DisORIENT: Money, Technological Development and the Rise of the West

A very short paper on a very broad subject, co-written with David Fields, which was presented at the last ASSA Meetings in San Francisco. It is forthcoming in the Review of Radical Political Economics (RRPE). The title is derived from Gunder Frank's ReORIENT, that David and I always thought was thought provoking, but surprisingly Monetarist in its assumptions about money. The paper also adds a discussion of Pomeranz famous views on the Great Divergence, particularly the views regarding technological change, which are marginalist at its core, as well as those of Gunder Frank and some of his critics, like Arrighi.

From the abstract:

This paper analyzes the revisionist literature on the Rise of the West. Revisionist authors suggest that the so-called Great Divergence is relatively recent, and that good luck – in the form of silver from the Americas, and abundance of coal, rather than European exceptionalism – was central for the higher rates of growth of GDP in the West. This paper argues that while the revisionist literature provides relevant critiques of conventional accounts of the Rise of the West, it remains rooted in marginalist or neoclassical views of both the role of money and technological progress, and that abandoning these theoretical foundations would strengthen some of its arguments.

As far as I can tell, there aren't many papers in economic history that properly acknowledge the contributions of the revisionist literature, but also of the Military Revolution (Parker), the Consumer Revolution (McKendrick), and the Fiscal-Military State (Brewer). In fact, these historical schools are more compatible with non-marginalist views of the functioning of the economy that emphasize the role of demand and endogenous money in the explanation of the Rise of the West.

Big Think and the nature of capitalism

Jack Goody was one of those rare thinkers that tried to think big. Not common in economics anymore, and less clear in other social sciences, as somewhat narrowly defined techniques take over the breadth of historical understanding. I've only read before his The Theft of History, somewhat iconoclastic book in which he debunks the idea that individualism, democracy and freedom were somehow invented by modern Western society.

I started reading now his Metals, Culture and Capitalism. There are already some interesting things associated to his emphasis on iron, rather than precious metals, in the trade interaction between the West and the Rest. Note that this suggests, probably against the grain of Goody's concern, that the metallurgic advantages of the West, played an early role in the so-called Rise of the West.

But what caught my eye is the following quote:

“In this piece I have covered a long period of time and will undoubtedly have got some things wrong, although I hope my references will usually bear me out. On few, perhaps none, of the subjects am I expert, but the expert does not always see the wood for the trees. One reason for my taking a long time-span is that historians have taken a much too restricted view of their subject and this has prevented them from going back to the commonalities which join us both to the Near and the Far East of what is essentially one continent. For this reason I would question the history cultivated in part of that region, in Europe since the eighteenth, but especially the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the west led the way in many things. They emphasised the development of ‘capitalism’ as a new mode of production in Europe (an idea not limited to Marxism) and have therefore overlooked the commonalities of which I have spoken.”

First of all, there is the admission that to think big it requires to deal in areas that one is not a specialist, and that leads to mistakes. But most of the mistakes are not central to the argument in my view (see for example, the discussion with Brad DeLong related to David Graeber's book on debt; see comments section).

The second and more relevant point is that he seems, as much as Gunder Frank in ReOrient, to suggest that the notion of mode of production is problematic, and that the very idea of capitalism should be questioned. While I find revisionism with regards the timing and the causes of the Rise of the West (including the work of Gunder Frank, but even more Pomeranz and Bin Wong) relevant to understand the limits of conventional views on the subject, both that it happened much recent than normally thought and that demand forces might have played a role, I find the dismissal of the notion of capitalism problematic (I discussed some of that here). In extremely simplified way, one could argue that it's capitalism that is behind the Rise of the West.

The deep causes of the Great Divergence: or why China fell behind

In the last post, I suggested that Kenneth Chase's explanation of why China invented, but did not pursue the development of gunpowder and guns to its ultimate consequences, could be seen as the very deep cause of the so-called Big Divergence, i.e. of the rise to dominance by Western Europe. Chase explains the lack of interest in the development of firearms in China as the result of geographical conditions and how they affected warfare. He argues that two types of warfare developed after the invention of firearms.

"Where there were technologically advanced agrarianate societies that were not threatened by steppe or desert nomads, we find the combination of firearms and pikemen, with an emphasis upon infantry (western Europe, Japan). Where there were technologically advanced agrarianate societies that were threatened by steppe or desert nomads, we find the combination of firearms and wagons, with an emphasis upon cavalry (eastern Europe, the Middle East, India, north China)."

From a geographical point of view Chase divides Eurasia in three regions. The Arid Zone, which includes those areas that supported pastoral nomads, the Inner Zone including the areas that were directly threatened by pastoral nomads, principally eastern Europe, the Middle East, India, and China, and the Outer Zone that was not directly threatened by pastoral nomads, principally Western Europe and Japan, as shown in his map below.

In a sense, this is a more sophisticated geographical argument than the one put forward by Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs and Steel, since it is capable of explaining why Western Europe and not China (or India, or the Ottomans) dominated the world, while Diamond (in a book that uses old political economy arguments, in particular the notion of surplus, something typical of many historians as argued here before) can only explain why Europeans conquered the people outside Eurasia (that had less luck in the choice of animals and plants to domesticate, and less chance to spread them in an East-West axis with similar climate) really. Note that Cipolla long ago had noted that the main advantage of Westerners when they arrived in the East (Vasco da Gama in 1498) was basically military.

The only thing missing in most of these non-economists discussions of the causes of Western European dominance is the role of demand expansion in technological progress and economic growth in general. But many historians do have an implicit demand-led growth or Keynesian story too, I should add. By the way, on the Keynesian view of many historians it might be worthwhile reading the last section of Garegnani and Palumbo's entry on the Elgar Companion to Classical Economics available here.

PS: This also suggests that on some level, particularly military and naval technology, the West was already ahead of the Oriental Empires considerably before Pomeranz and the revisionists time frame (i.e. around 1800).  However, the argument does not hinge on Eurocentric views about the superiority of culture, as in many neo-Weberian arguments (e.g. David Landes).

Urbanization and the Great Divergence

The Great Divergence between Western Europe and Asia, in particular China, according to revisionist authors like Ken Pomeranz, André Gunder Frank and Roy Bin Wong, has been a recent phenomenon, from around the early nineteenth century (and some would argue it will be a short lived one too; I expressed my doubts here). The graph below (source: Persson, 2010) shows rates of urbanization in Western Europe and China for a very long period.

Note that, by the renaissance of the twelfth century, Italy, particularly Northern Italy, shows a significant increase in the rate of urbanization, eventually returning to the levels of the Roman Empire. Chinese rates of urbanization are flat, in comparison, in this period. Mind you, the Song Dynasty period was a period of rapid growth in China. By the sixteenth century the rates of urbanization in Western Europe take off, with nothing comparable in China, until recent times.

Rosenthal and Wong (2011, p. 111) argue that "war was responsible for Europe’s urban manufacturing," while Chinese manufacturing remained eminently rural. And there are good reasons associated with the Military Revolution Theory to suggest Western European hegemonic rise was associated to guns and sails, as famously put by Carlo Cipolla.

From my perspective what is great about the graph is the suggestion that Western European growth, and eventually the Industrial Revolution, can be associated to the growth in demand. Note that urbanization goes hand in hand with the expansion and transformation of the patterns of consumption. In cities, that have to be built and all sorts of infrastructure and services must be provided, people have access to new consumption goods, and the significant expansion of demand is what forces supply to adjust. In that sense, urbanization, more than population growth, is a good measure of consumption expansion. And urbanization is certainly one way in which Western Europe was already diverging from Asia as far back as the twelfth century.