Showing posts with label Money. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Money. Show all posts
Monday, June 26, 2017
Capitalism is national & transnational, but what about the money?
This is my short response, originally posted here, to William I. Robinson's post here and Fred Magdoff's note in the comment section of that post:
While I generally agree with Robinson's and Magdoff's analyses, what is absent, specifically with respect to Robinson's discussion, is a concrete assessment of the acute variables that measure the degree to which national States have the capacity to engage in power-maximizing behavior and, thus, pursue certain responses, i.e. imperialism, to the competitive nature of the capitalist world economy. Certain material capabilities of national States generate the space to be 'constituted', whereby they embody a structural authority to shape the framework of global economic relations. This structural authority is tied to the qualification to establish and enforce a particular item, currency, as the unit of account in which global economic calculations are made, facilitating the functioning of financial markets and thus international trade. Hence, the analytical specificity of methodological nationalism, albeit in amalgamated form to cope with the forces of globalization, is still potent.
References:
Fields, D. and M. Vernengo (2013), “Hegemonic currencies during the crisis: the dollar versus the euro in a Cartalist perspective.” Review of International Political Economy, 20(4), pp. 740–59.
Fields, D. (2015). “Dollar Hegemony.” Pp. 145-147 in The Encyclopedia of Central Banking, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing
Ingham, G. (2004), The Nature of Money, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Vernengo, M. & D. Fields (2016), “DisORIENT: Money, Technological Development and the Rise of the West.” Review of Radical Political Economics, 48(4), pp. 562–568
Thursday, February 9, 2017
On the AS/AD model and the micro/macro relation
I promised to discuss Nick Rowe's claim that one must start with Aggregate Demand and Supply (AS/AD) to explain macroeconomics. Nick's argument is that the AS/AD model is useful to analyze monetary economies, and he quite correctly points out that money must be part of the discussion from the start. In his words:
Sure money matters, but it's worth remembering that the basic macro principle, the idea of effective demand and the multiplier can be described without directly discussing money. Sure, Keynes noted that effective demand works in a monetary economy of production, and suggested that it was similar to Marx's capitalism (M-C-M') in the drafts of the General Theory (GT). But that was just to note that that the process of production is not about consumption, but about accumulation, something relevant for debunking Say's Law.
But the idea that investment (in this case as a proxy for autonomous spending) determines savings, and the adjustment process results from increases in income, does not require a previous discussion of money. So much so that Keynes himself suggests that he only came up with the theory of liquidity preference, and the monetary rate of interest, after the development of the multiplier (and his version the psychological law, and the propensity to consume below one; Kalecki does it by the share of income going to wages below one, and with workers consuming all their income).
So why is AS/AD important in my view, you may ask. I actually start with the Quantity Theory of Money to provide an AD curve (as suggested by Nick; but he prefers to make M endogenous as in a Wicksellian model), and a simple production function and labor market story for a vertical AS at the natural level of output to describe the neoclassical model. Exactly to show that in this case output is supply constrained and money does not matter. And that would contrast with the Keynesian view of a demand determined level of income and employment, and a world in which money matters.*
The worst part of using the AS/AD framework is that most students will mechanically believe in something along those lines, and in particular the notion that the two curves are independent. And even though by the end of the course I try to emphasize that the AS (potential output) can be moved by changes in the AD, along the lines of the Kaldor-Verdoorn, it is harder once they have been using both curves independently.
That leaves the issue of the micro/macro relations and Nick's notion that money, which he sees as a medium of exchange in typical neoclassical fashion rather than as a unit of account that represents the power of the State, is the main difference with micro. In my course, the first thing I discuss is the different views of what macroeconomics is, simply the aggregation of individual rational behavior, or as in Keynes' notion of the fallacy of composition something beyond simple aggregation. One example I use is Keynes' notion of financial markets as a beauty contest, that is, the idea that agents in financial markets are concerned with the average view of where the markets should be. So the behavior of one agent affects the behavior of others.
But the main problem with the notion of conventional neoclassical micro is more complicated than the lack of interdependence of preferences, or the lack of money for that matter, but the very core notion of the principle of substitution. I only discuss this in my course, briefly when I have to deal with investment behavior and Keynes' acceptance of the marginal efficiency of capital. And yes, that requires some understanding of the capital debates.
* I should add that I make the distinction that you could have short run effects of money in the simple neoclassical story, but not in the long run, in which cycles are dominated by technological shocks (phlogiston as Romer would aptly call them). In my view, in the long run the main effect of money would be on the level of the normal rate of interest, and it's impact on income distribution and the dynamics of debt. But those are discussed only cursorily in the undergraduate course.
And if you don't start with money, monetary exchange, and AD and AS, you are doing macro wrong. Because the only thing that makes macro different from micro general equilibrium theory is the fact that macro incorporates the fact of monetary exchange, which microeconomists ignore.While I tend to agree that macro should deal directly with monetary economies, it's far from clear that the only difference between macro and General Equilibrium (GE) micro is the existence of money. But before I get to that a few things about the AS/AD model in general and Nick's suggestions.
Sure money matters, but it's worth remembering that the basic macro principle, the idea of effective demand and the multiplier can be described without directly discussing money. Sure, Keynes noted that effective demand works in a monetary economy of production, and suggested that it was similar to Marx's capitalism (M-C-M') in the drafts of the General Theory (GT). But that was just to note that that the process of production is not about consumption, but about accumulation, something relevant for debunking Say's Law.
But the idea that investment (in this case as a proxy for autonomous spending) determines savings, and the adjustment process results from increases in income, does not require a previous discussion of money. So much so that Keynes himself suggests that he only came up with the theory of liquidity preference, and the monetary rate of interest, after the development of the multiplier (and his version the psychological law, and the propensity to consume below one; Kalecki does it by the share of income going to wages below one, and with workers consuming all their income).
So why is AS/AD important in my view, you may ask. I actually start with the Quantity Theory of Money to provide an AD curve (as suggested by Nick; but he prefers to make M endogenous as in a Wicksellian model), and a simple production function and labor market story for a vertical AS at the natural level of output to describe the neoclassical model. Exactly to show that in this case output is supply constrained and money does not matter. And that would contrast with the Keynesian view of a demand determined level of income and employment, and a world in which money matters.*
The worst part of using the AS/AD framework is that most students will mechanically believe in something along those lines, and in particular the notion that the two curves are independent. And even though by the end of the course I try to emphasize that the AS (potential output) can be moved by changes in the AD, along the lines of the Kaldor-Verdoorn, it is harder once they have been using both curves independently.
That leaves the issue of the micro/macro relations and Nick's notion that money, which he sees as a medium of exchange in typical neoclassical fashion rather than as a unit of account that represents the power of the State, is the main difference with micro. In my course, the first thing I discuss is the different views of what macroeconomics is, simply the aggregation of individual rational behavior, or as in Keynes' notion of the fallacy of composition something beyond simple aggregation. One example I use is Keynes' notion of financial markets as a beauty contest, that is, the idea that agents in financial markets are concerned with the average view of where the markets should be. So the behavior of one agent affects the behavior of others.
But the main problem with the notion of conventional neoclassical micro is more complicated than the lack of interdependence of preferences, or the lack of money for that matter, but the very core notion of the principle of substitution. I only discuss this in my course, briefly when I have to deal with investment behavior and Keynes' acceptance of the marginal efficiency of capital. And yes, that requires some understanding of the capital debates.
* I should add that I make the distinction that you could have short run effects of money in the simple neoclassical story, but not in the long run, in which cycles are dominated by technological shocks (phlogiston as Romer would aptly call them). In my view, in the long run the main effect of money would be on the level of the normal rate of interest, and it's impact on income distribution and the dynamics of debt. But those are discussed only cursorily in the undergraduate course.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Monday, February 16, 2015
Kevin Gallagher on Emerging Markets and Re-regulation of Cross-Border Finance
Tuesday, August 26, 2014
Amato and Fantacci on reforming international money
New Cambridge Journal of Economics paper by Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci.
From the abstract:
From the abstract:
In the face of the current crisis, there is growing demand for regulation, often invoked in terms of a ‘return to Bretton Woods’. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was indeed the last explicit attempt to define a rule for international settlements. In fact, post-World War II currency negotiations gave place to a confrontation between two alternative visions of the international monetary system. The two plans set forth by the U.S. and by the U.K. embody two alternative principles: the first aims at producing international liquidity on the basis of a reserve currency (White’s plan for an International Stabilization Fund); the second aims at providing a pure means and measure for the multilateral clearing of current accounts in the form of a currency unit (Keynes’s plan for an International Clearing Union). The former has undoubtedly prevailed. However, it is questionable whether it is the most appropriate way to manage global imbalances. Indeed, the principle eventually embodied in the Bretton Woods system, and persisting even after its demise, tends to identify money with a reserve asset, making possible, and even necessary, the accumulation of global imbalances, despite original intentions to reabsorb them. On the contrary, the principle that inspired the alternative plan was intended to deprive money of the character of a reserve asset, thus making it the rule for international exchanges, rather than an object of regulation among others. This paper outlines the two principles both in historical perspective and in the perspective of future reforms, particularly in relation to the recent proposal by the governor of the People’s Bank of China to go back to the principles of the Keynes plan.Read rest here (subscription required).
Thursday, August 21, 2014
Classic Paper by Arestis & Eichner: "The Post-Keynesian and Institutionalist Theory of Money and Credit"
Recently, (see here) Matias posted a link to Fred Lee's collection of a classic set of by papers by the late Alfred S. Eichner. He mentioned that this not a complete set of Eichner's remarkable work, and that there are plenty of other exceptional pieces; in particular is Eichner's paper with Philip Arestis: "The Post-Keynesian and Institutionalist Theory of Money and Credit." This work has influenced my research tremendously (especially concerning the authors adherence to the tradition of Veblenian Institutionalism, and their emphasis of an 'open-systems' approach to political economy).
From the Introduction (which is worth quoting at length):
From the Introduction (which is worth quoting at length):
The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to identify the main elements of what constitutes post-Keynesian and institutionalist monetary theory and, second, to put forward a model general enough to encapsulate most, if not all, of the constituent elements of the post-Keynesian and institutionalist theory of money and credit. One further novel aspect of this article is that we account for the possibility of the openness of economic systems. This is an aspect that has been ignored by the literature on both post-Keynesian and institutionalist economics.
The emphasis in post-Keynesian and institutionalist monetary theory is on the proposition that "Monetary economics cannot help being institutional economics" [Minsky 1982, p. 280] and that "Capitalism is a monetary economy" [Dilland 1987, p. 1641]. In this view money capital is an institution that is inseparable from the other institutions that comprise economic systems. Money is not merely a medium of exchange. It is tightly linked to the behavior of the enterprise sector and the economy as a whole. Therefore, the basic theme in this approach is inevitably, "The Monetary Theory of Production" [Keynes 1973; Veblen 1964]. It is in fact this Veblenian/Keynesian premise that constitutes the core of what we have labelled in this study "the post- Keynesian and institutionalist theory of money and credit."
In this monetary theory of production, it is not surprising to find that credit rather than money is the mechanism that enables spending units to bridge any gap between their desired level of spending and the current rate of cash inflow. Money is viewed as essentially endogenous in a credit-based economy, responding to changes in the behavior of economic entities, rather than being subject to the control of the monetary
authorities. Money, in this view, is an output of the system, with the endogenous response by the financial sector governed by the borrowing needs of firms, households, and the government. Once it is recognized that money is credit-driven and therefore endogenously determined, any money creation emanating from fiscal or debt management operations initiated by the authorities or from a favorable balance of payments, can be neutralized through an equivalent reduction in commercial bank credit brought about by the actions of private economic agents.' It clearly follows that government may not be able to create money directly (see, however, Chick [1986]).
What it can do, instead, is redistribute money among different groups of economic agents. This can happen when governments, in their attempt to increase/reduce the stock of money, set in motion the process whereby bank credit is created/destroyed by groups of economic agents. To the extent that the latter groups are different from those initially receiving/destroying money following the government's initiatives, redistribution of money between those groups takes place.
The endogenous nature of money and credit is further elaborated upon in the next section with the constituent elements of the model under discussion being brought together in the section that follows. It is precisely here that the openness of economic systems is emphasized and its implications for the post-Keynesian and institutionalist theory of money and credit are compared with the neoclassical view. A final section summarizes the argument.Read rest here (subscription required).
Friday, August 15, 2014
Paul Davidson on The Gross Substitution Axiom, Heart of Mainstream Economics
By Paul Davidson, [h/t] Lars P. Syll
The gross substitution axiom assumes that if the demand for good x goes up, its relative price will rise, inducing demand to spill over to the now relatively cheaper substitute good y. For an economist to deny this ‘universal truth’ of gross substitutability between objects of demand is revolutionary heresy – and as in the days of the Inquisition, the modern-day College of Cardinals of mainstream economics destroys all non-believers, if not by burning them at the stake, then by banishing them from the mainstream professional journals. Yet in Keynes’s (1936, ch. 17) analysis ‘The Essential Properties of Interest and Money’ require that:
1. The elasticity of production of liquid assets including money is approximately zero. This means that private entrepreneurs cannot produce more of these assets by hiring more workers if the demand for liquid assets increases. In other words, liquid assets are not producible by private entrepreneurs’ hiring of additional workers; this means that money (and other liquid assets) do not grow on trees.
2. The elasticity of substitution between all liquid assets, including money (which are not reproducible by labour in the private sector) and producibles (in the private sector), is zero or negligible. Accordingly, when the price of money increases, people will not substitute the purchase of the products of industry for their demand for money for liquidity (savings) purposes.
Read rest here.
Friday, May 30, 2014
Chick & Tily on whatever happened to Keynes’s monetary theory?
New Cambridge Journal of Eeconomics paper by Victoria Chick and Geoff Tily.
From the abstract:
From the abstract:
Some see a return to Keynes’s ideas in response to the crisis that began in 2007, but we argue that the resurrected ideas belong to that betrayal of Keynes’s thought known as ‘Keynesian’ economics. What happened is almost a reversal of the Whig history view of economics, in which past knowledge is embodied in later theory: Keynes has been made a pre-Keynesian. We trace this transformation mainly through his monetary theory, though we range more widely where necessary. We state what we consider to be his monetary theory, then identify and summarize the key contributions to its destruction. Then, in a speculative section, we suggest a variety of motivations for this subversion of his ideas. We end by assessing what has been lost, in particular his monetary policy, and suggest social and political pressures that may have been partly responsible.Read the rest here (subscription required).
Friday, May 23, 2014
New Levy Working Paper: Shadow Banking - Policy Challenges for Central Banks
By Thorvald Grung Moe*
*Thorvald Grung Moe is a senior adviser at Norges Bank.
Central banks responded with exceptional liquidity support during the financial crisis to prevent a systemic meltdown. They broadened their tool kit and extended liquidity support to non-banks and key financial markets. Many want central banks to embrace this expanded role as “market maker of last resort” going forward. This would provide a liquidity backstop for systemically important markets and the shadow banking system that is deeply integrated with these markets. But how much liquidity support can central banks provide to the shadow banking system without risking their balance sheets? I discuss the expanding role of the shadow banking sector and the key drivers behind its growing importance. There are close parallels between the growth of shadow banking before the recent financial crisis and earlier financial crises, with rapid growth in near monies as a common feature. This ebb and flow of shadow-banking-type liabilities are indeed an ingrained part of our advanced financial system. We need to reflect and consider whether official sector liquidity should be mobilized to stem a future breakdown in private shadow banking markets. Central banks should be especially concerned about providing liquidity support to financial markets without any form of structural reform. It would indeed be ironic if central banks were to declare victory in the fight against too-big-to-fail institutions, just to end up bankrolling too-big-to-fail financial markets.Read rest here.
*Thorvald Grung Moe is a senior adviser at Norges Bank.
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Iren Levina: A Puzzling Rise in Financial Profits and the Role of Capital Gain-Like Revenues
New PERI working paper by my friend & colleague Iren Levina - From the abstract:
The paper provides an explanation for the puzzling decoupling between the rate of growth of financial profits and GDP in the 2000s. Drawing on the insights from Keynes, Minsky, and Hilferding, the paper identifies a peculiar type of profit – capital gain-like revenues that take the form of profits from underwriting, mergers and acquisitions, securitization, and trade in financial assets. These capital gain-like revenues come from the redistribution of monetary assets and lack a counterpart in current GDP. They can be thought of as wealth transfers. Based on an empirical analysis of revenues of U.S. bank holding companies, these capital gain-like revenues are shown to have contributed significantly to the decoupling between the rate of growth of financial profits and GDP. The paper identifies characteristics of these revenues that explain the puzzles around this decoupling – its very possibility, sustainability over long time, and lack of losses sufficient to offset the pre-crisis financial gains. These characteristics of capital gain-like revenues also allow one to reconcile two seemingly incompatible approaches to a rise in financial profits – as transfers (rent) and as an illusion (mirage).Read rest here.
Thursday, February 27, 2014
New Working Paper By Passarella & Sawyer: Financialisation in the circuit
From The Abstract:
The relationships between financial systems and the macro-economy with emphasis on the saving-investment relationships and the nature of money are set out. A circuitist framework is extended to reflect some major features of the era of financialisation circa 1980.Read the rest here.
* FESSUD is a multidisciplinary, pluralistic project which aims to forge alliances across the social sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve economic, social and environmental needs. For more on the project, see here.
Friday, January 31, 2014
Gerald Epstein on why the Fed is pushing interest rates higher
The quantitative easing is when the Federal Reserve essentially prints money and then buys Treasury bills and mortgage-backed securities and other things like that. And they've been doing about $85 billion a month and are now tapering--what they call tapering it down to $65 billion a month. And by doing that, they're putting less money and credit into the economy. And when there's less money and credit in the economy, that tends to raise interest rates. And hence you've seen a big shift in financial markets here in the U.S. and all over the world as a result of this expectation that both short-term and long-term interest rates are going to go up.
Monday, January 6, 2014
European Amnesia: Lithuania Considers Euro Adoption
Well, it is quite apparent that the euro crisis had done little to transform the sociology of knowledge concerning inherent problems related to common currencies; Lithuania is on track towards adopting the Euro. Read here. A related post on the issue can be seen here.
PS: Euroization is similar (wrt consequences for countries in the periphery) to the process of dollarization - see here.
PS: Euroization is similar (wrt consequences for countries in the periphery) to the process of dollarization - see here.
Saturday, January 4, 2014
Art Laffer: "I Was Wrong About Inflation." No Kidding!
Arthur Laffer said that: "Usually when you find the model this far off, you've probably got something wrong with the model, not that the world has changed... inflation does not appear to be monetary base driven." For the whole story go here.
PS: For an heterodox analysis of money and inflation, see here.
PS: For an heterodox analysis of money and inflation, see here.
Lessons Unlearned: Latvia Adopts Euro
Sunday, December 1, 2013
Friday, November 29, 2013
Saturday, November 23, 2013
More on The Sociology of Development: Towards A Re-articulation of Dependency Theory
The sociology of development as a field of study, a
structure of knowledge, providing an interpretive grid through which to render
impoverished regions of the world intelligible has its roots after the
completion of Second World War with the crystallization of ‘Modernization
theory', which constituted an ideation that societies are understood to move
from social positions of tradition to modernity polar ends of an evolutionary
continuum. At some point, incremental changes give way to a qualitative jump
into modernity, marked by the essence of industrialism. In this sense, the
Third world is perceived to be below the threshold of modernity, with a
preponderance of traditional-like features such as an extended kinship social
structure and, due to the lack of progress towards political differentiations,
similar to that of Western forms of democratization, strict hierarchical
sources of authority, altogether negating the possibilities to move beyond
disintegrated autarkic primary economic activities (Parsons, 1964).
The development of a high extent of differentiation: the development of free resources which are not committed to any fixed, ascriptive groups; the development of wide non-traditional, “national,” or even super-national group identifications; and the concomitant development, in all major institutional spheres, of specialized roles and of special wider regulative or allocative mechanisms and organization, such as market mechanisms in economic life, voting and party activities in politics, and diverse bureaucratic organizations and mechanisms in most institutional spheres (Eisenstadt (1973: 23).
According to Rostow (1960), all societies can be placed
along a linear continuum from undeveloped to developed along a ‘stages of
economic growth’ path, derived from an extensive study of Western economic
development. In ‘traditional society’, the first stage, it is deemed that
economic output is limited because of inaccessibility to innovative technology.
At the second stage, ‘the preconditions for take-off, modern science,
attributed to “Western Europe of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries” (Rostow, 1960, p. 6) ensues new innovations in production in
agriculture and industry, fostering widespread education, entrepreneurship, and
institutions capable of mobilizing industrial capital; capitalistic investments
increase, especially in transport, communication and raw materials.
Nevertheless, despite the development of some modern manufacturing, traditional
social structures and production techniques remain:
In many cases, for example, the traditional society persisted side by side with modern economic activities, conducted for limited economic purposes by a colonial or quasi-colonial power (Rostow, 1960, p.7)
Rostow’s third stage is ‘the Take-off’, in which traditional
barriers to economic growth, like the effect of a dual economy, are overcome.
At this point, capital investment increases rapidly and new industries expand
exponentially, as does an ‘entrepreneurial class’—economic growth becomes a
normal condition” (Rostow, 1960, p. 36). At the fourth stage, ‘the Drive to
Maturity’, technology becomes more complex and what produced is now less a
matter of economic necessity, and more a question of consumer choice. This
leads to the final fifth stage of high consumption, in which economic sectors
specialize in the manufacturing of highly sought after consumer durables and
basic life needs are mutually satisfied. In a play on Marx, Rostow’s analysis
suggests that the West, which “is more developed industrially only shows, to
the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx, 1954, p. 19). The assumption is that capitalism is a historically progressive system, which is transmitted from the privileged economically advanced countries to the rest of the world by a continual process of
destruction and replacement of pre-capitalist social structures (Palma, 1978).
The problem with modernization theory is that it is quite ahistorical, with respect to the global capitalist exploitation.
'Modernization’ theory can, and has been, be interpreted as a ‘blame the
victim’ approach to problems affecting the ‘Third World’. Rostow ignores the
external influences like colonialism that contributed to social in the Third
World. Rostow’s, and for most of ‘modernization’ theory, the unit of analysis
is the nation-state of the ‘Third World’, emphasizing internal dynamics, sectors
and sub-sectors, combined with the causal role of technology. As such,
conclusions drawn from this approach are that all nations, regardless of the
history of imperialism, colonialism, etc., should be able to modernize with
emulation of more developed economies and their diffusing of highly advanced
technology.
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, in Monopoly Capital (1960),
building on the path-breaking work of Michel Kalecki and Joseph Steindl, assess
the degree to which monopoly, as measured by the market concentration ratio of
large capitalist firms (corporations) in economically advanced countries,
ensues an inverse of Marx’s famous hypothesis that the ‘laws of motion’ of
capitalist development in produces a ‘tendency for the surplus to fall. Rather,
the economic surplus, defined as the gap, at any given level of economic
activity—effective demand in Keynesian terminology—, between what is produced
and the socially necessary costs of producing it, under monopoly capitalism has
a tendency to rise (Baran & Sweezy,1966, pp. 9, 52-57).
Since aggregate levels of effective demand for total output
determine the level of economic activity, crises of capital accumulation are
inevitable if the monopoly sector cannot sustain its power via sufficient
investment opportunities to absorb its accumulating share of the total surplus
produced. Rather than let this insufficiency put downward pressures on
potential profits as a whole, various stabilizing factors are set in motion,
which include classical Keynesian government deficit spending, research &
development (although risky without reliable forecasts potential spillover
effects), waste (as evidenced by a sales effort, i.e. consumerism), or
imperialism—the last of which provides the foundations for the dependency theoretical
approach to economic development.
In this sense, for an understanding of the fundamental
division between economically advanced countries and impoverished ones, it is
requisite to place attention to the extent to which foreign investment acts as
an outlet for investment-seeking surplus generation. Unlike Lenin’s theory of
imperialism, foreign investment is a method of extracting wealth, not a channel
through which surplus is directed, ensuing underdevelopment (Baran &
Sweezy, pp. 104-105). Underdevelopment is a thus process by which monopoly
capital in economically advanced nations exploit economically weaker countries
by exporting capital to the extent that profits produced (from the production
of cheaper consumer goods or raw materials via lower wages in these countries,
for example) are repatriated. It is the process by which the expropriation of
“foreign sources of supply and foreign markets, ena[ble] [the agents of]
monopoly capital to buy and sell on specially privileged terms” (Baran &
Sweezy 1966, p. 201), ensuring, caeteris paribus, their positions of power in
the world are sustained. The result is that economically weaker countries
suffer the retardation of the requisite forces to spawn autonomous and dynamic
process of self-governance of the conditions that constitute independent
social/political/economic coordination, planning and control.
The argument is that (Baran & Sweezy, pp. 9,178-179)
monopoly capitalism is tantamount to the degree to which large capitalist firms
in economically advanced countries have as their counterpart the “exploitation
of much of the rest of the world” and, as a result, constitute international
relations as a “hierarchical system with one or more leading metropolises,
completely dependent colonies [even if not name, certainly in practice] at the
bottom, and many degrees of superordinate and subordination in between […]
[t]hese features are of crucial importance to the functioning of both the
system as a whole and its individual components […] (Baran & Sweezy, 1966,
pp. 178-179). As such, “we cannot hope to formulate adequate development theory
and policy for the majority of the world’s population who suffer from
[impoverishment] without first learning how their past economic and social
history gave rise to their present underdevelopment” (Frank, [1966] 1969).
Underdevelopment is neither an original nor traditional social position. Hence,
it cannot be assumed that the contemporary position of the Third World can be
understood as solely a reflections of its internal historically specific
social, political, economic, and organizational characteristics. The process by
which monopoly capital in economic advanced countries extract surplus from
less-developed countries through capital exports limits the latter’s ability to
achieve the status of the former. Thus, 'modernization theory' is utterly
unsatisfactory, for such an approach
[…] in all its variations, ignores the historical and structural reality of the underdeveloped countries. This reality is the product of the very same historical process and systemic structure as is the development of the now developed countries’ (Frank 1969, p. 47).
To suggest that social, political, and economic advancement
of the underdeveloped world can be generated by the diffusion of what is deemed
modernizing institutions, values, etc. is fundamentally erroneous. If
development fails to occur, it is not because within the Third World there are
mere obstacles to diffusion because of innate poverty arising from some form
Gerschenkronian ‘backwardness’, but due to the net outflow of vital resources,
whether natural, monetary, human, technological etc. The implication is that
underdevelopment is not because of the “the survival of archaic institutions”,
or some inability to contract some ‘modern man’ (Inkles, 1969) syndrome; on the
contrary, it is generated by the same capitalist development that led to the
domination by economic advanced countries, that is, “the development of
capitalism itself” (Frank, [1966] 1969). Capitalism, hence, is an operation that cements a peripheral
latifundium system, via the constant forces of ‘primitive-accumulation', what
Myrdal (1957) defined as international ‘backwash’ effects, that reproduces a
cleavage between ‘town and country’, centre and periphery, on a tremendously
enlarged basis (cf. Bukharin & Lenin, 1929).
Viewed from this standpoint, dependency theory is a
manifestation of what David Harvey (1978, 2007) defines as ‘accumulation by
dispossession’ by virtue of which dialectical forces of motion and contradiction
generate vast disparities of wealth and power on a worldwide scale. The world
economy is reproduced as a world-system (Wallerstein, 1979) of ‘unequal
exchange’ (Emmanuel, 1972; Amin 1974, 1976), in which ‘underdevelopment’ ensues
peripheral internal long-run stagnation (Bornschier & Chase-Dunn, 1985, pp.
39-40). The terms of trade for the periphery fall precipitously – this is the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prebisch 1950). As Samir Amin (1976, p. 292) notes,
“whereas at the center growth means development, making the economy more
integral, in the periphery growth does not mean more development, for it
dis-articulates the economy. Since the imbalance of international trade defines
the mechanisms by which capital is drained from former colonized countries, there
is no way for peripheral countries in the world economy to ‘catch up’ in
Rostowian fashion (p. 383).
Nevertheless, the social facts that constitute the
particular social conditions for the constant negation of a ‘just price’ in
international trade ‘admits of varying interpretation’ (Frank, 1977). Case in
point is the extent to which the periphery is in fact ‘peripheralized’. To
suggest that the capitalist world economy simply, by definition, produces a
centre-periphery polarity (Frank, 1967; Wallerstein, 1974), is to pay
insufficient attention to understanding the extent to which economic
development in the periphery is a convoluted association of varying social
processes, rather than the mere result of a state’s homogenized world-systemic
position (Gellert, 2010).
According to Cardoso and Faletto ([1967] 1970), for
instance, development in the periphery, while controlling for socioeconomic
income differentials, is likely if foreign capital penetration creates
spillover effects. That is, partial economic growth is viable through what Peter Evans (1995) describes as the practice of an ‘embedded autonomy’-an apparent solidified social network between the state and civil society
(which consists of economic elites from the centre) that creates the capacity
for the state, as such, to engage in domestic Keynesian aggregate demand
management. Whether this is manifested is the extent to which a peripheral
country does not suffer the inability to borrow in its own currency, in which a
country, most likely a developing one, supplements its domestic unit account of
fiduciary reserve assets with a foreign currency. This is the exemplification
of a country foregoing its national ‘monetary sovereignty’ (Mundell, 1961).
The essence of national 'monetary sovereignty' is the
cartelist (or chartelist) (Goodhart, 1998) conception that emphasizes state
power to establish a particular unit of account, a national currency, which
allows economic calculations to take place (Ingham, 2004). In this sense, money
is a means for accounting for and settling of financial debts, the most
important of which are tax debts, which, in turn, regulate the level of
aggregate demand, and thus determination of national income through the use of
fiscal policy; it represents a [store of financial value] [...] [of which]
general purchasing power is held [...] (Keynes, 1930, p. 3).
In the United States, for example, and in contrast to James O’Connor ([1973] 2002) and Erik Olin Wright’s (1979) fiscal
sociological model for analyzing the intricacies of public finance, which
narrowly centers on a hypothetical natural limit to fiscal policy (Wright 1979,
p.157), the federal government, through open-market operations, sells
government bonds, Treasury securities, which are either bought or foregone by
the Federal Reserve (Fed). If the Fed commits to a policy of purchasing Treasury
securities, the interest rate by which the Federal government is liable on
Treasury securities held by the Fed is lowered. Symmetrically, if the Fed sells
Treasury securities, the Federal Government’s interest burden, which is paid
through taxes denominated in dollars, is raised. By providing a guarantee for
State debt, the Fed delivers the capability for the federal government to use
fiscal policy to regulate aggregate demand. Thus, the extent to which fiscal
policy is an option is determined by the burden of the federal government's
interest payments on Treasury securities to the Fed (cf. Lerner, 1943; Domar, 1944).
From this perspective, 'underdevelopment', or 'dependency',
is the powerlessness a peripheral country to establish its own unit of account
and thus is forced to variably peg its national currency to a foreign reference
currency. What ensues is the inability to use monetary policy—central bank
purchasing and selling of government bonds denominated in the domestic currency
for purposes of controlling the money supply, and thus the cost of credit—, and
fiscal policy, via deficit spending, for domestic economic needs. Since the
central bank is forced to maintain a certain level reserves of the foreign
reference currency such that the price of the domestic currency, in terms of
the reference currency, does not change, this produces a negative
money-multiplier that sets in motion an inherent deflationary bias, which, if
not counteracted by capital inflows to spur aggregate demand, can lead to
abrupt contraction of the monetary base, stinting any supposed progress towards
economic sustainability (cf. Fields & Vernengo, 2012, 2013).
Thus, if any form of government spending is to be engaged,
an 'underdeveloped' country has to issue bonds that are not denominated in its
own currency. This amounts to the attraction of external commercial loans with
the faith of the country's financial markets by foreign investors used as
collateral. As such, country risk is most likely going to exist. If confidence
is lost in the strength of the country's financial markets, leading to a spread
over bonds like US treasury securities, if the foreign reference currency is
the dollar, for example, interest rates on domestic foreign currency
denominated bonds are likely to rise, making government spending very costly,
which removes any form of domestic capacity to spur public investment as an
effective countercyclical policy in the face of economic downturns. This has
been essentially the case of Argentina before the 2001–2002 crisis, and of the
European periphery since the intensification of the Greek crisis in 2011.
Balance of payments constraints can be quite unsupportable,
spawning self-fulfilling financial collapses. Moreover, they altogether
constitute an ideological mask that normalizes the advance of global
cosmopolitan money-capitalist power to dictate the terms of domestic democratic
politics (Ingham, 2008). As such, the extent to which a country is
'peripheralized', is the degree to which its creditworthiness is essentially
evaluated in terms of the degree to which the state takes steps toward lowering
the social wage for the benefit of multinational corporations from the centre
(or core).
***This is a work in progress and I would like to thank
Matias Vernengo, Brett Clark, & Al Campbell for their assistance.***
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Tuesday, November 19, 2013
Krugman is Right for the Wrong Reasons on Dollar Hegemony
Paul Krugman argues (see here) that supposed threats of the US dollar losing its significance as the international vehicle currency are overblown (which I certainly agree with). He reaches his conclusion, however, from a mettalist perspective, suggesting that the dollar's role reflects self-sustaining increasing returns, that is, people
use dollars because the markets are thicker (many buyers and sellers)
and more liquid; i.e. it is 'confidence', not power, which rules the roost. For an analysis of the mettalist perspective, along with the alternative chartalist conception of dollar hegemony, see here.
Thursday, June 13, 2013
O sacred hunger of pernicious gold! What bands of faith can impious lucre hold?
Sociologist Geoffrey Ingham has written a review of David Graeber's Debt: The First 5,000 Years, which can be viewed here (subscription required). According to Ingham, while Graeber's monumental inquiry is much to be admired, there is quite a bit of room for critical refutation, specifically with respect to the exact nature of money, and its essence as a moral base for economic life.
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