Wednesday, May 31, 2023

Servaas Storm on Lance Taylor



Lance Taylor in Beijing (with me, center), 2001

Full paper for download here. From Duncan Foley's recollection cited in the paper.

Lance had what one might call a casual approach to every-day dress, though he appeared for public talks well turned out even with rather jaunty accessories. It was not unusual, however,for him to appear in his office in the working clothes of a Maine farmer. On some of these occasions, particularly when travel delays or cancellations disrupted work plans, I would try to persuade Lance that graduate students were at least as interesting as goats in the hopes of getting him to spend more time in New York, but I made no headway on this issue.

I don't know if I was as interesting as a goat, but I do recall a dinner after some late talk at CEPA, in which Duncan and Lance discussed about goats and whether they did have souls. Worth reading if you are interested in alternative macro views, and the legacy of someone diametrically opposed to Robert Lucas Jr, who also passed away recently (on my views on Lucas go here).

Friday, May 19, 2023

Soft landing or recession

This is a very short note, prompted by the increasing fears of the default and its consequences, which I think it's greatly exaggerated, and the relatively optimistic views about the effects of monetary tightening. Sure enough, as I noted recently, an adjustment, and lower spending, associated either with an agreement with Congress Republicans (very unlikely) or as contingency plans (14th Amendment of other solutions) are implemented, could certainly through the economy into a recession. But I'm somewhat skeptical about that scenario.

On the other hand, I'm less sanguine than Krugman on the possibility of a soft landing. Note that I don't think our situation is as good as the unemployment numbers show, and that the recovery, while fast, brought is back to a position with underutilized capacity, and more slack in the labor market than what the official numbers suggest. But that's another story (discussed before several times). At any rate, the number I would look is the one below: New Privately-Owned Housing Units Started. Basically, construction.

As it can be seen, new constructions fall before every recession since 1960, with the exception of the 2001, recession. Also, it fell in 1966, without causing a recession. It is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for a recession. In 1966, the military spending with the Vietnam war, and the expansion of social programs more than compensated the negative effects of the monetary tightening that was taking place at that time. In 2001, the collapse of the dot-com bubble is what explains the recession.

However, the current and fast increase in interest rates by the Fed, with direct impact on mortgage rates, not only affects the construction of houses (less people willing to buy, less construction), but also affects the patterns of consumption of a large share of the population. And construction is already declining. Sure enough the Fed might stop the interest rate increases, and Biden might continue spending, even expanding his social agenda (that's were this gets iffy), and this might look like 1966. But I wouldn't expect a lot from fiscal policy at this point, and the Fed is not helping. My two cents.


Thursday, May 18, 2023

How Industrialization Become the Core of Raúl Prebisch's Thought

New paper by Adriana Calcagno. From the abstract:

This paper focuses on the intellectual path through which Raúl Prebisch placed industrialization at the center of his economic thought and policy recommendations. It shows how the changing international  context  of  the  1930s  and  1940s  made  him  depart  from  laissez-faire  and  adopt counter-cyclical policies, gradually abandoning the agrarian export-led growth model and finally embracing industrialization as the new growth strategy for Argentina and Latin America.

Published here, and working paper open for download here.


Monday, May 15, 2023

The Forgotten Case Against Milton Friedman: Jacobin's Interview with Tom Palley

 

In 1967, Milton Friedman launched a counterrevolution in economics that overturned the Keynesian theory of inflation. Three years later, economist James Tobin issued a powerful theoretical rebuttal — but in the economics mainstream, it’s been all but forgotten.

Read full interview here.

Monday, May 8, 2023

The debt ceiling and the American economy: not Armageddon

There is a lot of discussion about the debt ceiling, most of it somewhat exaggerated and panicky. In a recent WAPO op-ed it was called Financial Armageddon. From a run on the dollar to the complete collapse of the economy, one can find almost anything in the news. And sure enough there are reasons to be more concerned this time than in previous disputes between a Republican House and a Democratic White House, which is always the pattern when it comes to the debt ceiling, an institutional feature that very few countries have, btw (old post here, and piece in Dollars & Sense).*

First, let me say a few things about the consequences. If the debt limit is breached, and a default occurs, the first and most direct consequence is that a series of government functions that require government spending cannot go on, and these activities will stop. That is essentially like a shutdown. Government shutdowns have occurred several times, but not as a result of a default, and this will have further implications. Last time we were close to breaching the debt ceiling, the credit rating agencies (Standards & Poor's, to be specific; old post on that here), that determine whether public and private agents are creditworthy, downgraded the US debt for the first time. It was unnecessary at that time, because there was no doubt that the government could pay its bills in its own currency. But that is likely to happen again, more so if there is a default. This would reflect not only the budgetary inability to spend, like in a shutdown, but also the fact that the Treasury will, most likely, stop paying interest on its debt.

Normally, countries that default pay a significant price. Argentina, for example, has defaulted, and that has led to a run on the currency, as agents seek to sell government bonds and try to buy foreign denominated bonds, mostly in dollars. That is inflationary, as the currency depreciates and the price of imported goods go up, and contractionary, since the inflation reduces the ability of consumers to spend. Depreciation, inflation and recession, are the likely outcomes of a sovereign default. Note that Argentina normally defaults on its foreign obligations in dollars, not the domestic ones in pesos (there would be no reason for that, even though Macri did it once), as the United States might do soon.

In the case of the United States, that holds the global reserve currency the consequences would be considerably milder. Everybody knows that the Treasury, besides the political bickering, can always pay its bills in dollars. This crisis does not represent a fundamental inability of the government to pay its bills, but simply the decision to not pay them for calculated political gains by Republicans. The likely effect might be a mild recession associated to the inability of the government to spend, that would add to the already contractionary monetary policy. I should note that a negotiation between McCarthy and Biden to reduce spending, which will be contractionary for sure, is in my view worse than breaching the debt ceiling, since Biden can always find some solution and continue to spend. A recession would be politically disastrous for Biden.

Besides a possible recession, some depreciation of the dollar might or might not occur. Sure enough it is possible that some agents would go to Euro denominated assets, or some other alternative currency, but since the interest rate is relatively high in the US, and it was raised last week again as a result of the preoccupation with inflation, that might attract economic agents into holding dollar denominated assets. The results are ambiguous. Certainly there is no danger of the dollar losing its international position, as Larry Summers correctly pointed out. And of course, even if there is some mild depreciation, its inflationary impact in the US is negligible as compared to developing countries like Argentina. In a developing country, if the currency depreciates 30 percent with respect to the dollar, the price of oil (priced in dollars in international markets) in domestic currency goes up tantamount, but that is not the case in the US.

I am skeptical that a default, if it happens, would be a prolonged problem, since it most likely will backfire politically for Republicans, as shutdowns normally do. So Biden should ignore this, and go on paying, as I suggested a while ago.

* Proof of that is that both Paul Krugman and Laurence Tribe have written in favor of alternative ways of dealing with the issue. I, for what's worth, always thought the one trillion dollar coin exceedingly idiotic, and would prefer the 14th Amendment solution. I think if it went to the SCOTUS, even this group of corrupt, pro-business, conservative justices would muster a narrow majority (Roberts and Kavannaugh perhaps) for the unconstitutionality of the debt ceiling.

Friday, May 5, 2023

Thursday, May 4, 2023

The problem with Keynes' General Theory: by Tom Palley



New working paper by Tom Palley. From the abstract:

Keynes' General Theory was a massive step forward relative to classical economics, but it was also a step backward in its denial of the conflictual nature of capitalism. There is need to understand Keynes' technical contributions regarding the workings of monetary economies, but also need to understand the flaws within his thinking and the consequences thereof. Keynes made a fundamental contribution elucidating the mechanism of effective demand, and he also has claim to be the preeminent monetary theorist. However, owing to his denial of conflict, he had a flawed view of capitalism which is why establishment Keynesianism struggles to explain contemporary stagnation. That flawed view also undermines the case for Social Democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, his view of capitalism is supportive of Neoliberalism and Keynes can be viewed as a compassionate (Third Way) Neoliberal.

In some ways this is the argument in Geoff Mann's In the Long Run We Are All Dead. I think one way of thinking about it is that Keynes' effective demand as a critique of marginalist (neoclassical) economics needs to be completed by old classical (political economy) ideas, which put the class conflict at the center of analysis. That of course is necessary for a policy break with neoliberalism.

Friday, April 28, 2023

Lavoie on Inflation Theory: Conflicting claims versus the NAIRU

New Paper by Julia Braga and Franklin Serrano. From the abstract:

The conflicting claims approach to the theory of inflation so thoroughly surveyed and well presented in Chapter 8 of Lavoie’s (2022) book is deservedly becoming increasingly consensual among heterodox (and even some notable mainstream) macroeconomists. However, the relevance of a concept (and the very existence of) a NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) derived consistently from the very premises of the conflicting claims approach is still very controversial. In this review article, we will be to argue that a NAIRU is not really useful for the conflicting claims approach. First, it can only properly be derived under quite restrictive assumptions; second, if a NAIRU actually existed, it would render demand management policies undesirable and very destabilizing anyway. With that in mind, the key aspects explored here are: 1) the different roles of hysteresis in the output and labour markets; 2) the assumptions concerning real profit markups of firms; and 3) the extent to which money wage increases actually incorporate past (or expected) inflation. We also add some remarks regarding the role of changes in international commodity prices and nominal exchange rates that further illustrate the necessary relation between conflicting claims inflation and the theory of distribution and relative prices.

Read the rest here.

On central bank independence and the public good

The debate between Tom Palley and Steve Kamin on central bank independence and the several rescues of banks after financial crises, including the more recent rescue of the Silicon Valley Bank.

Tom suggests that central banks are dominated by financial interests, and that this has been a problem. At the same time he avoids the libertarian notion of free banking, and suggests that a central bank at the service of public interest would require alternative views, I would directly say related to working class interests.

Tuesday, April 25, 2023

My talk at UNAM on Demand-pull and Oligopolistic Inflation

My talk (in Spanish) at the Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas of UNAM (virtually) on inflation. The talk starts at minute 20 or so.

Saturday, April 22, 2023

On Re-Industrialization: Brief Comment on Krugman's column

I have written on deindustrialization before (see here and here), and commented on the CHIPS Act, and how it was one of the first, if not the first, re-shoring of manufacturing jobs into the US. Krugman just wrote a column on that, noting that the concern with manufacturing is now bipartisan, as Biden policies follow Trump's, he argues the former more successfully than the latter. Also, I should note that the the pressures for US corporations to reorganize their supply chains away from China is bipartisan, but that might take a long while.

I mostly agree with Krugman's take. But there are two issues with his argument, in my view. One more conceptual, and the other just observational. Krugman says that

"we shouldn’t fetishize manufacturing. A good job is a good job; there’s nothing inherently superior about manufacturing as opposed to health care or even entertainment."
This smacks me too much as an acceptance of the post-industrial society myths. Kaldor's laws suggest that you should care about manufacturing. For example, a great deal of the increases in productivity both in health care and entertainment are associated to the rise of productivity in manufacturing sectors, like pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, electronics, computers, etc. And exactly because the US still is important in all these manufacturing sectors, in spite of the decline of the share of manufacturing jobs in total jobs the nature of deindustrialization in the US was different than in other parts of the world, like Latin America. That was my argument a decade ago.

However, something happened in the intervening decade. While before manufacturing jobs declined, and production increased, in the last decade the trend changed. Now manufacturing production stagnated.


So manufacturing output never recovered from the 2007-8 recession, and effectively stopped increasing. Even the fast recovery from the pandemic seems to have stalled. Again, I don't think this spells disaster for the US economy, since US corporations are still dominant in many sectors that are crucial for the future of Industry 4.0 or whatever that is called. My example during the pandemic was the video conferencing platforms I use (zoom, teams, google meet, webex, and skype) are from US corporations. But it does say something about how difficult it will be for the US to disentangle from the Chinese supply chains.

Also, I think that the reason for this change in attitude regarding manufacturing and China are less connected to electoral politics, than Krugman suggests (he said: "it’s not at all clear whether these policies will succeed in their implicit political goal: winning back working-class voters who have gone down the MAGA rabbit hole). If the implicit goal was political it wouldn't be bipartisan, and the solution would require recovering manufacturing jobs, not production, and that will not happen, at least not a recovery to the previous peak. This is revaluing of manufacturing is not about winning elections in Pennsylvania (even if it might not hurt Biden), it is a geopolitical concern with US hegemony.

PS: And expect a significant backlash against industrial policy, and any "protectionist" measures in the US from the neoliberal establishment, which is still entrenched. See for example Adam Posen here, or this from The Economist, who said that: "America’s openness brought prosperity for its firms and its consumers, both Mr Trump and Mr Biden have turned to protectionism... Subsidies could boost investment in deprived areas in the short term, but risk dulling market incentives to innovate. In the long run they will also entrench wasteful and distorting lobbying." On this I'm with Krugman that is considerably less upbeat about the US's great economic moment.

Thursday, April 20, 2023

Distributive Conflict and the "New" Inflation

Franklin Serrano on inflation (in Portuguese). More or less what I have been saying on the issue, with some interesting discussions on the changes in the New Consensus Model, and the changing views of some of the key authors like Larry Summers.

Thursday, March 30, 2023

Review of Crotty's "Keynes Against Capitalism" (forthcoming in ROKE)

It should not be a surprise that John Maynard Keynes is often seen as being relatively conservative by many progressively inclined or radical economists, that often tend to prefer the views of Michal Kalecki, or the more radical approach of Keynes’ favorite disciple, Joan Robinson. That is not the case in James Crotty’s book Keynes Against Capitalism, who takes a diametrically opposite view. He tells us that: “It is almost universally believed that Keynes wrote his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [GT from now on], to save capitalism from the socialist, communist, and fascist forces that were rising up during the Great Depression era”, but in his view, that “was not the case with respect to socialism. The historical record shows that Keynes wanted to replace then-current capitalism in Britain with what he referred to as ‘Liberal Socialism’” (Crotty, 2019: 1-2). His Keynes was anti-capitalist and, in some sense, a socialist. The notion that Keynes was a socialist often encounters as much resistance as the notion that he was somewhat conservative, of course.

The book is divided in three parts. The first part of the book traces the development of Keynes’ ideas in the inter-war period starting with his significant role during the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles, and the publication of his instant bestseller, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, that made him a worldwide celebrity, to development of the revolutionary ideas in the GT. The second part analyzes the theoretical ideas of the GT, and how they provide the foundations for a radical and socialist remaking of British capitalism. The third and last part discusses Keynes’ program in action, in the buildup to the war, and during World War-II, and its relevance for our days.

The first part of the book suggests that the Keynesian Revolution started in the 1920s with the slow evolution of Keynes’ thinking about the problems of the British economy, and his rethinking of neoclassical economics. Crotty uses the term classical, as did Keynes, creating unnecessary confusion, in particular because of his own sympathies with Marxist economics, that builds critically on the classical surplus approach. Crotty makes an important point, often neglected in the discussions of Keynesian economics. For Keynes the need for a new theory derived from an appreciation of the historical and institutional changes of British capitalism. Crotty argues: “Keynes’s core belief [was] that the West had entered a completely new historical era in which the institutions and policies currently used to regulate economic life were totally inappropriate. He associated himself with the American institutionalist economist John R. Commons’s view that Europe and America were currently in transition to a new historical epoch in which the main task was to create a new ‘regime which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces’” (Ibid.: 81).

The doctrines of laissez-faire, that were well adapted to the Victorian Era, were not suited for the world that emerged from World War-I, in which mass production, mass consumption and the rise of organized labor required a certain degree of government intervention to manage the economy. This is the best and most original part of the book, in which Crotty reminds us that: “Keynes’s enthusiastic and consistent support for state control of most large-scale capital investment is not the only ‘radical’ policy position overlooked by mainstream ‘Keynesian’ economists; his support of detailed industrial and labor-market policy has escaped their attention as well” (Ibid.: 87). The emphasis on the importance of industrial and labor policies, in particular, their direct connection with Keynes’ opposition to the return to Gold Standard and his support of the coal miners’ strike of 1926, are central to understand his need to rethink his economic theory.

However, even in this part, there is a neglect of an important element of Keynes’ trajectory, and for the development of the ideas exposed in the GT. Crotty forgets to note that Cambridge monetary theory was quite underdeveloped in the 1920s, and was based mostly on an Appendix to Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, and his evidence to some Royal Commission, and was in fact being developed by Keynes and his colleague Dennis Robertson during the 1920s. At that point it was unclear that this was a complete rupture with Marshallian economics on monetary affairs, as much as Piero Sraffa was starting to break with the marginalist theory of value and distribution with Keynes’ support. In fact, Keynes’ thought that his book A Treatise on Money was the culmination of the development of the alternative theory, which he defended as a member of the Macmillan Committee, and that argued that the Depression resulted from the high interest rates, that prevented investment from adjusting to full employment savings, as a result of the Gold Standard. This view was perfectly compatible with neoclassical economics, even if Keynes already advocated for public works, an unorthodox policy, as a solution for the crisis.

However, it was at this point, exactly as a result of the criticism of his book by the young economists of the Circus – a group that included besides Sraffa and Robinson, the latter’s husband, Austin, Richard Kahn, and James Meade – that Keynes finally developed in 1932, relatively late, his main theoretical contribution to economics, the Principle of Effective Demand. In other words, while the 1920s were formative, it was only with the Great Depression and his immersion in pure theory in the early 1930s that Keynes finally broke with orthodoxy in theory. The fact that he changed his diagnosis of the Depression, and adopted a whole new theory right after the publication of what should have been his major theoretical work to the date, led to the traditional complain that Keynes was inconsistent and held more than one view at the same time. Friedrich Hayek and Keynes’ opponents at the London School of Economics would make a of this inconsistency one of their main criticisms of Keynesianism.

This is also relevant because it shows that Peter Clarke is correct when he argues that: “The Suggestion that he [Keynes] wrote The General Theory because he had an axe to grind in immediate policy arguments is wide of the mark” (Clarke, 1991: 163). In other words, Keynes’ views on policy issues could be defended, and in fact he did defend them in the 1920s as noted by Crotty, even before he developed the notion that changes in the level of income were the mechanism by which savings adjusted to investment, and not the other way round. The fact that Crotty suggests that the GT was written: “to convince economists and members of Britain’s intellectual, business, and political elites that the theory that informed their economic worldview and provided essential support for the disastrous conservative economic policies of the era was fundamentally flawed” (Crotty, 2019: 161) seems incorrect.

This is compounded by the fact that Crotty accepts Keynes’ theory of interest and the notion of a marginal efficiency of capital in the second part of the book, and as such is forced, as Keynes was, in particular in the famous 1937 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) amply cited by Crotty, to use the argument of fundamental uncertainty to preclude the possibility that a sufficiently low interest rate would equilibrate investment to full employment savings. Crotty centers his analytical interpretation of Keynes on chapter 12 of the GT, and his defense of the GT in the QJE paper. The argument is essentially one associated with uncertainty and financial instability. In his words: “The outbreak of pessimism and the loss of confidence in the conventions that underlie expectation formation will also cast a pall over the bond market, a point Keynes also stressed in his 1937 defense of The General Theory in the QJE” (Ibid.: 266). It is clear that the abandonment of the marginalist, or neoclassical, notion of a marginal efficiency of capital would actually strengthen Crotty’s point, but for some reason he neglects the important results that followed from the capital debates in the 1960s, which were central for the completion, on a theoretical level, of the Keynesian Revolution in theory.

On the issue of Keynes’ adherence to some form of socialism, Crotty also makes a valiant case for his position. He provides copious circumstantial evidence, and quotes the famous phrase by Keynes in which he says that: “I am sure that I am less conservative than the average Labour voter; I fancy that I have played in my mind with the possibilities of greater social changes than come within the present philosophies of Mr. Sidney Webb, Mr. Thomas, or Mr. Wheatley. The republic of my imagination lies to the extreme left of celestial space” (Keynes, 1926: 308-309). The part that Crotty forgets to cite is the subsequent phrase, in which he tells us: “Yet—all the same—I feel that my true home, so long as they offer a roof and a floor, is still with the Liberals” (Ibid.). Certainly, many of Keynes’ policy proposals were radical. They moved in the direction that was compatible with socialist or social democratic views. And he recognized he had many common goals with Labour and the Fabian Socialists. But he called his views liberal socialism, and remained an Asquith New Liberal all his life.

Liberalism also spoke to Keynes political and social outlook in ways that Labour or Socialism never did. He was an elitist, the product of Eton and King’s College, Cambridge, and a member of the Apostles and the Bloomsbury group. To some extent Labour reciprocated. Philp Snowden, Labour’s first chancellor of the exchequer, was a committed defender of the Treasury View, and an avowed anti-Keynesian. Hugh Dalton, Clement Atlee’s first chancellor of the exchequer, was averse to Keynesian policies, and for him Keynesianism: “was virtually a deathbed conversion, for only in his fourth, final, fatal Budget of November 1947 did he explicitly relate his measures, which stepped taxes across the board, to the problem of controlling inflation… The paradox is that a Keynesian approach was directed chiefly to the problem of keeping demand down, not up” (Clarke, 1991: 186-87). But if there is a future for socialism, Crotty’s view that Keynes’ ideas remain relevant is correct, and there could be no sensible socialism without a good dose of Keynesianism.

References:

Clarke, P. 1991. A Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher, London: Hamish Hamilton.

Crotty, J. 2019. Keynes Against Capitalism: His Economic Case for Liberal Socialism, London: Routledge.

Keynes, J. M. 1926. “Liberalism and Labour,” in A. Robinson and D. Moggridge (eds.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Essays in Persuasion, Volume IX, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.