Theotônio dos Santos (1936-2018)

Theotônio dos Santos, one of the main authors of the Latin American Dependency School, has passed away. I had some minimal contact with him, seeing some of his talks as an undergraduate, and then at a few conferences were we could talk a bit more, including after I had published this paper.

When I was a student, I might add, I was basically taught that there were two dependency school traditions, and often the Marxist one, in which Theotônio and André Gunder Frank were the key figures, was seen, at my alma mater (the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) at least, as the lesser one, with the Structuralist school, of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, being the 'good' one. In retrospect, given the political views (and some of the economic views too) that Cardoso came to defend from the late 1980s onwards, with his adherence to Neoliberalism, I must conclude that my teachers might have been wrong.

An obituary in Portuguese here.

The inaugural Godley – Tobin Memorial Lecture

The inaugural Godley – Tobin Memorial Lecture at the Eastern Economic Association meetings in Boston on Saturday March 3, 11.30am – 12.50pm. The lecture pays tribute to both Godley and Tobin's emphasis on being non-hyphenated Keynesians (more on that for a later post).

The lecture is sponsored by the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE) and will be delivered by Professor James K. Galbraith, whose talk is titled “A global macroeconomics – Yes, macroeconomics damn it – of inequality and income distribution.”

It will be held in Gardner A & B of the Boston Sheraton. If you are attending the EEA meetings, I hope you will attend.

Was Keynes a Keynesian?

Mike Beggs wrote an interesting Review of the book In the Long Run We Are All Dead (which I started, but have not finished yet). Beggs argues that: "Marx lived long enough to declare himself 'not a Marxist.' Keynes was not so lucky. Followers would make the distinction between 'Keynesian economics' and 'the economics of Keynes.' But by then the word had well and truly transcended the man." That's not altogether correct.

Dave Colander retells the Abba Lerner story of Keynes' famous presentation at the Fed in 1943, which according to Colander might be the source for the Alan Meltzer (based on Terence Hutchison) argument that Keynes indeed did say "I am not a Keynesian," where Keynes was essentially against deficit spending, and that Evsey Domar, who was next to Lerner, "whispered: 'He ought to read the General Theory'."

Leaving aside the fact that the GT, in fact, does not deal with fiscal deficits, but more inscrutably with the socialization of investment, there is a certain amount of truth that Keynes was not always Keynesian, in the simple sense of for fiscal expansion. But that essentially puts an emphasis on Keynes' economics as essentially concerned with economic policy.

As I noted recently, Keynes arguments for public works precede the GT, and the book was published when the worst of the Great Depression was already over, clearly and expressly with a theoretical preoccupation. That is why Mann's view, which is central to his book, seems somewhat misguided. For him:

“Keynes and Keynesianism were not 'resurrected' following the financial meltdown of 2007–2008, because neither was ever 'dead,' however hard some mainstream economists might have tried to convince us otherwise. Capitalist modernity, in fact, is and always has been Keynesian on the inside.”


In his view, Keynesianism is just a name for the mechanism by which liberal capitalism tries to save itself from the contradictions that overwhelm the system in periods of crisis. And he is not wrong that Keynes is resurrected every so often (one can say the same about Minsky, now that most crisis have a financial/bubble component too).

My point is that Keynes notion that there is no unique (natural) level of employment around which the system fluctuates, and that it normally oscillates around sub-optimal levels was never actually adopted by the mainstream. What is often resurrected is the mainstream version of Keynesianism. Instead of the perennial persistence of Keynesianism, a more accurate description would be the idea that the Keynesian Revolution was really aborted.

Talk of military intervention in Venezuela is absurd

In early February, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson embarked on a Latin America tour aimed at promoting "democratic security". But just before he set off on his trip, he speculated on the possibility of a military coup in Venezuela.

"In the history of Venezuela and South American countries, it is often times that the military is the agent of change when things are so bad and the leadership can no longer serve the people," he said at an event at the University of Texas at Austin.

Tillerson's comments came six months after US President Donald Trump threatened military action in Venezuela.

Full piece published by Al Jazeera here.

Cohen and DeLong on Hamilton's Report on Manufactures

Hamilton's Reports, posthumous 1821 edition

Stephen Cohen* and Brad DeLong, in their highly readable book Concrete Economics: The Hamilton Approach to Economic Growth and Policy (if you haven't, go buy a copy now), argue that “Alexander Hamilton [was a] major economic theorist. His theory of economic development, first set out in his famous Report on Manufactures (1791), not only reshaped America’s economy but was channeled by Frederich List half a century later to play a central role in Germany’s rapid industrialization, and still later became a canonical text in Japan." Further they suggest that: “This Hamiltonian project was contrary to Ricardo’s canons of comparative advantage as well as Smith’s free markets. It was bold. The direction of economic activity was not commanded, but it was not left unguided either."

While I generally agree with the main points of the book (my major issues are with the notion that technical change was driven by scarcity of labor, and the need to economize labor along marginalist lines), I would qualify a bit the argument on the break with the Smithian/Ricardian classical political economy (or surplus) approach to economics.

Certainly Hamilton is not Ricardian in the sense that he suggests that the pattern of specialization should not follow comparative advantage (a notion not fully developed until Ricardo's own work a few years later, and simultaneously and independently by Robert Torrens). But note that for Ricardo Free Trade was part of a strategy of reducing the rent of landlords, which resulted from the use of lands of lower quality which were the consequence of the embargo first, and then the Corn Laws. In that sense, Ricardian Free Trade was a strategy of industrialization for England (as much as Hamilton's project was for industrialization in the US). It is also true that Hamilton was breaking with the laissez faire tradition of Smith and classical authors in general. But he was not precisely Mercantilist or Cameralist, in the sense that a reading of the Report clearly shows he understood that the wealth of nations derived from the division of labor, and not from the accumulation of bullion and trade surpluses.++

Hamilton believed, not unreasonably, that manufactures were more prone to the adoption of machinery, and indicates that manufacturing countries are more opulent than merely agricultural countries. In other words, he seemed to believe that what is produced matters, and that manufacturing would further the division of labor that was at the heart of the wealth of nations. That is why there is some importance in the Cohen and DeLong book emphasis on Hamiltonian trade management, and the willingness to use tariffs and bounties (subsidies). Note that the conventional view among economists increasingly tries to deny that this was central for Hamilton. For example, Douglas Irwin argues that: "Although the report is often associated with protectionist trade policies, Hamilton’s proposed tariffs were quite modest, particularly in light of later experience. This reflected his emphasis on using tariffs to generate fiscal revenue to fund the public debt; indeed, the country’s finances were his top priority, not discouraging imports for the sake of domestic manufacturers."

However, the Report itself seems pretty concerned with the differences between agricultural societies and manufacturing ones, arguing that: "nations merely agricultural would not enjoy the same degree of opulence, in proportion to their numbers, as those which united manufactures with agriculture." He cites England and the Cotton Mill developed there as something to be emulated, and that it can only be done with a certain degree of trade management (on free trade versus managed trade see this).

Hamilton is explicit on a strategy that we would call today as import substitution industrialization, and argues that: “The substitution of foreign for domestic manufactures is a transfer to foreign nations of the advantages accruing from the employment of machinery, in the modes in which it is capable of being employed, with most utility and to the greatest extent. The cotton mill invented in England, within the last twenty years, is a signal illustration of the general proposition, which has been just advanced.” Interestingly, he does not cite the use of steam engines, which was still not prevalent, but notes the use of the water wheel, and the extensive use of female and child labor (the latter as a positive development). In this regard, he seems more au courant than Adam Smith, with his pin factory, about what would later be termed the Industrial Revolution.

Moreover, Hamilton suggest that manufacturing and agriculture should be complementary, and argues that manufacturers would provide an outlet for the production of the agricultural sector. The Smithian notion of a vent for surplus, but a domestic one is utilized by him. He argues that: “It is evident, that the exertions of the husbandman will be steady or fluctuating, vigorous or feeble, in proportion to the steadiness or fluctuation, adequateness, or inadequateness of the markets on which he must depend, for the vent of the surplus, which may be produced by his labor; and that such surplus in the ordinary course of things will be greater or less in the same proportion. For the purpose of this vent, a domestic market is greatly to be preferred to a foreign one; because it is in the nature of things, far more to be relied upon.”

The relevance of the ideas related to managed trade seem to be again on the agenda with the rise of right wing populist governments, in particular here in the United States, and the skepticism about Free Trade and Globalization.

* Stephen Cohen was the co-author with John Zysman of a very influential book in the 1980s called Manufacturing matters: the myth of the post-industrial economy which is also still worth reading.

++ In the Report on a National Bank he explicitly says that: “it is immaterial what serves the purpose of money, whether paper or gold and silver; that the effect of both upon industry is the same; and that the intrinsic wealth of a nation is to be measured, not by the abundance of the precious metals, contained in it, but by the quantity of the productions of its labor and industry.”

What About the New Tax Law?

New Event from the Susquehanna Progressives. Drop by if you're around the area. Info below.

"As activists we need to understand the history of US tax policies, how they have changed since the 50's and why, the affect on our social fabric and what the new tax bill will mean for the health of our nation (Presentation followed by Q&A)."

Presenter: Matías Vernengo, Professor of Economics, Bucknell University

Thursday, February 22 | 7:00 - 8:30 PM
Community Zone, Market Street in Lewisburg 7-8:30

Keynes' intellectual influence: the theorist vs the pamphleteer

Keynes' 1933 and 1929 pamphlets, respectively

One of the many unfair criticisms of Keynes' General Theory (GT) is that is badly written or somewhat incomprehensible. Note that Keynes started to write it in 1932, four years into the Depression, and two years after publishing the Treatise, which he probably thought was going to be his Magnus Opus. In other words, by the time he started to write the GT the worst part of the Depression was coming to an end (the UK had abandoned gold in 1931, and the US would start the New Deal the following year). Keynes' policy advice, mostly about the need to abandon gold and promote public works was not based on the GT, which came considerably later. The idea of an employment multiplier, even before Richard Kahn developed the concept, can be found in one of the pamphlets depicted above (Can Lloyd George Do It?).

As he said, the book was basically for his fellow economists. More importantly the book marked a theoretical break with neoclassical economics (which he sadly called classical, creating more confusion than needed), one that was NOT necessary to promote public works or expansionary fiscal policy that would come to be associated with Keynesianism (he was advocating that before he reached the main conclusions of the GT). The point of the book was that, even with price and wage flexibility, the economic system did not have a tendency to full employment (that means you must wait for chapter 19, when wage flexibility is introduced, to get his main argument).

The fact that the Keynesian Revolution led to a reinterpretation of Keynes on the basis of rigid wages (or interest rates) or some other kind of imperfection in more modern versions of mainstream Keynesianism, suggests that to some extent Keynes the pamphleteer was more effective than the theorist, which is not altogether surprising, since Keynes was indeed very good at writing for greater audiences, and became internationally known as a result of his pamphlet on the Treaty of Versailles.

This is my list of his most influential essays or pamphlets:

• The Economic Consequences of the Peace
• The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill
• The End of Laissez-Faire
• Can Lloyd George Do it? (with H. Henderson)
• Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren
• The Means to Prosperity
• My Early Beliefs

Arguably someone may put How to Pay for the War in the list of important pamphlets. He basically wanted to finance war with taxes, and was concerned with demand pull inflation.

Alan Blinder on Fiscal Adjustment

Alan Blinder published recently two columns on the WSJ (here and here) on the need to exercise fiscal restraint. In both cases he complains that the fiscal deficit is too large. Note that he is not saying that this is always the case, he emphasizes that in the second and most recent piece. The reason, as always, is that we are close to full employment. In his words:

"... today we are back at full employment, or perhaps beyond it, ad economic growth kooks solid. The economy doesn't need fiscal stimulus."

Blinder one must note was strongly for hiking rates in the mid to late 1990s, when he was the vice chairperson at the Fed, exactly for the same reasons (see this old piece in The American Prospect).  So at least he is coherent. We cannot grow too fast, since that would cause inflation. And we have a tendency to be at full employment (note that a few years back almost everybody said full employment, the natural rate, was about 6%, not the 4% or so we have). But if he is coherent, he has also been almost always wrong.

And we are not at full employment. The employment-population ratio (seen below) has finally started to recover in the last three years, but it is still well below the peak before the recession, and the participation rate (not shown but available here) has been stagnant.

That means that too many people remain discouraged about the situation in the labor market, and that when we look at broader measures of unemployment that look at those marginally attached to the labor market the level of unemployment is closer to 8% (see here). And let's not forget that the last two decades saw an impressive decline in manufacturing jobs that reduced the availability of good jobs. So the issue is not just the number of jobs, but the quality of those. It should NOT be a surprise that Trump won in some Rust Belt states.

Dems, and their economists (like Blinder), should be more sensible about the need to create more jobs, and particularly good jobs if they want to regain the White House and Congress. I would suggest that austerity is a terrible strategy. This is what you should expect from the Progressive-Neoliberal branch of the party, as it was aptly called by Nancy Fraser.

Investment Rate, Growth and Accelerator Effect in the Supermultiplier Model: the case of Brazil

A new paper by Julia Braga, that she will present at the next Eastern Association Economic Meeting in Boston. From the abstract:

"This paper investigates the role of demand in the productive investment evolution in the Brazilian economy. First, it assesses the long-run relationship between investment rate and GDP growth, taking annual data since 1962 until 2015. We then construct a “Final Demand” index and estimate its impact on productive investment growth rate, taking quarterly data since 1996q1 until 2017q2, highlighting a shift in the aftermath of the 2008 world economic crisis. The results support two hypotheses of the Supermultiplier model of Freitas and Serrano (2015) and Serrano, Freitas and Behring (2017) for the Brazilian economy: 1) non-capacity creating expenditures lead productive investment; 2) there is a very slow adjustment of the investment rate to demand growth, as described by the flexible accelerator process."

Read full paper here.

Demand Drives Growth all the Way

New paper by Lance Taylor, Duncan Foley and Armon Rezai. From the abstract:

"A demand-driven alternative to the conventional Solow-Swan growth model is analyzed. Its medium run is built around Marx-Goodwin cycles of demand and distribution. Long-run income and wealth distributions follow rules of accumulation stated by Pasinetti in combination with a technical progress function for labor productivity growth incorporating a Kaldor effect and induced innovation. An explicit steady state solution is presented along with analysis of dynamics. When wage income of capitalist households is introduced, the Samuelson-Modigliani steady state “dual” to Pasinetti’s cannot be stable. Numerical simulation loosely based on US data suggests that the long-run growth rate is around two percent per year and that the capitalist share of wealth may rise from about forty to seventy percent due to positive medium-term feedback of higher wealth inequality into its own growth."

Read full paper here.

Godley-Tobin Lecture at the EEA in Boston

James k. Galbraith on inequality at the EEA in Boston. Don't miss it!

International Workshop on Demand-led Growth, Conflict Inflation, and Macro Policy

At my alma mater the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), to be co-sponsored by the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE). Call for papers to come soon in this channel. Stay tuned.

The slow recovery in historical perspective: 10 years after the Great Recession

It's hard to believe, but it has been almost a decade since the Great Recession. The official recession started in December 2017, but everybody remembers the collapse of Lehman in September of 2008. When you look at the recovery from the last recession in historical perspective, two things are clear. If you take GDP fall, or increase in unemployment, the Great Recession does not compare to the Great Depression, and that means that fiscal policy (automatic stabilizers and stimulus package) did work. The other is that 10 years into it, we are more or less were we where after 10 years of the Depression (which means the New Deal worked too, since the decline in GDP back then was much more pronounced, and recovery started in 1933).

But what I think is crucial, if one extends the historical data, is the effect of that crucial Keynesian experiment, World War II. Keynes was correct when he wrote in 1940 that: "It is, it seems, politically impossible for a capitalist democracy to organize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand experiments which would prove my case -- except in war conditions." And indeed, it seems very hard to see any circumstances that would push spending up to the extent needed to avoid the slow recovery to continue its course, and for 'secular stagnation' to prevail.

Actually if one looks at GDP per capita (per worker in fact), as The Economist (from last December, which was the inspiration for the graph above) does, then it seems that the New Deal/World-War-II policy experiment already looks better than the last decade.

And that is not considering that there seems to be a bubble in asset markets and the Fed is hiking rates (although I doubt that much). So things do not look particularly good.

The Latin American Crisis

Downhill

I have not written on the problems in the region for a while now (last stuff that is more comprehensive here in the talk at Keene, for example), in part, because the whole theme is a bit depressing (more recently the Honduras crisis, and the return of the right in Chile). As I have noted before, there is no doubt that the collapse of commodity prices has played a significant role in the downturn in the region, but it is also true that a lot of the problems are political in nature, and the resurgence of neoliberalism (with the support of the US, btw) has played a significant role too. In my view, the latter is far more relevant.

Two recent issues that I wanted to note, and that prompted my return to the issue of the crisis in the region. One is the downgrading of the Brazilian public debt by Standard & Poor's (I've written on credit rating agencies before here, and on the  previous downgrading of Brazil too). As I noted before, the Brazilian economy didn't face any significant fiscal or external problem. Figure below, from IMF WEO data, shows that the primary balances were actually positive until Dilma decided to cave and do a fiscal adjustment in 2015 (which did not save her from the coup, btw). And the external (current account) deficit was small, and manageable given the humongous external reserves and the great amount of global liquidity.

At any rate, why the new downgrading, you ask. The reason is to force the Brazilian government to push once again for pension reform. The whole point is that the crisis was caused to create the conditions for the dismantling of the old remnants of the very incomplete welfare state, if one can speak of one in Brazil, that survived the neoliberal onslaught of the 1990s under Fernando Henrique Cardoso. One should not minimize the importance of the soft power of US institutions, including the credit rating agencies, and how they can be used to promote certain political agendas.

The other issue is related to Venezuela (see my two previous posts here and here). I noted before that Venezuela's democracy (very problematic one, as I noted, before you complain; read the posts in the links please) is under attack, and that right wingers should not be seen as pushing for democracy against an authoritarian regime. That rhetoric, that still permeates most of the coverage in the US, is simply incorrect. I was somewhat shocked to read the recent op-ed by Ricardo Hausmann asking for military intervention by foreign powers (meaning the US). By the way, this comes from someone with the authority of being a Harvard professor (not that Harvard is supporting the coup, as far as I know). The role of the soft power of US institutions again.

If there were any doubts about their (right wingers that supported the 2002 coup) commitment to democracy I think this clears it up. I'll leave a discussion about the accuracy of the claim that elections have been rigged and the extent of the 'famine' for another post (something old on the latter here). I just wanted to note that here there is that step that is always there in the authoritarian argument about the justification for violence and the removal of the democratic institutions. Unacceptable.

On mainstream Keynesianism

Looking up to Galbraith

The ASSA Meeting was this last weekend in Philadelphia. It was the bomb... cyclone (Nate Cline's joke; I'm sure many others too came up with that one). I don't have much to report actually. I did participate in one section, and will post a link to a preliminary version of my paper soon. I was at the Economists for Peace and Security (EPS) dinner, that honored Jamie Galbraith. This blog was named Naked Keynesianism, as you may know, because years ago Fox News accused him of teaching naked Keynesianism, and I thought that was both funny and a reasonable name for the stuff I did.

Anwar Shaikh was at the dinner, and suggested that Jamie has one foot in each side of the heterodox/orthodox divide, as a result of his paternal influence (Richard Parker noted that as father/son duos come, the Galbraiths do much better than the Friedmans or Steins, and as well as the Gordons), and that for that reason at EPS (presided by Jamie for more than 20 years) we got accustomed to be less segregated from the rest of the profession. That seems about right.

And to prove Anwar right, Joseph Stiglitz was at hand to discuss Jamie's many achievements, and  the many battles, including the one on Greece's debt crisis, and that is far from over, that he fought with Jamie.* Yet, while on policy issues there have been many battles that reasonable, and progressive mainstream Keynesians have fought with heterodox economists (a topic discussed here before), there are important differences between heterodox Keynesians, and their mainstream counterparts. For example, check Stiglitz's new paper on the last issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy (OREP).

He acknowledges that: "the economy does not quickly return to full employment," and that "simple models have been constructed investigating how structural transformation can lead to a persistent high level of unemployment, and how, even then, standard Keynesian policies can restore full employment, but by contrast, increasing wage flexibility can increase unemployment." That is essentially correct, and I should add, that perhaps Stiglitz has gone further than most mainstream economists pushing the need for the limits of what he refers to as equilibrium models (mostly of the Monetarist and New Classical/RBC type). But essentially his critiques derive from information problems and limits to rationality, coming from behavioral economics insights.

I often think of Olivier Blanchard when I have to discuss the inability of reasonable mainstream Keynesians incapacity to break with old ways of thinking. Perhaps because of his role until recently at the IMF (now that role was taken over by Maurice Obstfeld). Blanchard tells us in his new paper in the same issue of OREP that: "current DSGE models are flawed, but they contain the right foundations and must be improved rather than discarded."

This is essentially the point of Blanchard's paper on the natural rate too. He essentially suggests that not only the natural rate hypothesis is theoretically reasonable, but that it is relevant for policy makers. Not surprisingly the IMF has not changed its views on macro policy that much (on that see my previous post and the several links to older stuff).

Of course Jamie long ago suggested that the the concept of the natural rate itself should be abandoned. And he did it in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, a journal that was supposed to showcase alternative views in pluralist fashion, but that has failed in being inclusive of heterodox traditions. The inability to ditch the natural rate, even in the face of the last financial crisis (and something that Keynes suggested in the GT) is the main persistent failure of the mainstream.

* Stiglitz acknowledged that Jamie has been studying inequality since before Piketty made it a fashionable topic.

The IMF and fiscal policy

This is a topic I discussed several times here (for example, here, here, here, here or here). Now there is a paper by Marc Lavoie (with co-author) in Intervention, on the same topic. The paper notes that: "There is a paper by Vernengo/Ford (2014) that covers some of the same ground. Their conclusion is that the 2008 crisis prompted only some cautious change in the views being entertained at the IMF" (my paper with Kirsten is here). Just to clarify, that's not exactly our point. The point we make is that while the research department has changed some of their views, without discarding the crucial concept of the natural rate of unemployment in their analytical framework, the policies pursued by the IMF changed very little indeed. So that there is a kind of double discourse. I referred to something like that within the mainstream of the profession as organized hypocrisy. Double discourse in theory, with no significant change in the theories that underlie the policy, and almost no change in policy.* At any rate, as anything that Marc writes this paper is worth your time and attention.

* In our intro we say: "It is concluded that even a most optimistic reading of IMF reports and country arrangements disappoints. The power structure ultimately remains the same: the Fund continues to be the mechanism through which creditor countries enforce contractionary policy on indebted countries." So, in our view, nothing really changed. more window dressing than anything else going on.

Review of Shaikh's Capitalism

woof, woof

I haven't posted in a while. As I noted before, it's harder to post new things after almost 7 years. Also, I've been both busy and not particularly fond of talking about economics (a certain degree of pessimism about the economy and the profession, I guess). But not yet ready to shut the blog down.

Anwar Shaikh was here at Bucknell and gave a lecture on his new book (Capitalism). Here a review by Susan K. Schroder, who was my micro TA back in graduate school a little more than 20 years ago.

"It has long been recognized that the state of economic theory, particularly modern macroeconomics, is in disarray. With the release of Capitalism: Competition, Conflict and Crises, Anwar Shaikh attempts to place the discipline on a more secure footing. Without doubt, this is a very large and complex book. This review essay hopes to assist readers in unlocking its insights.

Anwar Shaikh has been a Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research in New York for approximately 40 years. As a graduate student at Columbia University , he was stimulated by political and social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, and began his exploration of alternative approaches to understanding how capitalism functions. He has been particularly intrigued by the surplus approach to theories of value and distribution, especially those that are grounded in some form of a labor theory of value. The New School’s history of providing space to explore alternative, progressive approaches to a variety of disciplines has provided Shaikh with a natural home, encouraged by leading historians of econo mic thought and method, such as the late Robert Heilbroner and Adolph Lowe. Capitalism is the culmination of his life’s work, his magnum opus."

Read rest here.

PS: Anwar uses the term classical-Keynesianism, that I like and that I took from Heinrich Bortis's book Institutions, Behaviour and Economic Theory. There might be some differences on what exactly one means by classical political economy and Keynesianism, but there is a similar preoccupation, which I think is among the most important points of both books.

Hyperinflation and inequality

I'm still reading The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century, which is fun, well-written and in my view less controversial than what most reviews have suggested. Yes, inequality tends to fall mostly by violent means during periods of crisis. Note, also, that Walter Scheidel uses in this book the concept of surplus, and as noted earlier here (or here and here) before is part of this broader group of social scientists that still use the concepts of the old and forgotten classical political economists. There are significant advantages to this approach (see here, for example).

Having said there is an issue that is a bit annoying in the book, which is it simplistic Monetarist view of hyperinflation. For example, he says about the two world wars and the inter-war period that:

“These gargantuan struggles were for the most part funded by borrowing, printing money, and collecting taxes. Borrowing variously translated to future taxation to service public debt, inflation to erode it, or default. Only the leading Western powers successfully managed inflation...
... the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada were prepared to 'soak the rich,' whereas more autocratic systems such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia preferred to borrow or print money to sustain their war effort. The latter, however, later paid a high price through hyperinflation and revolution, shocks that likewise compressed inequality.”

There is no more detailed analysis, but one would infer from this that if the elites chose to print money to finance their war incurred fiscal deficits they ended up with hyperinflation. I have discussed hyperinflations before here (see also this one). Don't get me wrong, hyperinflations are destructive forces and certainly played a role in the Great Contraction (the inequality reducing forces that operated in this period, although I would put, as Scheidel seems to do also, more emphasis on the policy variables like New Deal kind of programs, taxation, land reform, etc). However, money supply was simply endogenous and had little impact on economies that were already in shambles. Inflation (hyper) resulted from the collapse of the economies and more often than not the pressing need for foreign currency that led to massive depreciation, and wage resistance.

You can read my paper on inflation and money here, if you're interested.

More on "Why Latin American Nations Fail"

Brief summary of the content of the book published in the newsletter of the World Economics Association.

Institutions are central to explaining the way in which, nations grow and develop. Traditionally the study of institutional economics focused on a very broad range of interests and made contributions in several different areas, including the structure of power relations, the beliefs systems, and also social norms of conduct. Contrarily the New Institutionalist turn in mainstream economics places the weight of its explanation on property rights.

Within the logical construct of neoclassical economic theory, the contribution of the New Institutional Economics is a necessity, basically because exchange and production in a market economy requires the prior definition of property rights (endowments and their distribution are part of the data jointly with technology and preferences that are needed to establish a market equilibrium). Because neoclassical theory is a-historical, the same framework derived from a priori reasoning must have universal validity and be applicable to any particular historical episode underscoring, in this way, the invariance of human behavior in space and over time. This dictates the New Institutionalist Economics´ approach to history which materializes in providing examples of hand-picked empirical evidence across different centuries, regions and countries and interpreting these as coherent with the deductive universal framework of neoclassical theory.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s influential book Why Nations Fail (2012) constitutes one of the most comprehensive and illustrative examples of this line of thought. Its authors argue that the economic failure or success of countries depends on whether these have inclusive or extractive political institutions. Inclusive political institutions are those that distribute power broadly, constrain arbitrary exercise, and make it harder to usurp power or set the basis for rent-seeking behavior. Inclusive political institutions require well defined and secure property rights. Extractive institutions have the opposite characteristics.

Why Latin American Nations Fail is in part a response to this New Institutionalist turn in mainstream economics focusing on the case of Latin America.

Read rest here.

Monitoring the evolution of Latin American economies using a flow-of-funds framework

New paper by Esteban Pérez. From the abstract:

Flow-of-funds accounting permit to monitor the financial sector in terms of flows and stocks and to analyze its relationship with the real sector. These show inter-sectoral financial flows, capture balance sheet positions and all financial transactions by instrument, type and economic sector. The construction of flow-of-funds accounts has been traditionally spearheaded by the central banks of developed nations including the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. In spite of its usefulness, flow-of-funds accounting has not experienced a parallel development for developing countries including for those of Latin American, In order to start filling this gap we undertook the construction of a data base of flow-of-funds account matrices for six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) that consider only flows for the period 1980-2015 using yearly and quarterly data when available. As a basis for comparison we also carried out the same exercise for four Asian countries (Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand). The construction of flow-of-funds account matrices follows the methodology proposed by Dawson (2004). In this paper we explain the methodology for the construction of flow-of-funds accounts and we exemplify their use for two source cases of study: the Mexican Crisis (1994-1995) and the Asian Crisis (1997-1998). Using similar sources of data, the same methodology and approach for the construction of all the flow-of-funds matrices allow comparisons among countries relating to the impact, manifestations of these crisis episodes and policy reactions to confront their effects. The use of homogeneous data and methodology also permits to trace contagion effects between countries.

Read full paper here.

The General Theory at 80: Reflections on the History and Enduring Relevance of Keynes’ Economics

New paper by Tom Palley. From the abstract:

This paper reflects on the history and enduring relevance of Keynes’ economics. Keynes unleashed a devastating critique of classical macroeconomics and introduced a new replacement schema that defines macroeconomics. The success of the Keynesian revolution triggered a counter-revolution that restored the classical tradition and now enforces a renewed classical monopoly. That monopoly has provided the intellectual foundations for neoliberalism which has produced economic and political conditions echoing the 1930s. Openness to Keynesian ideas seems to fluctuate with conditions, and current conditions are conducive to revival of the Keynesian revolution. However, a revival will have to overcome the renewed classical monopoly.

Read full paper here.

Why Latin American Nations Fail

Book has finally been published. I just got my copies. And yes it is a critique of New Institutionalist views and the title a play with Acemoglu and Robinson's book title. From the back cover.

"The question of development is a major topic in courses across the social sciences and history, particularly those focused on Latin America. Many scholars and instructors have tried to pinpoint, explain, and define the problem of underdevelopment in the region. With new ideas have come new strategies that by and large have failed to explain or reduce income disparity and relieve poverty in the region. Why Latin American Nations Fail brings together leading Latin Americanists from several disciplines to address the topic of how and why contemporary development strategies have failed to curb rampant poverty and underdevelopment throughout the region. Given the dramatic political turns in contemporary Latin America, this book offers a much-needed explanation and analysis of the factors that are key to making sense of development today."

You can get it here.

The Passage of Time, Capital, and Investment in Traditional and in Recent Neoclassical Value Theory

New paper by Fabio Petri published in Œconomia. From the abstract:

With the shift from traditional analyses where capital is a single value factor of variable ‘form’ to the neo-Walrasian versions, general equilibrium theory has encountered new problems pointed out by P. Garegnani (1976, 1990): impermanence problem, price-change problem, substitutability problem radically question the right to consider neo-Walrasian equilibria as approximating the actual path of real economies. The paper briefly summarizes these problems and then concentrates on a fourth problem, the savings-investment problem, arguing that neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory assumes that investment is adjusted to full-employment savings but cannot justify this assumption. The attempt to justify it in intertemporal general equilibrium through the tâtonnement is subjected to a new criticism: it is shown that the tâtonnement assumes Says’ Law all along the adjustments, and determines investment in a way that would crumble if it were not assumed that consumers determine their demands for consumption goods on the basis of an assumption of full employment incomes, which is not justified outside equilibrium, and was not assumed in traditional analyses. This reinforces the absence of reasons to view neo-Walrasian equilibrium paths as sufficiently approaching actual paths. It is concluded that behind the reference to intertemporal equilibrium as the microfoundation of macro analyses there is a continuing faith in traditional neoclassical time-consuming adjustment mechanisms, based on the old and untenable conception of capital that the shift to neo-Walrasian equilibria intended to do without.

Full paper available here.

On the jobs report at the Rick Smith Show

A bit old now. On the dismal report from the the first week of October, and Trumponomics in general.

Anwar Shaikh at Bucknell

Anwar will give a lecture at Bucknell next week (Thursday, October 12 at 4pm, in Academic West 112). Open to the public, and if you are in central PA you should NOT miss it up. Above a talk he gave last year at SOAS based on his recent book of the same title available here.

Masters & Sindicalists: Growth, Investment and Productivity in Argentina, from Perón to Kirchner

New paper published in Ensaios FEE. In all fairness, this was the paper that should have been published in 2013 in the volume organized by Ricardo Bielschowky and available here. But the revisions took longer than expected. It is in Portuguese, however. Below the English abstract.

This paper analyzes the three phases of Argentine economic development since the end of the 19th century, namely: the commodity export model, the period of state-led industrialization and the neoliberal reforms initiated in the 1970s, and complemented in the 1990s. The main argument is that the commodity export model had run its course, given the geopolitical changes in the world, and that the abandonment of the industrialization project had less to do with its own limitations, and more to do with the political implications of the model. In particular, the higher wages needed for mass consumption led to recurrent balance of payments problems, and a political backlash that made it ultimately unsustainable. The limits of the abandonment of the neoliberal project during the last commodity boom are briefly discussed.

Marx Capital turns 150

Marx's capital (Volume 1) was published September 14, 1867, exactly 150 years ago. Below a few links to posts on Marx written over the years.

What makes capitalism capitalism? (on the definitions of capitalism as a mode of production)

Sraffa and Marxism or the Labor Theory of Value, what is it good for? (on the labor theory of value)

Was Marx right? Nice of you to ask, but... (on common misconceptions about Marx)

A Note on the Concept of Vulgar Economics (an important idea, often neglected)

Garegnani on Sraffa, Ricardo and Marx (on the relation of Marx with classical economics)

The last Marxist? Or shortchanging Hobsbawm (a critique of The Economist's obituary)

And this one on why Marx and Keynes are essential for a coherent heterodox alternative to the mainstream:

The meaning of heterodox economics, and why it matters

Seminar in Mexico

The 8th international seminar on Coordination of Fiscal, Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Developing Countries at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán (UNAM-FES-Acatlán) will take place later this month. Ignácio Perrotini and I will give the opening talks the 26, and Ariel Dvoskin the following day. Many local economists will present too, like Flor Brown, Lilia Domínguez, Noemí Levy, Teresa López, and Luis Ángel Ortiz to name a few. Will post a link to the program soon.

ReOrient

A graph that shows, for a longer span, essentially the same information presented in Robert Allen's graph of manufacturing production, and discussed before here. It is evident that the rise of China (India is not quite yet visible, even if its share did increase) represents a certain rebalancing, which is inevitable as the income per capita grows in that country, even if it does not scape what mainstream economists refer to as the middle income trap. Source here, and the data is, as expected from Maddison.

Note that the first millennia, where Asia (China and India essentially) is much smaller in terms of the graph, which is a result of the paucity of data. In a sense, the graph shows the relatively brief rise, and now relative decline of Western GDP dominance, as Asia regains a space more proportional to its population share.

PS: On issues with GDP measures see here.

Sunday Reading: Economic Letters of Note

Rick Holt edited a superb book with John Kenneth Galbraith's letters from the 1930s until his death in 2006. He wrote to everybody, friend and foe, and displays his usual wit. Here I reproduce parts of his letter to Joan Robinson, that he wrote after having invited her to give the Ely Lecture (subscription required).

The letter is from January 12, 1972. It says:

Dear Joan:

Many thanks for your note. If the meetings were slightly less stuffy and neoclassical than usual, it was owing more to you than to anyone else...

The president of the Association, as I think I said once in New Orleans, has powers closely paralleling the President of Italy, but perhaps less. Indeed this is the way in which all establishments maintain themselves. One diffuses power through people who are reliably like of mind. But I hope to have some slight influence on the Journals, and I'm going to make a particularly determined effort to revise hiring practices in the profession... A good deal has been done in the past couple of years to put the problems of the black and Spanish-speaking minorities on the professional conscience. Discrimination against women remains in some degree the most blatant.

Would you... write me a little more complete observation and complaint... Sometimes the knowledge of an unsatisfied clientele produces some results.

Love, 

John Kenneth Galbraith

I was lucky to see Galbraith give a talk (subscription required) at the New School back in November 1998. Great book. Buy two copies!