Giancarlo Bertocco on Keynes’s criticism of the Loanable Funds Theory

Recently, Lars P. Syll posted a critique of the loanable funds theory (see here), and Matias Vernengo provides his take here. Below is a paper by Giancarlo Bertocco, in which he provides an analysis of Keynes' criticism of LFT.

From the abstract:

Contemporary monetary theory, by accepting the theses of the Loanable funds theory, distances itself from Keynes, who considered the rate of interest as an exclusively monetary phenomenon, and overlooks the arguments Keynes used, following publication of the General Theory, to respond to the criticism of supporters of the Loanable funds theory such as Ohlin and Robertson. This paper aims to assert that the explicit consideration of the role of banks in financing firms‘ investments connected with the specification of the finance motive does not imply acceptance of the LFT, which holds that the interest rate is a real phenomenon determined by saving decisions, but makes it possible to elaborate a theory of credit alternative to the LFT and a sounder theory of the non neutrality of money than the one based on the liquidity preference theory. 

Read rest here and here.

New Levy Working Paper: Shadow Banking - Policy Challenges for Central Banks

By Thorvald Grung Moe*

Central banks responded with exceptional liquidity support during the financial crisis to prevent a systemic meltdown. They broadened their tool kit and extended liquidity support to non-banks and key financial markets. Many want central banks to embrace this expanded role as “market maker of last resort” going forward. This would provide a liquidity backstop for systemically important markets and the shadow banking system that is deeply integrated with these markets. But how much liquidity support can central banks provide to the shadow banking system without risking their balance sheets? I discuss the expanding role of the shadow banking sector and the key drivers behind its growing importance. There are close parallels between the growth of shadow banking before the recent financial crisis and earlier financial crises, with rapid growth in near monies as a common feature. This ebb and flow of shadow-banking-type liabilities are indeed an ingrained part of our advanced financial system. We need to reflect and consider whether official sector liquidity should be mobilized to stem a future breakdown in private shadow banking markets. Central banks should be especially concerned about providing liquidity support to financial markets without any form of structural reform. It would indeed be ironic if central banks were to declare victory in the fight against too-big-to-fail institutions, just to end up bankrolling too-big-to-fail financial markets.

Read rest here.

*Thorvald Grung Moe is a senior adviser at Norges Bank.

Liquidity preference and effective demand

Reading The Battle of Bretton Woods, by Benn Steil, an interesting book with some problems associated to its conventional economics analysis, I was struck by the following phrase: "Keynes had struggled for years ... to induce a compelling theoretical cause for his burning belief that investment could, even under flexible prices, fail to harmonize savings in a way that would maximize aggregate income. ... It was the concept of ´liquidity preference,' or the idea that people might choose to hoard inert cash rather than consume or invest the fruits of their labor."

It is improtant to remember how Keynes himself suggested he developed Liquidity Preference, to put Steil's argument in perspective. Keynes says in his "Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest" (1937, p. 250; subscription required) that:

"the initial novelty [in his General Theory] lies in my maintaining that it is not the rate of interest, but the level of incomes which ensures equality between saving and investment. The arguments which lead up to this initial conclusion are independent of my subsequent theory of the rate of interest, and in fact I reached it before I had reached the latter theory."

In other words, the central idea of the GT is effective demand (investment determines savings through the multiplier) and liquidity preference is more or less an afterthought, developed to deal with the fact that by eliminating the Loanable Funds Theory he had left "the rate of interest in the air" (ibid.). Further, note that the situation in which "people might hoard cash," corresponds to the so-called Liquidity Trap.

In other words, when everybody expects that in the future the rate of interest will increase, and prices of bonds will collapse, and hence there would be windfall losses, there might be an absolute demand for liquidity [in spite of Krugman, not the case now]. What did Keynes have to say about the liquidity trap? In chapter 15 Keynes tells us ‘after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity preference may become virtually absolute … [b]ut … I know of no example of it hitherto’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 207). In other words, a downward rigidity of the rate of interest, while possible in theory, was not in practice the cause of unemployment for him, and certainly it was not the "compelling theoretical cause for his burning belief that investment could fail to harmonize savings in a way that would maximize aggregate income."

There are several other issues with the book, which I'll discuss in other posts.