without any danger of US default.

From this perspective, the persistence of global imbalances is not puzzling at all. It is structural. The dollar-based international system requires US deficits and the accumulation of surpluses elsewhere. This is not a temporary distortion, nor a pathology to be corrected, but a defining feature of contemporary capitalism. As noted above, the real asymmetry is not between surplus and deficit countries per se, but between those that issue internationally accepted liabilities and those that do not. The United States is not simply another deficit country. It is the anchor of the system.

* Adam Tooze had discussed the global imbalances, in a more perceptive way than the older debate, recently. Tooze's central argument is that the language of "global imbalances" is an old framework that obscures new forces (Trump, AI, China, fiscal crisis). In this case he is debating Michael Pettis (see Pettis more recent reply here). Pettis revived J. A. Hobson's idea that inequality within leading economies generates underconsumption, pushing capital outward and producing geopolitical conflict. Applied to the present, this suggests that domestic imbalances in countries like China generate export surpluses and capital outflows, which in turn create tensions with deficit countries like the United States. Tooze correctly points out some of the historical and institutional limitations of the analogy, but falls short of providing an analytical critique.

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Martin Wolf and what to do about the commodity shock

Martin Wolf's column today reflects on the commodity shock on the basis of the data provided by the World Bank in the last Commodity Markets Outlook. As has been the prevailing consensus he suggests that this is an unprecedented shock, larger than the oil shocks of the 1970s, and any other commodity crises of the last 50 years.

In his words, based on the World Bank: "the initial impact of the closure of the strait was a global loss of 10.1mn barrels a day of oil in March. This was much larger than the impact of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, or the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s."

The current data on the price of oil has not yet confirmed these pessimistic predictions. The issue might be related to how much of a chockepoint the Strait of Hormuz really is, and how trade can adapt to it. Note that between 1967 and 1975 the Suez Canal was closed and forced oil shipments around the Cape of Good Hope. This caused a surge in transport costs, incentivized the development of massive supertankers, and forced a rerouting of trade, but it had limited initial impact on oil prices compared to the 1973 oil crisis.

It is obviously to soon to say, but so far the current oil shock has not lived to previous ones, when oil producing countries in OPEC had more power. Figure below shows the nominal and real price of Brent oil, which remain quite below the 1970s peaks.

Wolf is on the pessimistic side of things, and suggest, correctly on that, that costs will be unevenly distributed and that action to avoid worst problems is necessary.  He says: "this is a sizeable disruption, which is sure to hit many of the world’s poorest people and most vulnerable countries hard. The rise in oil and fertiliser prices guarantees that. This underlines the moral case for continuing to provide international assistance." That's all good, even if one is more cautious about possible outcomes.

But then he goes on to say that: "central banks are going to have a tricky time navigating the consequences. But they must not let inflationary expectations slip out of control." In other words, this is going to hurt the poor, and he thinks it will very much, since this is an unprecedented shock, but central banks should not care, and be concerned only with inflation expectations.

Before the Pandemic inflation there was some growing understanding, now less so, that inflationary expectations are not that relevant (on that see this). Jeremy Rudd wrote an article for ROKE suggesting that modern macroeconomics assigns too much importance to inflation expectations, with weak theoretical and empirical justification. Measures of inflation expectations (surveys, market-based) are noisy, inconsistent and weakly correlated with actual inflation outcomes. For him, this makes them unreliable as a key driver in models.

If inflation is caused by a hike in costs of production, there is very little that a hike in interest rate could do to control it, other than repress wage increases by slowing down the economy. Not that this should be a major concern in most advanced economies, at least.

My guess is that the impact will be smaller than expected, and that central banks will overreact. That might be the case of the Fed today, that should reduce rates, but probably won't because of inflationary expectations.

Sunday, October 21, 2018

The budget, the fragile recovery and the next recession


I'm not a forecaster. I do macro, and worked for Wynne Godley at the Levy, but I feel that there are too many dangers in forecasting. Wynne was also, btw, more concerned with what he called medium term scenarios, than pinpointing when a recession would take place. The obvious joke applies here. Economists have predicted 10 of the last 9 recessions. Having said that let me do the exact opposite and throw caution to the wind.

So I'm going out on a limb here. Everybody thinks the recession is around the corner. I'm more skeptical. Let me start by looking at what Martin Wolf has said in his last column, since he seems to be close to what consensus views would argue. He resuscitates old views about confidence cycles. For him: "Bull markets, it is said, climb a wall of worry... so much optimism was already in the prices of financial assets — in the US, above all — that once worry returned they had nowhere to go but down." He suggests that a "jump in risk aversion" might trigger the recession.

Worse, he suggests, following the IMF (that has changed its mind, according to many), that the US government has not helped by embarking on a highly irresponsible, pro-cyclical fiscal expansion on top of what the IMF labels 'already unsustainable debt dynamics'." In other words, expansionary fiscal policy will promote a crash by sapping the confidence of financial markets. Presumably we need sound finance.

The worst risk for him comes from populism, particularly in the US. He notes:
"The biggest shift of all is in the US. Last week, President Donald Trump broke a longstanding taboo by condemning recent tightening by the Federal Reserve. Under him, the US has also embarked on an assault on the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system and an open-ended trade war with China."
As I noted in my previous post on this, the biggest risk in my view comes from monetary policy in the context of a relatively fragile and slow recovery, even if it is a very prolonged one. The yield curve (see below; I use the Fed Funds and the 10 year bond rather than the 10-2 spread, since the Fed Funds is more clearly a policy rate, and gives you the result of policy actions) is closing, but if the Fed does not raise the basic rate too fast, there is a chance for the slow expansion to continue.


Note that there are other indicators that suggest that even though the recovery is not great, it may continue for a while. For example, if one looks at Gross Fixed Capital Formation, it is clear that an initial downturn seems to have subsided (like in the mid-1980s), and that the system got a second wind.


Capacity Utilization in Industry shows a similar picture. Note that this does not mean that the recovery is strong by any means. But last week the news, in spite of the unstable financial markets, were if anything indicating that the economy may continue on this path. I'm referring to fiscal news.


The budget deficit increased. That in and off itself says nothing, since the deficit is endogenous. In part the deficit went up as a result of tax cuts (a lot going to corporations and the wealthy). But also higher spending, quite a bit on defense. So there is a lot to complain about how money is being spent and how taxes are being collected. But that provides a modicum of stimulus. Trump, one should note, actually was more accurate on this than Wolf. He said that there is no fiscal danger, and that the US runs no risk of default (so why would financial markets be concerned with that), since the US can print money. Note that printing money might have consequences, but these are not the ones orthodox economists often suggest (see more here).

Contrary to Wolf I don't think that the trade wars would affect significantly the US economy. It might affect China, and certainly will have effects on the supply chains of US corporations. It might lead to higher prices, but it's implausible that it would bring the economy to a halt. The American economy depends on domestic demand. Nothing much will be affected by the trade war on that front. Also, while I think that student debt (and car loans too) are out of control, and will have implications, it's not clear that these, by themselves would cause a recession, in the way that mortgage loans did last time. They might not affect domestic demand to the same extent, at least not in the short run.

If there is a risk (besides monetary policy) is the persistence of financial speculation and the shadow financial sector, as represented by for example Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), which have been going to high risk non-financial corporate firms (like Sears). But that does not mean that a recession is around the corner, and this weak recovery can (arguably) prolong itself for a few more quarters. Hey, conceivably it might go on until the 2020 election, giving Trump a serious shot at reelection (and that's not a happy thought).

Monday, April 21, 2014

McKinnon and Wolf on global imbalances and Chinese liberalization

This is a bit old. It was published earlier this month in the Financial Times, as a response to Wolf's column. McKinnon is a well-known exchange rate specialist, and one of the few that has, correctly in my judgment, not been overly concerned with the international role of the dollar for the last three decades. His concern with Chinese liberalization of financial markets is that it would lead to inflows, since interest rates in the developed world are too low, and instead of balancing the trade surpluses, it would lead to more accumulation of reserves. The implicit notion is that if rates of interest were higher abroad, and Chinese funds flowed abroad it would be okay to liberalize, one supposes.

Note that this is also what Martin Wolf suggested in the original column (subscription required). In his words: "In the long run China’s capital account will presumably become largely open and in time, no doubt, China’s savers will own large parts of the world." In other words, the idea is that Chinese funds would finance the over spending in the rest of the world, and help in dealing with global imbalances, and Chinese savers would invest in real assets abroad. In contrast, if inflows were added to the trade surpluses, the Chinese would add to the 'problem' of the global imbalances.

Note that this view goes hand in hand with the notion that the accumulation of reserves is intrinsically bad. Wolf says:
"The principal form of capital outflow has been the accumulation of foreign currency reserves by the government. At $3.8tn last December (almost $3,000 for each Chinese person), these are gigantic and extremely unrewarding. It would be far better if some of this were converted into real assets."
Don't get me wrong, China holds more reserves than it needs for avoiding a currency crisis, or any sort of balance of payments problem that might arise (in a very distant future). Yet, the notion that China could open the capital account and not get into the kinds of problems that all the countries that liberalized financial markets did seems excessively optimistic.

There is essentially no problem if China maintains a trade surplus and attracts capital flows, increasing their reserves. And that has no relation to the financing of their investment, or the transition to a more consumer oriented economy. As I said a while ago global rebalancing is one of the myths of the current crisis. If the US grows faster, say as the result of an improbable fiscal expansion, the imbalances would grow larger, and that would be good.

I hope that China doesn't open the capital account, but that has nothing to do with the global imbalances, and all to do with the problems of financial liberalization.
In the long run China’s capital account will presumably become largely open and in time, no doubt, China’s savers will own large parts of the world. - See more at: http://magazine.thenews.com.pk/mag/moneymatter_detail.asp?id=7688&catId=194#sthash.fw6I8fiF.dpuf

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Balance of Payments Adjustment and the Euro Crisis

It is worth remembering that according to Eichengreen (1996, p. 25) “the most influential formalization of the gold-standard is the price-specie flow model of David Hume. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this model is its durability: developed in the eighteenth century, it remains the dominant approach to thinking about the gold standard” (for a critique go here).

The idea is that, at least in a fixed exchange rate regime, inflation and deflation do all the work of adjusting the balance of payments (BOPs). Modern versions add credibility and all that (which includes austerity) for the stabilizing flows of capital to work. Why do I bring this up? Because of Martin Wolf's column (subscription required) in the Financial Times today, which has the graph below.

Note that the countries in crisis, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have already adjusted their BOPs (in this case their trade balances). Yet the adjustment is more Keynesian than Humean, or to be more precise, it follows the analysis of A.G. Ford, who argued that peripheral countries, like Argentina, adjust their current account deficits with a good old recession not by lowering domestic prices. And yes, Wolf is right, the specie-flow would only work in a parallel universe.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Unemployment and growth in the euro periphery

Martin Wolf had a few graphs in one of his recent columns that are worth reproducing. The first below shows the growth collapse.
Note that the recovery was very short lived and all rapidly fell into a double-dip recession. And as per Okun's Law, if output falls you should expect unemployment to go up. And indeed up it went.

Greece and Spain breaking the Great Depression like barrier of 25% of the labor force. So that's what austerity does. Back in the 1930s a similar situation is what made anyone that was reasonable Keynesian.

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Nominal output targeting


Christina Romer wrote this Sunday about the necessity for the Fed to target nominal output. The implication seems to be that so far the Fed had been targeting inflation, which is obviously incorrect. That would be the ECB. Krugman (here) for some reason liked it. By the way the idea is not new, Samuel Brittan had argued for that not long ago (here), and as noted by David Beckworth so have two other prominent FT columnists (Clive Crook and Martin Wolf).

First of all, Romer calls this a Volcker moment, which is from a historical point of view (and she is a macroeconomic historian) preposterous. Volcker is the guy that tried to use nominal monetary targets, as in Milton Friedman's monetary growth rule (now he is much better and is against de-regulation and too big too fail among other things).

Further, it's not clear how a nominal GDP target would be different from what the Fed is already doing, namely acting as a lender of last resort, and keeping interest rates (short and long, the latter through QE) low. Worse, her argument smells to the confidence fairy stuff you hear from the crazies serious people, and that correctly Krugman deplores. She says:
"By pledging to do whatever it takes to return nominal G.D.P. to its pre-crisis trajectory, the Fed could improve confidence and expectations of future growth."
Sure as objective targets come, nominal GDP is better than inflation,  but since the Fed does not target inflation what is she fighting? Ben Bernanke is fine, Super Mario (Mario Draghi), the new president of the ECB needs whatever is the reverse of a Volcker moment. The US (and Europe) need more fiscal expansion.